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In Greek mythology, one of the three monstrous sisters, Stheno, Eurale 
and Medusa; daughters of Ceto and Phorcus. Their hair was a cluster of 
writhing snakes, and their faces were so hideous that all who saw them 
were turned to stone
1. 
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Abstract 
Sustainability assessment is emerging as a form of impact assessment with the 
concept of sustainability at its heart. This thesis contributes to the process of theory-
building for sustainability assessment through an exploration of the development of 
this policy tool within the Western Australian context. Through an analysis of the 
sustainability assessments of the Gorgon gas development on Barrow Island and the 
South West Yarragadee water supply development, and a process of personal 
reflection, I explore the potential of sustainability assessment to contribute to a more 
sustainable society by facilitating learning.  
While the focus of traditional forms of impact assessment has typically been 
‘exterior’ forms of knowledge and learning relating to the potential impacts of a 
proposal, or to process methodologies and governance arrangements, in this thesis I 
argue that sustainability assessment processes should also facilitate ‘interior’ forms 
of learning that excavate and challenge underpinning assumptions about the 
organisation of society, including shared discourses and storylines, as well as 
personal views and beliefs.  
To achieve this aim, I maintain that sustainability assessment should be a proactive 
process that is integrated with the proposal development, framed by an open question 
and guided by a ‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ that operationalises 
sustainability for the decision at hand. It should be guided by a structured process 
framework that assures attention is given to issues that might otherwise be neglected. 
Each step of the process framework should represent a space for inclusive 
deliberation, with the concept of sustainability itself acting as a catalyst for learning 
and reflexivity. 
Located within the institutions of modern industrial society, deliberative 
sustainability assessment processes can contribute to the emergence of an 'integral 
sustainability' that embraces and reconnects the interior and exterior, collective and 
individual dimensions of policy-making and of society in general. The influence of 
sustainability assessment can thus extend beyond the immediate decision at hand to 
contribute to a momentum for societal change towards a more sustainable future.   
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Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
1.1  Introduction 
This thesis is about learning, focusing specifically on learning within a policy 
context about sustainability. It recounts the story of policy learning and sustainability 
in Western Australia during the period 2002-2006, when a ‘learning by doing’ 
approach to sustainability assessment was adopted by the State Government. It has 
been suggested that “in those cases where no regulations have been formulated in the 
area in question, there is obviously greater room for the advancement of social 
learning” (Glasbergen, 1996, p191). This has been confirmed in Western Australia, 
where the commitment to undertake sustainability assessment in advance of any 
legislative or institutional reform has provided space for the creativity, 
experimentation and reflection with which this research is concerned. The primary 
purpose of this thesis is to contribute not only to learning about sustainability 
assessment in Western Australia, but more generally to the process of theory-
building for sustainability assessment that extends beyond these jurisdictional 
bounds.  
Through my research process I have been actively and practically involved in the 
collective Western Australian journey. I have contributed to sustainability 
assessment case studies, assisted in the development of public and corporate policies 
and frameworks for sustainability assessment, and engaged with an international 
audience, with whom I shared our stories and from whom I brought back new ideas. 
This thesis therefore also tells the story of my personal journey as a researcher and 
an advocate for sustainability assessment over this period. 
In this introductory chapter, I begin by describing the background to the research and 
its nature and purpose, leading into an articulation of my research questions. I then 
introduce the three concepts that lie at the heart of the study: sustainability, 
sustainability assessment and policy learning, before anchoring my study firmly 
within the context of Western Australia. This is followed by a brief introduction to 
the two case studies through which these concepts are explored. After explaining the 
methodological approach, I conclude by providing a map through the various 
dimensions of my journey in the form of an overview of the thesis structure. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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1.2  Positioning the research 
My research journey commenced in mid-2002, when a State Sustainability Strategy 
for Western Australia was in preparation, sustainability was the dominant discourse 
in local politics and also increasingly within the business community, and 
sustainability assessment was emerging as one of the most promising tools by which 
the State’s sustainability goals might be achieved. This context has shaped the nature 
and aims of the research.  
The research is grounded in two case studies of sustainability assessments of large-
scale projects conducted by the Government of Western Australia during the period 
of the research. The first of these, the integrated strategic assessment of the Gorgon 
gas development, provided the original raison d’être for the research, the title of the 
thesis, and an important opportunity to learn about how sustainability assessment 
might be conducted in Western Australia. The second, the sustainability evaluation 
of the South West Yarragadee (SWY) water supply development, built upon the 
lessons learnt from Gorgon and also generated new insights into the potential of 
sustainability assessment as a tool for sustainability. Together they have not only 
provided the empirical data but have shaped the research process and given form to 
this thesis. 
1.2.1 The aims of the research 
Its practical orientation notwithstanding, the purpose of my research extends beyond 
reflections upon empirical practice and seeks to contribute to theory-building for 
sustainability assessment. It is thus located at the nexus of theory and practice, which 
is entirely appropriate, since theory is not an end-point in itself. The ultimate goal of 
theory-building is improved practice, and in the case of sustainability assessment, 
improved sustainability outcomes. Impact assessment theorist David Lawrence 
(1997, p81) describes the contribution of theory towards these ends when he states, 
“Theory explains, guides, and enhances understanding. It analyses, subdivides, 
connects, and recreates objects, concepts, experiences, knowledge, and actions in 
different ways”.  
Theory-building involves going beyond what might be called the ‘technological 
aspects’ of sustainability assessment, that is “the more or less concrete tasks and Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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routines which make up the world of practitioners” (Power, 1997, p6) that are only a 
small part of the story (Power, 1997; Rose & Miller, 1992). Of more influence and 
interest are the normative dimensions, which relate to “the ideas and concepts which 
shape the mission of the practice and which, crucially, attach the practice to the 
broader…..political sphere” (Power, 1997, p6). In relation to this point Friedmann 
(1998, p250) invokes Schön (1983), who shows that “practitioners constantly work 
with theoretical assumptions, and it is the theorists’ job to make these assumptions 
visible and thus to help practitioners reflect on them”. My role as a researcher of 
sustainability assessment is therefore to make the links between theory and practice. 
I echo the sentiments of Michael Power (1997, pxii) in his book The Audit Society, 
when he says:  
I am probably condemning myself to criticism from self-styled practical men and women 
as well as high theorists. But I hope that the text will appeal to both groups, offering the 
former occasion to reflect on that which they have always regarded as most concrete and 
secure, and providing the latter with an example of theorising close up.  
My target audience similarly has two groups: the practitioner of sustainability 
assessment, and particularly the practitioner seeking to understanding the wider 
meaning of his or her work, rather than the one merely looking for an instrumental 
approach to better practice; and the small but growing group of impact assessment 
theorists.  
It has been noted that impact assessment in general is under-theorised. There has 
been a tendency amongst those contributing to the literature to focus on 
methodological improvements rather than to engage with the conceptual foundations 
of practice, which in turn has been to the detriment of practice and its substantive 
outcomes (Bina, in press; Lawrence, 1997). Cashmore (2004, p420) argues for such 
conceptual engagement, since “it might be possible to bypass the current norms of 
small, incremental advances in [environmental impact assessment] and realise more 
radical improvements in effects and effectiveness by focusing on the fundamental 
theoretical premises on which this decision tool is based”.  
The need for theory building is further heightened by the rapid emergence 
internationally of sustainability assessment as a new generation of impact assessment Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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(Sadler, 1999). Sustainability assessment arises at the nexus between more 
established forms of impact assessment, such as environmental impact assessment 
(EIA), strategic environmental assessment (SEA) and social impact assessment, and 
the complex and ambiguous concept of sustainability itself. This thesis explores this 
coupling in the context of Western Australia. It then draws upon the understanding 
gained in this specific setting to contribute to more general theory-building for 
sustainability assessment in a way that makes this research relevant to an 
international audience. There are many different ways in which theory can be 
categorised, but sufficient for my purposes is the distinction between explanatory 
theory, and normative or prescriptive theory (Friedmann, 1998). This thesis seeks to 
contribute to both of these forms of theory; my concern is to describe and explain the 
Gorgon case study and then to draw from this to develop a normative theory of how 
sustainability assessment might be conducted to be an effective tool for 
sustainability. 
Cashmore (2004) asserts that the starting point for developing a theory of impact 
assessment should be a clear articulation of its substantive purpose, supported by an 
understanding of the causal mechanisms that might contribute to this purpose. Only 
when these dimensions are articulated can effective procedures towards their 
attainment be established. My starting position is that the substantive purpose of 
sustainability assessment must be to contribute to sustainability. From this basis my 
two research questions are therefore: 
•  How can sustainability assessment contribute to sustainability?  
•  How should sustainability assessment be conducted to maximise this 
contribution? 
1.2.2 The nature of the research 
The theoretical starting point for my research is the impact assessment literature. 
Although it can be argued that sustainability assessment has many roots (Gibson, 
2001), most contributions to the topic are located within the field of impact 
assessment, of which sustainability assessment is considered one form. Upon 
reaching the limits of the explanatory power of this somewhat ‘technological’ 
literature, with its focus on methods and techniques, I relocate the practice of Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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sustainability within its political or normative context by drawing on contributions to 
the broader policy literature. Other ideas that originate in sociology, psychology and 
philosophy, and which have often been previously translated by policy theorists for 
the purposes of overcoming the inherent limits of their own field, are also employed. 
In addition, I have introduced a heuristic model from integral theory (Wilber, 1995, 
2000) that provides the conceptual framework for my argument.  
My research is grounded in empirical practice, and specifically the Gorgon and SWY 
sustainability assessments conducted by the Government of Western Australia over 
the period 2002-2006, and thus meaning and theory have emerged from practice. As 
a ‘reflective practitioner’, in the manner of Schön (1983), who has been actively 
involved in both of the case studies and as a member of the informal ‘sustainability 
assessment learning community’
1 that has developed in Western Australia, I have 
contributed, along with others, to the evolution of sustainability assessment in 
Western Australia.  
This thesis is highly personal: firstly, since “[a]ll theory is personal, because it is 
infused with the experience of the person who formulated it” (Lawrence, 1997, p90) 
and secondly, because  it tells the story of my personal learning and reflexivity. 
Reflexivity in this sense means “interpreting one’s own interpretations, looking at 
one’s own perspectives from other perspectives, and turning a self-critical eye onto 
one’s own authority as interpreter and author” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000, pvii). 
Trained as a chemical engineer, I was working as an environmental management 
consultant to industrial clients when I commenced my research in 2002. The thesis 
documents my own journey of excavating and challenging the assumptions that I 
brought to my research, leading eventually to an entirely reformed conceptualisation 
of sustainability assessment and sustainability itself.  
                                                         
1 I use Kingdon’s (1995) terminology to refer here to a group of people from government, academia, 
consultancy and industry that have come together on various occasions in different combinations to 
discuss the practice of sustainability assessment. As well as innumerable informal discussions and the 
Sustainability Assessment Working Group (see Chapter 2), significant workshops were held in 
September 2004 and August 2005, convened respectively by Government and myself in conjunction 
with two colleagues. Two roundtable discussions, to which members of the learning community were 
invited, were held at Murdoch University in 2004 and 2005, with visiting specialists in the field. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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1.3  Three important concepts 
Three concepts are at the heart of my research: the discourse of sustainability, the 
theory and practice of sustainability assessment, and the notion of policy learning. I 
briefly introduce each of these here. 
1.3.1 Sustainability 
Sustainability, or sustainable development, has become the dominant discourse of 
environmental politics at the international level. This trend is generally traced to 
1987 and the Brundtland Commission report Our Common Future, which defined 
sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
As Davison argues (2001, p12), “The language of sustainable development has 
guided environmental issues from the margins towards the core of political debate”, 
and most commentators agree that this is a positive thing. For example, Fischer and 
Hajer (1999, p2), while acknowledging its limitations, concede that “[t]he concept of 
sustainable development should be credited with providing the ‘generative 
metaphor’ – or storyline – around which different key economic and environmental 
interests could converge”.  
Chapter 7 is devoted to tracing the evolution of the sustainability discourse, 
exploring the tensions within it, and considering how the discourse relates to the 
practice of sustainability assessment. The important points here are that 
sustainability is a highly contested concept, and arguably the greatest divide is 
between those who place environmental concerns at its heart and those who focus 
more upon socio-economic development. The former tend to consider sustainability 
as a call for social change, while the latter, particularly the business sector, interpret 
it as ‘business as usual with a bit more care’.  
Although Western Australia has followed the common model of conceptualising 
sustainability as three inter-related ‘pillars’ representing environmental, social and 
economic considerations, with an emphasis on seeking means by which the three can 
be integrated (Government of Western Australia, 2003b), I will argue in Chapter 7 Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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that the transformative potential of the sustainability discourse lies in its inherent 
ambiguity, which resists such attempts at rationalisation.  
1.3.2 Sustainability assessment 
Sustainability assessment has been broadly defined as a process that seeks to identify 
the future consequences of a proposed action in a manner that directs planning and 
decision-making towards sustainability
2. The form of sustainability assessment with 
which I am concerned is thus conducted prior to the implementation of a proposal or 
action, in contrast with assessments that seek to determine the ‘state of 
sustainability’ in a particular area and which are monitoring tools. Sustainability 
assessment is not a technique, but rather an orientation of practice.  
Sustainability considerations have been incorporated into many different decision- 
making processes in various contexts (Gibson et al., 2005). Environmental 
assessment, however, has arguably been the most natural fit and impact assessment 
practitioners have largely developed the literature on sustainability assessment (Rees, 
1988). Gibson et al. (2005, p15) say of environmental assessment and sustainability:  
The two grew up in the same large neighbourhood, facing similar challenges and learning 
similar lessons. It is hardly surprising that they should fit well together. 
Gibson (2001, p18) notes that environmental assessment has gradually evolved 
towards being:  
•  Conducted earlier in planning (beginning with purposes and broad 
alternatives); 
•  More participative (involving not just proponents, government officials and 
technical experts but also affected and concerned citizens, citizen organizations 
and other stakeholders); 
•  More comprehensive (covering the social, economic and cultural as well as 
biophysical environment, distant as well as local effects, cumulative as well as 
immediate effects, positive as well as negative effects, and strategic as well as 
project level undertakings); 
                                                         
2 This definition is derived from one suggested by Theo Hacking from Cambridge University (pers. 
comms). However, I will argue in this thesis that the potential influence of sustainability assessment 
extends beyond the boundaries of specific planning decisions. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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•  More integrative (considering systemic effects rather than just individual 
impacts); 
•  More cautious (recognizing and addressing uncertainties, applying the 
precautionary principle); and  
•  More demanding (seeking most desirable alternatives rather than just 
individually “acceptable” undertakings).  
The sustainability assessment literature reveals an astonishing array of approaches to 
practice and very little consensus on any aspect of it (see for example Dalal-Clayton 
& Sadler, 2005). Since I commenced my research, this situation has improved 
somewhat (see for example Gibson et al., 2005), but there remains much to be done. 
It can also be argued that there has been some benefit in the lack of definition and 
the vagueness surrounding the notion of sustainability assessment. Power (1997, p6) 
says of auditing, which is similarly undefined, “[I]t is precisely this fuzziness in the 
idea of auditing that allows its migration and importation into a wide variety of 
organizational contexts”. In Western Australia, sustainability assessment processes 
have been specifically developed around existing EIA processes, which are 
described in more detail in Section 1.4. My approach has therefore been, at least 
initially, to take an impact assessment perspective on sustainability assessment.  
1.3.3 Policy learning 
Learning is an important theme of my research, since it was prompted by a desire to 
contribute to the Western Australian Government’s ‘learning by doing’ approach to 
implementing sustainability assessment. Learning in a policy context has many 
dimensions and takes many forms (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), which unfold 
throughout this thesis. It is sufficient at this point to define policy learning as “a 
process in which individuals apply new information and ideas to policy decisions” 
(Busenberg, 2001, p173). The type of learning that was most obvious and significant 
at the commencement of my research was a specific form of ‘technical’ learning that 
focuses on ‘how to’ conduct sustainability assessment. The research, however, goes 
on to embrace other forms of learning that have sometimes been called ‘conceptual’ 
and ‘social’ learning (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2004). I develop a framework in Chapter 
6 within which these other, potentially far more powerful, forms of learning might be 
understood. Although policy learning often operates collectively, since a policy Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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community evolves together, I have also alluded to my own process of personal 
learning and reflexivity within the collective experience.  
1.4  The Western Australian context 
My purpose in this section is to set the scene for the case studies that are the 
empirical basis of this research. I describe the cultural context in which they took 
place, that not only provided the backdrop for these case studies but also shaped, 
framed and formed them (Bryson & Bromily, 1993). This is important, since context 
is “the frame of reference that makes understanding possible” (Lawrence, 1997, 
p93), and therefore the lessons drawn from our experiences and their meaning cannot 
simply be transposed without understanding the context in which they were learnt 
(Marsden, 1998).  
Context is a function of place, where place is (Healey, de Magalhaes, Madanipour, & 
Pendlebury, 2003, p62): 
understood as more than a physical locale or collection of assets to be positioned in a new 
geography of competing places. It refers to the congelation of meanings and experiences 
which accumulate around locales through the daily life experience of people living their 
lives and firms conducting their activities
3.  
Aspects of context relevant to sustainability assessment include the formal 
institutional and legislative arrangements within a particular jurisdiction, previous 
decisions that influence the way in which an assessment is framed, and also the 
physical, social, cultural, political and economic perspectives that define and shape 
how a place functions (Brown & Thérivel, 2000; O'Riordan & Sewell, 1981). 
Furthermore, these aspects of context are so interrelated that they become 
indistinguishable (Christoff, 1996); as Harvey (1993, p23) says, “[T]he cultural 
politics of places, the political economy of their development, and the accumulation 
of a sense of social power in place frequently fuse in indistinguishable ways”. 
Context is not something frozen into a ‘static entity’. In reality, it is “emergent, 
variable and highly elastic”, notwithstanding that it must be “stopped in its tracks” at 
certain points to permit description and analysis (Holstein & Gumbrium, 2004, 
                                                         
3 Flyvbjerg (2004b, p298) cites MacIntyre (1984, p216) to articulate the same point slightly 
differently, “I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of 
what story or stories do I find myself a part?’”. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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p309). Context, both fixed and flexible, is central to this thesis. Some important 
general aspects of the Western Australian context are described in the following 
sections.  
1.4.1 Western Australia, its economy and its policy culture 
Western Australia is the largest of the six states and two territories that comprise the 
Commonwealth of Australia. It is vast, sparsely populated, and rich in mineral 
resources, the extraction of which powers its economy. With only 10 per cent of the 
country’s population, Western Australia is Australia’s foremost export State, 
generating A$36.7 billion in total goods and services exports in 2003/04 or 26 per 
cent of Australia's total goods and services exports. One in five workers in Western 
Australia is employed directly or indirectly in the mining or petroleum industries 
(Government of Western Australia, 2002b).  
Despite the economic significance of the resource sector, which makes it of 
paramount importance to the State, there is a dearth of formal policy statements 
relating to it. In Western Australia, resource development is therefore an example of 
what has been called a ‘quasi-policy’, whereby “governments may have a wide 
variety of actions, past and present, within a given policy area, without necessarily 
having adopted consciously an over-all set of goals” (Simeon, 1976, p557). Western 
Australia offers a prime example of what Howitt (1995, p390) means when he says, 
“Within the conventional political arena, government policies assume that industrial 
expansion is development, and therefore unquestionably desirable”. 
Western Australia is also extremely remote, with its capital city, Perth, the most 
isolated capital city in the world and located 4000 kilometres from the seat of the 
Australian federal government in Canberra. Perhaps due to this ‘separateness’, 
Western Australians see themselves as independent and innovative, having a healthy 
scepticism for over-regulation that could constrain their entrepreneurial spirit. 
Furthermore, with approximately 80 per cent of its population living in Perth, 
Western Australian society is predominantly urban.  
Given these physical and cultural characteristics, it is unsurprising that economic and 
land use planning processes in Western Australia are far less complex and less 
developed than in some other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and other Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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parts of Western Europe. Development has been driven less by planning than by 
huge development projects, often located in remote areas of the State and 
considerable distances from population centres. It is important to note that these 
areas remain essentially pristine environments about which little is often known
4. It 
is, therefore, perhaps appropriate that sustainability assessment processes have been 
applied first to the approval of new projects, rather than to plans and programmes, as 
has been the case with sustainability appraisal in the UK. Sustainability assessment 
in Western Australia builds upon a strong culture of project EIA, as discussed further 
in Section 1.4.4. 
1.4.2 Sustainability in Western Australia 
The incumbent Labor Government of Western Australia came to power in February 
2001 on the back of an election campaign fought largely on environmental issues. 
The particular focus was the matter of the logging of old growth forests in the South 
West of the State. This issue had engaged sectors of the community not normally 
given to environmental protest, resulting in ‘men and women in suits’ marching on 
Parliament House calling for the practice to cease (Hillier, 2000).  
The Labor Party’s environmental campaign platform was strongly worded, and 
included commitments to the establishment of a Sustainability Policy Unit (SPU) 
within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC), and the development of a 
sustainability strategy for the State (Australian Labor Party Western Australian 
Branch, 2001). The new government, under the State Premier Geoff Gallop, quickly 
adopted the language of sustainability as an overarching framework for their vision 
for Western Australia. 
Professor Peter Newman of Murdoch University, a long-time campaigner on 
environmental and sustainability issues, particularly those relating to urban 
development, was invited to become Director of the new SPU. His task over the 
three years from 2001 to 2003 was to co-ordinate the development of the Western 
Australian State Sustainability Strategy. Representatives of many sectors of the 
community, including business, government agencies, non-government 
                                                         
4 Environmental studies in these remote areas are often only conducted in response to the 
development proposal through the EIA process (see Chapter 6). Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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organisations, community groups and the universities, engaged actively in the 
process. They attended seminars and workshops, wrote background papers and case 
studies, and made formal submissions responding to the draft strategy. This was a 
time of great energy and enthusiasm, and the resulting State Sustainability Strategy 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003b) changed the language of policy in 
Western Australia
5. 
1.4.3 Drivers for sustainability assessment 
The need for processes to review the broad sustainability implications of proposals in 
an integrated way was recognised in both the State Sustainability Strategy 
(Government of Western Australia, 2002a, 2003b) and the Review of the Project 
Development Approvals System, known as the Keating Review (Government of 
Western Australia, 2002b). In addition to a long list of recommendations aimed at 
streamlining the project approvals system for the benefit of proponents, the Keating 
Review made several recommendations relating to sustainability assessment. These 
included requirements for sustainability statements to be prepared as part of the 
development application process, and for major projects to be assessed by 
Government within a sustainability context (Government of Western Australia, 
2002b).  
The State Sustainability Strategy incorporated the Keating Review recommendations 
with respect to the sustainability assessment of ‘complex and strategic projects’. 
Vision for the Future: The Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy 
Consultation Draft, which was released in September 2002, recognised the need for 
sustainability assessment processes to integrate the environmental, social and 
economic aspects of decision-making and minimise trade-offs between these 
considerations (Government of Western Australia 2002a). The final strategy, Hope 
for the Future: The Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy released in 
September 2003, calls for sustainability assessment to be applied to all forms of 
government decisions, including policies, plans, programmes, Cabinet submissions, 
                                                         
5 Much of this work remains on the website: www.sustainability.dpc.wa.gov.au.  Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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government department corporate plans and legislation, as well as to complex and 
strategic projects of State significance (Government of Western Australia, 2003b)
6. 
There is currently no established process or supporting legislative framework in 
Western Australia that enables the sustainability assessment of project proposals. In 
both Gorgon and South West Yarragadee cases, ad hoc processes were developed 
around existing, statutory environmental assessment processes in order to address 
current institutional shortcomings. The regulatory frameworks for environmental 
assessment are discussed in the following section, while the specifics of the two case 
studies can be found in Chapters 3 and 6 respectively. 
1.4.4 Institutional and regulatory arrangements 
Western Australia has a strong tradition of EIA, enabled by the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 under which an independent statutory body, the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA), provides advice to the Minister for the Environment as 
to the environmental acceptability of project proposals assessed under Part IV of the 
Act. As has been described elsewhere (Bache, Bailey, & Evans, 1996), however, the 
EPA is limited in its ability to address the full scope of social and economic 
considerations that sustainability assessment requires. The potential for the EIA 
process to evolve without legislative amendment to encompass broader strategic and 
social considerations was effectively curtailed by a Supreme Court decision in 1996, 
which found that the EPA could not include economic and social considerations in 
its advice to the Minister for the Environment (Coastal Waters Alliance of Australia 
Inc v Environmental Protection Authority and another (1996) 90 LGRA 136).  
Section 16e of the Environmental Protection Act 1986 allows the EPA to provide 
environmental advice to the Minister for the Environment on strategic matters, but 
the scope of this advice is similarly limited by the Supreme Court ruling. 
Furthermore, while the EIA process is rigorous and well defined by the Act and its 
supporting Administrative Procedures (Environmental Protection Authority, 2002), 
there is no equivalent strategic environmental assessment process underpinning the 
                                                         
6 Interestingly, the final version of the Strategy contained considerably less detail about sustainability 
assessment processes than did the draft. This was a result of the recognition by Government of the 
need for further thought on the subject, including reflection on the Gorgon assessment process (see 
Chapter 4), prior to making commitments as to the form sustainability assessment should take.  Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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provision of any strategic advice under Section16e and there are no provisions for 
the establishment of conditions on the proponent as a result of the strategic 
assessment. 
Infrastructure projects undertaken in Australia with potential impacts on ‘matters of 
national environmental significance’ also fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth of Australia’s Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), which includes provisions for both strategic 
environmental assessment and EIA. A bilateral agreement has now been negotiated 
between the State and Commonwealth Governments to accredit certain levels of EIA 
in Western Australia under the EPBC Act to limit the potential for projects to require 
assessment under both Acts.  
There remain no formal processes for conducting either social or economic impact 
assessments of proposals in Western Australia, and capabilities in these areas remain 
under-developed within the Western Australian bureaucracy
7. This means that, until 
the advent of sustainability assessment, the perceived social and economic 
implications of project proposals have only been considered ‘behind closed doors’ at 
the point of the political approval decision. Unsurprisingly, given this somewhat 
lopsided situation, the Environmental Protection Act 1986 has formed the 
centrepiece of each of the case study assessments
8. 
1.5  Case studies: The empirical base 
The two case studies with which this research is concerned, the integrated, strategic 
assessment of the proposed Gorgon gas development on Barrow Island (Gorgon), 
and the sustainability evaluation of the South West Yarragadee (SWY) water supply 
development, represent the first two attempts within Western Australia to apply 
sustainability assessment concepts to complex and strategic projects and to integrate 
                                                         
7 For a short period in the 1990s, a social impact assessment unit located in a government agency 
provided advice on the social implications of projects; however this expertise was essentially lost 
when the unit was disbanded. 
8 The South West Yarragadee (SWY) proposal was assessed under Part IV, with the Gorgon 
assessment being conducted under Section 16(e). In the Gorgon case, however, the Part IV EIA 
methodology was applied in the provision of the strategic advice (see Chapter 3). Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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environmental, social and economic (ESE) considerations. They provide, therefore, 
the logical and appropriate choice for the empirical basis of my research
9.  
Each case study was part of a larger assessment and decision-making process. In the 
case of Gorgon, the integrated, strategic assessment was followed by a statutory 
project-level EIA process that does not form part of my scope
10. In the case of the 
SWY, the ‘sustainability evaluation’ that is my main focus is a proponent-driven 
process that precedes a regulatory ‘sustainability assessment’, which is in its early 
stages at the time of writing in October 2006. It is, therefore, also outside my scope 
although I do discuss the nexus between these two processes in Chapter 6. For 
simplicity, however, I refer to the case studies as the ‘Gorgon ESE process’ or the 
‘Gorgon assessment’, and the ‘SWY assessment’ respectively. The locations of the 
respective projects are shown in Figure 1.1.  
1.5.1 The Gorgon gas development on Barrow Island  
The integrated, strategic assessment of the proposed Gorgon gas development on 
Barrow Island (2002-2003) was conducted in response to a request by the Gorgon 
Joint Venture (JV), headed by ChevronTexaco, to develop the Gorgon gasfields off 
the coast of Western Australia and process the gas on Barrow Island. In broad terms, 
the ‘question’ addressed by the Gorgon assessment was, “Are the potential impacts 
of constructing a gas processing plant on Barrow Island acceptable?”  
This question would typically have been addressed through the statutory EIA 
process, and therefore the only grounds for not proceeding would be the risk of 
significant environmental harm. The situation in this case, however, was complicated 
because Barrow Island has been classified as an A Class Nature Reserve since 1910 
by virtue of its significant conservation values, and industrial development on the 
island would clearly contravene the pre-election platform of the incumbent Labor 
Government. Furthermore, the island has also supported a small operating oilfield 
since 1967, which is now managed by ChevronTexaco, the major partner in the 
Gorgon JV (Pope, 2003b). 
                                                         
9 A third sustainability assessment of the proposed Fremantle Outer Harbour development has 
subsequently been conducted by the Western Australian Government (Pope & Grace, 2006). 
10 Since its scope is limited to environmental impacts only, while my interest was in the sustainability-
oriented strategic-level assessment. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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Fig 1.1: Location of case study projects in Western Australia 
In response to the proponent’s request, the Government of Western Australia 
determined that a high level economic, social and environmental (ESE) evaluation
11 
                                                         
11 The Gorgon assessment was deliberately not termed a ‘sustainability assessment’, since it was 
recognised that although it would be a useful trial for the concept it should not necessarily become a 
model for future sustainability assessment processes (Pope et al., 2005).  Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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of the broad development plan
12 was required to allow it to make an informed 
decision on whether to reject it or to provide ‘in principle’ approval for the use of 
Barrow Island. The proponent was also required to demonstrate ‘net conservation 
benefits’ (NCBs) arising from the development as a contribution to sustainability
13.  
The assessment process was managed by the Department of Industry and Resources 
(DoIR) on behalf of a committee of government agency Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs), with the support of a Reference Group comprised of officer-level 
representatives from these agencies. The assessment process was based upon the EIA 
process in Western Australia, with an Expert Panel of consultants undertaking the 
social, economic and strategic assessment alongside the environmental assessment 
conducted by the EPA. The Western Australian Cabinet was the final decision-maker 
in this case. The Gorgon assessment process is the subject of Chapter 3. 
1.5.2 The South West Yarragadee water supply development  
The proponent in this case is the Water Corporation of Western Australia, the 
government-owned water utility, which is seeking approval to extract 45 gigalitres 
per year (GL/yr) of groundwater from the Yarragadee Formation aquifers in the 
South West of Western Australia, some 300 km south of Perth. The water is 
proposed for delivery to the Integrated Water Supply Scheme (IWSS) that services 
Perth together with some of the agricultural and goldfields districts of Western 
Australia (Strategen, 2006b). The sustainability assessment of the South West 
Yarragadee water supply development was designed to address two questions, 
firstly, “Is the proposal to extract 45 GL/year from the Yarragadee Formation 
aquifers acceptable?” and secondly, “What is the most sustainable way of developing 
the aquifer?”  
The SWY is one of a number of potential water supply strategies maintained by the 
Water Corporation in accordance with its ‘security through diversity’ policy. From 
the proponent’s perspective, and as reflected by the first of these questions, the 
primary aim of the sustainability assessment was to determine whether or not the 
                                                         
12 A detailed project proposal had not yet been finalised, and therefore the assessment was conducted 
on a ‘development plan’ based upon a ‘reference case’ of a gas processing facility initially producing 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) for the international market. For this reason, the assessment was 
considered to be strategic rather than project-level. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
13 This requirement was documented in a letter from the Minister for State Development in November 
2001 (see Chapter 3). Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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SWY could be developed as a water supply. The second question reflects the second 
aim of the assessment process, which was to develop the details of the proposal to be 
as ‘sustainable’ as possible. The proposal is controversial, since it is perceived by 
some sectors of the community, particularly in the South West, as an immoral 
appropriation of South West regional water for the benefit of city customers
14. It was 
particularly important, therefore, that the assessment be conducted in collaboration 
with the community and within a sustainability context. A Community Reference 
Group (CRG) was thus formed and a Sustainability Panel was established as an 
independent body to provide integrated sustainability advice to the Government and, 
as appropriate, to the proponent at various stages of the sustainability assessment 
process (Strategen, 2006b). 
The sustainability assessment commenced when the proposal was still in a 
conceptual stage
15 and applied an iterative approach to refining the proposal. It was 
conducted by Water Corporation and its consultants, Strategen, in collaboration with 
the CRG and the Sustainability Panel. At the conclusion of this stage of the process, 
the final proposal was submitted to the regulatory agencies for approval. The 
decision-makers in this case are the Minister for the Environment, acting on advice 
from the EPA, and the Waters and Rivers Commission (WRC), the body responsible 
for water allocation in Western Australia. In practice, however, the final decision as 
to the acceptability of the proposal will be made by the Minister or Cabinet based 
upon advice from the EPA, WRC and the Sustainability Panel. The SWY assessment 
process is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
1.6  Methodological framework 
Research methodologist Michael Crotty (1998) distinguishes four elements of a 
methodological framework that applies to all research projects: epistemology, 
theoretical perspective, methodology and methods. This research is grounded in a 
constructionist epistemology, and its theoretical perspective embraces interpretivism, 
since it “attempts to uncover the sense of a given action, practice or constitutive 
                                                         
14 This is an example of the divide between city and country communities in Western Australia, and is 
identified as a key issue in Stategen (2006c). 
15 A considerable amount of work, however, had already been done, for example in modelling the 
aquifer and determining the most appropriate locations for the bores and it would be fair to say that 
the proponent had some strong ideas about how the development should proceed before the 
assessment commenced.   Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
      19 
meaning” (Fay, 1975, p79) and, more importantly, critical theory, since in seeking to 
develop a theory prescribing how sustainability assessment might contribute to 
sustainability it is oriented towards understanding and reform of “those features that 
can be altered” (Fay, 1975, p92).  
Crotty (1998, pp14-15) points out that it is the nature and the focus of the research 
project ahead that suggest how the researcher should proceed, since “every piece of 
research is unique and calls for a unique methodology”, and therefore methodologies 
are usually the first element of this framework to emerge. Following his lead, I 
commence by identifying the various methodologies that have informed my 
approach and the methods applied in gathering and analysing the data. Some further 
justification for my claims regarding the theoretical perspectives that have guided the 
research comes in Section 1.7, where I provide an overview of the thesis and explain 
its structure, highlighting the theoretical and methodological approaches applied at 
each phase of the research journey. 
1.6.1 Methodology 
My research draws on a number of different methodological approaches, including 
case study research, action research, thick description, and grounded theory. Each of 
these was appropriate to the nature of the research situation before me, which was an 
opportunity to engage actively with case studies of sustainability assessment in 
Western Australia with the aim of learning what contribution sustainability 
assessment could make to sustainability and how it should be conducted. 
This is clearly an example of case study research, which has been defined as “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p13). Context has many layers, from the immediate 
policies surrounding a decision to the macro structures of global society, and the 
relationship of sustainability assessment processes with their broader context is a 
particular focus of my research. I explore not only how context shapes the practice of 
sustainability assessment but how sustainability assessment in turn might shape 
context.  Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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By virtue of the practical nature of this research, its focus upon improving practice as 
well as developing theory, and also my involvement as a ‘reflective practitioner’ 
(Schön, 1983) in the evolution of sustainability assessment processes in Western 
Australia, it also has an action research orientation. Action research is characterised 
by “a commitment to rigorous reflection and experimentation with new 
understandings or behaviours” (Ladkin, 2004, p537). Reflexivity, and the excavation 
of the researcher’s own assumptions and biases is an important part of action 
research (Ladkin, 2004). Although its primary purpose is often seen as “to produce 
practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday conduct of their lives” 
(Reason & Bradbury, 2001, p2), conceptualisation and theory building can also 
emerge from action research, reflecting Kolb’s cycle of experience-based learning: 
experience, reflect, conceptualise and plan (Kolb, 1984).  
Research methodologies can be generally categorised as either deductive, whereby 
data is analysed against an existing framework, or inductive, involving “discovering 
patterns, themes, and categories in one’s data” (Patton, 2002, p453). The inductive 
approach to case study research allows themes to emerge through a process of 
searching for patterns within the data, and relevant existing theory is incorporated 
into the discussion at a later point. Grounded theory is a specific example of 
inductive research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
I adopt an inductive approach in my analysis of the Gorgon data, since the Gorgon 
assessment commenced in somewhat of a vacuum of conceptual or practical 
understanding of sustainability assessment processes, a point that is discussed further 
in Chapter 4. The emergence of the Gorgon themes was facilitated by long 
interviews, sometimes up to three hours, guided by open-ended questions  in which I 
encouraged ‘elaborated and detailed answers’ (Rapley, 2004). The extensive data 
thus gathered contributed to what has been called a ‘thick description’, in which the 
data tells a story and issues become apparent in a way that they do not from a purely 
theoretical perspective (Flyvbjerg, 2002; Peattie, 2001). Forms of thick description 
have been applied in the ethnographic approaches to planning research (see for 
example Forester, 1999). Flyvbjerg (1998a, p1) adopted it to great effect in his study 
of the Aalborg Project in Denmark which is documented in his book Rationality and 
Power. He says:  Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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It has been my aim to present my findings in the form of a narrative that would help 
readers move about in the dense case material, so as to provide them with the basis to 
form their own judgments about the case and its implications.  
Thus thick description facilitates the transfer of understanding from one context to 
another. 
1.6.2 Data collection methods 
I collected data on the case studies through participant observation enabled by my 
direct involvement in the case study assessments, and semi-structured research 
interviews. Observation as a method of data collection draws from ethnography, and 
involves interacting with people as they carry out their tasks (Delamont, 2004), while 
interviews reflect a phenomenological orientation where the aim is an understanding 
of the individual and his or her frames of understanding. Both are interpretive 
approaches. In addition, I also reviewed the project documentation, particularly 
ChevronTexaco (2003a; 2003b; 2003c) and Strategen (2006a; 2006b; 2006c).  
Personal involvement and participant observation 
From 2002 to 2004, I undertook several roles, both professional and voluntary, with 
the Government of Western Australia in relation to sustainability assessment in 
general and to my case studies in particular. These roles enabled me to collect data 
through participant observation and reviews of documents to which I would not 
otherwise have had access, and also contributed significantly to the development of 
my ideas on sustainability assessment and to my research process in general. As a 
participant observer, I can not claim to be an objective recorder of my experiences. It 
has been argued, however, that a degree of subjectivity is inherent in all research, 
and that this is not necessarily a disadvantage (Flyvbjerg, 2004a; Lawrence, 1997). 
In fact, Flyvbjerg (2004a, p429) argues from a phenomenological perspective that 
“the most advanced form of understanding is achieved when researchers place 
themselves within the context being studied”. 
While working within the Sustainability Policy Unit (SPU) within DPC in the 
second half of 2002, I coordinated the Government-Industry Working Group on 
Sustainability Assessment (described in Chapter 2), attended Gorgon Reference 
Group meetings with the DPC representative (see Chapter 3), and reviewed Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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documentation for the purpose of providing feedback to the Project Manager of the 
Gorgon assessment process.  
From February to May 2003, I worked within the Office of Major Projects (OMP) in 
the Department of Industry and Resources (DoIR), where I attended Gorgon 
Reference Group meetings; attended internal DoIR meetings regarding the project 
management of the Gorgon assessment process; prepared meeting agendas and 
minutes; prepared information for submission to the Expert Panel evaluating the 
strategic, economic and social implications of the proposal; and reviewed 
documentation and provided comment. During this time, I also processed public 
submissions on the proponent’s Environmental, Social and Economic Review 
Document on behalf of the Department of Environment (DoE)
16. 
In early 2004, I was commissioned by DoIR to conduct a peer review of the 
Department’s internal review of the Gorgon assessment process. From July to 
December 2004, I was employed by the SPU within DPC to develop a Sustainability 
Assessment Framework for government agencies to assist them in meeting their 
commitments in accordance with the State Sustainability Strategy (Government of 
Western Australia, 2003b) and the Sustainability Code of Practice for Government 
Agencies (Government of Western Australia, 2004). 
In 2005, I was hired by Water Corporation to assist their consultants, Strategen, in 
the conduct of the sustainability evaluation of the SWY proposal. In this role I 
attended and contributed to meetings and workshops where the process was 
developed and refined, reviewed documentation, and contributed to the final 
approval documentation (Strategen, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c), specifically the sections 
on international experiences with sustainability assessment and the application of the 
trade-off rules devised by Gibson et al. (2005) to the SWY proposal, discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
Throughout the period of my research I have maintained membership of the 
International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), at whose conferences in 
                                                         
16 For the sake of simplicity I refer to the Department Of Environment (DoE) throughout this thesis. 
In fact, during the time of the Gorgon assessment it was called the Department of Environmental 
Protection and it has subsequently amalgamated with the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management (on 1 July 2006) to form the Department of Environment and Conservation. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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Marrakech, Morocco (2003), Vancouver, Canada (2004), Prague, Czech Republic 
(2005)
17, and Stavanger, Norway (2006), I have presented papers on my research and 
engaged in discussions with international practitioners and theorists of sustainability 
assessment. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Between May and August 2003, I interviewed 13 representatives of the Gorgon 
Reference Group, the proponent and community groups who had made submissions 
during the public process. Specifically, the organisations represented were: DoIR, 
ChevronTexaco, DoE, EPA, the Expert Panel of consultants; the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management (CALM), the Conservation Commission, and 
the Conservation Council of Western Australia (CCWA). They are identified in my 
analysis and discussion by their organisation, grouping the EPA and DoE together 
and CALM and the Conservation Commission together. With two exceptions, this 
meant that there were at least three interviewees from each organisation. Two 
participants, one from DoIR and one from DoE/EPA were interviewed twice. Due to 
confidentiality concerns, I have applied a numerical coding system to identify the 
interviewees, and have not included their names anywhere in this thesis. 
Between April and July 2006, I interviewed nine people directly involved with the 
SWY case study, the five members of the Sustainability Panel and four of the key 
personnel from the project team, including one representative each from Water 
Corporation and Strategen, and the social and economic consultants. 
The indicative interview questions for both series of interviews are presented in 
Appendix A. 
1.7  Thesis overview 
In this section I provide both a map to the thesis and an explanation of its trajectory, 
highlighting the various methodologies applied and pointing to my original 
contributions to knowledge. The thesis is structured broadly chronologically. This is 
because it chronicles two stories: that of the evolution of sustainability assessment in 
Western Australia and the emergence of understanding about the nature and 
                                                         
17 At the Prague conference I co-chaired a session entitled ‘SEA and sustainability appraisal’. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
  24 
practices of sustainability assessment, and that of my concurrent personal learning 
process.  
Chapter 2 presents my work in 2002 and 2003. It encompasses two of the starting 
points for my research: the work I undertook on behalf of DPC in co-ordinating the 
Government-Industry Working Group on Sustainability Assessment, and my 
sustainability assessment literature review. It commences by setting the scene in 
mid-2002 when there was considerable enthusiasm but also confusion about the 
notion of sustainability assessment. It presents some of the eventual outcomes of the 
Working Group process in the form of a brief overview of the purpose and 
application of sustainability assessment, before leading into a review of the 
literature.  
This initial literature review was conducted in 2003, presented as a conference paper 
later that year, and published in 2004 (Pope, Annandale, & Morrison-Saunders, 
2004). It is concerned primarily with conceptualisations of sustainability and process 
methodologies. It reflects my views on sustainability at the time, views that have 
evolved considerably throughout the course of my research. Its function within the 
thesis is therefore not to shape a rigorous deductive analysis of the case studies as 
might be expected
18. Rather, it serves to introduce the fundamental principles of 
environmental assessment that are also relevant to sustainability assessment, to 
document the literature and level of conceptual understanding that was available at 
the time, and as a ‘place marker’ in the development of my own ideas to which I 
reflexively refer throughout the thesis. 
The Gorgon assessment was also undertaken during 2002 and 2003, and Chapter 3 
tells the Gorgon story using the ‘thick description’ approach. It draws upon the 
assessment documentation, my personal observations and interview data. Applying 
an inductive analysis in Chapter 4
19, I identify a number of themes that emerge from 
the story. These themes fall into two broad categories: issues of process and issues of 
context, the latter including institutional and policy arrangements. Each is addressed 
in turn, drawing mainly on the impact assessment literature. The focus of the 
                                                         
18 Although I did use it for the purpose of analysing Gorgon in two papers that I draw upon in Chapter 
4 (Pope, 2004a; Pope, Morrison-Saunders, & Annandale, 2005). 
19 This process was partially aided by the qualitative data management software NUD.IST N6. Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
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analysis at this point is my second research question, “How should sustainability 
assessment be conducted to maximise its potential?”, and I posit a number of 
principles and recommendations for future practice arising from this analysis. 
The analysis of Chapter 4, however, based as it is in the impact assessment literature, 
leaves certain themes inadequately conceptualised, particularly the contextual and 
subjective elements of policy decision-making and the interplay between knowledge, 
values and power. I seek in Chapter 5 to develop a more complete explanation of the 
Gorgon experience that includes not only the ‘exterior’ dimensions of impact 
assessment as developed in Chapter 4 but also the ‘interior’ dimensions. Following 
the lead of other impact assessment theorists, I relocate impact assessment within the 
broader and better conceptualised field of policy theory. Finding previous attempts to 
do so lacking in any kind of overarching conceptual framework, however, I 
introduce a heuristic framework from integral theory (Wilber, 1995), which 
acknowledges the tensions between the exterior and the interior, and the individual 
and the collective dimensions of policy making, to guide my exploration of some 
important contributions to policy theory. I then apply the post-empiricist notion of 
policy discourses and storylines to demonstrate how these dimensions interrelate and 
to explore the Gorgon case study from a more holistic and integrated perspective. 
This analysis reflects a critical theory orientation since it acknowledges and 
incorporates the interpretive social sciences, seeks to uncover the nature of systems 
that shape and define actions, and connects theory and practice (Fay, 1975). 
My second case study, the SWY sustainability assessment, is introduced in Chapter 
6, and I retain the heuristic framework from Chapter 5 to guide an exploration of 
policy learning within it. The SWY analysis, therefore, is more deductive than the 
analysis of Gorgon, since my purpose was to explore the different forms of learning 
suggested by the heuristic framework. I begin with the exterior or technical 
dimensions of learning, drawing on and developing further the process and context-
oriented conclusions of Chapter 4, before noting that the SWY case study also 
demonstrated the potential of sustainability assessment to catalyse forms of interior 
learning or reflexivity, at both the individual and collective levels. Of particular 
interest is a form of collective learning through which the storylines framing the 
SWY proposal shifted, resulting in a significant reconceptualisation of the proposal Chapter 1: Framing the journey 
  26 
itself. This leads into the development of a conceptual model describing the 
mechanisms through which sustainability assessment can be a driver for learning and 
change.  
Having drawn extensively from general impact assessment literature and policy 
theory up to this point, in Chapter 7 I emphatically ‘put sustainability back into 
sustainability assessment’. A brief review of the evolution of the sustainability 
discourse from its roots in the environmental movements of the 1960s through the 
Brundtland Commission of 1987 to present interpretations in public policy and the 
corporate world, identifies a prevalence of interpretations of the concept that seek 
improved environmental, social and economic outcomes without challenging the 
structuring discourses of modern society. Following many other contributors to the 
literature, I argue that the discourses and current trajectory of industrial modernity, 
with its fixation on perpetual economic growth is unsustainable and that more 
fundamental change is required. I pose an argument for an ‘integral sustainability’ 
that embraces exterior and interior, and individual and collective dimensions, and 
which might be facilitated by sustainability assessment. I offer my personal research 
journey as evidence of this potential. 
Chapter 8 is my conclusion, in which the threads of the discussion of sustainability 
assessment, sustainability itself, and policy learning are drawn together. Chapters 5, 
6 and 7 all deal with policy discourses and storylines at different levels and depths: 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the power of particular storyline relating to the resource 
development sector in Western Australia to shape a political decision-making 
process; Chapter 6 reveals that storylines, at least those operating at the relatively 
low level of a particular decision, may also be flexible and could evolve through 
processes of social learning facilitated by sustainability assessment processes; and 
Chapter 7 identifies the deeply rooted discourses that shape industrial modernity as 
the fundamental cause of unsustainability. Together, they lead to my argument that 
sustainability assessment, as a tool of reflexive modernity, may be a process by 
which these structuring discourses might be challenged and through which deep 
change towards a more sustainable society might ultimately be attainable.Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s Box 
 
I sat in the meeting room in Perth, Western Australia on a Friday afternoon late in 2002, 
and looked around me at the 30 or so people who had gathered to discuss the prospect of 
new processes for sustainability assessment in Western Australia, the newly formed 
‘Sustainability Assessment Working Group’. It was a different group from that which had 
turned up a fortnight earlier and different again from the group of a fortnight before that. 
Clearly, some previous attendees had decided not to come back, that their priorities lay 
elsewhere. The timeslot late on a Friday afternoon was probably a deterrent too, 
especially as policy forbade the use of Government funds to provide drinks other than tea 
and coffee at the end of the session. 
Still, there was a good turn out again, from government agencies, industry, universities, 
consultancy firms and non-government organisations. Some had come to contribute to 
the discussion, some came to learn from the others, and some weren’t sure why they were 
there at all, apart from a sense that they couldn’t be left behind from whatever it was that 
was happening. There was bewilderment in the room, but also excitement and 
anticipation, and a conviction that we as a group could collectively ‘figure out’ what 
sustainability assessment was and how it could be done in practice. 
After a presentation from one of the group members, the discussion quickly deviated 
from the content of the presentation and from our mandate of considering techniques and 
methods for integration, to issues ranging from policy to institutional structures to 
critiques of the recently released Consultation Draft of the Western Australian State 
Sustainability Strategy to the concept of sustainability itself. At 5:30pm, we wrapped up 
the discussion and I wondered if we had achieved anything at all, beyond exposing the 
complexity of the task ahead. Not for the first time, I felt overwhelmed and wondered 
how many of my new colleagues felt the same way. 
2.1  Introduction 
Fundamental questions of what sustainability assessment is, where it has come from, 
what its potential contribution might be in furthering the sustainability agenda, how 
it could be applied to support and enhance decision-making processes, and the 
process models and features that might be appropriate, provide the focus for this 
chapter. Of course, these issues remain core to my research project as a whole and 
therefore are revisited many times throughout this thesis, in varying degrees of Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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detail, in different contexts, and from different perspectives, making it important to 
distinguish this chapter from those to follow.  
This chapter describes aspects of my own process of learning about sustainability 
assessment, and particularly my process of working out where to begin. It is written 
chronologically commencing with the Sustainability Assessment Working Group
1 
process of late 2002, leading into my review of the available literature undertaken 
during 2003 and touching in passing on the role I undertook within the Sustainability 
Policy Unit (SPU) of the Western Australian Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
(DPC) in the second half of 2004. The discussion in the chapter is grounded almost 
entirely within the boundaries of the impact assessment literature, and attempts to 
extract the maximum value from others working in this field while alluding to some 
of its limits. These limits in turn become the catalysts for my exploration of other 
sources and theoretical lenses through which to explore the case studies in later 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
2.2  Confusion reigns: The Sustainability Assessment 
Working Group (2002) 
My first exposure to sustainability assessment was the Sustainability Assessment 
Working Group process that I coordinated on behalf of the SPU in late 2002. This 
process began with a specific purpose, but quickly deviated from this and expanded 
to draw out many of the important themes of sustainability assessment. In this 
section, I begin by explaining the Working Group process before presenting what 
was, for me, the most significant outcome of the process: a conceptual framework 
for sustainability assessment in Western Australia describing its intended forms, 
applications and relationships with decision-making processes. I conclude by 
summarising the Working Group discussions, including those focusing upon its role 
and purpose, and those focusing on the substantive issues of sustainability 
assessment. 
                                                         
1 Here I revert to the simplified and commonly used name of this group, having referred to it in 
Chapter 1 the Government-Industry Working Group on Sustainability Assessment, its title in the State 
Sustainability Strategy Consultation Draft (Government of Western Australia, 2002a). Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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2.2.1 Overview of the Working Group process 
The Sustainability Assessment Working Group was convened by Professor Peter 
Newman, Director of the Sustainability Policy Unit (SPU) in late 2002 in response to 
an action raised in the State Sustainability Strategy Consultation Draft to, “Establish 
an Industry-Government Working Group on Sustainability Assessment to further 
develop processes and practices” (Government of Western Australia, 2002a, p41). 
The specific mandate of the Working Group was to draw on the experience of the 
industrial sector, which had already begun to develop sustainability assessment 
processes as a tool for internal decision-making and to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the available techniques. The emphasis of the Working Group 
deliberations on such techniques was to be “the integration of environmental, social 
and economic decision-making” (Pope, 2003a, p2). 
The Working Group met for six fortnightly workshops between September and 
November 2002, each consisting of the presentation of a case study followed by 
discussion. Membership of the Working Group was initially by invitation to people 
across the community known to be engaged with sustainability and the preparation 
of the State Sustainability Strategy
2, but was open to anyone who wished to 
participate. ‘Word of mouth’ brought a number of new members. Approximately 55 
representatives of government, industry, consultancies, academia and the not-for-
profit sector attended one or more of the six sessions, with a core group of 14 
attending four or more sessions. Typical attendance was between 25 and 30 people. 
The Working Group process and the discussions are documented on the SPU 
website
3 (Pope, 2003a).  
Since industry had already begun to conduct sustainability assessment, using either 
internal resources or consultants, the basic premise was that the group could 
collectively learn from these experiences for the common good. The hope was that 
the Working Group could ultimately develop a ‘how to’ guide that would assist 
                                                         
2 The invitation list was prepared by Professor Peter Newman from his personal contacts, who were 
many and varied by virtue of his long-standing work in sustainability and his role as Director of the 
SPU. Therefore, although membership was essentially by random selection, it was not exclusive and 
it did include a cross-section of stakeholders in matters of sustainability assessment. 
3 http://www.sustainability.dpc.wa.gov.au/BGPapers/Pope%20J%20-
%20Working%20Group%20Outcomes.pdf  Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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proponents in identifying and applying appropriate techniques within their decision-
making processes.  
It was initially considered important to confine the Working Group to reviewing the 
available tools and techniques for assessment and integration, in order to distinguish 
its role from other government activities in relation to sustainability assessment. The 
main point of confusion with regard to the mandate of the Working Group was the 
distinction between sustainability assessment conducted by an industry for its own 
internal purposes, skills that the group ostensibly was charged with discussing and 
ultimately sharing, and sustainability assessment as a regulatory tool. The latter was 
the mandate of the committees responsible for implementing the Keating Review 
(Government of Western Australia, 2002b)
4, and it was unclear where the 
boundaries, both jurisdictional and conceptual, actually lay. It proved difficult in 
practice to restrict Working Group topics of discussion in this way, and much of the 
group’s time was taken up discussing and challenging its mandate (Pope, 2003a). 
To aid this discussion, it became necessary halfway through the series of workshops 
to ‘map’ out the scope of sustainability assessment in Western Australia, that is, its 
intended forms, applications and relationships with decision-making processes, to 
provide the context in which the Government’s commitments to sustainability 
assessment and the activities and role of the Working Group could be considered in 
more detail. I developed such a map for the Working Group in 2002 and 
subsequently revised and expanded it in a background paper prepared in 2004 as part 
of the process of developing a Sustainability Assessment Framework for government 
agencies (Pope, 2004b)
5. The later version is reproduced below. 
2.2.2 Applications of sustainability assessment: A conceptual 
framework 
Sustainability assessment is a decision-aiding tool. To demonstrate how 
sustainability assessment can inform the decision-making process in practice, it is 
                                                         
4 The Keating Review was discussed in Chapter 1, and responsibility for the implementation of its 
recommendations rests with DoIR. For political reasons it was deemed important that the Working 
Group activities should not venture into the Keating territory. 
5 The Framework and accompanying background paper (Pope, 2004b) were released for comment to 
the government agencies in December 2004, but due to restructuring and personnel changes, 
including my departure at the end of my contract, the documents were never revised or formally 
issued. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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important to distinguish between different forms of sustainability assessment and the 
different groups that may be involved in the assessment and decision-making 
processes. 
Sustainability assessments can be categorised according to who undertakes them, as: 
•  Internal assessment conducted by a proponent organisation; or 
•  External assessment by government. 
Sustainability assessments can also be categorised according to their relationship 
with the development of the strategic proposal, as: 
•  Proactive (or ex ante) processes that inform the development of a strategic 
proposal at all stages of decision-making for the purpose of making the 
proposal as sustainable as possible; or 
•  Reactive (or ex post) processes conducted after the strategic proposal has 
largely been developed, for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
proposal is sufficiently sustainable to be approved. 
Proactive application reflects the view that sustainability assessment should not be 
considered an ‘add-on’ process but as a tool to provide a sustainability focus to 
existing planning and decision-making processes. By integrating sustainability 
assessment with the planning and decision-making process strategic decisions and 
policy outcomes can be better aligned with sustainability principles.  
The State Sustainability Strategy (Government of Western Australia, 2003b) and the 
Sustainability Code of Practice for Government Agencies (Government of Western 
Australia, 2004) call for government agencies to conduct internal sustainability 
assessment of strategic proposals, including policies, plans, programmes, projects, 
agreements, Cabinet submissions and legislation where appropriate and relevant. 
Ideally, internal sustainability assessments should be proactive processes although 
reactive internal assessments may also be appropriate in some circumstances.  Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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The Strategy also calls for external reactive sustainability assessment of ‘strategic 
and complex projects’
6. Some very significant agency strategic decisions, such as 
major projects or programmes for which a government agency is the proponent, may 
also require some form of external assessment and decision-making by government, 
either environmental impact assessment (EIA) under the Environmental Protection 
Act 1986, or possibly external sustainability assessment if the proposal is classified 
as strategic and complex. 
The State Sustainability Strategy commitments with respect to sustainability 
assessment are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy commitments with 
respect to sustainability assessment 
Application  Proponent  Type of 
assessment 






































External  Government 
assessors 









External sustainability assessment of a proposal by government regulators is by its 
nature a reactive process, since it is conducted after a proposal has largely been 
developed. However, internal sustainability assessment could potentially be either 
proactive or reactive. Therefore, three different forms of sustainability assessment 
can be distinguished: 
                                                         
6 No specific guidelines have been developed to define a ‘strategic and complex project’ but the 
Gorgon gas development certainly was considered to fit this category, arguably by virtue of it political 
sensitivity as much as its complexity or strategic importance. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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•  Internal proactive; 
•  Internal reactive;  
•  External reactive. 
2.2.3 The Working Group in context 
This conceptual framework enabled a clarification of the Working Group’s mandate, 
which in turn generated discussion about the relationships between these different 
forms and applications of sustainability assessment that served to ‘pry open’ the 
subject of sustainability assessment in a way that has proved useful. 
The role of the Working Group 
Based upon the conceptual framework, the primary role of the Sustainability 
Assessment Working Group in 2002 was to review techniques that could be applied 
by proponents undertaking internal sustainability assessments of their proposals, and 
particularly those techniques that could contribute to a proactive approach in which 
sustainability assessment guided the development of the proposal. As this mandate 
became clearer, however, members of the Working Group raised a number of 
concerns. 
Firstly, there were issues of intellectual property rights, particularly amongst some of 
the consultants in the group whose commonly expressed view was, “Why are we 
giving up our time to help project proponents who are potentially competitors or 
paying clients?” The issue of sustainability assessment to guide decision-making by 
government agencies was raised. While it was recognised that tools and techniques 
identified through the Working Group process would potentially be equally relevant 
to government agencies as to private proponents, this discussion highlighted that it 
was unclear at that time how the commitment relating to internal sustainability 
assessment of government strategic proposals was to be addressed.  
Furthermore, it became clear that sustainability assessment undertaken by 
proponents during the preparation of complex and strategic project proposals could 
not meaningfully be considered in isolation from the subsequent external, regulatory 
sustainability assessment process. Clearly, it would be important that sustainability 
issues considered by a proponent in such cases were compatible with those that 
would be ultimately considered by the regulators. This in turn led to questions about Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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how exactly the commitment to the sustainability assessment of complex and 
strategic projects was being addressed by Government through the Keating Review 
process.  
Perhaps most significantly, there was a feeling that perhaps tools and techniques, 
particularly given the Working Group’s emphasis on internal decision-making within 
private proponent organisations, were a minor consideration in the context of the full 
scope of work that would be required to implement Government’s commitments to 
sustainability assessment. It was argued that process and institutional considerations 
were at least as significant. Furthermore, it was suggested that there was in fact no 
shortage of useful tools and techniques for the purposes of gathering, analysing and 
integrating sustainability data
7.  
As a result of these debates about its role, the Working Group sought advice
8 as to its 
appropriate relationship with the Keating Review process. The response was that the 
Keating Review committee was waiting for the release of the final State 
Sustainability Strategy in the hope that it would provide details of proposed 
sustainability assessment processes in order to progress its implementation of the 
recommendations relating to sustainability assessment. This appeared to give the 
Working Group the mandate it was seeking to consider the broader issues of 
sustainability assessment, including regulator processes and institutional 
arrangements. The final workshop session was reserved for this purpose (Pope, 
2003a).  
Working Group discussion themes 
By the halfway point of the six-workshop series, the topics of the Working Group 
discussions had expanded from considering tools and techniques and debating the 
role of the group, to embracing a wide range of themes relevant to sustainability 
assessment. These included the nature of sustainability, appropriate applications of 
sustainability assessment, institutional arrangements for sustainability assessment, 
and the potential role for deliberation in sustainability decision-making. 
                                                         
7 Examples provided by Working Group members included decision analysis, matrix analysis, goal 
attainment setting, logical framework approach, pressure state response, multi-criteria analysis, 
sensitivity analysis, and cost benefit analysis. 
8 From the DPC representative on the Keating Review committee. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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The Working Group debated whether it was important to consider ‘sustainability’ as 
a future vision of a desirable societal state, and to define the characteristics of such a 
state. Some asserted that this was important, and called upon the State Government 
to provide clarity on the nature of sustainability in the form of principles, objectives 
and criteria for sustainability with which all sectors could align. Others believed that 
defining sustainability was an impossible task and an unreasonable expectation of 
Government and that the best approach would be to take small steps, hopefully in the 
right direction, within the context of different activities and decision-making 
processes. It was suggested that perhaps sustainability could be more easily and 
appropriately defined at a regional
9, rather than a state level. 
Many members of the group expressed concern that Government’s commitments to 
sustainability assessment of government agency decision-making and complex and 
strategic projects would not be a sufficient driver for change, since smaller projects 
and existing unsustainable practices would not be subject to sustainability 
assessment. This led into further discussion about the nature of sustainability, and it 
was suggested that implementing sustainability in a meaningful way requires 
challenging the norm and examining the structures of society through the lens of 
sustainability, to identify those norms and institutions that are incompatible with the 
concept and to determine what change might be required. 
The issue of institutional arrangements for sustainability was a prominent point of 
discussion in the Working Group sessions and other fora convened around this 
time
10. A significant concern was the relationship between the proposed 
sustainability assessment processes for complex and strategic projects and the 
existing statutory EIA processes, in particular that sustainability assessment would 
threaten the integrity of Western Australia’s EIA system, generally considered to be 
world class (Wood, 1999; Wood & Bailey, 1994). The question was asked whether 
sustainability assessment should be the responsibility of the EPA, which would 
require legislative change, or whether the EIA process should be left intact and 
                                                         
9 ‘Regions’ in the Australian context are sub-sets of states. 
10 These included the State Sustainability Strategy implementation workshop on sustainability 
assessment and institutional change held on 6 November 2002, a series of three workshops on the 
topic of sustainability assessment convened by DPC earlier in 2002, and a meeting in May 2003 at 
DPC attended by government agency representatives. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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sustainability assessment built around it
11. If this was to be the case, then who would 
be responsible for conducting the economic and social components of the 
sustainability assessment
12, and for integrating the three ‘pillars’? There were calls 
for the establishment of a Sustainability Commission to undertake this integration 
role in some submissions to the State Sustainability Strategy process. 
The issues of institutional arrangements and appropriate applications of 
sustainability assessment to maximise change were the focus of the discussion at the 
sixth and final workshop. A member of the group presented a potential framework 
for sustainability assessment that recognised the links between government and 
proponent activities, particularly the need to feed back actions resulting from 
assessment processes to government as well as proponents; the importance of the 
‘trickledown’ of sustainability assessment from policy, program and plan level to 
individual projects; and the need to assess and improve existing unsustainable 
practices as well as new proposals. The Working Group responded very favourably 
to this framework, with most members agreeing that it provided a positive way 
forward. The framework was subsequently developed into a paper and published 
(Jenkins, Annandale, & Morrison-Saunders, 2003). 
An interesting discussion, quite unrelated to the remainder of the Working Group’s 
discussions, occurred at the second workshop. This workshop was attended by a 
consultant who presented on the use of dialogue and conversation in the 
consideration of complex issues, such as sustainability assessments. Drawing from 
Aristotle, he explained that logical thinking, ‘rational’ methodologies are only 
appropriate in relation to natural science with stable data. In other circumstances, and 
sustainability assessment is one such example, alternative thinking processes are 
required. Although these ideas were not specifically discussed in subsequent 
workshops, they were of great interest to most Working Group members who could 
see their relevance in dealing with the complexities of sustainability assessment 
(Pope, 2003a). 
                                                         
11 The latter emerged as the preferred option during 2004. 
12 The State Sustainability Strategy Consultation Draft (Government of Western Australia, 2002a) 
specified that the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) and the Department for Planning and 
Infrastructure (DPI) respectively would undertake these roles, but this level of detail was removed in 
the preparation of the final Strategy.  Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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Where to from here? 
The Working Group discussions covered significant ground, most of which was not 
directly related to its original mandate to review sustainability tools and techniques 
appropriate for use internally by project proponents. Although it did not achieve its 
stated aim of producing a guidance note of analytical tools and techniques, the 
Working Group process had the important outcome of the formation of a core group 
of professionals willing and able to support the Government in developing and 
implementing sustainability assessment processes in Western Australia. Many 
members of this group have continued to be involved in subsequent discussions on 
the subject, both formal and informal. The Working Group ‘opened up’ the issue of 
sustainability assessment and exposed to the Western Australian policy community, 
perhaps for the first time, its magnitude and complexity. In a sense, then, the 
Working Group helped to clarify the problem if not generate a solution. The themes 
identified have continued to be relevant to and to some extent guide the gradual 
implementation of sustainability assessment over the intervening years. 
I was frustrated by the lack of structure to the discussions, which persisted despite 
my efforts, and at the time I blamed this lack of process for the lack of apparent 
results. The Working Group process did, however, help me to clarify in my own 
mind the nature of the commitments made by the Government to sustainability 
assessment (see Table 2.1) and this was a significant result in the context of my 
research and one that was to guide subsequent work. At the conclusion of the six-
workshop series, I came away with a sense of the complexity of the issues with 
which I was about to engage and a conviction that of all the themes discussed by the 
Working Group, the most fundamental to the development of sustainability 
assessment processes was consideration of the concept of sustainability itself. I was 
convinced that if sustainability was not defined, then sustainability assessment could 
not be meaningful
13.  To me, other concerns including institutional arrangements and 
even the appropriate application of sustainability assessment paled into 
insignificance compared with this core issue. This became almost an obsession that 
influenced my research and my work for the next two years and shaped my review of 
the sustainability assessment literature discussed in Section 2.3. 
                                                         
13 I share some further context for this conviction in Chapter 7, where I explore the evolution of my 
understanding of sustainability. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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2.3  Making sense of the literature: Literature review 2003 
Early in 2003, fresh from the Working Group experience, I commenced my literature 
review on sustainability assessment. As an unsuspecting newcomer to the field, my 
first impression was that the literature appeared to be rich with discussion about the 
importance of impact assessment for sustainability and methodological approaches 
to undertaking such assessments, but at the same time was fragmented and poorly 
cross-referenced. With a few notable exceptions (for example Gibson, 2001) there 
appeared to be a distinct lack of any higher level discourse on what the purpose of 
sustainability assessment actually was and how sustainability assessment related to 
the concept of sustainability itself. My view at the time was that these issues were 
fundamental to any discussions about sustainability assessment and should be their 
starting point. 
In my journey through the maze of ideas presented in the literature, I began to search 
for authors who addressed these important questions. Eventually, I came across the 
work of Clive George of Manchester University (George, 1999, 2001), who seemed 
to be a voice in the wilderness who perfectly articulated my own views in a way I 
was, as yet, not able to do. His work discussed both the role of sustainability 
assessment and its relationship to the concept of sustainability, and it therefore 
provided me with the conceptual map for which I had been looking. Furthermore, 
George argued that it was not only possible but indeed necessary to define 
sustainability for the purposes of sustainability assessment, and discussed how this 
could be done 
I was able to review and discuss the various ideas and approaches described in the 
literature using a conceptual framework derived from George’s work, distinguishing 
between the origins of the different approaches and their respective interpretations of 
sustainability. George’s work, and therefore my own, however, went one step further 
than merely the provision of a useful conceptual map, and proposed a ‘best way’ to 
undertake sustainability assessment based upon considerations of the nature of 
sustainability.  
At this point, I believed that my first research question had been answered. I 
presented my work as a conference paper in September 2003 (Pope, 2003c), and 
subsequently revised it with two co-authors as an article that was eventually Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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published in an academic journal the following year (Pope et al., 2004). This article 
was an important milestone for me, both since it was my first academically refereed 
publication and because it laid the groundwork for my research process. As such, the 
article is reproduced in this chapter in the form in which it was published. The longer 
and single authored original version (Pope, 2003c) is presented in Appendix B by 
way of comparison and to demonstrate that the content of the co-authored article is 
mine
14. 
2.3.1 Conceptualising sustainability assessment: Abstract 
Sustainability assessment is being increasingly viewed as an important tool to aid in 
the shift towards sustainability. However, this is a new and evolving concept and 
there remain very few examples of effective sustainability assessment processes 
implemented anywhere in the world. 
Sustainability assessment is often described as a process by which the implications 
of an initiative on sustainability are evaluated, where the initiative can be a proposed 
or existing policy, plan, programme, project, piece of legislation, or a current 
practice or activity. However, this generic definition covers a broad range of 
different processes, many of which have been described in the literature as 
‘sustainability assessment’. This article looks beyond the generic definition to 
examine the fundamental question of what sustainability assessment could, and 
should, be.  
It does this firstly by reviewing the different approaches described in the literature as 
being forms of sustainability assessment and evaluating them in terms of their 
potential contributions to sustainability. Many of these are actually examples of 
‘integrated assessment’, derived from environmental impact assessment (EIA) and 
strategic environmental assessment (SEA), but which have been extended to 
incorporate social and economic considerations as well as environmental ones, 
reflecting a ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) approach to sustainability. It is concluded that 
to deserve the title of ‘sustainability assessment’, an assessment process must seek to 
determine whether or not an initiative is, or is not, sustainable, rather than seeking to 
minimise unsustainability or even to achieve improvements which may still not 
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result in a sustainable practice. To avoid confusion, this paper uses the term 
‘assessment for sustainability’ for processes that have this first-mentioned aim. 
‘Assessment for sustainability’ firstly requires that the concept of sustainability be 
well-defined. The article compares TBL approaches and principles-based approaches 
to developing such sustainability criteria, concluding that the latter are more 
appropriate, since they avoid many of the inherent limitations of the triple-bottom-
line as a conceptualisation of sustainability.  
2.3.2 Introduction 
The pervasive growth of interest over the last 15 years in the idea of ‘sustainability’ 
or ‘sustainable development’
15 has brought with it challenges to the way in which 
impact assessment has been traditionally conceived.  
Designed originally in the late 1960s and early 1970s to focus on the environmental 
impacts of proposed projects, impact assessment has recently been reassessed by 
scholars to take account of the sustainable development agenda (Gibson, 2001; 
International Association for Impact Assessment, 2002; Partidário, 2003; Sadler, 
1999; Verheem, 2002). There has been a consequent call for the development of 
‘sustainability assessment’ procedures that would contribute to the shift towards a 
more sustainable society. 
Available definitions of sustainability assessment include: 
•  “Sustainability assessment is…a tool that can help decision-makers and 
policy-makers decide what actions they should take and should not take in an 
attempt to make society more sustainable” (Devuyst, 2001, p9); or 
•  The aim of sustainability assessment is to ensure that “plans and activities 
make an optimal contribution to sustainable development” (Verheem, 2002, 
p7).  
However, as this article seeks to demonstrate, these definitions are sufficiently 
generic to describe a broad range of different processes, many of which have indeed 
been called ‘sustainability assessment’ or some similar term in the literature.  
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The purpose of this article is to clarify what the term ‘sustainability assessment’ 
should mean if it is to fulfil its potential as a tool for promoting sustainability. We 
believe that such clarification is an essential prerequisite for meaningful discussions 
on the development of sustainability assessment processes around the world.  
Our work is also driven by a concern that moves currently being taken 
internationally towards sustainability assessment are not being informed by proper 
critical debate. There appears to be a view that any move towards sustainability 
assessment will axiomatically be a ‘good thing’. Like Scrase and Sheate (2002), who 
write about integrated assessment, we do not believe that all sustainability 
assessment approaches can be assumed to be ‘good for the environment’, or indeed 
will encourage sustainable development. As we will show, it is possible for some 
concepts of sustainability assessment to overly promote the prevailing economic 
agenda and thereby undermine 30 years worth of hard-won environmental policy 
gains.  
The article begins by reviewing and categorising sustainability assessment 
approaches, as they have been described in the literature. These sections of the 
article also evaluate these conceptions, asking how likely they are to contribute to 
sustainable development. In the final section of the article we present an alternative 
conceptualisation of sustainability assessment (that we call 'assessment for 
sustainability') which we believe addresses the limitations presented by existing 
approaches. 
2.3.3 Defining sustainability assessment 
The concept of sustainability, or sustainable development, is clearly the basis of 
sustainability assessment. Sustainable development was first described by the 
Brundtland Commission in 1987 as “development that meets the needs of the current 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).  
Since the Brundtland Commission, many alternative definitions of sustainability 
have been proposed and diverse interpretations of the concept made. Many of these 
are based upon the ‘three-pillar’ or ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) concept. Whereas the 
Brundtland Commission presented a two-pillar model reflecting environment and Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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development concerns, the three-pillar TBL model separates development issues into 
social and economic factors, emphasising that “material gains are not sufficient 
measures or preservers of human well-being” (Gibson, 2001, p7). For the purposes 
of this paper, the TBL can be considered an interpretation of sustainability that 
places equal importance on environmental, social and economic considerations in 
decision-making.  
 The theory of sustainability assessment as currently expressed in the literature has 
largely evolved from work undertaken by practitioners of environmental impact 
assessment (EIA), and more recently strategic environmental assessment (SEA), 
which in turn has been influenced by policy analysis techniques (Sheate et al., 2001, 
2003). The fact that much sustainability assessment thinking has been substantially 
developed by EIA and SEA practitioners is understandable, given that sustainability 
assessment is often considered to be the ‘next generation’ of environmental 
assessment (Sadler, 1999).  
The literature reflects a widely-held belief that environmental assessment processes 
such as EIA and SEA can, and do, make valuable contributions towards 
sustainability. Gibson (2001, p1) points out that “environmental assessment 
processes….are among the most promising venues for application of sustainability-
based criteria. They are anticipatory and forward looking, integrative, often flexible, 
and generally intended to force attention to otherwise neglected considerations”, 
although he also recognises that “environmental assessments are not the only 
vehicles for specifying sustainability principles, objectives and criteria” (Gibson, 
2001, p19). 
Marsden (2002) highlights the two schools of thought around the relationship 
between environmental assessment processes and sustainability. In some cases it is 
suggested that this contribution arises directly from the integration of environmental 
considerations into decision-making (see for example Sheate et al., 2003, p5; Wood, 
2002), while others suggest that EIA and SEA provide a sound basis that can be 
extended to include broader sustainability concerns (Gibson, 2001; Verheem, 2002).  
The two views of the potential contribution of environmental assessment to 
sustainability often correspond to two different conceptions of sustainability. It is Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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important to note at this point that sustainability is a difficult concept to define in a 
way that is meaningful and sufficiently practical to allow it to be operationalised. It 
has been suggested that the difficulty arises because sustainability is a concept like 
‘love’, ‘hope’ or ‘freedom’, and as such tends to remain ‘fuzzy’ until applied in a 
specific context (Government of Western Australia, 2002a). This situation is not 
aided by the fact that many alternative theoretical formulations and applications of 
sustainability have been developed, which are founded upon common concerns and 
principles, but which have different emphases (Gibson, 2001).  
This article does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of alternative 
conceptualisations of sustainability, but does seek to highlight where appropriate 
how these alternative views are embedded in the various documented approaches to 
‘sustainability assessment’. 
For example, the suggestion that EIA itself contributes to sustainability reflects the 
view that “environmental impacts are at the core of sustainability concerns” (Sadler, 
1999, p12) and that “integrating the environment into strategic decision-making is an 
essential pre-requisite for moving towards sustainable development” (Sheate et al., 
2001, p5). This is consistent with a ‘deep green’ ecological sustainability model that 
can be represented as three concentric circles, the outer representing ecology, the 
middle representing society and the inner representing the economy (Gibson, 2001). 
This view of sustainability emphasises that the source and sink functions provided by 
natural resources are finite, and that sustainability therefore means finding a way to 
live within the limits of natural systems (Sadler, 1999).  
On the other hand, the suggestion is often made that environmental assessment could 
contribute to sustainability by extending its scope to include social and economic 
considerations along with environmental ones (Devuyst, 1999; Marsden & Dovers, 
2002; Sadler, 1999). This reflects the ‘three-pillar’ or triple bottom line (TBL) model 
of sustainability, which is often conceptualised as three intersecting circles 
representing the environment, society and the economy (Gibson, 2001). This form of 
extension of environmental assessment results in a form of TBL integrated 
assessment (Twigger-Ross & Eales, 2003).  Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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In the next two sections of this article we examine the nature of proposals for 
sustainability assessment approaches which embody the concept of TBL integration, 
as they have evolved from project-level environmental assessment processes, and 
from strategic environmental assessment thinking.  
2.3.4 The conceptual origins of sustainability assessment 
In the literature, sustainability assessment is generally viewed as a tool in the 
‘family’ of impact assessment processes, closely related to EIA applied to projects 
and SEA applied to policies, plans and programmes (PPPs) (Devuyst, 2001). When 
considering the concept of sustainability assessment and reviewing the literature 
available on the subject, we believe that it is useful to consider its conceptual origins 
by examining the more traditional forms of these assessment tools in more detail.  
As a tool typically applied to project proposals, the limitations of EIA are well 
understood and documented, particularly the late stage in the decision-making 
process at which EIA is applied. Consequently SEA has evolved rapidly over the 
past decade as a tool to address the need to assess the environmental implications of 
decisions made at much higher levels of decision-making, including PPPs (Dalal-
Clayton & Sadler, 2002; Dovers, 2002; Partidário, 1999; Thérivel & Partidário, 
1996). 
However, within the broad definition of SEA as environmental assessment of PPPs 
there has been considerable debate as to how it should be approached (Brown & 
Thérivel, 2000; Sheate et al., 2003; Verheem & Tonk, 2000) and as a result “there 
are several definitions of SEA stemming from the many ideas over its role and 
purpose” (Sheate et al., 2001, p6). 
Therefore, at this point, and based upon the work of several authors, we believe that 
it is important at this point to distinguish between two forms; ‘EIA-driven’, and 
‘objectives-led’ SEA (Eggenberger & Partidário, 2000; Partidário, 1999; Sheate et 
al., 2001, 2003). 
EIA-driven SEA is essentially project-level EIA process applied to a PPP, or ‘EIA 
writ large’ (Sheate et al., 2003). As such, it is typically a reactive, ex post process 
that aims to evaluate the environmental impacts of a policy, plan or programme for 
which decision-making is well advanced or complete against a baseline, to evaluate Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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the acceptability of the impacts and to identify potential modifications to improve the 
environmental outcomes (Devuyst, 1999; Sheate et al., 2001, 2003; Sippe, 1999). 
Partidário (2003) suggests that an EIA-driven approach is reflected in some early 
definitions and SEA legislation, including The US National Environmental Policy 
Act (1969). 
The literature also describes a range of SEA processes that can be considered to be 
‘objectives-led’. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘objectives-led’ will be 
used to refer to SEA in which the potential impacts of a proposal are assessed against 
a series of aspirational environmental objectives, rather than against a baseline 
(Sheate et al., 2001, 2003; S. Smith & Sheate, 2001; Twigger-Ross & Eales, 2003).  
Objectives-led SEA aims to be a proactive, ex ante process and as such it has been 
seen as part of the process of developing PPPs, rather than evaluating them after the 
fact. Clearly, a well-defined set of environmental objectives is an important 
prerequisite for this form of SEA. Objectives, or goals, describe the purpose of a 
policy, plan or programme, and in this discussion the two terms will be considered 
synonymous. Reflecting the principles of ‘tiering’, also known as ‘vertical 
integration’ or the ‘trickledown effect’ (Noble, 2002a; Thérivel & Partidário, 1996), 
these objectives must be consistent and compatible with those applied at higher and 
lower levels of decision-making. Ideally, environmental assessments conducted at 
higher levels of the planning hierarchy would establish appropriate objectives for 
decision-making processes at the lower levels, although it is recognised that 
processes are rarely so streamlined in practice (C. Jones, 2003; Lee, 2002; Noble, 
2002a; Nooteboom, 2000).  
Extension of environmental assessment processes to include the three pillars of the 
triple-bottom-line could conceivably occur within all three of the environmental 
assessment processes described thus far: EIA, EIA-driven SEA and objectives-led 
SEA. For the purposes of the rest of this article, we will categorise and discuss 
contemporary approaches to sustainability assessment as being either ‘EIA-driven 
integrated assessment, or ‘objectives-led integrated assessment’. Although the latter 
is derived from objectives-led SEA, an objectives-led integrated assessment 
approach could equally be applied to project-level proposals. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
  46 
Both of these approaches can be considered to be examples of ‘sustainability 
appraisal’, as defined by Sheate et al (2001); ‘integrated sustainability appraisal’ as 
discussed by Eggenberger and Partidário (2000) or ‘integrated impact assessment’ 
(Sheate et al., 2003). Similarly, Lee (2002) uses the term ‘sustainability assessment’ 
to describe a special form of integrated assessment, which takes into consideration 
economic, environmental and social impacts; a definition which applies equally to 
EIA-driven and objectives-led integrated assessment.  
As with sustainability, the term ‘integration’ can be understood in different ways. 
Scrase and Sheate (2002) define 14 meanings of the term ‘integration’, with at least 
three
16 being directly related to the concerns of impact assessment. The integration 
of environmental, social and economic considerations is an example of what Scrase 
and Sheate (2002) call ‘integration among assessment tools’, and what Lee (2002) 
calls ‘horizontal integration’. 
The term ‘integration’ implies that integrated assessment should be more than the 
sum of separate environmental, social and economic assessments. Eggenberger and 
Partidário (2000, p204)  remind us that “the principle that the sum of the parts does 
not equal the whole is widely acknowledged” and suggest that “integrating in fact 
means that a new entity is created where new relationships are established, bearing 
on individual entities that have specific characteristics and specific dynamics but in 
combination act in a different way”.  
The aim of integrated assessment is articulated by Post et al (1998, p50):  
It aspires to describe – from the perspective of an identified problem or proposed project 
– the relations between the human communities concerned, their economic organization 
and their actual resource base. It qualifies, quantifies, and, as far as possible, values the 
effects of proposed and alternative interventions on the three (economic, social and 
natural) subsystems and their intersystem relations. It attempts to identify beneficial 
interventions and to fully expose unavoidable trade-offs. 
Therefore, both EIA-driven and objectives-led integrated assessment should not only 
consider the environmental, social and economic implications of proposals, but 
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should also examine the interrelations between these three pillars of the triple-
bottom-line. In the case of EIA-driven integrated assessment, this means that 
potential interlinkages between TBL impacts must be identified, while objectives-led 
integrated assessment also requires the identification of interlinkages between TBL 
objectives. 
In what follows, we provide a more detailed definition of these two contemporary 
approaches to sustainability assessment. We discuss their origins, aims, contribution 
to sustainability, and limitations. 
2.3.5 Existing approaches to sustainability assessment 
EIA-driven integrated assessment 
EIA-driven integrated assessment has its origins in the 30 years of international 
experience with traditional, project-level EIA.  
Like traditional EIA, it is defined by its reactivity, and tends to be ‘applied’ after a 
proposal has already been conceptualised. It aims to identify social and economic 
impacts of a proposal (in addition to traditional environmental impacts), and to 
compare these impacts with baseline conditions. It is then possible to determine 
whether or not the impacts are ‘acceptable’.  
George (2001, p96) describes the application of EIA-driven integrated assessment to 
international trade agreements, noting that “the prime aim of such an appraisal, often 
referred to as a sustainability impact assessment (SIA) is to identify mitigation 
measures through which adverse impacts might be minimised or avoided”.  
In terms of contribution to sustainability, EIA-driven integrated assessment reflects 
the ‘three-pillar’ or TBL model, which was conceptualised earlier as three 
intersecting circles representing the environment, society and the economy (Gibson, 
2001). This approach to sustainability assessment aims to ensure that impacts are not 
unacceptably negative overall, meaning that the guiding acceptability criterion for a 
proposal is that it does not lead to a less sustainable outcome. This approach can be 
thought of as 'direction to target', where the exact position of a sustainable state for 
that particular proposal is unknown (Figure 2.1). Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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Fig 2.1: EIA-driven integrated assessment approach to sustainability 
assessment (minimise adverse impacts) 
It is possible to foresee benefits from this way of thinking about sustainability 
assessment. In theory it can allow for a more transparent examination of the social 
and economic implications of proposals. Clearly in traditional EIA these aspects tend 
not to be examined in parallel. On the other hand, the literature and practical 
experience point to significant procedural and substantive limitations to this 
conceptualisation of sustainability assessment.  
In relation to administrative procedure, jurisdictions which do assess the social and 
economic, as well as environmental impacts of proposals tend to conduct three 
separate assessment processes, and therefore inconsistencies in the methods and 
paradigms of different sectoral assessments may inhibit implementation of more 
integrated approaches (Lee, 2002).  
To be truly integrated, the interrelations between the three ‘pillars’ of impacts must 
be considered (George, 2001), since it has been recognised that “the combined 
impacts, positive and negative, of the sets of measures as a whole, are likely to be 
more than the simple sum of the impacts of their constituent measures because of 
synergistic effects” (Lee & Kirkpatrick, 2001, p404).  
If the respective impact assessment processes are not integrated effectively, then this 
form of ‘integrated’ assessment is reduced to three separate impact assessments, each 
generating data relating to the potential environmental, social and economic impacts 
of the proposal or initiative. The three sets of data must then be ‘integrated’ in some 
way after they have been collected in order to reach a decision as to whether or not 
the proposal or initiative is acceptable within a sustainability context.  Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
      49 
This raises a substantive limitation, which is related to ‘trade-offs’ between the 
triple-bottom-line categories. Gibson (2001) suggests some trade-offs may be 
inevitable in EIA-driven integrated assessment, and the risk of environmental 
standards being traded off against socio-economic factors in such a process has been 
discussed extensively in the literature (Gibson, 2001; Jenkins et al., 2003; Lee, 2002; 
Sheate et al., 2003).  
Fuller (2002, p3) summarises these concerns by suggesting that “where trade-offs 
between the economy and the environment are seen as legitimate in the pursuit of 
sustainability, sustainability assessment could be regarded as a means for economic 
requirements to override those of the environment or the social context”. This 
concept of sustainability assessment can be seen to overly promote the prevailing 
economic agenda and thereby undermine 30 years worth of hard-won environmental 
policy gains. 
This is a valid concern since there appears to be a perception, particularly from some 
industry quarters, that EIA-driven integrated assessment processes actually increases 
the chances of project proposals being approved, in spite of clear environmental 
detriment. In the jurisdiction that we work in – Western Australia – we have seen 
recent evidence of this. In relation to perceived delays in a Government approval 
process associated with extending an iron ore mine, the Managing Director of a 
mining company stated (Weir, 2003a): 
It is a very stressful time. This is absolutely crucial to us, but as I’ve said all along I 
believe at the end of the day the Government will look at this with its triple bottom line 
approach of social and economic considerations as well as environmental considerations 
and make a sensible decision. 
In this case the Government did approve this mine extension, despite the EIA 
process having concluded that this action was likely to result in the destruction of 
rare flora (Weir, 2003b).  
Another recent case saw the Western Australian Government’s two main 
environmental advice bodies
17 recommend that an offshore gas processing plant be 
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refused approval on a sensitive island nature reserve. The Government undertook an 
EIA-driven integrated assessment for this project proposal, and approved the 
development when environmental impacts were clearly negative (Environmental 
Protection Authority, 2003)
 18. 
Earlier we said that this approach to sustainability assessment aims to ensure that 
impacts are not unacceptably negative overall. This is akin to a ‘weak’ conception of 
sustainability, which states that a proposal can be considered to be overall positive as 
long as net assets are not degraded (Neumayer, 2003). Arguably this means that a 
proposal may have positive outcomes in one of the triple-bottom-line categories, but 
negative outcomes in the other two. As long as the overall (‘net’) outcome is still 
positive, then negative impacts in two of the categories would be acceptable.  
Although Sadler (1999, p20) points out that the likelihood of win-lose scenarios can 
be reduced by the incorporation of minimum acceptability thresholds into the TBL 
model and requiring that any initiative at least meets these minimum thresholds, he 
also agrees that “beyond these boundaries, one set of criteria are either unduly 
promoted or unduly discounted against the others”. 
Objectives-led integrated assessment 
Objectives-led integrated assessment reflects a desire to achieve a particular vision 
or outcome defined by integrated environmental, social and economic objectives. It 
assesses the extent to which the implementation of a proposal contributes to this 
vision, in contrast with EIA-driven integrated assessment, which aims to ensure that 
triple bottom line impacts of a proposal are acceptable compared with baseline 
conditions.  
Objectives-led integrated assessment has its origins in objectives-led SEA. The tools 
and techniques used to undertake this kind of sustainability assessment have been 
borrowed from policy analysis and appraisal (Sheate et al., 2001, 2003).  
An objectives-led approach reflects a concept of sustainability as a goal, or series of 
goals, to which society is aspiring. As Gibson (2001, p1) notes:  
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Adopting contributions to sustainability as a key objective and test in environmental 
assessment clearly implies that minimization of negative effects is not enough. 
Assessment requirements must encourage positive steps – towards greater community 
and ecological sustainability, towards a future that is more viable, pleasant and secure.  
In our view, this means that it is a proactive approach, and has a 'direction to target' 
characteristic, although as for EIA-driven integrated assessment, the position of the 
sustainable state is unknown (Figure 2.2).  
 
Fig 2.2 Objectives-led integrated assessment approach to sustainability 
assessment (maximise objectives) 
Just as objectives-led SEA requires defined environmental objectives, objectives-led 
integrated assessment requires clearly defined environmental, social and economic 
objectives against which the assessment can be conducted.  
We suggest that an objectives-led approach is more likely to result in ‘win-win-win’ 
outcomes between the three pillars of sustainability, and is therefore less likely to 
generate conflicts and trade-offs. This would require agreement on a broad set of 
objectives reflecting the needs of all stakeholders at the commencement of the 
process. According to Gibson (2001, p20): 
For practical (environmental) assessment purposes, especially at the project level, it is 
usually desirable and often crucial to specify the relevant sustainability principles, 
objectives and criteria as fully and credibly as possible before proponents begin thinking 
about their purposes and options. 
Since the objectives define the required outcomes of the proposal under 
development, specifying objectives at the commencement of the process places the 
onus of identifying and maximising ‘win-win-wins’ on those responsible for 
developing the proposal rather on than those who may be conducting a reactive 
impact assessment once the proposal has been largely developed. The former are 
much better placed to do this, since they are involved at an earlier stage of the Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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decision-making process. There may be additional incentives if sustainability criteria 
have been applied that restrict a ‘business as usual’ approach.  
An example of objectives-led integrated assessment is the UK Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) process requiring that regional 
plans be subject to ‘sustainability appraisal’ defined as: 
a systematic and iterative process undertaken during the preparation of a plan or strategy, 
which identifies and reports on the extent to which the implementation of the plan or 
strategy would achieve the environmental, economic and social objectives by which 
sustainable development can be defined, in order that the performance of the strategy and 
policies is improved (George, 2001, p95-96; S. Smith & Sheate, 2001, p265). 
Given the prevalent view that sustainability is about positive change rather than 
simply minimising the negative, objectives-led integrated assessment clearly has 
more potential to contribute to sustainability than EIA-driven integrated assessment. 
As Gibson (2001, p19) points out: “In most jurisdictions, the essential immediate 
effect of a shift to sustainability-based criteria is an expansion of central concern 
from avoidance of significant adverse effects to expectation of positive contribution 
to the achievement of sustainability objectives, however vaguely specified”. 
However, an objectives-led approach to sustainability assessment has its own 
challenges and limitations. Issues of tiering and its practical limitations apply to 
objectives-led integrated assessment as they do to objectives-led SEA. Furthermore, 
the objectives must be consistent and compatible with each other, which in itself 
represents a challenging task since it is not uncommon for strategic objectives to be 
conflicting (George, 2001; Thérivel, 1996).  
Finally, the most important remaining question is whether the chosen triple-bottom-
line objectives really reflect ‘sustainability’. In his analysis of the UK DETR 
process, George (2001) recognises the important role of environmental, social and 
economic objectives within the decision-making process, but suggests that such 
objectives, which typically concern issues such as jobs, economic growth, housing, 
transport, services and so forth, relate to development that is not necessarily 
sustainable and therefore should guide the planning process rather than the 
sustainability assessment process. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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Towards a new conception of sustainability assessment 
Our analysis so far has pointed to the possible benefits, and the main limitations of 
the current approaches to sustainability assessment. We have indicated that we 
believe EIA-driven integrated assessment approaches allow decision-makers to ask: 
Are the triple-bottom-line impacts acceptable? The focus in these approaches is on 
minimising negative triple bottom line impacts. We have also argued that objectives-
led integrated assessment goes further to ask the question: Does this proposal make a 
positive contribution to triple bottom line goals?  
Both of these conceptions of sustainability assessment can be described as 
‘direction-to-target’ approaches. While these kinds of assessment have their place, it 
could be argued that they do not go far enough to make a significant contribution to 
sustainability. Fuller (2002) and Sadler (1999) discuss the need to measure ‘distance 
from target’ as well as ‘direction to target’. George (2001)
19 goes even further by 
stating that proposals should not be assessed for their contribution to sustainability, 
but to determine whether or not they are, in themselves, sustainable.  
In general, both approaches avoid attempting to define a condition of sustainability 
that a proposal should be required to meet. Even the earlier-mentioned UK DETR 
process - which does require assessment against “objectives by which sustainable 
development can be defined” - does not actually require that these objectives be 
achieved, requiring only that “the extent to which” the objectives of sustainable 
development would be met is identified (George, 2001, p96).  
In the next section of this article, we present an outline of a new possible conception 
of sustainability assessment that we believe goes some way towards overcoming the 
concerns we have discussed above. 
2.3.6 'Assessment for sustainability' 
In our view, and based upon the work of George (1999; 2001); Sadler (1999) and 
Gibson (2001), there is room for a new conception, where sustainability assessment 
can be defined as a process to determine whether or not a particular proposal, 
initiative or activity is, or is not, sustainable, and therefore effectively becomes a 
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yes/no question. Instead of asking: Are we heading in the right direction?, the 
alternative process allows us to ask: Are we there?  
Based upon this discussion, it is suggested that the term ‘sustainability assessment’ 
should be reserved exclusively for those processes that have the aim of determining 
whether or not an initiative is sustainable. However, to avoid confusion between 
terms, this article will use the term ‘assessment for sustainability’ to distinguish it 
from other related forms of assessment that do not share this specific aim.  
Table 2.2 compares the three conceptualisations of sustainability assessment that we 
have discussed in this article.  
The notion of ‘assessing for sustainability’ implies that sustainability is a societal 
state, or perhaps more realistically a series of societal states, with particular 
characteristics or conditions, defined by sustainability criteria.  
‘Assessment for sustainability’ could potentially be applied in a range of different 
circumstances, although there are no real-world applications that can currently be 
pointed to. It could be conducted reactively at the conclusion of decision-making, 
perhaps by regulators, to determine whether a proposal is sustainable, or proactively 
during the decision-making process to assess the sustainability of the various options 
proposed to meet a series of objectives. It could also be applied to existing practices 
and activities. In some cases it may be a stand-alone process, and in others it may be 
one component of a more complex decision-making process. 
Perhaps one of its most important applications may be to the assessment of existing 
practices.  Current impact assessment procedures only apply to new development 
proposals and often only to the (relatively) few proposals likely to have a significant 
effect on the environment. For example, in Western Australia, EIA is only applied 
for some 30-40 proposals each year. Ongoing land-use activities, such as natural 
resource management (fishing, agriculture, forestry and so forth.) or urban life (for 
example, use of private motor cars) are not subject to assessment processes. 
Assessment for sustainability could be applied equally to existing and proposed land-
uses or other human activities. Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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Table 2.2:  Comparison of three conceptualisations of sustainability assessment 
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It has been suggested that to be effective and an instrument for change, assessment 
processes, including ‘assessment for sustainability’, must be applied: 
•  within a structured framework (Jenkins et al., 2003); 
•  to proposed new initiatives at all levels of decision-making (Noble, 2002a); 
•  to existing practices across all sectors (Jenkins et al., 2003); 
•  to the prevailing policy and legislative paradigm (Dovers, 2002);  
•  to any decision with the potential to impact on patterns of production and 
consumption; governance and settlement (Dovers, 2002); and 
•  by all sectors of society (Devuyst, 2001). 
One of the main implications for this conception of sustainability assessment is that 
it necessarily requires a clear vision of what sustainability means. Further, this vision 
needs to be translated into context-specific sustainability criteria. Sustainability 
criteria should effectively separate sustainable outcomes from unsustainable ones for 
the purposes of the assessment process, which would then ask whether or not these 
criteria have been met.  
Determining ‘assessment for sustainability’ criteria  
In our view there are two overarching approaches to the development of ‘assessment 
for sustainability’ criteria. One generates criteria by assuming that simultaneous 
achievement of a series of environmental, social, and economic goals or objectives 
defines a state of sustainability. This is effectively a ‘bottom-up’ approach in which 
objectives are defined in relation to baseline conditions. One problem with this kind 
of approach is knowing how to judge when the extension has reached far enough to 
achieve the goal of sustainability. Quoting George (2001, p96) again: 
The extent to which an appraisal will achieve its aim depends critically upon the extent to 
which the chosen objectives do indeed define sustainable development. It is insufficient 
for them to be a combined set of environmental, economic and social objectives. They 
must be objectives ‘by which sustainable development can be defined’. 
The alternative approach to the development of assessment for sustainability criteria, 
and the one that we favour, assumes a ‘top-down’ generation of criteria. It begins Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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with the concept of sustainability as a state to which society aspires, and then moves 
on to define this state in terms of sustainability criteria. 
The UK DETR process is an example of a process which seeks to define a condition 
of sustainability in terms of TBL objectives. The practical difficulties of developing 
a consistent and compatible set of environmental, social and economic objectives 
that truly define sustainability have already been discussed. In addition to the 
inherent difficulties of a ‘bottom up’ approach, we also suggest that the problems 
arise from the TBL conceptualisation of sustainability.  
Firstly, as has already been discussed, the separation of the concept of sustainability 
into the three pillars of the triple bottom line tends to emphasise potentially 
competing interests rather than the linkages and interdependencies between them, 
making the task of integration extremely difficult and promoting trade-offs, often at 
the expense of the environment (Gibson, 2001; Jenkins et al., 2003; Lee, 2002; 
Sheate et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, the TBL can be considered a reductionist approach to sustainability, 
and that dividing the holistic concept of sustainability into three pillars as a starting 
point invariably runs the risk of the sum of the parts being less than the whole. This 
is particularly true if the interrelations between the three pillars are not adequately 
understood and described, and therefore sustainability is reduced to a consideration 
of separate environmental, social and economic factors, the sum of which is less than 
the whole, that is, sustainability. Gibson (2001, p17) expresses this concern by 
pointing out that there are sustainability-related discourses that are: “not always 
incorporated in pillar-based sustainability literature and practice”. 
In addition, Gibson (2001, p7) points out that the three pillars of the triple bottom 
line, although recognised to be interconnected and interdependent, still: “reflect more 
or less conventional modern disciplinary categories” whereas sustainability should 
be “necessarily an attack on conventional thinking and practice” (Gibson, 2001, p6). 
As an alternative to the triple bottom line, Gibson (2001) promotes the use of a 
principles-based approach to sustainability assessment, in which sustainability 
criteria are derived from sustainability principles rather than triple bottom line goals. 
He argues that a principles-based approach emphasises interconnections and Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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interdependencies between the pillar areas rather than promoting conflicts and trade-
offs. Therefore, a principles-based approach could avoid some of the inherent 
limitations of the triple bottom line approach to sustainability. 
In presenting his model, Gibson (2001, p8) states:  
We have therefore chosen here to propose a slightly different approach – one that avoids 
constructing the edifice of sustainability criteria on the conventional pillars…The 
alternative, which is perhaps only superficially different from the pillar approach, is to 
begin not with categories based on the usual areas of concern (ecological, social etc.) but 
with a list of the key changes needed in human arrangements and activities if we are to 
move towards long term viability and well-being.  
Similarly, in presenting the approach he calls ‘environmental sustainability 
assurance’ Sadler (1999, p17) discusses the establishment of “'benchmark principles’ 
which are robust enough to evaluate the ‘sustainability contours’ of development 
proposals and choices”.  
George (2001) also reaches the conclusion that a principles-based approach to 
developing sustainability criteria is the more appropriate, after recognising the 
limitations of the objectives-led approach in the UK. He recommends an approach to 
sustainability assessment based upon fundamental principles of sustainability as 
defined by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, as does Sadler (1999). 
The use of the Rio Declaration principles is also supported by the International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) in its performance criteria for SEA where 
it is suggested that the ultimate objective of sustainability assessment should be to 
determine how proposals can best contribute “to the overall sustainable development 
strategy as laid down in Rio 1992 and defined in the specific policies or values of a 
country” (International Association for Impact Assessment, 2002).  
Other principles-based approaches to the development of assessment for 
sustainability criteria include the Natural Step System Conditions (Sadler, 1999; The 
Natural Step, 2001). 
The principles used to define sustainability will clearly depend upon the prevailing 
conceptualisation of sustainability in the context in which the assessment is Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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conducted. As we have discussed throughout this article, sustainability is not a 
simple concept to define and there are a large number of different interpretations.  
In order to provide an example of principle-based criteria, Table 2.3 presents the 
sustainability principles that have been developed for Western Australia and the 
criteria for sustainability assessment that have been derived from the principles 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003b, p40). Clearly the criteria are generic and 
insufficiently defined to form the basis of an ‘assessment for sustainability’ process. 
The next stage in the process of defining criteria for the purposes of assessment 
would be to operationalise the criteria in Table 2.3 specifically for the assessment at 
hand.  
2.3.7 Summary and conclusions 
This article has reviewed the evolving concept of ‘sustainability assessment’ by 
firstly considering its origins as a member of the family of environmental assessment 
processes that includes environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA), where a distinction was made between EIA-
driven, and objectives-led processes.  
The potential for these processes to contribute to sustainability was then discussed. 
Typically, this has involved the expansion of the scope of environmental assessment 
processes to include social and economic considerations as well as environmental 
issues, reflecting the ‘triple-bottom-line’ or ‘three-pillar’ approach to sustainability 
and resulting in forms of integrated assessment. Examples of EIA-driven and 
objectives-led integrated assessment were provided, and the risks and challenges of 
these approaches discussed. In particular, the practical difficulty of integrating 
environmental, social and economic considerations in a way that fully recognises 
interactions and interlinkages, and that maximises ‘win-win-wins’ and minimises 
trade-offs was acknowledged. 
These forms of integrated assessment were then reviewed for their contributions to 
sustainability. It was argued that EIA-driven integrated assessment tends to focus on 
minimising negative impacts and reducing unsustainable practices, but fails to 
address the concept of sustainability as a societal goal. Objectives-led integrated 
assessment was found to be far more compatible with the concept of sustainability, Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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since it assesses the contribution of a proposal to aspirational objectives, rather than 
against baseline conditions.  
Table 2.3: Western Australian sustainability principles and criteria 
Principles  Criteria 
Long-term economic health. Sustainability recognises the 
needs of current and future generations for long-term 
economic health, innovation, diversity and productivity of 
the earth. 
Provides both short and long-
term economic gain. 
Equity and human rights. Sustainability recognises that an 
environment needs to be created where all people can 
express their full potential and lead productive lives and 
that significant gaps in sufficiency, safety and opportunity 
endanger the earth. 
Increases access, equity and 
human rights in the provision 
of material security and 
effective choices. 
Biodiversity and ecological integrity. Sustainability 
recognises that all life has intrinsic value and is 
interconnected and that biodiversity and ecological 
integrity are part of the irreplaceable life support systems 
upon which the earth depends. 
Improves biodiversity and 
ecological integrity and builds 
life support systems 
Settlement efficiency and quality of life. Sustainability 
recognises that settlements need to reduce their 
ecological footprint (i.e. less material and energy demands 
and reduction in waste) while they simultaneously improve 
their quality of life (health, housing, employment, 
community…) 
Reduces ecological footprint 
while improving quality of life 
Community, regions, ‘sense of place’ and heritage. 
Sustainability recognises the significance and diversity of 
community and regions for the management of the earth, 
and the critical importance of ‘sense of place’ and heritage 
(buildings, townscapes, landscapes and culture) in any 
plans for the future. 
Builds up community and 
regions, ‘sense of place’ and 
heritage protection 
Net benefit from development. Sustainability means that 
all development, and particularly development involving 
extraction of non-renewable resources, should strive to 
provide net environmental, social and economic benefit for 
future generations. 
Provides conservation benefits 
and net social-economic 
benefit 
Common good from planning. Sustainability recognises 
that planning for the common good requires equitable 
distribution of public resources (like air, water and open 
space) so that ecosystem functions are maintained and a 
shared resource is available to all. 
Increases ‘common good’ 
resources 
Precaution. Sustainability requires caution, avoiding poorly 
understood risks of serious or irreversible damage to 
environmental, economic or social capital, designing for 
surprise and managing for adaptation. 
Ensures there are acceptable 
levels of risk with adaptation 
processes for the worst case 
scenarios 
Hope, vision, symbolic and iterative change. Sustainability 
recognises that applying these principles as part of a 
broad strategic vision for the earth can generate hope in 
the future, and thus it will involve symbolic change that is 
part of many successive steps over generations. 
Brings change and a sense of 
hope for the future as it is 
linked to a broader strategic 
vision Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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However, it was pointed out that most applications of integrated assessment 
processes in practice, even objective-led processes that attempt to define 
sustainability in terms of TBL objectives, tend to limit themselves to measuring 
whether or not a proposal represents a positive or negative contribution to 
sustainability. In other words, they consider ‘direction to target’, where the target is a 
sustainable society. It has been pointed out that while this may be useful, it may not 
be sufficient to drive the kind of change required in the pursuit of this goal and that 
processes are needed that actually assess whether an initiative is, or is not, 
sustainable. For the purposes of this article, such processes have been termed 
“assessment for sustainability’ approaches. 
‘Assessment for sustainability’ requires a clear definition of sustainability and 
corresponding criteria against which the assessment can be conducted. While 
sustainability criteria could theoretically be developed through a triple-bottom-line 
interpretation of sustainability, this approach has practical challenges and conceptual 
limitations. Several writers have therefore recommended principles-based criteria for 
sustainability that avoid the problems of the TBL approach.  
Furthermore, ‘assessment for sustainability’ does not replace all applications of EIA-
driven impact assessment or objectives-led processes of decision-making. Rather, it 
is an additional tool that can be effectively applied within a decision-making 
framework to ensure that decisions are in fact sustainable. It can also be used 
retrospectively as a stand-alone process to evaluate existing practices for 
sustainability. It can and should be applied broadly, to both proposed and existing 
practices, and to all levels of decision-making. 
The major conclusions drawn are therefore: 
•  Sustainability assessment should assess whether or not an initiative is 
sustainable, and not simply assess ‘direction to target’. For the purposes of 
this paper, such processes have been termed ‘assessment for sustainability’;  
•  ‘Assessment for sustainability’ requires a clear concept of sustainability as a 
societal goal, defined by criteria against which the assessment is conducted 
and which effectively separate sustainable outcomes from unsustainable ones; 
and Chapter 2: Opening Pandora’s box 
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•  While a triple-bottom-line view of sustainability could theoretically be used as 
a starting point to develop these criteria, in practice this is unlikely to be 
successful, and principles-based approaches are recommended. 
2.4  Conclusion  
This chapter has described my own first attempts at making sense of sustainability 
assessment. It has drawn upon the impact assessment literature and my experiences 
with Government policy processes from 2002 to 2004. The first stage in the 
alleviation of my own confusion was the development of my conceptual framework 
for the application of sustainability assessment, which categorised as being internal 
or external, ex post or ex ante. The second was the heuristic framework proposed in 
the literature review, consisting of three models of sustainability assessment, 
distinguished by their embedded interpretations of sustainability and the processes 
with which each appeared to align
20.  
As I continued my research, becoming involved with several sustainability 
assessment case studies and also contributing further to Government policy 
development in 2004, I began to challenge my own conclusions as expressed in the 
literature review article. Writing this thesis has thus provided me with an opportunity 
to acknowledge some of the limitations and flaws in the article, as well as its 
strengths. These reflections emerge throughout my thesis and this chapter therefore 
provides the background against which the further learning and understanding can be 
described.   
The range of the Working Group discussions exposed the complexities of what the 
group was collectively trying to achieve in implementing the Government’s 
commitments to sustainability assessment. While my literature review focused on the 
nature of sustainability
21, other Working Group themes remain to be discussed in 
detail. Of particular importance are process methodologies and institutional and 
governance structures for sustainability assessment, including the relationship 
between internal proponent processes and external, regulatory assessment. Both of 
these themes enter the discussion in Chapter 4 in the context of the Gorgon case 
                                                         
20 I revisit the relationships between interpretation of sustainability and process methodologies in 
Chapter 4. 
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study and the discussion continues in Chapter 6 in relation to the SWY assessment. 
The potential role of deliberative processes and dialogue in sustainability 
assessment, first raised in the Working Group also emerges as an important theme in 
later discussions (see Chapters 6 and 7).  
While Chapter 2 has been based in the impact assessment literature and in various 
mainly abstract discussions and activities, Chapter 3 moves into the first case study, 
the Gorgon assessment. This is appropriate in terms of the thesis structure, because 
although the Western Australian policy community’s collective understanding of 
sustainability assessment was even more limited at the time than the conclusions of 
Chapter 2 would suggest, Gorgon can be usefully discussed in terms of these 
conclusions for the purposes of highlighting the tensions that arise when the concepts 
of traditional impact assessment are applied to sustainability assessment. Chapter 3 
then provides a launch pad into new ways of looking at and thinking about 
sustainability assessment.Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
3.1  Introduction
1 
ChevronTexaco, in conjunction with its joint venture (JV) partners Shell and 
ExxonMobil, approached the Western Australian Government in 2001 seeking 
access to Barrow Island off the coast of Western Australia (see Figure 1.1) for the 
purpose of constructing a plant to process gas from the Gorgon gasfields. The 
proponent maintained that the island represented the only commercially viable 
location for the development.  
This request represented a significant political challenge to Government, as 
described earlier, because the 23 500 hectare Barrow Island has been classified as an 
A Class Nature Reserve since 1910 by virtue of its significant conservation value, 
and industrial development on the island contravenes the pre-election platform of the 
incumbent Government. The island is home to a unique ecosystem, with endemic 
flora and fauna and species that are now extinct on the mainland. It is also free from 
many common vermin and weeds. Barrow Island, however, has also supported an 
operating oilfield since 1967, which is now managed by ChevronTexaco, the major 
partner in the Gorgon JV. Therefore, the proponent claimed extensive knowledge of 
Barrow Island and a good record of quarantine and environmental management.  
In recognition of the conservation significance of Barrow Island, and the potential 
benefits that could flow to the State of Western Australia from gas development 
there, the Western Australian Cabinet agreed to assess the proposed development 
plan at a strategic level to determine whether an in-principle approval for access to 
Barrow Island could be granted to the Gorgon JV. The assessment process involved 
evaluation of the strategic, economic, social and environmental ramifications of the 
plan, as far as these could be determined at a strategic level based upon the available 
information, and represented the first attempt by the Government of Western 
Australia to conduct such an integrated assessment. Since there remains no 
legislative basis for such a process (see Chapter 1), the Gorgon assessment process 
was ‘custom-made’ in response to the Cabinet decision. On September 8
th 2003, 
following the completion of the integrated strategic assessment of the proposed 
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development plan
2, the Government of Western Australia granted the proponent in-
principle access to Barrow Island subject to the outcome of the statutory 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process.  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe in detail, from the perspectives of those 
involved, how the Gorgon assessment process unfolded leading up to the decision of 
8
th September 2003.  
3.2  Background and context 
In this section I establish the background and context against which the detailed 
discussion of the Gorgon assessment process, which follows in Section 3.3, may be 
read. I commence with a brief overview of the development proposal itself; its broad 
strategic, environmental, social and economic implications; and its specific points of 
contention. I then provide some further detail of the Western Australian policy, 
legislative and institutional context within which the Gorgon assessment was 
conducted, and an overview of the assessment process.  
3.2.1 The proposed Gorgon gas development 
The Greater Gorgon Gasfields, located approximately 130 kilometres off the north-
west coast of Western Australia, are among the largest ever discovered in Australia. 
The fields are estimated to contain over 40 trillion cubic feet of gas (ChevronTexaco, 
2003a). At present, Australia uses and exports a total of about 1 trillion cubic feet of 
gas per year. ChevronTexaco is the operator of the Gorgon gasfields, and plans to 
develop them with its joint venture partners. Following 20 years of investigation into 
alternative development and marketing options, the Gorgon JV identified Barrow 
Island as the only commercially viable location for the initial stage of the 
development. 
At the time of the Gorgon assessment, several options were available to the 
proponent for the development of the Gorgon gasfields. These included a liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) plant producing LNG for export, a range of Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) 
processes, a gas plant supplying natural gas to the Western Australian domestic gas 
                                                         
2 As discussed in Chapter 1, the integrated strategic assessment should not be confused with the 
statutory EIA process under Part IV of the Environmental Protection Act 1986, which is nearing 
completion at the time of writing in October 2006. The relationship between the two levels of 
assessment is discussed in Section 3.3.1. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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market by connection into the existing transmission and distribution network, or 
combinations of these. Since the Gorgon assessment was conducted at a strategic 
level to determine whether in-principle approval could be granted for access to 
Barrow Island for an initial development, and was not a detailed impact assessment 
of a specific project proposal (the subject of the subsequent statutory EIA process), 
the proponent was not required to commit to a development concept at that stage. 
For the purposes of the strategic assessment, the Gorgon JV presented an illustrative 
reference case for the initial development of the resource. 
This reference case was based upon a gas processing facility initially producing LNG 
for the international market, but with the potential to supply gas into the Western 
Australian domestic market, or to a GTL plant, in the future. The required 
infrastructure included offshore wells for gas production, corrosion resistant 
pipelines bringing the gas onshore to a processing facility to remove water and 
carbon dioxide, a single-train LNG process, and pipelines and other infrastructure for 
the injection of the stripped carbon dioxide into the deep (2000 metre) saline Dupuy 
aquifer in a process of geosequestration. The proponent requested access to 300 
hectares of land on Barrow Island to meet both its immediate and future 
development needs. There was no commitment to future development options. The 
proponent’s alternative sites analysis and the discussion of potential impacts were 
based upon this development reference case (ChevronTexaco, 2003a). 
3.2.2 Substantive issues and points of contention 
This section provides a brief description of the most controversial substantive issues 
associated with the Gorgon development proposal, which were common themes in 
the public submissions and were the main subjects of debates within Government 
during the data collection phase. It is not intended to explore the complexities of 
these issues, but simply to provide some context and substance for the ensuing 
discussion.  
Alternative Locations 
The proponent claimed that only Barrow Island represented a commercially viable 
option for its reference case development option, by virtue of its proximity to the 
gasfields. Several alternative locations, both on other islands and on the mainland, 
were potentially available to the proponent. None of these has conservation values as Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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significant as Barrow Island, but some have other constraints. For example the 
Montebello Islands were claimed to be commercially and socially unacceptable by 
the Gorgon Joint Venture, despite being economically competitive, because nuclear 
testing was conducted in the area in the 1950s. 
The proponent stated its intention to inject carbon dioxide into the Dupuy saline 
aquifer beneath Barrow Island, a decision that had the effect of adding further weight 
to the selection of Barrow Island as the proponent’s preferred location for the gas 
processing plant
3. Other aquifers in alternative locations may have represented viable 
alternatives, but had not been investigated to the same extent as the Dupuy at the 
time of the assessment, and therefore were considered to have a higher order of 
technical risk. 
The selected development reference case also had implications for the alternative 
sites analysis, and there was also criticism of the multi-criteria methodology applied 
by the proponent in its alternative sites analysis
4. 
State strategic issues 
Government recognised that the Gorgon development plan had the potential to 
deliver significant strategic, economic and social benefits to the State of Western 
Australia. These local benefits would, however, be considerably greater with Gorgon 
gas or gas products available on the domestic, rather than the export, market, an 
outcome that was not part of the proposed development plan submitted for 
assessment
5. 
                                                         
3 It was suggested at Reference Group meetings that if the ability to geosequester into the Dupuy 
aquifer was the determining factor in the proponent’s preference for Barrow Island, then a conscious 
choice should be made between the relative environmental significance of the geosequestration of the 
gas versus the conservation values of Barrow Island. It was argued by the EPA that the conservation 
values should have precedence and therefore the development should be moved to another location, 
even if that meant that geosequestration became infeasible (Environmental Protection Authority, 
2003). 
4 The EPA commissioned an expert review of the multi-criteria analysis, which found the 
methodology to be deeply flawed (Environmental Protection Authority, 2003). The Expert Panel 
appoined to conduct the strategic, environmental and social assessment on behalf of DoIR (see 
Section 3.2.4) however, responded by saying that despite this it was convinced that the conclusion of 
the analysis that Barrow Island was the only economically viable location for the development was 
correct (Allen Consulting Group, 2003). 
5 Note that the requirement for ‘gas to shore’ was subsequently embedded in the Barrow Island Act 
2004 and appended Agreement, the legislation enabling the Cabinet decision of 8
th September 2003. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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Of particular concern was the distribution of revenue from the project between the 
State and Commonwealth Governments. Economic modelling indicated that State 
Government revenue would increase by $980 million over the life of the project, 
while $17 billion would flow to the Commonwealth Government, mainly through 
the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax and corporate taxes (ChevronTexaco, 2003b). 
Development reference case 
The development reference case of an LNG plant was used by the proponent as the 
basis for its analysis of costs and also the potential impacts of its proposal. It was 
known at the time, however, that various proposals for gas-to-liquid (GTL) plants 
were being developed, which could have become foundation customers of the initial 
Gorgon development.  
Furthermore, although the proponent expressed a commitment to delivering gas to 
the domestic market at some point in the future, this was also excluded from the 
development reference case. Concerns were also raised that the costs of future 
pipelines to the mainland for the purposes of supplying the domestic gas market 
were not included in the cost comparisons of the alternatives sites, thus biasing the 
analysis against mainland locations. The proponent responded that including these 
costs would not have affected the final ranking of the alternative sites 
(ChevronTexaco, 2003b). 
Questions were raised as to what effect a fuller consideration of all of the options 
may have had on the analysis (ChevronTexaco, 2003b), and why these options were 
not discussed in the public domain
6. 
Quarantine 
Quarantine breaches represent the most significant environmental threat to Barrow 
Island, since the island is free from many feral competitors, predators and weeds 
found on the mainland that pose a risk to the unique ecology of the island. 
Quarantine issues were, therefore, the subject of many public submissions that called 
for detailed risk assessments and information regarding quarantine management 
practices, particularly in light of the predicted numbers of vessel and personnel 
movements during the various phases of the project. Several submissions also 
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challenged the proponent’s claims of effective quarantine management in the past, 
citing examples of previous weed infestations (ChevronTexaco, 2003c). 
Net conservation benefits 
The proponent was required to demonstrate net conservation benefits (NCBs) 
associated with the plan, whereby it would contribute to the enhancement of 
conservation values, over and above any values that might be lost, similar to those of 
Barrow Island, in a different location
7. At this time Western Australia did not have a 
policy for green offsets or NCBs
8 and therefore a proposal was developed 
specifically for the Gorgon case. Issues discussed by the Reference Group and in the 
public submissions related to what types of benefits would be considered acceptable, 
what their monetary value should be, and who should be responsible for managing 
them. 
Other environmental issues 
While the proponent claimed that environmental impacts resulting from the proposed 
development could be mitigated and managed, there was strong feeling from some 
sectors of Government and the community that industry and conservation values are 
inherently incompatible and therefore, that Barrow Island should be protected as a 
nature reserve with no additional industrial development. 
A wide range of environmental issues were discussed throughout the data collection 
phase, including the climate change implications of the use of fossil fuels, waste 
disposal, existing soil and groundwater contamination, the lack of detailed 
knowledge about many aspects to the island’s ecosystem, wildlife ‘road kill’ as a 
result of vehicle movements, and the potential environmental impacts of gas leaks 
and fires. The credibility and thoroughness of many of the ecological studies 
undertaken by the proponent were also challenged, particularly those concerned with 
migratory birds and stygofauna. It is important to note, however, that potential 
environmental impacts are the subject of more detailed analysis in the subsequent 
EIA process.  
                                                         
7 This requirement was stated in the Minister for State Development’s letter of 20th November 2001, 
which is discussed in Section 3.2.4. 
8 The EPA has subsequently released a draft position statement of environmental offsets 
(Environmental Protection Authority, 2005) and it is generally considered that the Gorgon case 
provided the impetus for this action. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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Geosequestration 
The proponent stated its intention to inject the 12 per cent carbon dioxide separated 
from the gas into a deep saline aquifer, a process known as geosequestration. 
Without geosequestration, the project would contribute significantly to Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Gorgon JV proposed the Dupuy aquifer, located 
beneath Barrow Island, as it had increased knowledge of this aquifer compared with 
others by virtue of its existing oil operations on Barrow Island, as well as its 
favourable characteristics. 
Concerns raised about geosequestration related to the lack of proven technology at 
this scale, the lack of knowledge about the likely behaviour of the stored gas and 
particularly whether it might cause geological fracturing, the potential impacts on 
other oil and gas wells in the area, and the possibility of gas ‘leaking’ in the future 
and whose responsibility this would be (ChevronTexaco, 2003b).  
3.2.3 A closer look at the context 
Against the backdrop of the broader Western Australian legislative and policy 
context, two competing views on the Gorgon proposal could be discerned within the 
community. 
Mining in National Parks 
The proponent’s claim that Barrow Island represented the only potentially 
commercially viable location for the gas processing plant represented a significant 
political challenge to the Western Australian Government due to the island’s status 
as an A Class Nature Reserve. The political sensitivity that would have surrounded 
the proposal anyway was greatly intensified by the election platform of the 
incumbent Labor Government of Western Australia stating that it would “prohibit 
mineral and petroleum exploration and mining in National Parks and nature 
reserves” (Australian Labor Party Western Australian Branch, 2001).  
It was initially argued by some that the proposed gas processing plant did not 
constitute mining (see Box 3.1), and furthermore that this statement was an election 
promise and not Government policy. However, political realities ensured that this 
argument did not persist, and it was eventually conceded that that most members of Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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the public would have considered a development such as Gorgon located within a 
National Park or nature reserve to be counter to the spirit of this election promise
9. 
Box 3.1: Gorgon and the Western Australian mining legislation 
 
                                                         
9 As already described in Chapter 1, there is a common perception that the ‘green vote’ won Labor the 
2001 election, particularly due to their stance on the protection of old-growth forests in the South 
West of Western Australia.  
Section 8 of the Western Australian Mining Act 1978 includes the following 
definitions: 
“mine”, as a noun, means any place in, on or under which mining operations are carried 
on; 
“mining” includes fossicking, prospecting and exploring for minerals, and mining 
operations; 
“mining operations” means any mode or method of working whereby the earth or any 
rock structure, stone fluid or mineral bearing substance may be disturbed, removed, 
washed, sifted, crushed, leached, roasted, distilled, evaporated, smelted or refined or dealt 
with for the purpose of obtaining any mineral therefrom whether it has been previously 
disturbed or not and includes: 
(a)  the removal of overburden by mechanical or other means and the stacking, 
deposit, storage and treatment of any substance considered to contain any mineral; 
(b)  operations by means of which salt or other evaporatives may be harvested; 
(c)  operations by means of which mineral is recovered from the sea or a natural water 
supply; and 
(d)  the doing of all lawful acts incident or conducive to any such operation or 
purposes;  
“minerals” means naturally occurring substances obtained or obtainable from any 
land by mining operations carried out on or under the surface of the land, but does not 
include —  
(a) soil;  
(b) a substance the recovery of which is governed by the Petroleum Act 1967 or the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 ;  Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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The strong environmental platform upon which the Government was elected in 
February 2001 sat alongside the culture of resource development policy (see Chapter 
1) that supports the development of State resources to deliver economic prosperity 
and social benefits to the people of Western Australia. In this context and following 
several years of informal discussions with Government, the Gorgon JV approached 
the Western Australian Government in 2001 seeking approval in principle for access 
to Barrow Island. At this point, the proponent was unwilling to submit a formal 
proposal for EIA under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 without some degree 
of certainty that it would not be rejected immediately on policy grounds, since the 
State Government environment and conservation agencies had already recommended 
against a previous proposal. For this reason, the proponent was seeking in-principle 
approval of access to Barrow Island to enable it to continue its marketing efforts with 
more certainty and justify the commencement of front-end engineering design for the 
development. If in-principle approval were granted, a more detailed project proposal 
would be subject to EIA at the State and Federal levels
10.  
                                                         
10 The Gorgon development plan also triggered the Commonwealth of Australia’s Environmental 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), which includes provisions for both 
strategic environmental assessment and EIA by virtue of its potential impacts on matters of ‘national 
environmental significance’, specifically ‘listed threatened species and ecological communities’, and 
‘the Commonwealth marine area’. However, although it would have been possible to conduct a 
strategic assessment under the s146 of the EPBC Act, the Commonwealth environmental agency, 
Environment Australia, agreed that provided it remained involved on an informal basis, the Western 
Australian process under s16e of the Environmental Protection Act 1986 would provide sufficient 
information and therefore a formal process under the EPBC Act would not be necessary at the 
strategic level.  
(c) a meteorite as defined in the Museum Act 1969 ; or  
(d) any of the following substances if it occurs on private land —  
(i) limestone, rock or gravel;  
(ii) shale, other than oil shale;  
(iii) sand, other than mineral sand, silica sand or garnet sand; or  
(iv) clay, other than kaolin, bentonite, attapulgite or montmorillonite 
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The 'pro-development' view 
The pro-development view of the Gorgon proposal is perhaps best illustrated by a 
comment piece that appeared in the Weekend Australian newspaper on 8
th February 
2003, which is reproduced in Box 3.2. 
Box 3.2: The 'pro-development' case for Gorgon 
Harry Butler, legend of natural history television, first visited Barrow Island as a 
young naturalist and stayed on as an environmental consultant when a licence to drill 
for oil was granted in the mid-1950s.  
It is his efforts, and the cooperation of Wapet (Western Australian Petroleum), now 
part of ChevronTexaco, that turned a scrubby, low-lying piece of unrelieved dirt into 
an internationally renowned icon of conservation. 
Without the involvement of the oil industry, Barrow Island would not have an 
inventory of 15 land mammals, seven marine mammals, 110 species of birds and 40 
reptiles (including the perentie, a fabulous-looking lizard), making it a genetically 
important island. 
It is a simple issue for the developers: if they don’t get access to Barrow, Australia 
loses an initial $6 billion investment and a further $5 billion in downstream activity by 
2020. 
But for the WA Government the issue is far more complex. 
The governing Labor Party dumped on some of its traditional worker support before 
the last election, sacrificing timber worker jobs in a bid to pick up part of the 
conservation vote and win green preferences. 
Partly as a result, the WA Upper House is controlled by Green MPs who remain to be 
convinced that an LNG plant on Barrow Island is such a good idea. 
For Canberra, in a year when the Prime Minister is determined to make energy a 
political winner, Gorgon gas could be an important contributor to changing the 
national energy mix. 
The economic argument is relatively simple. Whether it wins out against soft furry 
animals and prowling perenties remains very much an open question. 
Source: Wilson (2003) Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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The ‘green’ view 
The ‘green’ view of the proposed Gorgon gas development is illustrated by the 
extract from the website of the Conservation Council of Western Australia 
(Conservation Council of Western Australia, 2003) in Box 3.3. 
Box 3.3: The ‘green’ case against Gorgon 
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil and Shell (the Gorgon partners) are currently proposing 
to put over $6 billion worth of industrial gas processing plant and equipment on the 
Barrow Island infrastructure that could be located offshore, on the mainland or on less 
important islands nearby. 
According to Gorgon the proposal is likely to involve: 
  Liquid Natural Gas processing; 
  Gas to liquids processing; and 
  A compressed domestic gas capability. 
Workers swarming over Australia’s ark? 
A huge workforce will be required to build the proposed facilities – a manifold 
increase in the level of human industrial activity presently occurring on Barrow 
Island. This activity is one of the central threats posed to the 24 known types of 
animals (including five types of mammal) that live nowhere else but Barrow – put 
simply, with people comes the risk of weeds and disease that could wipe out the 
island’s environmental values forever. 
Presently, only 150 barge movements occur per year and only 150 people live on 
Barrow Island at any one time. Yet this relatively low level of activity has led to 27 
recorded breaches of quarantine. These breaches resulted in the introduction of eight 
known species of environmental weed, four of which remain on Barrow. In recent 
years it has also been necessary to implement eradication programmes for black rats, 
house mice, and European bees. 
The Gorgon proposal estimates that 861 barge movements and 52,307 personnel 
movements per year will be required to build the new facilities. This will dramatically 
increase the probability of pests and weeds arriving on the island – indeed, the 
Environmental Protection Authority considers that weed or pest invasion is “virtually 
certain”. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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Threats posed by a temporarily contracted workforce 
Gorgon proposes that the bulk of the work done in the construction phase will be done 
by temporary contractors. The EPA warns that this transitory workforce will be unable 
to meet appropriate quarantine standards – standards that even the current permanent 
employees on Barrow Island have been unable to meet. 
What would happen if there was further invasion? 
Barrow Island has existing infestations of Buffel Grass (Cenchrus ciliaris) and Kapok 
(Aerva javanica). Thus far these weeds have proved impossible to eradicate. 
The eradication of further invasive species, such as ants, mice and rats, could prove 
impossible to undertake without irreversibly damaging Barrow Island’s native species 
and ecosystems.   
The potential for disease-causing pathogens that could kill native animal and plant 
species is also very worrying.  A disease like the virus that caused kangaroo blindness 
disease would have the potential to quickly devastate Barrow Island. 
Climate threat 
Gorgon gas is very dirty! Gorgon gas has a reservoir carbon dioxide content of 14%, 
compared with other gas sources, where 3% is the usual level.  If allowed to proceed 
the proposal could cause the annual emission of approximately 8 million tonnes of 
climate-threatening greenhouse gases. 
Source: Conservation Council of Western Australia (2003) 
3.2.4 Overview of the Gorgon assessment process 
In response to the proponent’s request for access to Barrow Island, the Minister for 
State Development stated in a letter dated 20th November 2001 (ChevronTexaco, 
2003a, Appendix 1):  
Against this backdrop and without any guarantee of outcome, the Government is 
prepared to give consideration, after the relevant environmental, social, economic and 
strategic ramifications have been examined and the results made available, to the 
restricted use of Barrow in relation to the initial development of the Gorgon project, 
provided that there are net conservation benefits associated with the proposed 
development. I would anticipate that the reports relating to environmental, social, 
economic and strategic ramifications would include comparisons with outcomes that 
would occur if alternative locations were used for the project. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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This was also enshrined in a Cabinet decision conveying the context within which 
the Government would consider the proposed development plan
11. The Gorgon 
assessment process was developed in response to this decision. 
Designing the process 
Although both the State Sustainability Strategy (Government of Western Australia, 
2002a, 2003b) and the Keating Review (Government of Western Australia, 2002b) 
recommend that sustainability assessments be conducted on projects of State 
significance, neither of these studies was complete in late 2001 when the Gorgon JV 
approached the Western Australian Government. There was a need, therefore, to 
develop a suitable, ‘custom made’ process specifically to meet Government 
requirements with respect to the strategic assessment of the Gorgon development 
plan in order to meet the time requirements of both the proponent and Government. 
Responsibility for devising the process rested with DoIR, which collaborated with 
the DoE to establish the following principles as the basis for the Gorgon assessment 
process (Pope, 2003b): 
•  The assessment process should be managed through a whole of Government 
approach; 
•  The environmental assessment should be conducted under s16e of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986, which allows the EPA to provide 
environmental advice to the Minister for the Environment on strategic matters, 
following the Administrative Procedures for EIA undertaken under Part IV of 
the Act (Environmental Protection Authority, 2002); 
•  The social, economic and strategic assessment should mirror and be 
synchronised with the process for the environmental assessment; 
•  The assessments should incorporate public review and comment; 
•  The process should provide Government with sufficient information to make 
an in-principle decision regarding access to Barrow Island from a high level, 
strategic perspective, recognising that if this in-principle approval were to be 
granted, a detailed EIA under Part IV of the Environmental Protection Act 
                                                         
11 Cabinet documentation in Western Australia is not publicly available and therefore the Cabinet 
decision cannot be reproduced here. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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(1986) and the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (EPBC Act) would be subsequently conducted. 
Process overview 
As the first stage of the scoping process, DoIR produced the Economic and Social 
Evaluation of Petroleum Proposal Guidelines, which defined the factors, other than 
environmental factors, that the Gorgon JV was required to consider in its proposal 
and impact statement. The EPA’s Administrative Procedures for EIA under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (Environmental Protection Authority, 2002) 
require the proponent to initiate an environmental scoping process, to be 
subsequently approved by the EPA. This same approach was applied to the strategic-
level assessment of Gorgon. In this context, the proponent elected to conduct its own 
scoping process encompassing the full range of the assessment, and produced the 
Environmental, Social and Economic Review Scoping Document through an internal 
process incorporating stakeholder consultation. In turn, DoIR commissioned a 
review to assess the extent to which the proponent’s Scoping Document 
encompassed the requirements of its Guidelines. 
The Gorgon JV then prepared its project documentation entitled Environmental, 
Social and Economic Review of the Gorgon Gas Development on Barrow Island, 
hereafter referred to as the ESE Review (ChevronTexaco, 2003a). The ESE Review 
document was released for a six-week public comment period on 24
th February 2003 
and submissions were received to which the proponent was required to publicly 
respond. 
At this point an Expert Panel
12 appointed by DoIR gained access under a 
confidentiality agreement to commercially sensitive information provided by the 
proponent, in order to complete a review of the veracity and robustness of the 
proposed development plan, and particularly the Gorgon JV’s claim that Barrow 
Island was the only commercially viable location for the gas processing plant.  This 
was the first stage of the strategic, economic and social assessment. 
Drawing upon the findings of this review, together with information gathered 
through the public submissions process and the ESE Review itself, the Expert Panel 
                                                         
12 Comprising representatives of The Allen Consulting Group. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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prepared its advice to Cabinet in the form of a Strategic, Economic and Social 
Bulletin (Allen Consulting Group, 2003). The EPA prepared a corresponding 
Environmental Bulletin under s16e of the Environmental Protection Act 1986 
(Environmental Protection Authority, 2003) and the Conservation Commission of 
Western Australia prepared separate advice (Conservation Commission of Western 
Australia, 2003). 
It was then the responsibility of the Standing Interagency Committee of Chief 
Executive Officers (SIAC), the committee of government agency Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs), to consolidate the extensive and sometimes conflicting data-set for 
Cabinet, a task that was undertaken in two stages. The first stage was the preparation 
of a brief Overview Report entitled Consideration of access to Barrow Island for gas 
processing: Advice for Government's environmental, social, economic and strategic 
deliberations (Standing Interagency Committee of CEOs, 2003), which was released 
for a six-week public comment period, and to which the two bulletins plus 
Conservation Commission advice were appended. The second stage was the 
preparation of the Outcome Report for Cabinet that reflected comments received on 
the Overview Report, but which was not itself made publicly available. The Outcome 
Report also formed the basis of the formal Cabinet Submission (also confidential) 
presented on 7
th September 2003. 
To ensure that the proponent’s and Government’s timeframes could be met, drafting 
of the enabling legislation and negotiation of the terms of the agreement between the 
State of Western Australia and the Gorgon JV occurred simultaneously with the final 
stages of the ESE process.  
Finally, on 8
th September 2003, Cabinet determined that the Gorgon JV should be 
granted access to Barrow Island for the purposes of gas processing
13. The Barrow 
                                                         
13 A detailed project proposal based upon the development plan reference case has subsequently been 
prepared, and the proponent is currently seeking to obtain the full range of usual project approvals, 
including those conducted under Part IV of the Environmental Protection Act 1986, the EPBC Act, 
other legislation, and licences to construct and operate. These, however, are outside the scope of this 
research project. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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Island Bill and appended Gorgon Gas Processing and Infrastructure Project 
Agreement
14 were introduced to Parliament on 16
th September 2003. 
Roles and responsibilities 
Overall responsibility for coordinating the Gorgon assessment process across 
Government rested with SIAC, and the SIAC Reference Group comprising members 
of the represented agencies. The agencies involved were DoIR (Chair), DoE, which 
provides support to the EPA in the EIA process, the Department of Conservation and 
Land Management (CALM), the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC), the 
Office of Energy (OoE), the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DPI), the 
Department of Indigenous Affairs (DIA), and the Department of Treasury and 
Finance (DTF). 
Project management of the Gorgon assessment process was the responsibility of the 
Office of Major Projects (OMP) within DoIR, which was also responsible for 
conducting the strategic, economic and social assessment, for which it appointed the 
Expert Panel so that some degree of independence was maintained
15. The EPA was 
responsible for conducting the corresponding strategic environmental assessment 
under Section16e of the Environmental Protection Act 1986. The Conservation 
Commission of WA, as the authority in which Barrow Island is vested, also had a 
key role in providing advice to the Minister for the Environment, as the minister 
responsible for the Barrow Island Nature Reserve. The Cabinet of Western Australia, 
as representatives of elected Government, was responsible for making the final 
decision as to whether the Gorgon JV would be granted in-principle access to 
Barrow Island for the purposes of gas processing. 
In June 2002, which was the time at which I became involved in the Gorgon 
assessment, the Minister for State Development issued a press release summarising 
the Gorgon proposal and the principles of the assessment process, entitled ‘Gorgon 
gas development possibility’. This is reproduced in Box 3.4. 
                                                         
14 The Gorgon Gas Processing and Infrastructure Project Agreement was developed under the 
Western Australian Government Agreements Act 1979, which is the standard means by which large 
infrastructure developments are legitimised in Western Australia, as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
15 The representatives of the Allen Consulting Group had extensive and high-level experience within 
the oil and gas sector. While this was the reason the group was appointed, some questioned the extent 
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Box 3.4: ‘Gorgon gas development possibility’ press release 28 June 
2002
16 
The Western Australian Government has agreed to examine proposals for 
development of the huge Gorgon gas reserves offshore from Dampier, including the 
possible use of a small area on Barrow Island. 
State Development Minister Clive Brown said today the Government had been 
advised of efforts to harness the large Gorgon gas reserves, including a possible 
development scenario using a restricted area of the Barrow Island 'A' Class Nature 
Reserve. 
The development proposal had come from ChevronTexaco. 
"The Government would only consider this development after a rigorous, accountable 
and transparent examination of the environmental, social, and economic ramifications 
were undertaken," Mr Brown said. 
"Recognising the important and complex issues such a proposal raises, we have not 
presumed or guaranteed any outcome at this time," he said.  
The State Government has requested the Environmental Protection Authority conduct 
a strategic environmental evaluation of the proposal and report back.  
As the vesting authority for the Barrow Island Nature Reserve, the Conservation 
Commission of WA will also be advising the Government on nature conservation 
matters relating to the nature reserve. 
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources would report to the Minister for 
State Development on the social and economic aspects. 
The Government had therefore developed an integrated environmental, social and 
economic process to examine the proposal.  
This evaluation was modelled on the usual environmental impact assessment 
processes of Part Four of the Environmental Protection Act and included a six-week 
public comment period. 
Mr Brown said this did not mean that the Government would approve the use of 
Barrow Island for this purpose. However, it would keep an open mind. 
The Government supported sustainable development of resources and believed the 
                                                         
16 Media release. Available online URL http://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/media/media01-
05.nsf [Accessed 22nd June 2005] Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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extensive reserves of natural gas off the WA coast could provide significant clean 
energy benefits to the wider community.  
Mr Brown said that even with a 40-year history of industry and conservation 
coexisting on Barrow Island, the Government was especially aware that additional 
development on the island raised environmental concerns. 
It therefore considered the best way to deal with these matters was through the 
rigorous and public processes it has developed for this proposal.  
"We recognise and support the rigour of the State's environmental impact assessment 
process," Mr Brown said.  
"The crucial role of CALM, the examination of alternative potential sites, and 
quarantine, are among the issues that will be addressed through this process, together 
with the economic and social benefits for the people of WA that would come from 
sensitive and responsible development of our natural resources."  
 
3.3  What happened? The Gorgon ESE process as it unfolded 
Section 3.3 describes how the Gorgon ESE assessment process unfolded through 
2002 and 2003, drawing on my own observations, documentary records and 
interviews conducted with many of those involved in the process. It is not intended 
to be a comprehensive retelling of all of the events that took place during the Gorgon 
ESE process, and indeed can not be, since given the highly political nature of the 
decision, it is fair to assume that much happened ‘behind closed doors’ of which I 
was not aware. Furthermore, my data is shaped by my interview questions, which in 
turn reflect my own personal views and interests, so this version of events cannot be 
considered ‘objective’. My intent then is to chronicle the story as I saw it, exposing 
the ambiguities and challenges of the ESE process, mainly through the reflections of 
those involved, and in a way which provides the context for reflection and analysis. 
Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.7 present events chronologically, as far as this is practical; 
Section 3.3.8 reflects upon the purpose of the ESE process; Section 3.3.9 briefly 
examines the ‘for’ and ‘against’ campaigns that ran alongside the ESE process and 
raises the question of the role of the community in sustainability assessments; 
Section 3.3.10 examines the roles and relationships of the various players that Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
      83 
underpinned and shaped the process; and Section 3.3.11 reviews the time and cost 
implications for both proponent and Government. 
3.3.1 In the beginning 
There remains some ambiguity about where the idea to conduct an integrated 
environmental, social, economic and strategic assessment of Gorgon actually came 
from, and how this decision related to the commitments to sustainability assessment 
made in the Keating Review and the State Sustainability Strategy. For example, it has 
been variously recalled that the suggestion of trialling a sustainability process on a 
case study such as Gorgon emerged directly from the Keating Review (DoIR, 2004); 
that the proposal to conduct an integrated assessment of the Gorgon development 
plan came from DoIR officers
17; that it was suggested by the EPA in response to a 
draft Cabinet submission prepared by DoIR that recommended the Gorgon JV be 
allowed access to Barrow Island
18; that it was made by DPC during early discussions 
of the Gorgon case within Government
19; and that it was put forward by the Gorgon 
JV itself
20. It seems that the concept of sustainability assessment emerged 
simultaneously within different corners of Government and converged on the 
Gorgon case.  
While it was recognised by those involved that the Gorgon assessment process 
would have many characteristics of a sustainability assessment process, it was 
considered that this ‘special case’ process should not necessarily be perceived as a 
precedent for future sustainability assessment processes in Western Australia. To 
avoid possible confusion, therefore, the Gorgon assessment process was referred to 
as an ‘integrated strategic environmental, social and economic (ESE) assessment’, 
rather than a sustainability assessment. It was believed, however, that many of the 
experiences gained and the lessons learnt through the Gorgon process would provide 
useful input to the development of these future processes
21. 
                                                         
17 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
18 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (1). 
19 Professor Peter Newman - pers. comm. 
20 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
21 For this reason, the Gorgon process was well represented in the Sustainability Assessment Working 
Group (discussed in Chapter 2), and was the subject of a joint presentation between ChevronTexaco 
and DoIR at the second meeting of the group. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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One of the main strengths of an integrated assessment was its potential to make 
transparent many of the social and economic implications of a proposal that would 
otherwise be considered only ‘behind closed doors’. In the words of one 
interviewee
22: 
One of the real advances of this ESE process is that we have put the economic data on the 
table, made it transparent and we’re having a robust debate about it. I think that’s a real 
advance.  
This increased transparency of social and economic information was seen by many 
to be of particular benefit to the proponent, since the ESE process provided “a 
vehicle, a process that would allow issues other than the ecological and conservation 
values of Barrow as part of the conservation estate to be aired on the same 
platform”
23. The opposing view was also put forward: since the Gorgon gasfields are 
located in Commonwealth and not State waters, and so the royalties and therefore the 
majority of the economic benefits would pass to the Commonwealth Government, 
some believed that the transparent process would demonstrate that the benefits to the 
State of Western Australia would not be great, particularly in the context of the 
potential environmental risks associated with the proposal. 
As well as including economic, social and State strategic considerations, the 
assessment was conducted at a more strategic level than statutory EIA and therefore 
did not require a detailed project proposal. This was also of benefit to the Gorgon 
JV, which was reluctant to further develop their proposal without in-principle access 
to Barrow Island. The distinction between strategic- and project-level assessment 
was articulated as being that the ESE process should determine whether the 
proponent should be allowed access to Barrow Island, while the subsequent Part IV 
assessment should determine how that could be done in an environmentally 
acceptable manner should the decision be made to grant access, and as such the ESE 
process should represent 80 per cent of a standard Part IV EIA process
24. This 
interpretation, however, did lead to some ambiguity with respect to the actual 
purpose of the assessment, a point that is considered in more detail in Section 3.3.3.  
                                                         
22 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
23 Gorgon interviews –ChevronTexaco (5). 
24 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (1). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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What is clear is that following this decision it was agreed early on that the Gorgon 
assessment should mirror the existing statutory EIA process, and the design of the 
process was led by DoIR and the EPA/DoE. Despite later discussions about whether 
or not the rigorous Western Australian EIA process model was really appropriate for 
a strategic level assessment, the broad consensus was that it was reasonable for 
Government to have fallen back on familiarity in the absence of a formal process or 
any local precedent, and that familiarity would result in wider acceptance of the 
approach and would ensure that the focus of future debates remained on the question 
at hand and not the merits of the process itself
25. Even representatives of the 
Conservation Commission/CALM, which was to become possibly the most 
disenchanted with the process later, conceded, “Initially…it was a good process…it 
was fine for a while”
 26. 
Several parties made the point that it was courageous of Government to embark on 
developing a new assessment process, particularly one that embodied a higher than 
usual degree of transparency
27. There was also a strong sense of Western Australia 
having entered a ‘brave new world’ of impact assessment, particularly in the early 
stages of the ESE process. A representative of a community group conceded, “I think 
there was a genuine attempt to try to look at it a bit differently”
28. 
3.3.2 Scoping  
The Guidelines for the social, economic and strategic evaluation of the Gorgon gas 
development proposal prepared by consultants on behalf of DoIR (dated 30 May 
2002) identified social and economic factors, issues, objectives and tasks that the 
proponent was required to address in its ESE Review document. While the distinction 
between these categories is somewhat unclear in some cases, essentially the 
Guidelines required the proponent to provide the results of 32 social and 13 
economic studies. Examples of these, selected at random for purposes of illustration, 
include, “Predict potential population changes resulting from the Proposal”, “Discuss 
how the Proposal meets policy objectives”, and “Quantify the impact on domestic 
                                                         
25 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
26 Gorgon interviews -CALM (6). 
27 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9); Gorgon interviews – ChevronTexaco (8). 
28 Gorgon interviews – Community groups (12). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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industry resulting from the addition of a further major gas supply source, including 
regional, state and national benefits resulting therefrom”. 
The Gorgon JV incorporated the requirements of these Guidelines into its own 
document The Gorgon gas development environmental, social and economic review 
scoping document (dated 5 July 2002)
29. The broad approach to the environmental 
studies was also outlined in this document, including commitments to “describe the 
existing biophysical environment”, “broadly identify the significant (environmental) 
issues”, “identify and broadly describe the type of magnitude of potential impacts” 
and their significance, and “identify likely mitigation strategies”.  
The social and economic ‘nets’ were thus cast broadly with very little specificity in 
terms of goals or criteria, perhaps at least partly due to the lack of experience in 
Western Australia with conducting such assessments (see Chapter 1). In retrospect, 
this somewhat tentative approach to scoping the Gorgon ESE process probably 
significantly influenced the process as a whole and generated several points of 
conflict – particularly in relation to the nature of a strategic assessment compared 
with a project-level assessment, and the question of what data was required to enable 
Cabinet to make its decision.  
In turn, the scoping was probably the result of a general lack of clarity around what 
the ESE process was actually intended to achieve, and at the time of the scoping 
process there had been no clear articulation of the question that the ESE assessment 
was designed to answer. The first attempt to provide some clarity was at the meeting 
on 10
th February 2003 to brief the Expert Panel hired to undertake the strategic, 
economic and social assessment on behalf of DoIR. This purpose was subsequently 
refined to cover the whole ESE process, by extending it to the environmental and 
conservation issues that were outside the mandate of the Expert Panel (Pope, 2003b, 
p2)
30: 
In essence, the Gorgon assessment process aims to answer the following questions: 
                                                         
29 The Reference Group was somewhat affronted by this, and noted in the minutes of the Initial Client 
Briefing meeting on 10
th February 2003 that “ChevronTexaco appear to have largely ignored these 
Guidelines and instead based the scope of their investigations on their own Scoping Document. This 
document does not have WA Government endorsement”. 
30 Although I was the sole author of this paper, DoIR and the EPA/DoE had a considerable amount of 
input into its development, and this clarification of the purpose of the ESE assessment process was 
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1. Why Barrow Island? In other words, is the Government satisfied with the veracity of 
the proponent’s analysis of alternative locations, which demonstrates that Barrow Island 
represents the only viable option for the initial stages of the development of the Gorgon 
gasfield? 
2. If granting access to Barrow Island is indeed the only way that the Gorgon gasfield 
may be developed in the foreseeable future, the questions to be answered are: 
a) What are the potential impacts of the proposed development on the conservation 
values of Barrow Island, and what is the likelihood of these impacts occurring? 
b) What are the potential strategic, economic and social benefits of the proposed 
development to the people of Western Australia? 
c) Is the Government convinced that the environmental risks are sufficiently low, and the 
strategic, economic and social benefits sufficiently high, to justify allowing the proponent 
access to Barrow Island? 
d) Can the proponent demonstrate net conservation benefits associated with the 
development plan? 
In simple terms the question can be phrased, “Are the potential impacts of 
constructing a gas processing plant on Barrow Island acceptable?” However, the 
implications of this question remain ambiguous, as discussed further in Section 
3.3.8.  
3.3.3 The ESE Review document 
Members of the SIAC Reference Group received copies of the Gorgon JV’s draft 
ESE Review document (Version B) for review on Christmas Eve 2002. Their 
response was not favourable; in the words of one interviewee, “Their first attempt in 
the draft ESE thing was bloody hopeless”
 31. The general feeling amongst the 
Reference Group was characterised by the question from another member, “Are they 
taking this thing seriously?”
32  
I commenced my role with the SIAC Reference Group when I was also asked to 
provide comments on the proponent’s document in early January 2003, so that these 
could be compiled along with responses from other members of the group and 
submitted back to the proponent. I was informed by members of the Reference 
                                                         
31 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (7). 
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Group that my views were consistent with those of the group in general, and for 
purposes of illustration an extract from my document is reproduced in Box 3.5. 
Box 3.5: Personal views on the draft ESE Review (January 2003)
 33 
To me, the ESE Review reads like a corporate public affairs document, and as such is 
unconvincing and trite in many areas. It is thin on detail in relation to many potential 
environmental and social concerns and has an over-riding tone of paying lip service to 
the issue of sustainability. 
Playing Devil’s Advocate, the overwhelming message I received from the proponent 
in reading this document was, “We really want to develop this gas field because we 
are going to make loads of money and we just need Government to say yes to this 
issue of access to Barrow Island so we can get on with it. We really can’t see what the 
big deal is, but we’ve been forced to go through this assessment process to make 
everyone feel better about it all so we’ve done as little as we think we can get away 
with. We’ve done some environmental work and we know we can manage the issues 
based on previous experience. We’ll do what we have to do, including demonstrating 
net conservation benefit, and we might do some other things, like CO2 re-injection as 
long as it doesn’t cost too much, because our profit is the most important thing after 
all. The social issues, like training and indigenous partnerships, we’ll figure out later – 
no big deal, we’ll throw some money at it, don’t you worry about that.” 
I hasten to point out that I don’t believe that this is the true attitude of ChevronTexaco, 
but there is little in this document which reflects the extent of soul-searching which I 
know has been undertaken at least by some members of the organisation in relation to 
the moral dilemmas represented by this development proposal. 
Fundamentally, this process is about the Government of Western Australia deciding 
whether the benefits of this development, as promised by the proponent, are sufficient 
to warrant granting access to a Class A Nature Reserve. As a member of the public, I 
want to feel that this corporation shares my concerns with respect to global 
sustainability, that it is committed to creating a better world and respect to global 
sustainability, that it is committed to creating a better world and that it has put real 
effort into finding ways to do that. Why else would I, as a citizen of Western 
                                                         
33 I use this extract as an example of the sentiment of the Reference Group as I was not privy to the 
formal submission made by the Reference Group to the Gorgon JV. It is taken from a document I 
submitted to the SIAC Reference Group on 8
th January 2003, entitled “Gorgon draft ESE Review- 
comments from Jenny Pope”. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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Australia, sit back and watch my Government hand over access to Barrow Island just 
to make an oil company even richer and more powerful? 
To accept the proposal, I particularly need to be convinced that Barrow Island really is 
the only feasible location option, and this document completely fails to convince me 
of that. There is a fundamental problem here, in that site analysis for the gas 
processing facility has been conducted assuming that re-injection is to be conducted 
on the northern end of Barrow Island (Section 4.1.4), while the analysis of appropriate 
re-injection sites has been made by assuming that the gas production facilities are to 
be on Barrow Island (distance from gas processing facilities identified as one of the 
factors in site selection as discussed in Part 11). Clearly, the two site selection 
processes should have been conducted together. Furthermore, there is insufficient data 
provided in the Review document to enable the reader to follow the logic of selection 
of the two sites. 
The bottom line is that, as a member of the public concerned about sustainability 
issues, I don’t get the sense of assurance and confidence in the proponent from 
reading this Review document that I would need in order to fully support the proposal. 
Source: Unpublished document entitled Gorgon draft ESE – Review comments 
from Jenny Pope 
The draft ESE Review document was discussed at the Reference Group Meeting of 
13
th January 2003 and the minutes of this meeting list the specific concerns of the 
Reference Group before concluding that
34: 
There was a general consensus that: 
- Gorgon needs to fully justify its ‘preferred option’ - Barrow Island - over other 
locations; 
- Government needs to be assured that the draft ESE has sufficient information for an 
assessment to be undertaken; 
- SIAC Reference Group can only agree with the release of draft ESE document if 
sufficient information is provided. This advice to be sent to Gorgon through the Chair. 
Extensive comments were provided by the Reference Group and member agencies 
back to the proponent and the subsequent Version C was considered to be ‘just over 
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the line’ in terms of quality. The draft report of the retrospective review suggested 
that the proponent’s own timing constraints prevented them from achieving the 
desired level of acceptability of the document prior to its release (DoIR, 2004). 
There was a perceived resistance by the proponent to accommodate feedback made 
by the government agencies on the ESE Review, as evidenced by comments such as, 
“ChevronTexaco was not a very good listener
35” and
36: 
You think about how they’ve been dragged forward kicking and screaming and they’ve 
still got something that is inadequate, you think well, Government is making a big 
commitment to try to get these guys over the line and they’re not very helpful.  
As a result, many of the criticisms of Version B expressed by the Reference Group 
were carried over into Version C
37, which also retained a positive flavour. One 
Gorgon JV interviewee reflected that, “I guess that was a product of the process that 
the boundaries weren’t set and this could be anything we wanted it to be and 
Government allowed it to be”
 and
38:  
Maybe something else that didn’t help was that the document was pretty much 100 per 
cent positive, and there wasn’t that acknowledgement that hey we’re really confident 
about this, we’re less confident about this and we’ve got more work to do on this. There 
was a ‘trust us we can do anything’ kind of flavour, and it might have helped if there had 
been that kind of doubt presented, or slightly less confidence or whatever.  
The Gorgon JV’s ESE Review was released for public comment on 10
th February 
2003 for a six-week period concluding on 24
th March 2003. 
                                                         
35 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (4). 
36 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (7). 
37 For example, the chapter on social issues was not significantly changed between revisions and 
detail remained sparse; an example from this chapter states, “The Gorgon Venture would work with 
the State Government education institutions to assess the education and training requirements of the 
development and to cooperate in designing programs that would meet these requirements. The 
Gorgon Venture would also seek to support existing Indigenous education programs” 
(ChevronTexaco, 2003a, p225). Other concerns discussed at the Reference Group meeting of 13 
January 2003, such as the LNG focus of the document, the lack of detail regarding net conservation 
benefits, the alternative sites analysis, and the lack of unequivocal commitment to supply the domestic 
gas market, remained recurring themes throughout the ESE process and were reflected in many of the 
public submissions received. 
38 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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3.3.4 Public submissions 
The opportunity for stakeholders and the general public to comment on the ESE 
Review document supplemented the many processes of consultation and engagement 
carried out by the proponent throughout the ESE process that focused mainly on 
targeted stakeholders (ChevronTexaco, 2003a). These are described in Section 3.3.9. 
By the close of the period of public comment on the ESE Review on 24
th March 
2003, a total of 43 public submissions had been received by the EPA Service Unit of 
the DoE
39, including seven from industry organisations, five from members of the 
public, eight from government agencies, eight from community groups and non 
government organisations (NGOs), thirteen from individual businesses, one from a 
research and development organisation, and one from a Member of Parliament
40.  
The submissions were processed by converting the concerns raised into questions 
that the proponent was required to formally address. A list of general comments to 
be considered in the preparation of the Bulletins was also included
41. The proponent 
would have preferred to have responded directly to each submitter, believing that 
interpretation of submissions by Government was not in the spirit of openness and 
transparency and that the proponent case would have been served by debating the 
issues in the context of the whole proposal directly with the submitters
42. 
Government, however, did not agree to this. 
In all, 408 questions were compiled. These were separated into two sets: one put 
forward by DoIR and the other by the EPA
43. There was overlap between the two 
sets, since issues such as geosequestration as a method of greenhouse gas 
management were relevant to both agencies. There was considerable criticism of the 
                                                         
39 The EPA Service Unit of the DoE acted as a ‘clearing house’ for the submissions, as it was felt that 
the public was familiar with this process from statutory EIA. 
40 The source for these statistics is an unpublished report I wrote for DoIR entitled “Summary of 
public submissions on the ESE Review of the Gorgon gas development on Barrow Island” dated 2
nd 
April 2003. 
41 The latter were mainly positive comments, which were collated separately in recognition of the 
standard process for receiving and handling public submissions (for example in an EIA process) 
tending to focus upon negative comments and questions and therefore that submissions from 
supporters of a proposal are generally ‘lost’. 
42 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
43 The proponent was affronted when the EPA placed the questions on its website at the same time 
they were sent to the ChevronTexaco, complaining that without the responses they presented the 
proposal in an unnecessarily negative light (Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (11)). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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I don’t think they did us any favours in just regurgitating sections from the submissions. 
There was no intelligence provided to that, no review, no balance, so the stupid left field 
questions came in as well.  
The proponent responded to the questions posed in two separate documents that were 
placed on the EPA and DoIR websites as well as the proponent’s own 
(ChevronTexaco, 2003b, 2003c). There was criticism, however, that the submissions 
themselves were not made public in their entirety, particularly as the proponent had 
stated in the ESE Review that submissions would be considered public unless stated 
otherwise
46. Some argued that making the submissions public as they were received 
may have limited the number of identical ‘form letter’ submissions and also 
stimulated debate in the public arena
47. 
Many of the questions received, particularly in the environmental area, requested a 
level of detail that was unavailable, or possibly even inappropriate, at the time of the 
strategic-level assessment. However, the proponent believed that it could not simply 
respond in the spirit of ‘this will be addressed in the subsequent EIA process’ and 
made a valiant attempt to provide meaningful answers by indicating how the 
particular concern would be managed
48: 
And I guess one of our strategies for responding to that…was to try not to fuel the fire of 
deferring the decision to the [EIA], the natural response, and I had to pull people up for 
writing it. So we need more information on turtles, yep, no worries, it’ll be in the 
[environmental impact statement under the subsequent EIA process]….We have to take a 
                                                         
44 The task of processing of the public submissions and converting them into questions and comments 
was given to me during my time at DoIR, and therefore these criticisms were aimed at my work. I did 
indeed convert every single (negative) comment made in a submission into a question, for fear of 
omitting anything and in acknowledgement of the amount of work that had gone into preparing the 
submissions. Due to the tight time schedule that required the processing to be completed within two 
weeks and the proponent to respond within one, there was no time for the questions to be reviewed or 
even removed in the case of those that could be considered vexatious and unnecessarily 
confrontational. (An illustrative example of the latter was, “By reference to what criteria can it be 
suggested that $10m for biodiversity research ‘offsets’ this sort of footprint on an A Class Nature 
Reserve, let alone the massive greenhouse emissions associated with the project?”). 
45 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
46 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
47 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
48 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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step back and say fundamentally do we have enough information to make a decision or 
not? Well, we do. Do we think we can manage it? Yes, we can. 
The larger questions about the data collection process in general are considered in 
the following section. 
3.3.5 Data, detail and debates 
The proponent’s ESE Review document and the public submission process described 
in the previous sections were two of many mechanisms by which Government 
gathered data about the proposal. Others included independent studies commissioned 
by the EPA
49, the work of the Expert Panel in reviewing commercially confidential 
documents in order to test the veracity of the proponent’s financial analysis, and 
responses to specific requests of the proponent for information made by the SIAC 
Reference Group. As one DoIR interviewee said, “This is a Government process and 
the Gorgon document is one data input. The advantage of the process is that 
Government is at liberty to seek answers elsewhere”
50. The purpose of the data 
collection phase, and indeed of the ESE process itself was “to provide the most 
complete and most robust data set… to go before Cabinet so that they can make the 
most fully informed …decision”, and specifically to provide information that 
Cabinet might not otherwise have had
51. 
Under the terms of the process and consistent with the approach to EIA in Western 
Australia, it was the proponent’s responsibility to provide data requested by 
Government, although some considered that Government had been forced to invest 
resources to gather its own data in some cases and to ‘rework’ what it perceived was 
inadequate data provided by the proponent
52. Comments were also made about the 
degree of power that the proponent had in determining what data would be provided 
and how it would be presented. These issues, combined with a level of discomfort 
with the overly positive tone of the proponent’s ESE Review document, led to some 
                                                         
49 These included the independent review of the multi-criteria analysis undertaken by the proponent in 
its alternative sites analysis, discussed previously, and a review of quarantine risks. 
50 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9) 
51 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
52Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (13). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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discussion of alternative approaches to data collection, with one interviewee 
explaining
53: 
There’s a range of options. One option is for the steering committee (which is SIAC) to 
put in place a process and to define a process that effectively has a proponent engaging 
consultants who are approved by the steering committee, with independent reference 
panels, so when it actually comes to us it doesn’t have to be reanalysed or redigested, 
because you’ve analysed and come to a view about it. So that certainly is one way of 
doing it, and probably in many ways the most effective way, because to say Government 
should do it, Government doesn’t have the commercial information that the proponent’s 
got access to, so it’s impossible for Government to do it. I think we need to make sure 
though that there’s a little bit more objectivity in this, rather than it just being a sales 
document
54. 
The main point of debate with respect to the data collection phase, however, was not 
who should bear the responsibility and cost, but rather the question of ‘how much 
data is enough to enable a decision about access to Barrow Island to be made?’ 
In the midst of the data collection phase, which included the labour-intensive 
preparation of responses to the public submissions, the proponent questioned 
whether the ever-increasing levels of detail for which they were being asked were 
appropriate for a strategic-level assessment. They recalled the idea that the ESE 
process should be 80 per cent of an EIA and considered that they “should have 
pushed back on this because 80 per cent of an [EIA] is just about an [EIA]”
55. 
Reflecting on the scoping process and the breadth of issues that were included in 
both DoIR’s Guidelines and its own Scoping Document, the proponent suggested 
that in retrospect the scoping process should have identified those issues that would 
be relevant to Cabinet in making these decisions and those that would not. Therefore, 
the focus during scoping should have been on defining “the critical issues that are 
                                                         
53Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (13). 
54 The same interviewee gave an example of this approach, “Now, there are precedents for that in part, 
in that in various locations in Australia, Part V and in some cases Part IV has been handled that way. 
And the most recent one in WA was Cockburn Cement with their problems. They put together a 
reference panel approved by the EPA, they put together a technical advisory group approved by the 
EPA, and by the time the report came to the EPA there was no big work required, just interpretation 
and judgement”. 
55Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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fundamental to the decision…so we agree that it’s not turtles and it’s not jobs in 
Onslow, whatever it might be”
56. 
The proponent also pointed out that the critical issues and potential ‘show-stoppers’ 
were known well before the formal scoping process began and therefore the scope of 
the ESE process could have been limited to only these
57:  
I’m sure I could go into our electronic files and find a presentation that [ChevronTexaco 
representatives] would have given in January 2002 or November 2001 that listed critical 
issues. And on that list would have been appropriate management of CO2, management 
of quarantine, gas to shore….  
A similar point was made by an interviewee from the EPA/DoE who expressed 
concern about the quality of data presented in the ESE Review with respect to some 
of the critical issues
58: 
If we had said perhaps more emphatically, look quarantine is the issue – if you’ve got a 
million bucks to spend on this thing, spend $800 thousand on quarantine and the other 
$200 thousand on everything else. Then we might have got better data. 
Others argued in response that there is always the potential for new critical issues 
and risks to become apparent through the assessment process and therefore it may 
not have been appropriate to limit the scope of the ESE assessment too early
59: 
I guess my nervousness is how sure are we that we can identify the ‘show stoppers’? If 
counting turtles had identified that the eastern shore of Barrow was in fact by far the most 
important turtle nesting site from the southern regions of turtle nesting to Indonesia or 
something, then we might not have known that before they started counting turtles.  
Correspondingly, the Chairman of the EPA’s comment that the ESE assessment 
should be 80 per cent of an EIA and therefore that the strategic level decision was 
about whether the proposal should go ahead, meant that “they really needed to look 
at almost everything that wasn’t simply the nuts and bolts of the buildings”
60. 
However, there was some ambiguity about what the 80 per cent actually meant, and 
particularly whether it was intended that 80 per cent of the issues should be 
                                                         
56Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
57 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
58 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
59 Gorgon interviews - Conservation Commission/CALM (4). 
60 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (1). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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addressed in detail, or whether all of the identified issues should be investigated to 
80 per cent of the depth that would normally be required in an EIA process. The 
proponent acknowledged the latter may have been assumed
61:  
We sent flora and fauna guys out there and they counted plants and those sorts of things. 
They just did less of it than you would have done for an [EIA], but they wrote it up like it 
was an [EIA].  
They also acknowledged that this may have invoked requests for more detail from 
the environmental agencies
62:  
I don’t know whether it’s the nature of scientists that they need more certainty, so we’ve 
been moving further and further down the path of what is it you want to put on there and 
what the emissions would be, and we’ve got away from the strategic process into the 
weeds. 




What we’ve provided was detail, and if you look at process that if we had delivered a 
punchy, sophisticated 40-page document it would have stayed at the [senior officer] 
level, you deliver a 350-page document and it gets way down the levels and you get 
CALM’s stygofauna graduate-type expert commenting on it, and that’s not where we 
should have been. Because the only guidelines when you get down to that technical level 
of assessment that you’ve got, is [EIA]-type guidelines, so they open up the document 
and it’s not what they wanted, not what they expected, and inadequate to fit what they see 
as the picture so it gets a cross. 
It was also suggested, however, that it was probably in the proponent’s best interests 
to address a wide range of issues in detail in the ESE process and not be restricted to 
a narrow scope, since by responding to every issue or concern raised they could 
‘keep a lid’ on the issue. Furthermore, providing more information was a good 
strategic move because “it’s human nature that if you don’t have the information 
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63 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
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you’ll make a conservative decision” and therefore the proponent “probably owe(s) 
Government a debt of gratitude for having flushed out all the issues for them”
65.  
Government also wrestled with the issue of ‘how much is enough’, and the view of 
some was that by the end of the data gathering phase there was probably 
considerably more information on the table than was necessary for Cabinet to make 
its decision
66. Some defended this approach by saying that detail was necessary since 
“if you don’t have some definition of the detail you are fighting with gossamer” 
and
67: 
You need to have a level of detail that allows you to actually come to some 
understanding of what the form is of the issue, and without that detail it is very difficult 
to make strategic decisions, because not everybody has the ability to conceptualise 
without that level of information. 
Although the proponents perceived that too much had been asked of them, the 
counter view, often from the ‘green’ side of the debate, was also expressed. It was 
suggested that the data set was insufficient because the proponent did not provide 
detailed analysis of the environmental, social, economic and strategic implications of 
the alternative locations
68. Others challenged both the quantity and the quality of the 
data, calling it ‘exceedingly patchy’
69. 
Others within Government were more comfortable with the data collection process
70: 
From my perspective …the internal processes of Government are to make sure that the 
right amount of information of an appropriate quality is available to Cabinet to enable 
them to make a good quality decision. Whether the community agrees with that is a 
different issue. I would argue that that process achieved that outcome. It was expensive 
and resource hungry, but at the end of the day, Cabinet got good quality information upon 
which they could make a decision, good economic information, good budget impact 
information, good conservation information, good environmental overview information 
at the high level. So from that point of view the process yielded what I saw as the 
                                                         
65 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
66 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (2). 
67 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
68 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (4). 
69 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (7). Similar comments were made by 
interviewees from community groups (12); EPA/DoE (13); EPA/DoE (14), noting that this was the 
reason the EPA/DoE commissioned several consultancy reports as already discussed. 
70 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (13). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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outcome. And the outcome wasn’t a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision, it was about good information 
to enable Cabinet to come to a decision. 
There was a sense expressed in the interviews, however, that while the original 
concept of the Gorgon assessment process was sound, the implementation had 
resulted in it becoming something of a ‘worst of both worlds’, in that it was not a 
true strategic assessment, and neither was it adequately detailed for a project 
assessment
71. The confusion over its process, where the lack of consensus as to the 
purpose of the assessment, and therefore what information was required to answer 
the question, is described in Section 3.3.8. 
3.3.6 Preparation of advice for Cabinet 
At the conclusion of the data collection phase of the ESE process, the Expert Panel 
(acting on behalf of DoIR) prepared its Social, Economic and Strategic Bulletin, the 
EPA produced its Environmental Bulletin, and the Conservation Commission 
prepared separate advice in its role as the authority in which Barrow Island is 
vested
72. SIAC subsequently prepared its Overview Report and Outcome Report as 
described previously. 
Both the EPA Bulletin and the Conservation Commission advice were structured in 
two parts. Part A in each case addressed the issues of industry on Barrow Island, 
alternative locations, and threats to the environmental and conservation values of 
Barrow Island. Part B addressed the plans to manage the risks to the environmental 
values of Barrow Island, and net conservation benefits, in the event that the 
proponent was granted ‘in-principle’ access to Barrow Island. Both advised against 
the proposal on the grounds of excessive environmental risk (Conservation 
Commission of Western Australia, 2003; Environmental Protection Authority, 
2003). An extract from the EPA Bulletin is presented in Box 3.6. 
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72 In preparing its Bulletin, the Expert Panel circulated several draft versions for comment by the 
reference Group and also the proponent. In contrast, the EPA conformed to its normal EIA procedures 
and did not consult on the conclusions of drafts of its Bulletin, for which it was criticised by some 
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Box 3.6: Extract from the EPA Bulletin 1101 
Given the very high environmental and unique conservation values of Barrow Island, 
which are reflected in its status as a class A Nature Reserve, it is the view of the EPA 
that, as a matter of principle, industry should not be located on a nature reserve and 
specifically not on Barrow Island.  
The EPA considers that, from an environmental point of view, alternative sites to 
Barrow Island could be found acceptable in the sequence (most to least desired 
location) of brown-fields mainland sites, green-fields mainland sites and Thevenard 
Island. Trimouille Island could be considered, provided marine values could be 
adequately protected. 
Having weighed the environmental values, the limited available data about risks, and 
the current level of knowledge on their management, the EPA is of the view that the 
proponent has failed to demonstrate that establishing a gas processing complex on 
Barrow Island could achieve an acceptably low level of risk to Barrow Island’s 
outstanding environment and unique conservation values. 
Source: Environmental Protection Authority (2003) 
In contrast, the Social, Economic and Strategic Bulletin prepared by the Expert Panel 
advised in favour of the development by virtue of its forecasted socio-economic 
benefits to the State
73 (Allen Consulting Group, 2003). The conclusion of the 
Bulletin is presented in Box 3.7. 
Box 3.7: Extract from Expert Panel Bulletin 
The fact that the GJV has put forward a substantial proposal for the development of 
the Gorgon Gas Fields is to be welcomed. The experience of the last two decades 
since its discovery is that there are significant technical and commercial impediments 
to the development of this very important resource. The current proposal would allow 
the Australian community to benefit from the monetising of a substantial national 
asset, the value of which otherwise may not be realised in the foreseeable future. 
The GJV’s proposal would produce a very high level of economic benefits, with GDP 
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and consumption raised significantly above their projected levels under a business-as-
usual situation. Although the GJV is foreign-owned, major community benefits would 
be delivered by the taxes appropriately levied on the profits and rents accruing from 
the development of an Australian resource. The benefits to the Commonwealth’s 
budget, however, would be much higher than the projected budgetary gains for 
Western Australia.  
Although the GJV is seeking in-principle approval to establish gas-processing 
facilities on Barrow Island, the final form of the development has yet to be 
determined. While the LNG/DOMGAS operation proposed by the GJV offers major 
economic benefits, these would be even greater if a GTL facility, such as that 
proposed by Sasol Chevron, were incorporated into the project. 
Finally, on the key question of location, Barrow Island possesses clear commercial 
advantages over the alternatives. Trimouille Island is ruled out for commercial reasons 
as a consequence of past nuclear contamination. A site on Thevenard Island would 
only be viable if very high levels of government assistance were provided. While we 
cannot rule out the possibility that, at some time in the future, commercial 
circumstances could change and agreement could be reached to share facilities on the 
Burrup Peninsula, on the basis of existing cost information this would be very difficult 
to achieve. In the current circumstances, therefore, and on the basis of the information 
available to us, we conclude that Barrow Island represents the only commercial option 
for monetising the substantial national asset represented by the Gorgon resource. 
 Source: Allen Consulting Group (2003) 
Despite attempts to consider the proposal within a sustainability context, the debate 
was effectively reduced to the traditional stand-off of economic development versus 
environmental protection
74, with the champions of each side defending their 
positions. Neither did SIAC address this divide in its Overview Report, which simply 
provided the context to the decision and a description of the ESE process. Similarly, 
the SIAC Outcome Report (which was not released publicly) did not attempt to 
reconcile the two opposing views, and simply presented the ‘for’ and the ‘against’ 
cases. As one interviewee said, “It was really a more extensive version of the 
Overview Report, summarising arguments put forward by others and leaving 
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decision, basically unadvised, to Cabinet”
 75. Another, when asked what form 
SIAC’s integration of the range of sustainability considerations took, replied, “A 
staple”
76.  
Some considered that this lack of integration of economic, social and environmental 
considerations was a fundamental weakness of the ESE process, since it did not 
provide Cabinet with a clear basis for its decision as to what would be in the best 
interests of the State of Western Australia
77. There was little consensus, however, on 
what ‘integration’ might mean in this situation, where the two opposing views 
(which might crudely be described as ‘pro-development’ versus ‘green’) were so 
clearly delineated. As one proponent interviewee said
78: 
There are two camps. There’s a CALM/DoE/EPA camp, and I’m not sure within that 
camp who’s doing what but they are obviously in a different camp from the DoIR camp, 
the social and economic side, and I think that’s not a good thing for the future. If we’re 
really serious about an integrated view, then everyone’s got to be able to subscribe. I 
mean DoIR should be as aware of the environmental impacts and environmental concerns 
and issues and how they’re going to be managed as the EPA should be aware of the 
social, economic impacts and benefits for the State. I think until everyone has that cross 
appreciation it won’t work, because it’s just divisive. 
The challenges posed by the institutional arrangements dividing the ESE process into 
environmental and conservation on one hand and social, economic and strategic on 
the other were also recognised by an interviewee from within Government, but who 
found it appropriate that agencies should stick to their areas of expertise
79: 
It was quite clear that that Outcome Report was never going to have a single agreed 
outcome because positions were so different. It then had to represent different views from 
different quarters and it also had the difficulty perhaps, or the challenge anyway, that the 
view of people dealing with the economics was pro, but they couldn’t comment on the 
environment or the conservation, and the view of the people doing environment and 
conservation was anti but they couldn’t comment on the economic… although I think 
there was pretty good discipline in getting people to stick to their area of expertise and 
                                                         
75 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (4). 
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stick to their views backed up by factual argument, under the microscope of the other 
players challenging statements that were made.  
It was suggested that some kind of agreed weighting factors could have been applied 
that assigned relative values to the various considerations, and it was recalled that 
weighting had been the subject of some very early consultation on the process 
undertaken by DPC, but had never been progressed
80. As was also pointed out, “I 
don’t think there’s any really easy way to try to rationalise those dollars against 
unquantifiable values”
 81. In the words of another interviewee
82: 
I don’t think you will ever have a clear equation in people’s minds where three units of 
strategic benefit are worth one unit of environmental risk. You’re talking about 
contingent pricing, and as far as I know contingent pricing has never worked and 
personally I wouldn’t want to go down that track. I am quite comfortable with 
recognising these as values which are quite different values, and…would never enter an 
equation saying ‘doubling security of gas supply is worth losing one species to 
extinction’. Never. What I think you do, is say, ‘I value doubling gas supply a bit, 
moderately, highly, having more jobs, I value that a bit, moderately, highly, increasing 
environmental risk, I value a bit, moderately, highly’ and different people will value 
those things differently because have different personal values. And we have an elected 
Cabinet process to duke all that out. 
Another interviewee suggested this meant that all of the impacts had to be 
considered in the context of all the others, and that this in turn implied that the direct 
relationship between the level of acceptable environmental risk and the socio-
economic benefits should be recognised (that is, that a higher level of environmental 
risk should be considered acceptable when the socio-economic benefits are greater) 
because otherwise “we’d just be doing environmental risk assessment”
83.   
Others expressed reservations about this view, which was seen by some as an 
attempt to validate the erosion of environmental values in the guise of 
sustainability
84: 
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I think it’s going to be a long time before sustainability is a check on those who’ve 
traditionally been under [the] economic [banner] and start making them social and 
environmental, whereas it’s already a check on those who are environmental.  
Most were of the view that it would never be possible to reconcile the 'yes' or 'no' 
divide and that SIAC’s role was to present a robust, unfettered data set to Cabinet
85, 
and that it was appropriate to allow representatives of elected Government to make a 
decision, rather than forcing agencies to back a position they weren’t comfortable 
with
86.  
It was suggested that SIAC’s task of consolidating the data on behalf of Cabinet 
might have been easier had there been clear State objectives and assessment criteria 
to provide the context within which to discuss the costs and benefits of the Gorgon 
proposal, and would also have resulted in a more certain process. In particular, the 
lack of clear environmental objectives and ‘goalposts’ was raised as an issue
87. One 
EPA/DoE interviewee, however, responded to the call for fixed environmental 
goalposts as follows
88:  
What you find over and over and over again in assessments is industry, and particularly 
industry advocacy bodies like Chamber of Mines, or Chambers of Commerce saying ‘we 
like fixed goal posts’. And actually, at the time they do, they want things to be the same 
for everybody, they want a level playing field with fixed goal posts, and they use both of 
those, but as soon as you get into a case, a project: well, actually, we just want to change 
this a little bit, and that’s OK isn’t it? And it’s a bit like you’re playing a game of footy, 
to use the analogy, and you say  you want fixed goal posts, and you kick the ball and you 
realise there’s a side wind and the ball’s not going to quite go through the goal. And 
you’d just like to move them a bit to ensure that it goes through the goal. Well, sorry 
guys, you should have thought about the side wind beforehand. So, you get used to 
everybody saying they should have fixed goal posts and level playing fields. The world 
doesn’t work that way. Things do change, community aspirations change, and that’s the 
biggest driver, political imperatives change, knowledge changes
89. 
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Some within DoIR took the somewhat optimistic view that an integrated consensus 
view to which all players subscribed could have been reached, but that this 
opportunity was lost about half way through the ESE process. Achieving a consensus 
would have required the EPA and Conservation Commission to “stick to their 
mandate” and cast aside their philosophical opposition to the proposal since Cabinet 
had already stated that access was not to be refused merely on policy or 
philosophical grounds, and the focus should have been on achieving consensus on 
conditions for access
90. 
An important observation was made by an interviewee from outside the Reference 
Group who noted that there actually were opportunities to achieve a consensus 
viewpoint, but that it would have required a different framing of the assessment 
process to allow the possibility of finding an alternative location
91: 
Our understanding of how we’re supposed to be going about sustainability is not 
necessarily trading one against the other, and I know in some circumstances it’s very 
difficult, but in this situation they actually could have done it pretty well. If they’d been 
prepared to look for alternative sites, they could have done much better for the 
environment and also economic and social, triple bottom line
92. 
A factor that many believed played a significant part in these final stages of the ESE 
process (commencing with the preparation of advice for Cabinet) was that the 
responsibility for project management changed hands within DoIR at the time of the 
preparation of the Outcome Report. It was considered by many of those outside 
DoIR that this resulted in a change in direction, and an eroding of the respect for 
others’ points of view that had previously characterised the process. The decision 
that the Outcome Report would not be publicly released was also seen as indicative 
of a change in attitude
93. As one interviewee recalled, “We began to see people’s and 
                                                                                                                                                              
also suggested by an EPA/DoE interviewee (14) that a lack of clear up-front objectives is an 
advantage, since ‘small ‘p’ policy’ can be developed through the process of conducting assessments. 
The example given was that the Gorgon ESE process was a primary driver for the development of a 
state-wide policy on environmental offsets, or net conservation benefits. 
90 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
91 Gorgon interviews -Community groups (12). 
92 The alternatives sites discussion was effectively closed prior to the ESE process commencing by 
the proponent putting forward its ‘Barrow or nothing’ position. This point is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 4. 
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agencies’ true colours and their prejudices about what should happen. Debates 
became disappointingly personal at this time”
94.  
An example of a display of DoIR’s ‘true colours’ during the preparation of advice to 
Cabinet was the perceived manipulation of the advice provided by other agencies. 
An EPA/DoE representative said
95:  
I would put in…that the EPA found the project to be fatally flawed and the editors over at 
DoIR took that out, it must have been four or five times they took it out and I put it back 
in and they took it out and I put it back in. I said, ‘look this is in the EPA’s report, you 
can’t take it out’ but they didn’t like it, they took it out. And that illustrates one of the 
mechanics of the process that I guess pulling the Outcome Report together was always in 
the control of DoIR and its basic politics, if you want to manage something you control 
the resources and the pen. 
3.3.7 Enabling legislation and Cabinet decision 
Prior to and in anticipation of the Cabinet decision of 8
th September 2003, 
negotiations were conducted between the State of Western Australia and the 
proponent to agree to the terms of the approval. The necessary enabling legislation 
was drafted, in the form of the Barrow Island Bill 2003 and the appended Gorgon 
Gas Processing and Infrastructure Project Agreement. The Bill covers matters 
pertaining to the management of industry on Barrow Island in general, while the 
Agreement specifically addresses the Gorgon development.  
The negotiations and drafting of legislation were timed so that if the Cabinet 
decision was ‘yes’ the legislation could be immediately introduced into Parliament 
and both Government and proponent time frames with respect to the project could be 
met. It was also suggested that the negotiations needed to be complete by the time 
Cabinet debated the issue and made a decision, since the draft legislation was part of 
the information that went to Cabinet, containing as it did the general shape of what 
the company was agreeing to with respect to net conservation benefits, gas to shore 
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and other critical issues. The outcomes of the negotiations were an important part of 
the context in which Cabinet was required to make its decision
96.  
In introducing the Bill to Parliament on 16
th September 2003, the Minister for State 
Development described the purpose of the Bill as being to
97: 
- ratify and authorise the implementation of an agreement, scheduled to the Bill, between 
the State and the Gorgon joint venturers for a gas processing and infrastructure project, to 
minimise environmental disturbance on Barrow Island, and to provide for the support of 
conservation programs in similar bioregions;  
- with the approval of the appropriate ministers, allow the granting of titles, totalling no 
more than 300 hectares of uncleared land on Barrow Island for gas processing project 
purposes, over the A-class nature reserve - No 11648 - that covers the island; and  
- allow the underground injection and disposal of carbon dioxide on Barrow Island. 
Both the Conservation Commission/CALM and the EPA/DoE expressed a number 
of concerns relating to the negotiations and drafting of the legislation, which was 
undertaken by DoIR on behalf of SIAC. These included their increasing sense of 
marginalisation, the haste with which the negotiation and drafting processes were 
conducted, and the outcomes of the negotiation itself. In the words of one 
CALM/Conservation Commission interviewee, “As the proponent, the Minister for 
State Development and DoIR started to negotiate, that marginalised everybody else” 
and “in this process, when it came to the detail of legislation, [we were] totally 
marginalised at the end of the day”
98. 
While the negotiation was unquestionably the responsibility of the Minister for State 
Development and DoIR, the environmental agencies
99 felt that their views were not 
taken into consideration. Comments included, “So the process of generating the 
Agreement Act and Bill, while it was consultative, it was consult and ignore rather 
than consult and accommodate”
100 and similarly, “[It was] a classic case of being 
asked to comment on multiple drafts, with little change occurring between drafts, 
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and reiterating the same point time and time again”
101. One EPA/DoE interviewee 
summarised the situation
102:  
So that all became a lot less consultative and a lot less transparent when the real power 
broking was going on as opposed to the front end stuff, which was about sharing 
information but wasn’t about decision-making. So the information-sharing stuff was 
good…but when it got down to the real nuts and bolts of where the power lay, which is in 
drafting the legislation it became a lot worse and everyone resorted to good old fashioned 
methodologies.  
These complaints from the environmental agencies, however, were received with 
little sympathy from at least one DoIR representative, who viewed the comments and 
proposed amendments submitted by these agencies as a strategy to undermine the 
overall process
103: 
If you have people who really don’t agree that the project should go forward at all, then 
they’re very unlikely to come forward with practicable amendments to legislation…And 
you also start to get suggestions very late in the day when the negotiation is basically 
closed, Cabinet is to all intents and purposes signed off, and people are still coming in 
with what they think are really useful suggestions…This isn’t realistic, but then if you 
really don’t want the thing to happen at all, then you don’t care if it’s not realistic do 
you?...Right at the end particularly, people probably felt disenfranchised because they 
would come in and say we fundamentally don’t agree with some of this stuff, here’s a 
long list of changes we want, and we’d say well this doesn’t go in the direction that the 
Ministers have agreed. This isn’t something which we can agree with the company 
because we’d have to reopen everything. So, guys, sorry, with the greatest respect, we’re 
closing this off. So yes, we did feel empowered at times! We didn’t have a choice! What 
can you do? 
Apart from a sense of being ignored, there was also a strong belief within the 
environmental agencies that the time frame was inappropriately short for the 
preparation of the legislation and consequently they were given inadequate time (less 
than 24 hours in some instances) to comment on or respond to drafts that related to 
very fundamental issues
104. There were also rumours of “draft legislation supposedly 
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being walked into Cabinet…draft legislation being amended right up to the 12th 
hour”
 105. One DoIR interviewee responded to this criticism by reiterating that the 
time schedule for the ESE process was set by Cabinet and that therefore time was 
extremely tight throughout
106.  
The final result was dissatisfaction with the ultimate contents of the legislation by 
some parties, with the handling of NCBs in the legislation being of particular 
concern to several interviewees
107. The general perception among the environmental 
agencies was that the legislation and Agreement did not represent a ‘good deal’ for 
Western Australia and that it was DoIR’s responsibility to ensure that the 
development of this resource delivered the greatest possible benefit to Western 
Australia
108. One interviewee said
109:  
I remain perplexed and disappointed that the last few weeks were so rushed and what 
could have been a better deal for the state in all senses, but particularly a conservation 
sense, was foregone.  
Possible reasons for the perceived ‘bad deal’ were also discussed. One interviewee 
considered that the proponent had undue power in the negotiating process
110: 
It’s hard to say what role DoIR, the Minister and the JV had in the development of the 
legislation, but I would say the JV had significantly greater control over that process than 
any agency in Government. That’s the feeling.  
One DoIR interviewee also questioned Government’s ability to negotiate such 
agreements with large corporations
111:  
Governments just haven’t got the wherewithal to negotiate with these large corporations. 
It would have been a tough negotiation, there’s no doubt about it. These corporations 
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109 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (4). 
110 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (6). Similarly, another interviewee said: “I 
suspect what we have seen is the ‘pro’ forces got a sniff of the yes a long while before the decision 
and all of the deal started to go backwards from that point. The amount of the NCB went down, the 
term of the agreement went up, all of the controls and outcomes that the state got went backwards 
from the point that it started to become apparent what the outcome was going to be” (Gorgon 
interviews -EPA/DoE (14)). 
111 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
      109 
send their people that they have negotiating, they send them to negotiating school, 
whereas these are mere public servants at all levels and the Ministers of the Crown.  
On 8
th September 2003, after consideration of the information before them, including 
the draft Bill and Agreement, the Western Australian Cabinet granted the Gorgon JV 
in- principle access to Barrow Island for the purposes of gas processing. The State 
Premier of Western Australia issued a press release the following day entitled 
‘Gorgon gas development to deliver groundbreaking environmental benefits’. It is 
reproduced in Box 3.8. 
Box 3.8: Western Australian Premier’s press release (9
th September 2003)
 112 
Groundbreaking environmental benefits will flow to the North-West following the 
signing today of the State Agreement for the $11billion Gorgon gas development. 
Under the agreement, the Gorgon Joint Venture will contribute payments totalling 
$40million towards conservation projects to protect native plants and animals in 
environments similar to Barrow Island. 
"This is the first time any State agreement has provided for special environmental 
benefits outside of the project area paid by the developers of a project," the Premier 
said today." 
The money will be paid to the Department of Conservation and Land Management 
(CALM) and allocated to major new conservation projects by the Executive Director 
of CALM, acting on the advice of a special advisory board. 
"The money will begin to flow within a month of the Gorgon development gaining 
Parliamentary approval, with an initial $3million payment by the Gorgon Joint 
Venture to flow to major new conservation projects." 
In addition to the initial $3million payment, the conservation package will include:  
  $2million on Stage 1 of the development gaining approval;  
  $5million on approval of Stage 2 of the project; and  
  $1million per year for 30 years following the approval of Stage 1. 
All payments will be indexed to protect their value against the effects of inflation. 
The Premier said the $40million conservation benefits package was in addition to 
commitments the Government had secured for the Joint Venture to fund the 
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monitoring of its quarantine protections on Barrow Island by officers from CALM. 
Under conditions contained in the State Agreement, the Joint Venture will fund:  
  seven full-time CALM officers during the construction phase to a 
maximum of $1million per annum; and  
  five full time CALM officers during operations to a maximum of $750,000 
per annum. 
This would ensure that a minimum of two CALM officers would be deployed on the 
island at all times. 
The Premier said the Government had delivered on its commitment to sustainability 
by securing funding by the Joint Venture for key biodiversity conservation projects 
and the independent monitoring of its operations on Barrow Island Nature Reserve. 
Monitoring would particularly focus on quarantine arrangements for the whole island 
to be operated by ChevronTexaco, which the Government was requiring to be above 
current world's best practice standards. 
"The Gorgon development is a win for the environment, as well as being a win for 
both the State and national economies," Dr Gallop said. 
State Development Minister Clive Brown said the project also had global 
environmental benefits. 
"The global environment will benefit greatly from the Gorgon development, with 
LNG exports being used to produce clean energy for the world," Mr Brown said. 
"In addition, the reinjection of carbon dioxide from Gorgon gas will result in the 
Gorgon gas development being the most greenhouse friendly LNG operation in the 
world 
3.3.8 The purpose of the ESE process
113 
Reflection upon the Gorgon experience has highlighted the lack of a common 
understanding between the various participants and stakeholders as to what the 
purpose of the ESE process actually was and what the Cabinet decision based upon 
the assessment process would mean. The ambiguity was recognised by a 
representative of the Expert Panel at a Reference Group Meeting in April 2003, who 
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opened the meeting by asking what exactly the ESE process was designed to 
achieve
114.  
A common response to this question from interviewees during the research 
interviews was: ‘The objective of the process is to provide Cabinet with a robust data 
set so that they can make the most informed decision’
115. The process was certainly 
successful in generating large quantities of data relating to a wide range of issues 
associated with the proposed development plan, as was discussed in Section 3.3.5. 
Whether or not the data gathered was appropriate to facilitate Cabinet’s decision 
clearly depends upon the nature of the decision itself, and therefore it becomes 
important to clearly articulate the purpose of the assessment and the actual question 
facing Cabinet. It has been suggested that the ultimate decision could be 
simplistically defined as ‘to determine whether or not the Gorgon gas development 
on Barrow Island is, on balance, a good thing for Western Australia’. Such 
statements, however, are of little value without a clear understanding of the function 
of the process and its relationship to other processes and decision points. 
A closer examination of the original Cabinet decision not to exclude Barrow Island 
as a matter of policy
116, which was the initiation of the ESE process, finds it 
somewhat ambiguous. One interviewee described this decision as implying that 
industrial development in National Parks may be acceptable to the Government 
under certain circumstances, and inferring that the purpose of the ESE process was 
therefore to determine whether the circumstances were acceptable, or could be made 
acceptable, in this case
117. Another interpreted it as Cabinet deciding whether or not 
to reverse a previous policy decision
118. It was also pointed out that in making this 
decision Government also reserved the right to decide that there are no 
circumstances in which industrial activity in National Parks is acceptable, 
particularly if the suggestion should prove unpalatable to the community
119. Despite 
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this reservation, however, the Cabinet decision apparently did open a door that had 
previously been closed. 
It was suggested by another interviewee that the Cabinet decision to not reject access 
‘as a matter of policy’ should have curtailed any further ethical, philosophical or 
values-based discussion as to the appropriateness of development on Barrow Island, 
“Cabinet in their original decision had already decided that Gorgon’s desire to use 
Barrow Island for gas processing was not to be excluded as a matter of policy, i.e. 
not as a matter of philosophy”
120. This interviewee was later critical of the EPA 
Bulletin and Conservation Commission advice that both opened with a statement of 
opposition in principle to an industrial development in an A Class Nature Reserve
121:  
Now if you read the Conservation Commission and EPA bulletins, their opening 
statements disregard that Cabinet decision and directive. They go beyond the mandate 
and the charter…. whether they agree with the Cabinet decision or not, it was not their 
role or their mandate in this process to actually reopen that debate.  
Others took the view that the philosophical debate was essential to the ESE process 
and a significant component of its purpose, although often qualifying this by stating 
that it should be a philosophical debate based upon facts and data and not 
emotions
122. Despite the ambiguity as to whether there was room at this stage of the 
process for arguments based upon value considerations, it was pointed out that the 
facts and data were necessary to aid in the conceptualisation of a complex and 
controversial policy issue and to support the philosophical debate
123. Consequently, 
the ESE process did focus on the collection and evaluation of data relating to the site 
selection, the environmental risks and the potential economic, strategic and social 
benefits of the proposal in order to provide Cabinet with as complete a data set as 
possible upon which to base its decision. 
It was perceived by many that the purpose of the ESE process was to identify any 
potential fatal flaws in the proposed development plan. There were differing views, 
however, as to what the implications of that were for the subsequent Part IV 
environmental assessment. One proponent interviewee believed that a ‘yes’ decision 
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by Cabinet which was subject to the outcomes of the Part IV assessment would be of 
no value at all
124, while another stated after the Cabinet decision that the decision 
had been interpreted to mean that the gas processing plant would definitely be 
built
125. The EPA, however, strongly reserved its right to ‘have another bite of the 
cherry’, highlighting that fatal flaws may only become apparent at a late stage in the 
approvals process and pointing out that the EPA could again recommend against the 
project should it feel the proposed environmental management practices (and 
particularly quarantine controls) were of an inadequate standard
126. 
Three broad categories of issues rose to the surface as being of most concern to the 
Reference Group and to the public through the comment process: 
•  The veracity of the proponent’s claim that Barrow Island is the only 
economically viable site; 
•  Quarantine risk;  
•  Strategic implications. 
These can be considered to relate to the three potentially fatal flaws that could have 
resulted in the Government refusing Gorgon access to Barrow Island: 
•  Another site being found to be economically viable
127; 
•  Quarantine risk being deemed to be unacceptably high; and 
•  Lack of strategic and economic benefits to WA, for example, lack of a firm 
commitment to bring gas to shore and that royalties from the project would go 
to the Commonwealth rather than the State under current arrangements.  
The point was made that the bi-level ESE plus subsequent EIA route was the only 
one available to the proponent since the engineering work was not sufficiently 
advanced for a Part IV assessment alone. Consequently, the assessment was 
conducted on a development reference case and not a defined project. Concerns were 
raised about the difficulties of identifying fatal flaws and also of applying 
appropriate management controls without full project definition, and hence the risks 
                                                         
124 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
125 Gorgon interviews - DoIR  (2). 
126 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
127 Gorgon interviews - DoIR (9). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
  114 
associated with placing too much emphasis on the strategic level assessment to the 
detriment of the subsequent Part IV assessment
128.  
This discussion formed part of the larger debate about whether or not the ESE 
process could actually be considered a strategic assessment. In the field of 
environmental assessment, the term ‘strategic’ is used to refer to an assessment 
process conducted at a level above a specific project, typically an assessment of a 
policy, plan or programme (see Chapter 4). Since the ESE process was conducted on 
a development concept and not a detailed project proposal, it could be considered a 
strategic assessment. Others pointed out that it could be considered a strategic 
assessment because it included examination of strategic issues for the State, 
particularly the issue of providing an alternative source of domestic gas, although it 
was not strategic in an environmental sense
129. 
It was also suggested that the main purpose of the ESE process was to provide a 
means of gauging public opinion and therefore the political implications of the 
Gorgon proposal
130, and not necessarily to make decision based on a logical and 
transparent weighing up of all of the factors. 
The above discussion highlights some of the ambiguity around the purpose of the 
ESE process. To summarise, points of discussion included: 
•  Whether the debate should have been based solely upon analytical 
information and data with respect to environmental risks and potential 
strategic, economic and social benefits, or whether there was also room for a 
debate around the less tangible concerns of values, ethics and philosophy; 
•  Whether the ESE process was designed to identify fatal flaws in the proposal, 
and if so, the practicalities of conducting such an assessment on a partially 
conceptualised proposal; 
•  Whether the ESE process effectively amounted to a full assessment of a 
partially conceptualised project and therefore to what extent the Cabinet 
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decision of 8
th September 2003 was ‘subject to the outcomes of the Part IV 
assessment’; 
•  Whether the assessment was sufficiently strategic, given that its boundaries 
were largely defined by the proponent’s strategic objectives rather than the 
State’s; 
•  To what extent the Cabinet decision was based on analysis of the available 
data and considered weighing up of the implications in all areas versus the 
outcomes of a public opinion poll. 
3.3.9 Consultation, community and campaigns 
The release for public comment of the proponent’s ESE Review document, and then 
SIAC’s Overview Report, including the appended bulletins and advice, were two of 
the formal mechanisms for consultation within the ESE process. The Gorgon JV, 
however, undertook extensive consultation of its own commencing before the 
initiation of the ESE process and extending right through to the Cabinet decision. A 
ChevronTexaco representative described three phases of consultation undertaken by 
the proponent
131: 
The first phase was to make them aware of the proposal, the sustainability proposal. Then 
secondly, once the scope of work had gone out, to talk to them about their views about 
the scope of work. Then once the document had been produced to go out and talk to 
them, as we are now, about the document itself, and I guess we’re now in a situation in 
phase three where we’re honing in on particular issues raised by key stakeholders and 
basically trying to resolve those issues in a way that meets their aspirations and doesn’t 
jeopardise the future of the project.  
It was considered by some that there was a fine line between consultation and 
lobbying, and that the latter strategy was pursued particularly vigorously since the 
Gorgon JV, as a powerful multinational corporation, had privileged access to 
political leaders at both State and Commonwealth levels. The Gorgon JV did not 
attempt to hide the importance of lobbying to its campaign
132: 
I guess when I say we’ve gone around consulting with stakeholders, you can call it 
lobbying, that’s what it is. We’ve been making a point of talking to every Cabinet 
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member. We’ve already given Cabinet collectively a briefing at a Cabinet meeting, but 
we’re also going out to individual Cabinet members and I guess I always think of 
lobbying as almost undue influence, but some of them won’t even know what Gorgon is. 
I doubt if [some Ministers] would know what Gorgon is….there’s half of them who 
probably don’t know anything about it, and yet they’ll be sitting in a Cabinet meeting, 
and I don’t know how those Cabinet meetings really work when it comes to making a 
decision, on the basis that they do it in a democratic way then I want to make sure that 
each Cabinet member has had the opportunity to talk to us. 
The political power of the Gorgon JV was viewed with suspicion by some who 
described their behaviour as “virtually blackmailing the State Government, saying if 
we don’t get Barrow [Island] we won’t be bringing this massive project here”
 133.  
There were further criticisms made by the community sector regarding consultation 
on the Gorgon proposal, with one interviewee pointing out that community groups 
had not been given access to all of the available information (citing the proposed 
GTL plant as an example)
 134, and that the lack of consideration of alternative 
locations within the ESE process made consultation a farce in any case
135.  
The Conservation Council of Western Australia (CCWA), a peak environmental 
NGO, launched a campaign called ‘Rescue Barrow Island’, which was launched on 
National Threatened Species Day, 7
th September 2003, with a well-attended public 
meeting in Perth. It was ‘too little, too late’, however, particularly as the Cabinet 
decision to grant the Gorgon JV access to Barrow Island was made on the following 
day
136. While the EIA of the detailed project proposal is still incomplete at the time 
of writing in October 2006, there was a sense that the favourable in-principle 
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decision at the strategic level meant that approval had already been granted and 
perhaps because of this, the Rescue Barrow Island campaign lost momentum
137. 
The CCWA acknowledged that the lack of general public awareness of Barrow 
Island, due to its isolation and distance from major population centres, and the fact 
that access to the island is restricted, made it difficult for the environmental NGOs to 
mobilise community support for their campaign. To be successful, a comprehensive 
education campaign, designed to increase awareness of the conservation values of 
Barrow Island in the broader community would have been required
138.  
In discussing the community engagement within the ESE process, a representative of 
the EPA/DoE made an important point regarding the broader issue of the role of 
community in sustainability
139: 
There really was no community engagement about the whole process. It was very much a 
Government-driven process and a proponent-driven process, whereas if we’re going to 
argue that sustainability is about reflecting community values and then working towards 
those values, we need to find ways to meaningfully engaging the community much more 
thoroughly. 
There were a number of different views expressed in the interviews as to the purpose 
of stakeholder engagement and its role in decision-making. Several of these views 
were based on the concept of the right of interested members of society to be 
informed. One DoIR interviewee said, “Society has evolved as a questioning society. 
It’s a luxury that we have because we are a well-educated, inclusive society that has 
the luxury of expectations”
140.  
The same interviewee also discussed the advantages of the public debate
141:  
We have gained a great deal of public debate. There is greater public awareness, and 
perhaps greater public recognition of the breadth of the debate and the need to have a 
comprehensive debate rather than a myopic debate, that these are not simple 
considerations…It has been a debate within society.  
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The advantage of this to the politicians is that they are made aware of public 
sentiment about the decision. Furthermore, there is a view that public outrage is 
lessened as a result of consultation processes, since “it makes it more difficult for 
them to mount a [Save Barrow Island] campaign now when they have been given the 
opportunity to state their case here and now”
142.  
The primary focus of the consultation conducted by the proponent was keeping the 
stakeholders informed. Part of this process was attempting to address particular 
concerns raised, although the proponent’s response appears to have been to provide 
further information in order to clarify issues rather than to modify the proposal in 
any significant way. This somewhat limited role of stakeholders in shaping the 
process or its outcomes was also reflected in the comments of one DoIR 
interviewee
143:  
It’s about level of inclusiveness, ensuring that people have the opportunity to be heard, 
but it’s also about managing their expectations, but notwithstanding their right to be 
heard they do not necessarily have a right, or they do not have a mortgage on what is 
right, and the judgement of what is right. 
One community representative also perceived that stakeholders were given limited 
opportunity to influence the process, highlighting issues of the way in which 
information was presented
144:  
Looking back now in hindsight I think that a lot of what they did was rhetoric so they 
could be seen to be consulting. They haven’t seriously changed their proposal. What they 
were on about all the time was to locate on Barrow, was quite clear. You look at some of 
the analysis that [a consultant] has done, and he’s quite firmly of the opinion that their 
site was always going to be Barrow and it wasn’t genuine assessment of alternative sites. 
….Those sorts of things just make a farce of adequate community consultation. 
There was also a sense that greater forces were at work, which further diminished the 
influence of community stakeholders
145:  
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And particularly when you started seeing stuff in the media, virtually blackmailing the 
state Government, saying if we don’t get Barrow we won’t be bringing this massive 
project here. So it does make you feel like, what’s the point in talking to them? 
One DoIR interviewee raised the issue of the advantageous position of the proponent 
compared with Government as a result of the public consultation process, “And the 
other thing talking in terms of process that I think has emerged through this process 
is that Gorgon is the one who has been out there engaging with stakeholders”, and
146:  
I think that the proponent has developed a sense of public opinion that is not available 
directly to Government, which is then reliant on the proponent’s articulation of public 
opinion rather than having its own understanding. Through this process, we in 
Government agencies think that we understand what the public is thinking, but we don’t 
have the same strength of understanding that perhaps Gorgon has. 
In summary the consultation was viewed by both the proponent and members of 
government agencies as being a process of providing information to stakeholders and 
addressing concerns raised, so that they felt engaged and were therefore less likely to 
mount a high-profile campaign against the proposed development; to enable the 
Government to gauge the public reaction to the proposal and therefore to evaluate 
the political implications of its decision; and to allow the proponent to manage the 
potential effect of the development on its reputation.  
3.3.10   Roles and relationships 
This section firstly examines the broad issue of interagency cooperation in the 
Gorgon ESE process, and then explores the roles of each of the main players: DoIR, 
the EPA/DoE, the Conservation Commission/CALM, and the proponent 
ChevronTexaco.  
Interagency cooperation 
Particularly in the early stages of the ESE process, prior to the preparation of advice 
for Cabinet and negotiations between Government and proponent, there was regular 
favourable comment about the higher than usual level of interagency cooperation, 
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which was reflected in the interviews. In particular, the degree of cooperation 
between DoIR’s Office of Major Projects (OMP) and the EPA/DoE was noted
147.  
There was a correspondingly high degree of optimism about what could be achieved 
through such interagency cooperation. One EPA/DoE interviewee said early in the 
process
148:  
The other real advance that I think is, and whether it’s the personalities, or the political 
climate or just timing, I am seeing a lot more cooperative whole-of-Government 
consideration of the issue than I’ve seen on a lot of other things. At least at this stage, and 
we’re still in middle, the rubber hasn’t hit the road yet, and people haven’t had to take 
hard decisions, but at least at this stage we’ve found people prepared to listen to the 
economic argument, people prepared to listen to the environment argument rather than 
getting in their corners and duking it out with environment on this side and economic on 
the other, this is Government people, bureaucrats. That’s a fantastic advance. Whatever 
happens with Gorgon, that will be a legacy of this process that I think will be valuable for 
years to come. I hope I’m still saying that at the end
149. 
The same interviewee also made the point that effective cooperation did not 
necessarily mean agreement, since each agency had its own mandate and role to play 
in the process. He said of DoIR
150: 
It’s not your job to worry about whether environment is protected, we don’t expect you 
to, we expect you to acknowledge it as an important issue, like we acknowledge that 
economic development is an important issues, but it’s not your job to advocate. We 
expect you to listen to us and to have a fair process”.  
Another implied, however, that advocating for a particular position was indicative of 
a lack of trust between agencies
151, trust being a recurring theme in the interviews
152. 
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As the process progressed towards the negotiation of the agreement between the 
proponent and Government and the final Cabinet decision, however, various groups 




I think there was some potential and some good interaction with agencies and different 
levels, but I think probably that as time has gone on, people recognise the self-interest of 
the agencies that they’re working for at the core of it and it’s probably become less 
constructive. Some of the initial interaction was probably better than lately.  
This perceived lack of trust and increasing levels of conflict between agencies was 
variously discussed in terms of ‘bureaucratic turf issues’
155 and ‘bad blood and bad 
history’
156 rising to the surface. One DoIR interviewee, however, painted a positive 
picture of the whole ESE process, including the final stages
157:  
[The interdepartmental relationships] were very professional. I’ve got very high regard 
for the people. The people from the other agencies were extraordinarily generous with 
their time. They really put a lot of effort in. The agencies that you would expect us to 
disagree with over this, we did maintain our sense of humour, we maintained our 
relationships, we probably got a bit snappy at times, but …everything is perfectly 
amiable. I think [there’s] a view that we’ve burnt a few bridges and I disagree 
completely.  
Department of Industry and Resources 
The Office of Major Projects (OMP) within the DoIR was responsible for the project 
management of the Gorgon ESE process. As articulated by one interviewee within 
the agency, DoIR is traditionally the agency that “helps developers to make 
investments in WA in the context of compliance with all the laws and aspirations of 
the State Government” and as such is “not routinely, formally involved in doing 
evaluations
158”. Consequently, DoIR’s adoption of the project management role, and 
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hence responsibility for the coordination of the Government response to the 
proposed development, raised a number of issues:  
•  The credibility and actual or perceived conflict of interest in having a 
traditional industry advocate managing the assessment process (the 'fox in 
charge of the henhouse' scenario);  
•  The extent to which DoIR retained its role as the proponent’s advocate in 
Government; 
•  The capacity of the DoIR to coordinate the Government response; 
•  The behaviours exhibited by DoIR in its project management role and the 
perceived impacts of these behaviours on the integrity of the process. 
DoIR was also responsible for coordinating the drafting of the Barrow Island Bill 
and associated Agreement between the State and the proponent, as would normally 
be the case for any project development. Issues associated with this role have already 
been discussed in Section 3.3.7 and the following discussion therefore relates to the 
project management of the ESE process. 
The sensitivity of DoIR taking the role as project manager was acknowledged by 
most of those involved in the process, both internal and external to the agency. From 
outside the government agencies came the comment
159:  
I think DoIR are in a very difficult position. [When you have] whole of Government 
coordination responsibility …on approvals or whatever, you live and die by the 
credibility which you bring to it. Now that’s credibility as a coordinator of the whole of 
Government effort, which was part of DoIR’s job in this process. That’s a hard one…at 
some stage when it gets tough, someone will take your authority and credibility on.…I’ve 
seen the tussle sitting there, where parts of them had an advocacy hat on: ‘but we’re the 
advocates for the development’. It’s a very hard thing to maintain a whole of 
Government, coordination, to take a ‘clean hands’, rise above it all approach, which 
stands at the centre of the success of the process one way or another. At the same time, 
schizophrenically saying there’s a Chinese wall between us and the other guys who are 
advocates. Organisationally you’re straddling a very, very nasty barbed wire fence.  
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Sensitivity to the ‘fox in charge of the henhouse’ criticisms, and commitment to 
‘playing clean’ led to DoIR’s hiring of the Expert Panel to conduct the strategic, 
economic and social evaluation on its behalf. In acknowledging this, one DoIR 
interviewee reflected on the prevailing perceptions, saying
160:  
You can’t trust an economic champion to rationally and dispassionately look at economic 
aspects. But conversely, you are allowed to have a green zealot and expect them to look 
dispassionately at the green elements. It’s hypocrisy, but you have to live with the 
perception. 
This interviewee considered that “moving people forward with a belief in the process 
and continually having to fight the perception that we have approached this with pre-
conceived ideas and a pre-conceived outcome” had been DoIR’s greatest challenge 
as project manager. 
Some parties outside DoIR remained unconvinced by DoIR’s efforts to remain 
impartial managers of the ESE process and questioned its credibility, given its 
traditional pro-development stance. One interviewee said, “[DoIR] is unashamedly 
[pro-development]… unashamedly, that’s their job. It’s understandable
161”. Some 
believed that pro-development sentiments therefore had a powerful influence over 
the ESE process, “[The Reference Group process] was useful but it was DoIR 
controlled and it was contrived to some extent” and
162: 
While all the agendas are really all being constructed by DoIR, it’s always going to have 
that flavour and you can envisage that the public perception, the conservation 
stakeholders’ perception will be not that great about how things are done
163.  
Another interviewee went much further in saying, “Frankly there’s obviously been 
manipulation of the outcome of meetings and so it’s not a really balanced process 
that you would really need”
164. 
The conservation movement perceived a distinct power imbalance and believed that 
DoIR and its Minister were clear advocates for the proponent, particularly in the 
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media. Comments were made that, “the very agency that’s pushing it so bloody hard 
is the very agency that is coordinating the assessment? I don’t think that’s right!”
165 
Similarly, “One of the problems is you have a government agency being advocate for 
the development, but you don’t get the same level of advocacy from the 
environmental agencies and the conservation agencies, and that always puts you at 
the rough end” and “[DoIR has] become essentially the proponent for this 
development, or as good as. Gorgon does a bit of media, but it’s [DoIR] and [the 
Minister for State Development] who are the spokespeople for this development, and 
that’s extremely disappointing and not appropriate”
166. 
Within DoIR, there were debates about the agency’s appropriate role in the ESE 
process, particularly during discussions relating to the nature of the proposed DoIR 
submission during the first public consultation process. Some internal parties put 
forward their case that the advocacy voice had been diluted by the project 
management role and therefore the agency’s submission should be pro-development. 
Others believed that taking such a position would undermine the credibility of the 
ESE process and therefore that the DoIR submission should seek clarification and 
further information on certain issues, consistent with the aim of the ESE process to 
provide Government with as complete and robust a data set as possible
167.  
Ultimately, the opposing views were somewhat reconciled by noting that DoIR could 
best support the proponent by managing an open and robust process and giving no-
one cause to question its integrity
168, or in other words, “the best thing we can do is 
to run this thing as cleanly as possible, squeaky clean”
169. The comment was also 
made that
170: 
Being an advocate probably means being their worst enemy, in other words, testing those 
sorts of assertions almost to breaking point by saying to them if we…later find out that 
there’s spurious rubbish, we look stupid and you’ve lost an advocate inside Government 
[and] you’ve probably lost our confidence and your own reputation is history, pal. 
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While there were those within DoIR who claimed, “We dumped the role of project 
advocate, we just dropped it”
 171, others perhaps more realistically conceded that “we 
haven’t abandoned our advocacy role, but to some extent have suppressed it because 
of the bigger picture”
172. 
This partial suppression of DoIR’s traditional advocacy role was perceived by the 
proponent as abandonment
173:  
To be honest, we’re battling the agencies, the EPA, the Conservation Commission, the 
Conservation Council, some members of public, some other agencies and we’re battling 
[DoIR] as well. All they’re doing is putting up problems for us to solve. They’re not 
solving things for us and they’re not advocating for us, and they were standing on the line 
and saying well we are not necessarily supportive of this project, we want to be the 
impartial broker, but everybody views them historically as supportive of the project, so 
we didn’t have anybody who was for us in Government, and it wasn’t until the last, after 
our responses to submissions, it wasn’t until the last month or 6 weeks that DoIR actually 
realised that unless they came out supportive it was going to fall over I think. And I was 
really disappointed that it took so long because it meant that the people here took a 
significant burden”. 
The proponent’s feelings of abandonment did not engender sympathy from DoIR
174:  
Yeah well, we just said to them, mate, we’re just doing the information, we’re not going 
to be out there advocating for the project. We cannot, because it’s going to compromise 
the whole Cabinet system…We can’t afford to start getting compromised in this…We 
just cannot be an advocate.  
However, this interviewee also commented that “if there is to be this kind of process 
again…it seems to me that there is a risk [if DoIR can not take an advocacy role]. I 
mean there [are] plenty of people out there lobbying against industry development, 
some of them are well informed and others aren’t”. 
Despite the external questioning of its credibility, DoIR believed firmly in their 
ability to undertake the project management role, pointing out that they had the 
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resources and expertise to take the project management role
175 and that they had 
done “this sort of ‘honest broker’ stuff before” since “we’re not just industry 
advocates, we’re a coordinating agency. That’s what we do”
 176. Having highlighted 
DoIR officers’ credentials in industrial and economic matters, the same interviewee 
also commented that:  
I do hope that we understand, or we have an adequate understanding of the green agenda 
too, because it’s pretty important. If you don’t understand what the EPA’s trying to do, or 
the Conservation Commission’s trying to do, then you really can’t pretend that you’re 
going to be involved in any sort of balanced decision.  
Another suggested that DoIR, being “unshackled by statutory confinement” is “able 
to take a broader, almost societal view” when considering development proposals, 
and in fact have always done so in their role in negotiating State Agreements
177 since 
“most State Agreements have an [environmental] enhancement [component], 
additional reporting, and accountability and not an erosion of the environmental 
bottom line”
178. 
One ‘green agency’ interviewee acknowledged the increasing recognition by the 
development agencies of the need to take a broad range of factors into 
consideration
179: 
The world has changed a hell of a lot. There used to be a time when [DoIR’s] successes 
were: knock off a Cabinet Minute, show it to nobody, get it through Cabinet, and all of a 
sudden we’d have an industrial estate on the Burrup
180, for example…it got a lot of 
developments up fast, you can’t argue about there being economic and social values. We 
wouldn’t be where we are today if it wasn’t for the Charlie Court
181 era, but we’ve got 
some environmental legacies because of it. And some process legacies that are finally 
                                                         
175 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (2 and 10). 
176 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (10). The example provided was DoIR involvement in a controversy 
involving the Collie River, Western Power and the Water Corporation (the State owned electricity and 
water utilities respectively). 
177 Referring to the agreements generated under the Government Agreements Act 1979 discussed 
earlier. 
178 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
179 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
180 The reference is to the Burrup Peninsular, near Karratha in the Pilbara region of Western Australia 
(see Fig 1.1). Woodside Petroleum’s operations are located on the Burrup and a proposal for a large 
industrial esstate there is currently being considered. 
181 The reference is to a former Liberal Premier of Western Australia, under whom the resource sector 
boomed. Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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working their way out by people on the development side coming to the realisation that 
they do have to work within the one Government. They can’t just bulldoze stuff through 
because the community won’t let them do it. 
The suggestion from within the agency that DoIR is perhaps more holistic in its 
views than other agencies and therefore able to fully appreciate and take account of 
other agency agendas, particularly environmental and conservation agendas, met 
with some reservations from the ‘green’ side of Government. In the words of one 
interviewee, “I’m absolutely gobsmacked” and “it’s not DoIR’s job to decide 
whether the environment is adequately protected”
182.  
Environmental Protection Authority and Department of Environment 
As an independent statutory body, the role of the EPA in the ESE process, as is the 
case for any assessment process, was to provide advice to the Government decision-
makers on the environmental implications of the proposed development. The EPA, 
with the support of the DoE, considers itself a pragmatic body, as expressed by one 
interviewee, “I don’t know, maybe people see us as being just obstructionist, green 
and impractical, and trying to stop everything, but I certainly don’t have that 
philosophy”
183. Discussions with the proponent also indicated that the company 
expected the EPA/DoE to take a pragmatic approach to environmental management 
and occupy the middle ground between the polarised views of DoIR and the 
Conservation Commission/CALM. One proponent interviewee expressed this as
184:  
EPA/[DoE] I guess were seen partially as being the impartial judge that was going to 
weigh pros and cons and so forth and the general feeling is that they’ve been more 
towards the Conservation Commission/CALM position, that they’ve been more than 
keeping the bastards honest, they’ve been, not making it tough for us, but they certainly 
haven’t made it easy. Unreasonably, probably unreasonably so.  
Examples were provided of ways in which the proponent believed the EPA/DoE had 
‘made it tough for them’, most of which related to the handling of public 
submissions arising from the first comment period (see Section 3.3.4). In contrast, 
                                                         
182 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
183 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
184 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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the conservation movement felt that the EPA/DoE was not a strong enough public 
advocate for the environment during the ESE process
185: 
[DoE], I always got the feeling they were a bit on the back foot, under a lot of pressure, 
that they were on the back foot which is where they often are, weren’t running a proper, 
strong, proactive…let’s put it this way, we need an environmental advocate as a 
Government agency in the same way development needs an advocate like they’ve got in 
State Development. They weren’t doing that”.  
This interviewee also described both the EPA and the Conservation Commission as 
being ‘petrified small players’ in comparison with the DoIR but was pleasantly 
surprised by the strength of the EPA Bulletin, “although they qualified some of their 
stuff, they came out pretty strongly. I didn’t expect that either of them would come 
out that strongly”
186. 
The view was expressed that the strength and philosophical nature of the EPA 
Bulletin (discussed in Section 3.3.8) was due to factors including the political context 
and the change in the Chairmanship of the EPA in March 2003. In the words of one 
DoIR interviewee
187:  
One of the points that I think that was unfortunate, but you’ve just got to deal with it, was 
the fact that we had a change in the Chairmanship in the EPA partway through and a 
change in the membership of the EPA, that those who had lived with it up to a  point 
were no longer there …And I think that at that point there was a distinct change in the 
understanding of what the process was about and perhaps there was a change in the 
perception of the EPA as to what its role in this was. They’d not lived with it to that 
point
188. 
Immediately following the Cabinet decision of 8
th September 2003, concerns were 
raised by other organisations about the position in which the EPA subsequently 
found itself, that of preparing to assess under Part IV of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 a project proposal which it believed was fundamentally flawed 
and to which it is philosophically opposed. However, EPA/DoE did not view this as 
                                                         
185 Gorgon interviews -Community groups (12). 
186 Gorgon interviews -Community groups (12). 
187 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
188 The impact of the change in EPA Chairpersonship, however, was refuted from within EPA/DoE on 
the grounds that “none of the real decision-making had been started” by the time of the change
 
(Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14)). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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a problem and were comfortable with switching focus to consider how 
environmental issues such as quarantine should best be managed, rather than whether 
or not the development should go ahead
189. 
Conservation Commission and CALM 
CALM and the Conservation Commission participated in the ESE process as 
members of SIAC and the Reference Group, and the Conservation Commission also 
prepared separate advice to Cabinet, alongside the two bulletins prepared by the EPA 
and the Expert Panel on DoIR’s behalf. In practice, the two organisations worked 
effectively as one, mainly due to the limited resources available to the Conservation 
Commission, which is a relatively new body
190.  
The respective roles of the Conservation Commission/CALM and EPA/DoE were 
distinguished between the strictly conservation mandate of the former and broader 
environmental concerns of the latter
191. Not unexpectedly considering its mandate, 
CALM/Conservation Commission expressed their opposition to the development 
proposal consistently throughout the ESE process. This, however, was viewed by 
most as quite a reasonable response since, “it’s their role [and] they’re charged with 
that responsibility and they’re carrying it out and keeping us honest. It’s not seen as a 
bad thing”
 192. 
The Conservation Commission/CALM felt very much marginalised by DoIR 
throughout the ESE process. This sense of ‘being treated with contempt’
193 is 
validated to some extent by the following discussion, in which a range of 
interviewees question Conservation Commission/CALM’s motivations and 
behaviours during the ESE process in general and the NCB discussions in particular.  
Because the original Cabinet Minute indicated that the proposed development would 
need to demonstrate net conservation benefits (NCBs) and since there was no 
                                                         
189 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (1, 13 and 14). 
190 Although the observation was not made in interviews by anyone outside the Conservation 
Commission/CALM, there was an internal awareness of the potential implications of the Gorgon 
decision on the reputation and credibility of the Conservation Commission in particular, because of its 
position as a new statutory body. The Gorgon process was therefore seen internally as “a bit of a line 
in the sand for the Commission” (Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (7)). 
191 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
192 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5); DoIR (9). 
193 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (6). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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existing Government policy on the subject, discussions about NCBs began early in 
the ESE process and continued throughout. This placed Conservation 
Commission/CALM in the position of being fundamentally heavily involved in the 
process of negotiating the NCB ‘deal’ should Cabinet grant access to Barrow Island 
while at the same time maintaining a position of fundamental opposition. 
One interviewee found this situation to be entirely inappropriate
194:  
Well they can’t put their hat on and then say, 'Oh by the way we’ve taken that [high 
moral ground, but] now we’re actually going to take off these robes and put on a sharp 
suit and get into a negotiation'. Doing the latter potentially demeans the currency of the 
former. That’s a tough ask. Take the high moral ground and then run down into the pit 
with the rest of the bears and start duking about. 
There was a high degree of cynicism from outside the environmental agencies on 
NCBs and CALM/Conservation Commission’s motivations in the Government 
discussions. One interviewee said
195:  
Quite frankly …if I was a harsh judge and being particularly provocative on a bad day, I 
would watch the nature of some people in CALM [who say], 'Yeah, we’ll let you develop 
on Barrow, but we want our 30 pieces of silver, in fact it’s not about 30, we’re talking 
about a little bit north of 30'…I thought that was very, it was brazen almost for me, when 
I heard them talk in those terms at this stage. 
From within DoIR came the remark, “There are those cynics who would suggest that 
the whole concept of Net Conservation Benefits or NCBs is about Net CALM 
Benefits”
196. This sentiment was also echoed by a proponent interviewee who 
expressed the proponent’s disillusionment with the NCB process
197.  
                                                         
194 Gorgon interviews -Expert Panel (3). 
195 Gorgon interviews -Expert Panel (3). 
196 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
197 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (11). This argument was also extended to the CALM’s cost 
recovery for its duties in monitoring the development, “[A State Agreement provides an] income 
stream for CALM. That’s all they are interested in. They want to manage the island. They want funds 
to support their activities and they want more money than treasury is prepared to give to them, a 
‘treasury by-pass’. Treasury, in the normal course of events, takes society revenue and decides on 
behalf of society how it will allocate society’s priorities in terms of funding. CALM obviously has a 
belief that that does not provide them with the necessary resources to deal with Barrow Island and it 
would be better if they could have that quarantined, for want of a better word, into a separate ‘piggy 
bank’” (Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9)). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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The suggestion was also made on several occasions that Barrow Island had been 
better managed by industry than it would have been by CALM
198, a view strongly 
refuted by the Conservation Commission/CALM
199. This debate also alludes to a 
power struggle between the Conservation Commission/CALM and ChevronTexaco 
over Barrow Island. The comment was made from outside the government 
agencies
200:  
[CALM has] been the manager of the estate out there for 40 years. I think there’s an issue 
about them trying to entrench that as much as ChevronTexaco is trying to entrench their 
ownership and control as a leaseholder, whereas CALM is trying to entrench their 
position as a manager. It might be an unfair thing to say, but I’d probably say it to them 
just to see the look on their faces when they’re challenged. 
The belief was expressed by some interviewees that the Conservation 
Commission/CALM attitudes and behaviours were at least partly due to history and 
the context in which the ESE process was conducted. One interviewee said
201: 
I think [the Gorgon proposal] has reopened old wounds. [It] has focused the less-than-
perfect circumstances that we find ourselves in in relation to Barrow Island, it has 
refocused the frustration that CALM does have in relation to Barrow Island, since 
Government in its wisdom fettered their ability to manage Barrow Island notwithstanding 
that it had been a nature reserve since 1910 and the values had been recognised since 
[that time]. Government chose, rightly or wrongly, to grant a petroleum lease and then to 
vest with Conservation Commission as it is now and then to fetter that vesting, making it 
subservient to the rights and entitlements of the petroleum lessee. 
One proponent interviewee questioned the Conservation Commission/CALM’s 
tactics in terms of the level of detail in their public submission, which led to the large 
number of questions the proponent was required to answer
202. One proponent 
interviewee said
203: 
                                                         
198 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). The main argument put forward here was the presence of 
the oil operation has meant that access to barrow island has been restricted since the 1960s, and that 
the oil company is better funded than the government agency. 
199 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (6). 
200 Gorgon interviews -Expert Panel (3). 
201 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). 
202 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5 and 8). 
203 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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And we’ve recognised that there’s obviously fundamental opposition from CALM, we 
understand the reasoning and we understand that one strategy is to sow seeds of doubt in 
Government’s mind that this isn’t a good enough basis, we haven’t got all the 
information, you can’t make this decision, is, if I was in their shoes, I’d probably be 
saying the same thing, it’s a reasonable strategy for them to adopt to delay, defer etc.  
Another ChevronTexaco representative disagreed
204: 
For sustainability to work, we’ve got to trust each other, and if there’s going to be a 
whole level of technocrats using this stuff to potentially undermine the project, and I’m 
not saying that’s what they’re doing, but one could interpret it that way, that’s got to 
change. 
The proponent: ChevronTexaco on behalf of the Gorgon JV 
In addition to a certain frustration amongst the Reference Group regarding the 
proponent’s approach to the process of information gathering (see Sections 3.3.3 to 
3.3.5), the other concern expressed in relation to ChevronTexaco was the degree of 
influence the proponent had over the ESE process and its outcomes. This influence 
was acknowledged by one proponent interviewee, who believed strongly that the 
process was “collectively our process, ours and Government’s process” and that “I 
think that Chevron was adequately able to influence the process…I think we had the 
power, the ability, the resources, the willingness of Government to listen”
 205. 
Another said that the ESE process “[had] the potential to be more strongly 
influenced by political lobbying and pressure” than a Part IV EIA process
206. 
One DoIR interviewee expressed particular resentment about this situation. When 
questioned about the proponent’s behaviour during the process, the interviewee 
responded, “'Their' process? …They will always try to project manage the process to 
what they see as their best ends”
 207. The proponent’s access to Cabinet members
208 
                                                         
204 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (8). 
205 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). Interestingly, another proponent interviewee had a 
different view: “I don’t know that we had a lot to do with the process but we did get copies of draft 
documents, particularly from DoIR (Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco(11)). 
206 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (5). 
207 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). In support of this statement, the example was provided of “the 
timing of the release of the review of the draft of the document. It was provided to Government on 
Christmas Eve, which kept government to a very tight time frame through the holiday period, and put 
enormous pressure on government to deliver. It was amazing dedication by government to live up to 
its end of the bargain”. 
208 Gorgon interviews -Community groups (12). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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and the media
209, particularly in comparison with Government agencies, were causes 
of concern for some. Another perceived that there had been an attempt to manipulate 
Government by a strategy of “divide and conquer by the proponents, playing both 
ends off against the middle”
 210. As discussed previously, there was concern over the 
degree of influence the proponent had over negotiations around the legislation and 
Agreement
211. 
3.3.11  Resources 
All parties agreed that the ESE process was expensive, time-consuming and slow, 
and it was noted that different agencies were affected to varying degrees. A 
CALM/Conservation Commission interview said, “The drain is huge on this 
Department”
212. A DoIR representative questioned whether the department had 
committed enough resources to the process
213. An EPA/DoE representative pointed 
out the disparity between the resource available to the proponent and those available 
to the government agencies, “There’s only [two of us] in here and they have a team 
of 60 and God knows how many millions of dollars have been spent on 
consultants”
214.  
This was also acknowledged by the proponent
215:  
                                                         
209 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). 
210 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (9). The interviewee went on to suggest that this could have been 
overcome by ensuring adequate resources to maintain “a universal attendance at all (proponent) 
dealings with government, to be present to understand what is being said at the different forums so 
that there can be some sense that different messages aren’t being used for different purposes in 
different forums or that the same message is being presented differently in different forums and being 
imparted to the audience, which leads to distortions”. It was pointed out that “quite often a company 
will go and have briefings that we have not been invited to, whether on purpose or otherwise. It would 
be generous to say that they are always oversights. We would do exactly the same thing if we were in 
their shoes”. 
211 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (6). 
212 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (6). This interviewee went on: “I estimated 
11 (full time equivalent people), to get to the point of something being approved, and there’s more 
afterwards”. 
213 Gorgon interviews -DoIR (2). 
214 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (14). The same interview also presented a different perspective: 
“I’m sure from their side of fence they would say that ‘we have the entire public service to convince, 
this is unfair’”. 
215 Gorgon interviews -ChevronTexaco (11). This interviewee also acknowledge that the ESE was “a 
process that places a significant burden on the state as well, the amount of time and money that DoIR, 
EPA and the Conservation Commission, CALM and others have put into it is not a light burden”.  Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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I guess it was probably what big companies are able to…we just poured on lots and lots 
of resources, and the people we have here worked extremely hard and long hours and did 
lots of preparation so we could meet timetable.  
One DoIR interviewee suggested that had there been a statutory process in place, the 
process may not have been so resource-intensive, “I believe that a statutory process 
ought to be a little quicker than that and certainly you wouldn’t have had to design it 
from scratch, sit there and design the process and then implement it”
216. 
While there was also a general belief that the drain on agency resources in particular 
was appropriate due to the scale of the proposed development and the importance of 
Barrow Island to the conservation estate
217, the question was also raised as to 
whether the resources had been well spent. As previously mentioned, an EPA/DoE 
interviewee pointed out that a large proportion of the resources were used to 
“effectively rework what could have been provided the first time around”
218 to 
ensure that Cabinet received the most thorough and highest quality data possible.  
3.4  Conclusion 
It was always anticipated that the Gorgon ESE process, while not necessarily 
providing a model for future sustainability assessments in Western Australia, would 
be an important trial for some of the concepts and would provide vital input to the 
future development of such processes, to meet commitments made in the Keating 
Review and the State Sustainability Strategy. The important questions, therefore, are 
what has been learnt, who has learnt and how have they learnt? 
One important mechanism for reflecting upon and capturing lessons learnt from 
Gorgon was the retrospective review process undertaken by DoIR, and with which I 
assisted by providing some of my research interview data (DoIR, 2004). This process 
identified many of the problems, challenges and ambiguities of the process design, 
such as those highlighted in Section 3.3 and also explored some of the substantive 
issues. Unfortunately, the review report was never released, so the influence of these 
lessons, particularly within DoIR as the agency responsible for the implementation 
of the recommendations of the Keating Review, remains to be seen.  
                                                         
216 Gorgon interviews -Gorgon (10). 
217 Gorgon interviews -Conservation Commission/CALM (7). 
218 Gorgon interviews -EPA/DoE (13). Chapter 3: The Gorgon story 
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The Gorgon ESE process was watched with great interest, however, by officers 
within Government, industry and the broader community and perceptions were 
formed with or without a formal report. This is evidenced by the design of 
subsequent sustainability assessment processes, such as those applied to the South 
West Yarragadee Water Supply Development, which is the subject of Chapter 6. 
In the following chapter, I review the Gorgon experience beginning by identifying 
the common threads and themes that emerge from the story as presented in Chapter 
3. I then explore these themes through the lens of the impact assessment literature in 
an attempt to shed light on the forces at play and to consider how they might best be 
harnessed in the interests of meaningful future sustainability assessments. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
4.1  Introduction 
What could be considered as ‘Phase 1’ of the sustainability assessment learning 
process in Western Australia is the subject of this chapter, whereby the focus is on 
Gorgon and the year is 2004. The learners in this case are both myself as an 
individual and the broader policy community involved in sustainability assessment. 
The mechanisms of learning include both reflection on practice and analysis of the 
Gorgon assessment process in the context of the impact assessment literature.  
Much of the content of this chapter emerged from the events of 2004 and my roles 
within them. The first of these was the retrospective review of the Gorgon process 
undertaken by the Department of Industry and Resources (DoIR) early in 2004, to 
which my contribution was the consideration of the Gorgon assessment as a model 
for future sustainability assessment (DoIR, 2004)
1. The second was the preparation 
of a conference paper for the International Association for Impact Assessment 
(IAIA) conference in Vancouver, Canada in April 2004, which analysed Gorgon 
against the three conceptual models presented in the literature review of Chapter 2 
(Pope, 2004a; Pope et al., 2005). The third was my role in the second half of 2004 
within the Sustainability Policy Unit (SPU) of the Department of the Premier and 
Cabinet (DPC), where I developed a Sustainability Assessment Framework for 
government agencies and an accompanying background paper (Pope, 2004b). Here 
in particular, the experience of attempting to put my own thoughts and theories into 
practice led to some significant reflection and revisions to the conceptual model, 
which are outlined in the course of the discussion. The focus of this reflective self-
critique is on the practicalities of ‘operationalising’ sustainability, and appropriate 
process frameworks for sustainability assessment
2.  
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the development of principles for 
effective sustainability assessment. While various sets of what have been generally 
                                                         
1 As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the report of the retrospective review was never finalised or 
issued. 
2 My role with DPC also provided me with an opportunity to bring together members of the informal, 
‘sustainability assessment learning community’ that had begun to develop in Western Australia by 
this time. This group of people reflects the willingness of proponents, representatives of government 
agencies and community representatives to engage with this trial period for sustainability assessment 
in Western Australia, and share reflections in the interests of learning. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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termed ‘effectiveness criteria’ have been developed for strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) (T. B. Fischer, 2006; International Association for Impact 
Assessment, 2002), equivalent sets of principles or criteria for sustainability 
assessment are only recently beginning to emerge (see for example Gibson, 2006; 
Gibson et al., 2005). While I had developed a conceptual framework for 
sustainability assessment in the process of conducting my literature review (see 
Chapter 2) during the period in which the Gorgon assessment was conducted, this 
was limited to distinguishing between different conceptualisations of sustainability, 
with which possible process methodologies were linked.  
While it may be that SEA effectiveness criteria naturally extend to sustainability 
assessment, there is ongoing debate about the relationship of the two tools (Pope, 
2006b). Furthermore, it has been noted by others that generic effectiveness criteria 
may prove to be dependent upon the level of decision under assessment (T. B. 
Fischer, 2002) and the jurisdiction in which it is conducted (T. B. Fischer, 2006). In 
attempting to be universally relevant, they tend to adopt the language of 
‘motherhood’ statements, which requires significant interpretation to make them 
useful and in some cases precludes meaningful analysis altogether (T. B. Fischer, 
2006). In light of this, coupled with the previously noted lack of generally accepted 
criteria for effective sustainability assessment, an inductive or ‘bottom up’ 
methodology has been applied (see Chapter 1). I believe that grounding the analysis 
in practice in this way ultimately facilitates the development of principles that are 
both practical and universally relevant. 
My process of reflecting upon the Gorgon experience thus took place over time and 
was focused by practice. A number of themes or focal points emerged from the data, 
in this case the ‘thick description’ of the Gorgon assessment process in Chapter 3. 
These were:  
The question. The framing of ‘the question’, “Are the potential impacts of 
constructing a gas processing plant on Barrow Island acceptable?” did not permit any 
reconciliation between the opposing viewpoints. 
Influence on the final proposal.  The assessment process followed an EIA model and 
was, therefore, essentially reactive to the proponent’s proposal. There was little Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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opportunity for the assessment process or the consultation and engagement it 
encompassed to influence either the development of the proposal or the Cabinet 
decision. 
Basis for sustainability decision-making. The basis for the Cabinet decision whether 
to grant the proponent access to Barrow Island was unclear. 
Integration and trade-offs. The process was not successful in demonstrating an 
integration of environmental, social and economic issues.  
 ‘Facts’ and ‘values’. Despite its emphasis on the collection of scientific and other 
technical data to aid Cabinet’s decision, the Gorgon process was characterised by a 
value-clash between those in favour of the development on Barrow Island and those 
opposed to it, which could not be reconciled by recourse to ‘the facts’.   
Policy context. The Gorgon assessment highlighted areas of policy gaps and 
deficiencies. 
Institutional arrangements. The Gorgon assessment highlighted aspects of the 
institutional and regulatory arrangements in Western Australia that are unsupportive 
of sustainability assessment. 
Politics, power and interests. Some participants in the process considered that power 
was unevenly distributed between the parties and therefore that politics played too 
great a role in what was intended to be a process grounded in technical knowledge 
and rationality. 
I now consider what might be learnt from the Gorgon experience with respect to 
each theme. Since I have located my research within the field of impact assessment 
(see Chapter 1) it is to this literature that I predominantly turn as a basis for the 
analysis. At times I also pose my own solutions to some of the issues raised, drawing 
from ideas I developed through my practice during 2004. In the process, I reflect 
upon the three conceptual models developed in Chapter 2, this self-critique being 
important to the overall spirit of reflection and learning that underpins my research at 
many levels. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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4.2  Exploring the themes
3 
In this section I explore the Gorgon themes in more detail. The spirit of this 
discussion reflects the prevailing concern in Western Australia in 2004 of learning 
how to do ‘better’ sustainability, as reflected in the retrospective review of Gorgon 
undertaken by DoIR.  
4.2.1 Framing ‘the question’ 
The ‘question’ framing an assessment determines the boundaries of what can be 
discussed and addressed within the process and what cannot. The Gorgon question 
can be most simply articulated as, “Are the potential impacts of constructing a gas 
processing plant on Barrow Island acceptable?” This is a ‘threshold’ question 
relating to the acceptability or otherwise of the proposal as it was presented, which 
provided no opportunity to discuss alternative locations
4 and consider what might be 
required to make them acceptable to the proponent
5. In fact, any meaningful 
discussion of alternatives was deliberately excluded from the charter of the Gorgon 
assessment process
6. 
As one interviewee said
7: 
I think the key thing that wasn’t on the table was the prospect of having your cake and 
eating it too. From a whole raft of perspectives, almost as with a classic Part IV project 
assessment, there was no genuine consideration of alternatives. [The consultant who 
reviewed the alternative sites analysis] will tell you that, most people will tell you that. I 
think certainly ChevronTexaco didn’t, [DoIR] wasn’t prepared to contemplate the 
possibility of offering the Government a third option. Now it may be that there is no third 
option that would meet the company’s requirements, but in a sense that’s an example of 
decision being made on the basis of insufficient information. There wasn’t a sufficient 
analysis of ways of how the development could go ahead without touching Barrow 
[Island]. 
                                                         
3 This section draws from Pope and Grace (2006). 
4 The proponent was required to justify its ‘Barrow or nothing’ position, but independent analysis of 
the multi-criteria analysis applied for this purpose exposed methodological weaknesses (EPA 2003).  
5 For example, the possibility of a government financial ‘stump up’ as compensation to the proponent 
was informally and hypothetically raised in these discussions. 
6 Gorgon interviews – DoIR (9). 
7 Interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (4). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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This was somewhat ironic, since as it was pointed out by several interviewees, both 
sides of the debate within Government would have preferred the development to 
have been located on the mainland, the DoE/EPA and Conservation 
Commission/CALM because of the risk to Barrow Island, and DoIR because Gorgon 
could have provided the incentive for other industries to locate in a new mainland 
industrial estate
8. These different perspectives allude to the values and philosophical 
divide between those who believed that some places, including Barrow Island, 
should be held sacred and protected accordingly, and those who believed that 
resource development is inherently a good thing for society and the threshold 
question provided no means by which they could be reconciled (Pope et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, threshold questions tend to frame very technical assessment processes, 
as was the case with Gorgon, which sideline the ‘softer’ issues that the community 
often believes are important to sustainability
9 (Bradbury & Rayner, 2002). For this 
reason, calls have been made for the definitional and framing stages of assessment to 
be more participatory (Enserinck, 2000; Petts, 2003)
10 (see Section 4.2.2). The 
notion of ‘acceptability limits’ or ‘thresholds’ also has its place, particular in relation 
to the protection of environmental values. I discuss this further in Section 4.2.3. 
The boundaries of the proposal and therefore the assessment process were defined by 
the proponent’s strategic objectives rather than the State’s (Pope et al., 2005), 
making Government’s role in the assessment entirely reactive to the proponent’s 
preferred (for commercial reasons) option of Barrow Island. This reflects the model 
of environmental impact assessment (EIA) in Western Australia upon which the 
Gorgon process was based. It ultimately also reflects the prevailing pro-development 
policy discourse in Western Australia, whereby the approvals process serves to 
establish the conditions upon which a development may proceed rather than to 
question the need for or appropriateness of the development. A more open question 
might have been, “What is the best way of developing the Gorgon gasfield?” This 
would have permitted discussions on alternative locations in a way that 
                                                         
8 Gorgon interviews - Conservation Commission/CALM (4) and Community groups (12) 
9 Bradbury and Rayner (2002, p23) conclude from their case study research that “residents’ concerns 
were much broader than the narrow definition of the problem in terms of concerns about technology 
that the research had been commissioned to address”. 
10 Petts (2003) suggests that Enserinck’s (2000) quick scan screening method might be an appropriate 
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acknowledged different views and values, and potentially led to more creative and 
mutually beneficial solutions being found (Pope et al., 2005).  
Noble (2002a), however, would argue that this variation is still ‘unstrategic’ since it 
is framed by the higher level assumption that developing the Gorgon gasfields is a 
desirable goal. This question would, therefore, only generate ‘option alternatives’ 
and not the potentially more powerful ‘alternative options’ that might emerge from 
even more strategic questions, such as: “What is the best way to manage Western 
Australia’s energy reserves and future energy requirements?” This question would 
enable strategic policy issues that are relevant to a sustainable future (such as energy 
policy) to be debated. It is also noted, however, that such issues are the responsibility 
of Government and therefore will remain well outside the scope of sustainability 
assessments of private project proposals. I discuss the interaction between projects 
and their policy contexts further in Section 4.2.6 
4.2.2 Influence on the final proposal 
There was little evidence that the Gorgon assessment process had any significant 
influence on the final proposal. This observation is related to the previous discussion, 
since the framing of the question did not permit significant rethinking of the 
fundamental concepts of the proposal such as the location of the development, and 
also reflects the late stage in the process at which the sustainability assessment 
commenced. Furthermore, although the proponent consulted extensively with a 
number of stakeholders throughout the process and the broader community was 
given two opportunities to make submissions on the proposal (ChevronTexaco, 
2003a), there was a perception that this too had little effect.  
Clearly there is an argument arising from the Gorgon experience for a sustainability 
assessment process methodology that is more proactive and integrated with the 
process of developing the proposal and that incorporates more meaningful forms of 
community engagement. My co-authors and I made this point in our review of the 
Gorgon assessment against the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2 (Pope 
et al., 2005). Further reflections, however, have led me to question the basis of our 
argument and to search once again in the impact assessment literature for guidance. 
This process is the subject of the following discussion, which is followed by a brief 
review of the role of community engagement in impact assessment. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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Reflections upon previous research 
As my co-authors and I concluded in our evaluation of Gorgon against the three 
conceptual models of sustainability assessment (Pope et al., 2005, p295): 
The Gorgon case study provides a clear, real-life example of an EIA-driven integrated 
assessment approach. The assessment process was borrowed deliberately from the 
established project-based EIA process in Western Australia …It focused on identifying 
and evaluating the social, economic and environmental impacts of the proposal and 
attempting to determine whether or not these impacts were acceptable. It was also 
conducted reactively, after many key decisions relating to the development had already 
been made. The EIA-driven approach highlighted some of the issues and inherent 
difficulties associated with this form of assessment, especially in relation to integration 
and trade-offs. 
That is, both the framing of the question and the forms of consultation applied are 
the result of the late stage in the history of the development
11 of the proposal at 
which the assessment process commenced. By this time, major decisions had already 
been made by the proponent, including the selection of the preferred location, and 
the ‘Barrow or nothing’ position was firmly held. We argued instead that a proactive 
assessment process, guided by an articulation of the State’s sustainability objectives, 
that is, an ‘objectives-led integrated assessment’, would have resulted in a better 
outcome (Pope et al., 2005, p298-299): 
While an objectives-led integrated assessment approach represents a departure from 
traditional impact assessment processes as conducted in Western Australia, it is 
consistent with best practice objectives-led SEA processes …What the outcome of this 
hypothetical process would have been depends upon how the State's objectives were 
defined and whether the proponent was able to develop a commercially viable proposal 
within the boundary formed by these objectives. However, the fact that a best practice 
objectives-led approach is proactive and integral to the process of developing the 
proposal means that options are left open longer and the focus is on finding the best 
option rather than defending the proponent-preferred option. This in turn suggests that it 
may have been possible to reach a different and more widely acceptable outcome through 
                                                         
11 The proposed development plan that was assessed in this case was actually the result of 20 years of 
planning by the proponent for development of the Gorgon gasfields, and the long history of the 
project was a significant factor in the assessment process. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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an objectives-led process, particularly in relation to the location of the Gorgon 
development. 
The distinction here is between reactive and proactive assessment processes (see 
Chapter 2), which were discussed in the contexts of EIA-driven and objectives-led 
approaches respectively. We also suggested that our third model, ‘assessment for 
sustainability’ could be applied either reactively or proactively, and that in fact, a 
proactively applied ‘assessment for sustainability’ model would have been the most 
likely to deliver sustainable outcomes (Pope et al., 2005). 
The link between the objectives-led conceptualisation of sustainability and a 
proactive assessment process integrated with decision-making was first made in the 
literature review of Chapter 2 (Pope et al., 2004). It was based upon a review of the 
SEA literature, which provides a useful and appropriate basis for the consideration of 
sustainability assessment, not least by virtue of the current debate in the literature on 
the extent to which the two may be considered one and the same thing
12. The 
question is raised because in many jurisdictions the definition of ‘environment’ is 
broad enough to encompass the sorts of social and economic considerations that 
would typically be included in a sustainability assessment
13.   
Upon reflection, however, relationship between the interpretations of sustainability 
embodied within the models and the processes assigned to each model is 
contestable
14. For example, an assessment focusing upon the achievement of 
aspirational objectives could theoretically be conducted reactively after the 
development of the proposal, while an assessment aiming to minimise negative 
impacts could be conducted proactively as an integral part of developing the 
proposal. To some extent, this is analogous with practices under the Western 
                                                         
12 ‘SEA and sustainability appraisal’ was the title of one of the sessions at the International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) special topic conference on strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) in Prague in September 2005.  
13 As already argued in Chapter 2, it is debateable whether or not suites of ‘triple bottom line’ 
objectives guiding such proposals in practice can be considered to adequately define ‘sustainability’ 
but I do not intend to engage with this debate here.  
14 Note that the link between processes that are objectives-led and those integrated with decision-
making was somewhat weakened in Pope et al (2005) compared with Pope et al (2004), as the 
conceptual tenuousness of this link had begun to be realised by the time this article was written. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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Australian EIA process, where proponents are generally well aware in advance of the 
EPA’s environmental ‘bottom lines’ or ‘acceptability limits’
15.  
Revisiting some of the original sources that informed the development of the model 
in fact confirms this. For example, Sheate and his co-workers distinguish between 
‘EIA-inspired SEA’ in which predicted impacts are compared with baseline 
conditions, and ‘policy analysis/appraisal-inspired SEA’, whereby impacts of a 
preferred option proposal are assessed against objectives, citing UK sustainability 
appraisal as an example (Sheate et al., 2001, 2003). Objectives are associated here 
with a reactive application of assessment and there is no link between objectives and 
a proactive approach to decision-making. In fact, the idea of proactive assessment 
only appears in the third of Sheate et al.’s SEA models
16 – ‘integrationary SEA’ - in 
which impacts are assessed against both baselines and objectives, and the “process 
begins early in the development of the policy and investigates alternative means of 
achieving those objectives” (Sheate et al., 2003, p11).  
While the link between the models of sustainability and the process frameworks  
assumed in the literature review of Chapter 2 and also embodied in the discussion of 
Gorgon in the context of this framework (Pope et al., 2005) clearly does exist both in 
the literature and in practice (see for example Thérivel, 2004)
17, its removal from a 
conceptual discussion allows for further thought as to how sustainability principles 
and concepts might best be incorporated into strategic decision-making. I now turn 
to the SEA literature for inspiration on effective assessment methodologies. 
Reviewing SEA methodologies 
The detailed review of methodologies for strategic level assessments that follows 
serves a number of purposes. It examines more closely how proactive sustainability 
assessment might be applied and provides some justification to the assumption that 
                                                         
15 Assumptions about processes relevant to each model become even more arguable in light of the 
sustainability decision-making protocol described in Section 4.2.3, which incorporates aspects of the 
interpretations of sustainability drawn from each of the three models.  
16 The fourth model is ‘ad hoc mechanisms’, such as roundtables, audit committees and state of the 
environment reports. Furthermore, it is noted that these distinctions have arisen empirically from a 
survey rather than being based on theoretical foundations. 
17 A contributing factor to this apparent link may be that the shift from baseline-led to objectives-led 
SEA occurred at the same time as a number of other shifts in thinking about SEA, particularly the 
relationship between SEA and the process of formulating the proposal. The evolution of SEA is 
discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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such proactive methodologies should be considered a ‘good thing’. It also provides a 
framework for the evaluation of Gorgon as a strategic assessment, which ultimately 
enables recommendations to be made for the development of sustainability 
assessment processes in Western Australia. The need to reconsider the assumptions 
upon which my earlier work was founded arises from the ambiguity that surrounds 
the practice of SEA. Beyond the basic agreement that by definition SEA should be 
applied to strategic level decisions and EIA to projects
18, there has been little 
consensus as to which roles, purposes and methodologies should be assigned to it 
(Brown & Thérivel, 2000; T. B. Fischer, 2002; Sheate et al., 2001, 2003; Verheem & 
Tonk, 2000).  
Methodology, therefore, remains one of the most significant concerns within the 
SEA literature, and the one most relevant to the purposes of this chapter. There are 
several related threads to this discussion, since although it appears to be widely 
acknowledged that there are two broad forms of SEA, the points of distinction 
between them varies. For example, Fischer (2003) distinguishes between SEA with a 
mandatory process framework and SEA that is ‘grafted on’ to existing planning and 
policy processes as recommended by Verheem and Tonk (2000) and Brown and 
Thérivel (2000) (see also Boothroyd, 1995; Renton & Bailey, 2000). Others 
distinguish between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘broad brush’ processes (Bailey & Dixon, 
1999; Boothroyd, 1995; Brown & Thérivel, 2000; Noble & Storey, 2001; Partidário, 
1999; Sheate et al., 2003; Verheem & Tonk, 2000)
19; and still others between 
‘technical’ and ‘communicative models’ (Owens, Rayner, & Bina, 2003). 
The particular thread of this discussion that I followed in the literature review of 
Chapter 2 emphasised the point in the decision-making process at which 
environmental concerns should be considered. Here, a distinction is drawn between 
SEA processes conducted on a draft proposal, and an approach in which SEA 
                                                         
18 Bina (in press) is one of few writers in the impact assessment literature to challenge this distinction 
in application of EIA and SEA, pointing out that the US National Environmental Policy Act 1969 was 
intended to apply to both projects and more strategic initiatives, and early discussions on the 
introduction of environmental assessment in Europe followed similar trends. Practice, however, has 
tended to limit the application of EIA to project-level assessments, leading to demands a decade or so 
later for environmental assessment at the strategic level. Bina argues that this shortcoming in the 
implementation of EIA is insufficient rationale for the development of a new instrument in the form 
of SEA.  
19 Verheem and Tonk (2000) provide the example of the Dutch E-Test applied to legislative 
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informs the development of the proposal from a much earlier stage. Eggenberger and 
Partidário (2000) term these ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ SEA respectively, and 
suggest that the latter may be more likely to occur in jurisdictions with stronger 
planning traditions. Analogously, Thérivel and Partidário (1996a) use the 
terminology ‘consent-related’ and ‘integrated’ SEA. I prefer the terms ‘reactive’ and 
‘proactive’ to describe these alternative models of assessment.  
The proactive model is generally considered to be best practice, since SEA is more 
likely to have a real influence on decision-making if conducted during the 
formulation of a proposal rather than afterwards when important decisions have been 
made (Brown & Thérivel, 2000; International Association for Impact Assessment, 
2002; Partidário, 1999; Thérivel & Partidário, 1996a)
20. Whether SEA is applied 
reactively or proactively has implications for methodologies, as implied in the 
literature review of Chapter 2. Highlighting the variety of possible approaches, 
Glasson and Gosling (2001) distinguish four models evident in SEA of regional 
plans, the first two of which could be considered ‘reactive’ and the second two 
‘proactive’:  
•  the application of EIA methodologies to the plan;  
•  the ‘stapled model’ in which the SEA is conducted at a certain point in the 
preparation of the plan and the report stapled to the plan;  
•  ‘concurrent’ in which the SEA is integrated into various stages of the 
development of the plan; and  
•  the ‘holistic’ integration of environmental concerns into the planning process 
such that separate SEA is not required
21.  
The first of these models clearly follows the ‘old’ conceptualisation of SEA as ‘EIA 
writ large’ (Sheate et al., 2001) and is thus out of favour, while the second retains 
concerns over the extent to which a ‘stapled’ SEA report could be expected to 
                                                         
20 This suspicion was empirically confirmed by Thérivel and Minas (2002) in their study of UK 
planning processes, who found that although 80 per cent of appraisals were carried out when the plan 
had already been drafted, of the cases in which the appraisal made a difference, 70 per cent were 
integral to the planning process. 
21 Similarly, Partidário (2003) identifies four possible models for this: EIA, standardised SEA, SEA 
completely integrated with decision-making and SEA guided by the decision-making process and 
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influence decision-makers, as evidnced by the Gorgon case. There is wide-spread 
support, however, for the third model, that is for decision-making processes to be 
‘independent but interlinked’, with ‘flexible’ assessment processes commencing 
early in the planning process (Partidário, 2003; Sheate et al., 2003) and ‘speaking’ to 
it at critical junctures (Thérivel, 2004; Thérivel & Partidário, 1996a). This model is 
the basis for repeated calls for impact assessment practitioners to better understand 
policy and political decision-making (Brown & Thérivel, 2000; Deelstra, 
Nooteboom, Kohlmann, van den Berg, & Innanen, 2003; Eggenberger & Partidário, 
2000; Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001; Nitz & Brown, 2001; 
Thérivel & Brown, 1999; Verheem & Tonk, 2000).
  
A counter argument focused upon improving the practical and procedural aspects of 
impact assessment has also been observed (Cashmore, 2004; Kørnøv & Thissen, 
2000; Nitz & Brown, 2001). It has been suggested that given the general lack of a 
structured approach to higher level decision-making, particularly policy 
development, the assessment process itself can provide a structure for decision-
making (Sheate et al 2003). Following this line, SEA has been increasingly promoted 
as a proactive design tool, or ‘policy formulation tool’ (T. B. Fischer, 2003; Noble & 
Storey, 2001). This approach reflects most closely the fourth of Glasson and 
Gosling’s (2001) models whereby SEA is completely embedded within the process 
of developing the proposal.  
In this vein Noble (2000, p215) suggests:  
SEA is the proactive assessment of alternatives to proposed or existing [policies, plans 
and programmes], in the context of a broader vision, set of goals, or objectives to assess 
the likely outcomes of various means to select the best alternative(s) to reach desired 
ends.  
The goals and objectives of which he writes include but are not limited to 
sustainability goals and objectives, and therefore it could be argued that in this 
definition, SEA is indeed shaping the process by which the proposal is formulated
22. 
                                                         
22 The fully integrated approach, however, is not without its detractors, who raise concerns that it is 
not transparent and that it is not clear how, or even whether, the SEA has actually been done 
(Partidário 2003). George (2001) expresses concern about a lack of distinction between planning and 
the objectives-led sustainability appraisal of broad-based development plans in the UK context, 
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Noble (2000) uses this model as the basis for his useful comparison of EIA and SEA. 
In his terminology, Gorgon represented an ‘end’, rather than a ‘strategy for action’; 
assumed predetermined goals and objectives rather than being set in the context of a 
broader vision, goals and objectives; asked ‘what are the impacts’ and not ‘what is 
the preferred option?’; forecasted, rather than backcasted; was reactive rather than 
proactive; was project specific; and had a narrow focus and was highly detailed, 
rather than having a broad focus and a low level of detail; and therefore, can be 
demonstrated to be effectively an EIA conducted on a development plan rather than 
a true strategic assessment.  
Despite the implication here that the Gorgon assessment was closer to a project-level 
EIA process than a strategic assessment, as I have already noted, it can not even be 
considered a good example of EIA. Referring to Noble’s fellow-Canadian, Gibson 
(2001), who notes that many of the characteristics that Noble attributes to SEA have 
gradually become evident through evolution in the practices of environmental 
assessment generally (see Chapter 1), including better integration with the 
development of the proposal and more focus on purposes, strategic visions and 
alternatives, it is evident that the Gorgon process did not embody these 
characteristics. 
Regardless of whether the proactive model of SEA shapes or is shaped by the 
planning process
23, its important features are the clear up-front determination of the 
issue to be addressed and the identification and comparison of alternative ways to 
address this issue. This in turn implies that the assessment must be framed by an 
open, strategic question rather than a threshold question. A proactive approach to the 
Gorgon assessment, in which sustainability objectives were established at the 
commencement and alternative means to achieve both these and other objectives 
identified and evaluated, would have promoted a better and more sustainable 
outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                              
the plan’s own objectives and the objectives of sustainability is unclear. Following George (1999 and 
2001), a feature of the ‘assessment for sustainability’ model promoted in the literature review of 
Chapter 2, was the separation of the assessment process from the planning process.  
23 The best choice clearly depends upon the nature of the planning process to which assessment is to 
be applied, whether it is indeed strategic in the sense of being framed by an open question, and 
whether or not it considers alternatives. I return to this issue in Chapter 5. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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Consultation and engagement 
Formal community consultation in the Gorgon process was limited to two periods of 
public review of documentation, as well as a process that was labelled as ‘lobbying’ 
by the proponent themselves, whereby ongoing discussions were held with various 
community and business groups together with members of Cabinet. It was concluded 
that the purpose of this ‘consultation’ was chiefly to manage the potential ‘outrage’ 
associated with the proposal (see Section 3.3.8). There was little evidence that 
comments provided in the public submissions process or other meetings between 
environmental groups and the proponent had any impact on the final proposal
24, 
implying that the Gorgon assessment was an example of ‘instrumental’ approach to 
participation, where the aim is to legitimise decisions already essentially made 
(Bradbury & Rayner, 2002). The Gorgon assessment was, therefore, a poor example 
of community engagement, at a time when the increasing emphasis on public 
participation and engagement in public policy decision-making in general has been 
noted (Monnikhof & Edelenbos, 2001; Petts, 2003; Scrase & Sheate, 2002)
25. Petts 
(2003, p271) asserts that this shift is due to the “changing relationship between 
science and society, including the decline in social trust in experts and increasing 
public demands for influence upon decisions”
26.  
The advantages of wider engagement are often cited as the provision of opportunities 
for social learning, procedural fairness, the integration of social values into analytical 
decisions, increased public trust and confidence in decisions and decision-makers, 
and an improved quality of technical assessment processes through lay interrogation 
and challenging of expert assumptions (Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Monnikhof & 
Edelenbos, 2001; Petts, 2003; Scrase & Sheate, 2002; Webler, Kastenholz, & Renn, 
1995). In contrast with the ‘instrumental’ approach of old, there are now calls within 
impact assessment for the engagement of the wider community early in the decision-
making process, including the framing of the assessment (see Section 4.2.1) and the 
identification of alternatives (Doelle & Sinclair, 2006; Enserinck, 2000; Monnikhof 
& Edelenbos, 2001; Petts, 2003). 
                                                         
24 Gorgon interviews – Community groups (12). 
25 Public participation has been recognised as vital for sustainability in the Rio Declaration, the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998 (Doelle & Sinclair, 2006). 
26 The lack of trust in experts is a characteristic of the Risk Society (Beck, 1992), which I discuss in 
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Although it is recognised that assessment processes provide an ideal framework for 
participatory decision-making (Sheate et al., 2003), the role that participation might 
play is less clearly articulated within the impact assessment literature. Indeed Scrase 
and Sheate (2002, p284) argue that: 
wider ‘participation’ in assessment shares some similarities with ‘integration’ in that it is 
often invoked as positive and desirable, but with little thought given to what is actually 
meant.  
There is a sense that it is important that collective values be expressed in 
‘deliberative public fora’ (Scrase & Sheate, 2002), but the impact assessment 
literature provides few answers to questions of ‘how?’ and ‘to what purpose?’ such 
deliberations should occur. In a recent attempt to answer these questions, Lemon et 
al. (2004) highlight the importance of understanding not just the reactions of 
participants in a deliberative process to the specific decision at hand, but also their 
worldviews of  mental models about environmental change.  They do not claim that 
this understanding leads to agreement, but suggest it can highlight incongruencies 
between policy responses and people’s perceptions that can lead to policy reform. 
The Gorgon assessment process did not attempt to engage members of the 
community in processes of deliberation, a point to which I return in Chapter 6.  
A number of barriers to effective deliberation have been identified, including 
regulatory limitations such as fragmentation of responsibilities, expert cultures and 
institutional paternalism, technical issues, a failure in the transfer of community 
views between related decisions, and a reluctance on the part of proponents or 
Government to reveal confidential material (Glasson & Gosling, 2001; Petts, 2003). 
Confidentiality was certainly an issue in the Gorgon assessment where much of 
ChevronTexaco’s data was classified as ‘commercial in confidence’.  
4.2.3 Basis for sustainability decision-making 
The basis for the final decision made by Cabinet to grant the Gorgon Joint Venture 
access to Barrow Island was unclear, which compromised the overall transparency of 
the process. Of particular concern was the lack of evidence that sustainability was 
taken into consideration at all, and my colleagues and I subsequently argued that an 
assessment of the Gorgon proposal, using the Western Australian sustainability 
principles and criteria “would have demonstrated that the proposal was Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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fundamentally unsustainable” (Pope et al., 2005, p302). The Gorgon experience thus 
demonstrates a need for sustainability to somehow be ‘operationalised’ for 
application within decision-making. 
‘Operationalising’ sustainability 
The lack of clear criteria for decision-making at the time of the Gorgon assessment 
was unsurprising, since the State Sustainability Strategy was still in development, 
and hence the Government’s position on sustainability was not yet clearly 
articulated. In the words of one government agency representative
27: 
I mean…have they actually yet produced a white paper or a green paper or anything of 
this nature of what Government’s expectations are in sustainability? I think they need 
to…And I believe that can be done, you can give guidance on those matters….and it 
should be not beyond the wit of people actually sitting down trying to [set standards, 
goals and those types of things]… I think they have to bring out some guidelines, some 
philosophical guidelines. 
While it was recognised that sustainability decision-making would require 
consideration of environmental, social and economic issues, and hence the Gorgon 
ESE process was conceived, what was missing was any attempt to define 
Government’s expectations of the proponent in terms of these issues
28. It was noted 
in the absence of such criteria, the proponent had, in fact, attempted to assess the 
development proposal against its own sustainability criteria, although my co-authors 
and I criticised these for being ‘vague’ or not aligned with the State’s principles 
(Pope et al., 2005) 
The calls for a clear basis for sustainability decision-making that provide a workable 
definition of sustainability echo through the impact assessment literature (Devuyst, 
1999; Gibson, 2001; Hardi & Zdan, 1997; Partidário, 1999; Sippe, 1999). 
Furthermore, it is argued that principles, objectives and criteria should be specified 
early, “before proponents begin thinking about their purposes and options” (Gibson, 
2001, p20), and should guide the proponent in developing its proposal a point also 
made by Sippe (1999) and Partidário (1999).  
                                                         
27 Gorgon interviews – EPA/DoE (1). 
28 While policies related to environmental protection are articulated through legislation, policies 
relating to social and economic outcomes either do not exist, or if they do exist, are not articulated in 
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For example, Gibson (2001, p42) argues: 
Sometimes [vagueness] has served well, at least as a means of postponing conflict. But 
perhaps it is now past time for a more explicit and forceful translation of sustainability 
commitment into sustainability criteria.  
Furthermore (Gibson 2001, p5): 
Decision criteria are the basic rules of the game. Effective application of sustainability-
based criteria in [environmental] assessments will entail at least some clarity about what 
the effective criteria are and how they are to be interpreted. Policy-makers and process 
designers have sometimes embraced vagueness as a means of preserving discretionary 
flexibility and contextual adjustability. Constructive ambiguity can also be helpful in 
keeping representatives of competing interests at the table. But vagueness is maintained 
at a cost. While participants in [environmental] assessments – proponents, intervenors, 
administrators and decision-makers – will appreciate the need to adapt assessment 
obligations to suit different undertakings, locales and expectations, reinventing the rules 
for every specific case is likely to bring intolerable uncertainty and unduly attenuated 
deliberation. 
Sippe (1999, p74) expresses the same idea equally eloquently 
29: 
EIA has managed to tread carefully between the decision makers’ and administrators’ 
appetites for flexibility in discretionary decision-making and the pressure proponents and 
community groups apply for increased certainty. In environmental decision-making these 
terms are inversely related. 
The literature review article reproduced in Chapter 2 was partly my attempt to 
highlight the need for clear operational guidance on sustainability and to propose the 
most appropriate way of advancing this in Western Australia. I reflect upon my 
earlier argument further here.  
Further reflections upon previous research 
Each of the three conceptual models in the paper reflects a particular conception of 
project sustainability
30 (Pope et al., 2004):  
                                                         
29 At this point Sippe is specifically discussing the concept of defining environmental ‘significance’ in 
impact assessment, but the principles are the same. 
30 As has already been discussed, the inspiration for these three models was the work of Clive George 
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•  Sustainability as the minimisation of negative triple bottom line impacts (EIA-
driven TBL assessment); 
•  Sustainability as the simultaneous achievement of triple bottom line objectives 
(objectives-led TBL assessment); and 
•  Sustainability as a societal vision represented by clearly defined criteria 
(assessment for sustainability). 
Gibson (2001, p25) advocates ‘decision criteria’ based upon sustainability principles 
to guide sustainability assessments, and “a process for specifying these principles – 
and associated values, objectives and criteria – in light of the specific context, 
through informed choices by the relevant parties (stakeholders)”. Although my co-
authors and I linked Gibson’s work with that of George (1999; 2001), Sadler (1999) 
and The Natural Step (2001) in our endorsement of the ‘assessment for 
sustainability’ approach, we overlooked that his work was conceptually quite 
different from the other three. The important distinction is that Gibson does not 
imply that such criteria should unequivocally define a state of sustainability and thus 
does not embody the more radical, ‘black and white’ (and eco-centric) approach to 
defining sustainability. 
In refining my original article for publication, however, my co-authors and I chose 
not to promote the potentially radical nature of the ‘assessment for sustainability’ 
model. Instead, the article emphasises that this model, in contrast with the first two, 
is not based upon the triple bottom line conceptualisation of sustainability, and dubs 
this a ‘principles-based approach’. At this point, we draw upon Gibson’s (2001) 
advocacy of principles-based approaches as a way of avoiding, or at least 
minimising, the reductionism of the triple bottom line. In order to make the article 
relevant to our own jurisdiction, we then proposed the Western Australian 
sustainability principles as a suitable, and potentially more politically acceptable, 
alternative to those of George, Sadler and The Natural Step (George, 1999, 2001; 
                                                                                                                                                              
negative impacts was an insufficiently ambitious aim for sustainability assessment. However, rather 
than promoting alternative approaches based upon suites of positively phrased triple bottom line 
objectives (the model applied to the sustainability appraisal of regional planning in the UK), he 
returns to a more fundamental conception of sustainability and suggests criteria to distinguish 
between sustainable actions and activities and unsustainable ones, leaving the simultaneous 
attainment of diverse objectives to the planners rather than the assessors of impact, developing his  
sustainability criteria from two core principles of sustainability: inter- and intra-generational equity, 
equating the latter to the reservation of natural capital. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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Sadler, 1999; The Natural Step, 2001). So, in making this shift in emphasis from 
radicalism to principles, we diluted our own argument.  
This became clear to me in the latter half of 2004 when I was involved in the 
development of a Sustainability Assessment Framework for Western Australian 
government agencies. It appeared that my first task in this role was to do what we 
had said in the article could be done, and convert the Western Australian 
sustainability principles into meaningful criteria upon which decisions could be 
based. Almost immediately, this proved impossible. While it was theoretically 
feasible to develop acceptability limits for negative impacts, and this had already 
been done for environmental impacts by the EPA in defining ‘critical environmental 
assets’ which should not be compromised (Environmental Protection Authority, 
2005), there was very little upon which to base criteria for positive impacts. 
Furthermore, as Jenkins and his colleagues point out, Western Australia did, and still 
does, lack appropriate economic and social criteria for sustainability decision-
making (Jenkins et al., 2003). Many of the principles did not suggest criteria in any 
case; for example, how should one develop criteria for ‘hope’ or ‘sense of place’
31?  
It seemed that the Western Australian principles did not allow an absolute definition 
of sustainability after all
32. 
‘Sustainability decision-making protocols’  
In response to this apparent problem, in my role for DPC at the end of 2004, I coined 
the term ‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ to describe a framework that 
would operationalise the Western Australian sustainability principles in a different 
and less absolute way. This would effectively be an interpretation of sustainability 
specific to the decision at hand but based upon agreed sustainability principles and 
                                                         
31 As Sippe (1999, p81) notes: “Criteria and standards, by definition, have their basis in science” and 
goes on to define a criterion as “a scientific requirement on which a decision or judgement may be 
based concerning the suitability of the environment to support a designated use”. He puts the 
reluctance of decision-makers to stipulate firm criteria down to “uncertainties – both scientific and 
dealing with judgements and values” and notes that where they do exist they are usually based on 
allowable emissions or on the quality of the receiving environment. According to this definition, it 
would be theoretically, as well as practically, impossible to establish criteria for concepts such as 
‘sense of place’ that are not derived from the natural sciences. 
32 At this point, we also considered the development of criteria on a case-by-case basis for individual 
decisions. This attempt too struck problems, however. Against a backdrop of general 
‘unsustainability’ (characterised for example by inequity, hopelessness or eroding senses of place), 
how much of a positive contribution should an individual project, for example, be required to make. 
Where should the bar be set to define positive criteria? Was clarity of criteria impossible, if not 
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guided by the policies, plans and programmes repesenting the existing policy 
context. Along the lines suggested by Gibson (2001), this protocol would be 
developed on a case-by-case basis and would consist of  
•  Parameters to be considered with respect to each sustainability principle; 
•  Acceptability limits for each potentially adverse impact where practicable; 
•  Aspirational objectives and targets for potential positive impacts.  
The protocol approach reflects the emphasis on ‘mutually supportive outcomes’ or 
win-win-wins in the Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy as well as the 
need to protect the environment (Government of Western Australia, 2003b). In a 
sustainability context, Verheem (2002, p10, italics in original) also emphasises that 
impacts go beyond the local and the foreseeable future and that “at the heart of 
sustainability assessment is the question of whether a plan or project will lead to 
improvements on all fronts, or whether there is a risk of transfer of impacts into 
another domain – either in time or place”
33. I argued in the Sustainability Assessment 
Framework and background paper (Pope, 2004b) that a sustainability decision-
making protocol should guide the development of a proposal and also form the basis 
of the regulatory approvals process. 
The first step in establishing such a protocol is ‘scoping’, which in impact 
assessment is the process by which significant factors, boundaries and key issues are 
identified and the means by which they will be appraised established. The purpose of 
scoping is to ensure that appropriate data on the most significant factors is gathered 
and that data collection resources, including time and money, are used wisely, since 
although many factors may be identified for each decision only relatively few will 
prove crucial to decision-making (B. D. Jones, 1999; Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; 
Thérivel & Partidário, 1996a)
34. 
The Gorgon ESE process was very broadly scoped, with no attempt made to identify 
and concentrate on critical issues, for which it was widely criticised in the interviews 
                                                         
33 Jones (1999) discusses how some EIA processes involve public participation at the scoping stage to 
ensure that community values are taken into consideration in the assessment process. 
34 In the terminology developed in this chapter, scoping is the first stage in developing a sustainability 
decision-making protocol – once the relevant sustainability factors are determined, the next step is to 
establish appropriate objectives, targets and criteria. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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and in the retrospective review process. The source of the indiscriminate scoping 
process can be traced once more to the lack of clarity about what the process was 
intended to achieve, what question it was designed to help to answer, and how it 
would relate to the subsequent, more detailed EIA process. This in turn contributed 
to the difficulty in establishing a clear basis for decision-making. As one interviewee 
suggested
35: 
A better way is to canvas in some form the issues that are fundamental to the decision 
and get agreement on those so we agree that it’s not turtles and it’s not jobs in Onslow, 
whatever it might be. And having agreed those issues, or at least made a decision after 
having canvassed those issues with public and community and Government and 
ourselves, you then need to agree what our objectives should be against each of those, 
and they might be sustainability principles if you wanted to couch them that way. What 
would our objectives be in addressing each of those fundamental issues, and then we 
needed to demonstrate that it is reasonable to expect, to go to the nth degree of counting 
all the x pods, but we need to agree that it’s reasonable to expect that you could manage 
the potential downsides and deliver the potential upsides. 
Integral to the protocol concept is the notion of ‘environmental bottom lines’ or 
acceptability limits for environmental impacts, as their clear articulation may help to 
reassure those who believe that sustainability assessment will result in the trading off 
of the environment for economic gain (Jenkins et al., 2003; Sheate et al., 2001). This 
point is also strong in the literature; for example, Sippe (1999) distinguishes between 
‘negotiable’ and ‘non-negotiable’ environmental issues
36.  
While one interviewee highlighted the practical difficulties of defining inviolable 
environmental bottom lines when proponents can claim they have the technology to 
overcome them, for example by sequestering carbon dioxide or potentially even 
cryogenically freezing some species, and when bottom lines can be expected to 
change continually as societal values change
37, others endorsed the concept, arguing, 
“We mustn’t let the sustainability stuff move into…‘this means that everything is up 
for grabs’”
38. Another interviewee referred to significant environmental issues as 
                                                         
35 Gorgon interviews – ChevronTexaco (5). 
36 See also Noorbakhsh and Ranjan (1999). 
37 Gorgon interviews - Conservation Commission/CALM (7). 
38 Gorgon interviews – EPA/DEP (1). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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‘touchstones’
39, and suggested that they had been inadequately defined for Western 
Australia at that point
40. Another argued that the Gorgon decision could not be 
considered to have been made in a sustainability framework because ‘environmental 
bottom lines’ were crossed
41:  
The environmental bottom line is clearly painted as don’t do it. The risks are too high, 
and that line is crossed. The decision has been made on the basis of one criterion. It’s a 
traded off decision, which is the way we used to do things, it’s not a sustainability 
decision. 
Other interviewees emphasised the need for sustainability objectives
42, including 
environmental objectives with respect to sensitive issues
43, with an emphasis on the 
local context
44. The Gorgon experience also demonstrated that the protocol should 
incorporate societal sustainability objectives as well as the proponent’s objectives, 
noting that they will not always correspond (Noble, 2000). This was demonstrated by 
the proponent’s focus on financial goals, while the State’s sustainability principles 
speak of ‘economic health’ (Pope et al., 2005). 
Despite the inherent challenges, therefore, I argue now that a sustainability decision-
making protocol is an important part of a sustainability assessment process. I return 
to discuss this in another context in Chapter 6. 
4.2.4 Integration and trade-offs 
Integration has been a major theme in discussions of sustainability assessment and 
sustainability decision-making more generally, but there has also been ambiguity 
about what this actually means, much less how to achieve it. Owens and Cowell 
(2002, p64) note that “while the rhetoric of integration is pervasive, its precise 
meaning and its implications for policy practice are often unclear”, while Scrase and 
Sheate (2002) identify 14 different forms of integration relevant to assessment.
. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Lee (2002) clarifies that the form of ‘integration’ we 
generally discuss in relation to sustainability is ‘horizontal integration’ as opposed to 
                                                         
39 The example provided of a ‘touchstone’ was the Old Growth Forests in the South West of Western 
Australia (see Chapter 1). 
40 Gorgon interviews – Expert Panel (3). 
41 Gorgon interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (4). 
42 Gorgon interviews – Expert Panel (3). 
43 Gorgon interviews – ChevronTexaco (5). 
44 Gorgon interviews – EPA/DoE (1). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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‘vertical integration’ or tiering (see Section 4.2.6) or the integration of assessment 
into decision-making (already discussed in Section 4.2.2). In turn, Eggenberger and 
Partidário (2000) distinguish five different forms of horizontal integration – 
substantive, methodological, procedural, institutional, and policy. 
Lee (2002) provides a typical analysis of horizontal integration, specifically of 
environmental, social and economic concerns, with the benefits cited as: 
•  Greater relevance to decision-makers and other stakeholders who wish to be 
informed of the full range of likely impacts associated with proposed 
measures, rather than subsets of these;  
•  Greater ability to capture the indirect and synergistic effects that result from 
linkages between economic, environmental and social impacts that otherwise 
might be overlooked in separate, more specialised assessments; and 
•  Greater opportunities to streamline the overall assessment process, reduce 
duplication and double-counting problems, and to strengthen the consistency 
between the methods and data used within the overall assessment. 
Streamlining has become a bigger issue, given the apparent paradox of a 
continuing proliferation of specialist forms of impact assessment, alongside 
proposals for greater integration within impact assessment. 
The corresponding challenges are articulated as (Lee, 2002): 
•  Continuing inconsistencies between certain assessment methods currently 
used in different, specialist forms of impact assessment; and 
•  Potential conflicts between the assessment paradigms of different disciplines 
involved in integrated assessments. 
This widespread concern with horizontal integration reflects the growing recognition 
that impacts in one area are often related to those in another. The relationship 
between different impacts could be opposing or synergistic. For example, a positive 
environmental outcome (for example through the use of offsets, which I discuss 
below) could come at an economic cost. On the other hand, a detrimental 
environmental impact on a river might have a corresponding negative social impact 
if the environmental loss also results in a loss of amenity or a detrimental impact on Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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‘sense of place’. Alternatively a proposal may deliver ‘win-win-wins’ or positive 
outcomes with respect to several sustainability factors.  
Clearly, ‘win-win-win’ outcomes are desirable, and the Western Australian State 
Sustainability Strategy (Government of Western Australia, 2003b, p30) places great 
emphasis on this by seeking to achieve “net environmental, social and economic 
benefits for future generations” from development projects. Several approaches to 
facilitating these win-win-wins have been suggested, including basing the 
assessment on integrated, holistic sustainability principles that move away from the 
triple bottom line concept, which “tends to focus attention on competing objectives, 
rather than on needs and opportunities for positive accommodations of interrelated 
human and ecological interests” (Gibson, 2001, p8). Such principles should inform 
the development of a sustainability decision-making protocol, which as discussed in 
Section 4.2.3 should also incorporate ‘acceptability limits’ to prevent the kind of 
trading off of the environment for economic gain that was perceived by some to have 
been the outcome of Gorgon. 
Equally importantly, integration is a function of the way the sustainability 
assessment is structured, and a proactive assessment process that informs the 
development of the proposal (refer to Section 4.2.2) provides the greatest 
opportunities for mutually beneficial outcomes (Morrison-Saunders & Thérivel, 
2006; Pope et al., 2005). By keeping the sustainability decision-making protocol in 
sight as the proposal is developed, alternatives considered and impacts predicted, the 
opportunities for mutually beneficial outcomes may be enhanced and unnecessary 
trade-offs limited. This opportunity was missed in the Gorgon assessment process.  
One of the recurring criticisms of the Gorgon ESE process was that it did not 
successfully integrate environmental, social and economic considerations. Instead, it 
concluded by simply presenting two opposing views to Cabinet and asked them to 
‘integrate’ them and make a decision
45. While some argue that this is an appropriate 
model (Jenkins et al., 2003), since it ensures that the environmental component of 
the assessment is independent and thus able to play its advocacy role in decision-
making (Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000), as Gibson (2001) points out, this is a process of 
                                                         
45 There was early consideration of using some form of multi-criteria analysis to perform the 
‘integration’ which appears to reflect a technocratic reliance on ‘black box tools’ to make a decision. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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balancing rather than integrating noting that balancing results in net ecological loss. 
He, along with many other authors expresses concern about the potential for the loss 
of the traditional environmental focus within a sustainability context, and the 
“reassertion of the traditional emphasis on immediate economic priorities”, but 
questions the view that a separate environmental assessment process is the way to 
protect environmental values, since in an adversarial situation, the environment is 
unlikely to win out over development interests (Gibson, 2000, p8). 
The decision to conduct the environmental assessment separately from the social, 
economic and strategic assessment ensured that the Gorgon process would not be 
integrated. The process design reflects the origins of the process in EIA, and as 
Gibson (2001, p22) notes, “In environmental assessment practice, an assumed 
conflict between environmental and other objectives is commonly built into process 
design. In the Canadian federal process, for example, significant adverse 
environmental effects may be ‘justified in the circumstances’”.  
This was felt by participants in the Gorgon process; as one interviewee said
46: 
What disturbs me is that you talk about sustainability and all you see is that triple bottom 
line and many will argue that the TBL is a slightly spurious process of sustainability, and 
even that was effectively thrown out at the end of the day because there’s too many zeros 
on the end of the dollar figure [and it’s] too attractive.  
Similarly
47: 
The economic argument outweighed all others and to that extent I don’t think it was a 
sustainability assessment. Because environmental benchmarks have been breached to 
avoid breaching economic benchmarks. It may have been a situation in which it was 
either/or and maybe in those situations presumably you can’t do a sustainability 
assessment, or you can’t have a sustainable outcome because one bottom line at least has 
to be breached or the project doesn’t go ahead. 
Since development is impossible without some impact on the natural environment, a 
mechanism to achieve a net positive environmental outcome from a development is 
necessary. This mechanism is the concept of ‘net conservation benefits’ (NCBs) as 
                                                         
46 Interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (6). 
47 Interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (4). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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applied in Gorgon, or to use alternative terminology ‘environmental offsets’. Offsets 
can be considered as a special kind of trade-off, made within a pillar rather than 
between pillars
48. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, the EPA argued that NCBs in 
the Gorgon case could not compensate for the risk to the conservation values of 
Barrow Island (Environmental Protection Authority, 2003). 
4.2.5 Facts and values 
It was always recognised that the potential location of the Gorgon gas processing 
facility on Barrow Island was highly controversial and that different views on the 
issue reflected the fundamentally different philosophies or value-bases of those 
involved in the assessment and of the community at large.  
The two assessments and two arguments presented to Cabinet reflected the two 
distinct 'camps' that formed, both in the community, as evidenced by the public 
submissions, and amongst the government agencies. The 'green camp' was 
fundamentally opposed to an industrial development on a Class A Nature Reserve, 
while the 'pro-development camp' perceived that the strategic and economic benefits 
to Western Australia of the development outweighed the risk to the environment 
(Pope et al., 2005). This was reflected in the advice to Cabinet, with both the EPA 
and the Conservation Commission recommending against the development 
(Conservation Commission of Western Australia, 2003; Environmental Protection 
Authority, 2003), while the Expert Panel acting on behalf of DoIR recommended in 
its favour (Allen Consulting Group, 2003). Although the fundamentally different 
views of the participants were never far beneath the surface, however, they sat 
uncomfortably within the assessment process.  
As discussed in Section 3.3.8, one interviewee attempted to reconcile his own 
ambivalence to the question of values in different ways: firstly by insisting that the 
Cabinet decision to conduct the ESE process meant that access to Barrow Island was 
not to be rejected on purely philosophical grounds and that therefore this value-based 
line of argument should have been closed. When challenged, this interviewee 
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admitted that yes, the debate was fundamentally value-based, but that data was 
needed to give form to the debate
49. 
Despite the controversial nature of the proposal, DoIR maintained a hope until quite 
late in the process that consensus could be reached through a rational process based 
on the generation of good, scientific and technical data, and therefore that Cabinet 
could be presented with a unified recommendation from the bureaucracy. This hope, 
expressed on several occasions by one interviewee in both formal and informal 
conversations
50, was founded on the setting aside of value-based opposition to the 
proposal by the environmental agencies and that, as the process progressed, the 
‘facts’ of the matter would ‘speak for themselves’, demonstrating the acceptability of 
the proposal. This somewhat naïve belief reflects a faith in the ability of science to 
convert an emotional debate into a ‘rational’ one through a clear separation of ‘facts’ 
and ‘values’.  
Despite this hope and belief upon which it was founded, the process of generating 
data during the Gorgon assessment process was not smooth, technical or divorced 
from value positions; instead, it was emotional and often quite heated. Different 
agencies called in experts, accusations were made of vexatious questions from public 
submissions, and there was a degree of ‘nit-picking’ by some agencies in critiquing 
the quality of the data. The quality and quantity of the data generated were both the 
subject of debate, with the pro-development side generally finding them adequate 
and the green side considering them inadequate. More data was not the solution to 
the conflict; in fact, as more and more data was generated, the divisions appeared to 
become more firmly entrenched (see Section 3.3.5).  
The belief that facts and values could be separated was inherent in the process of 
gathering, analysing and interpreting data the institutional configuration. Although 
not everyone believed even at the outset that bureaucratic consensus could be 
reached, there was general acceptance across the various agencies of the role 
separation between the bureaucrats responsible for coordinating the collection of 
data through the Gorgon assessment process, and the elected members of Cabinet 
responsible for making the final (political and value-based) decision. This 
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manifestation of Bacon’s notion of ‘knowledge speaking to power’ is also embedded 
in the Western Australian EIA process, and this was articulated by one ‘green 
agency’ interviewee
51: 
Yeah, I have a very clear view about that. At the end of the day, only the elected 
representatives can make those trade-off and those decisions. That’s what they’re elected 
for, to represent all of us. And because of their elected status, if we don’t like their 
decisions collectively as a community we can remove them and put somebody else in. So 
only they are accountable for making those value judgements, and quite rightly, in my 
view, only they can make those decisions 
The failure of the Gorgon assessment process to engage with differing value sets 
reflects its origins in the ‘information provision’ model of EIA, whereby value-free 
data is generated through ‘objective’ analytical processes and provided to decision-
makers who employ it to make the best decision (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999; 
Cashmore, 2004). It has long been recognised that this is an erroneous model of 
policy decision-making (Beattie, 1995; Lawrence, 1997), but despite this it remains 
persistent, particularly in EIA. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 5. 
4.2.6 Policy context 
I argued in Section 4.2.3 that sustainability assessment of a project proposal should 
be guided by clear criteria for decision-making, in the form of what I have called a 
‘sustainability decision-making protocol’. I also argued that it should be based upon 
agreed sustainability principles and strategic objectives. This is the concept of 
‘trickle-down or ‘tiering’, which argues that decisions and assessments at lower 
levels should be guided and influenced by those at more strategic levels of decision-
making. Tiering reflects the decision-making hierarchy with policy at the highest and 
most general level, followed by plans and programmes, and finally by projects as the 
most specific initiatives
52. The concept is much discussed in the impact assessment 
literature (Lee, 2002; Marsden, 2002; Noble, 2000, 2002a; Nooteboom, 2000; 
Thérivel & Partidário, 1996a).  
                                                         
51 Gorgon interviews – EPA/DoE (14). 
52 Fischer (2002) distinguishes these forms of decision-making as follows: policies relate to strategies 
and visions, plans typically relate to land use and transport planning, and programmes are groups of 
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Calls for tiering are a reflection of the limitations of project-level EIA in comparison 
with the influence of policy context. For example, Boothroyd (1995) notes that the 
project orientation of most EIA processes naturally precludes the consideration of 
‘bigger questions’
53. In an early contribution to the discussion, Rees (1988, p286) 
argues: 
In the absence of a broader policy and planning context, without knowing potentially 
competing resources uses and values, it is impossible to assess the ‘significance’ of 
impacts associated with isolated projects
54.  
It is insufficient, however, that such policies should be in place; they must also 
reflect sustainability, since sustainability assessment can be misleading if the 
assessment is conducted within a policy framework that does not support 
sustainability (Fuller, 2002). The theory of tiering states that sustainability 
assessment applied within a tiered system will ensure that unsustainable activities are 
excluded at the higher levels of decision-making, thus limiting options at the lower 
levels to those that might be considered sustainable (Noble, 2000; Nooteboom, 
2000). 
It is also noted, however, that tiering is somewhat idealistic and rarely works in 
practice according to the theory (Lee, 2002; Noble, 2000; Nooteboom, 2000). One 
explanation is that often the policies, plans and programmes that should guide 
project level assessments and inform the development of the sustainability decision-
making protocol either do not exist, or if they exist they are incompatible with the 
sustainability principles
55. This was borne out by the Gorgon case study, which 
                                                         
53 Boothroyd (1995) goes on to argue that a focus in EIA on technical questions that lend themselves 
to science-based analysis, to the exclusion of the higher level strategic issues that shape the project 
decision, is generally to the benefit of proponents. 
54 Others suggest this might be considered “an unrealistically centralized and influential planning 
system (Scrase & Sheate, 2002, p280). 
55 Other reasons have been put forward by (Lee, 2002; Noble, 2000; Nooteboom, 2000):  Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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exposed ‘disconnects’ between the decision at hand, previous decisions that 
influenced it, and the policy context within which it was to be made. For example, 
although the proponent was required to demonstrate net conservation benefits 
associated with the proposal, in other words some form of environmental 
compensation for the potential negative impacts of the proposal, there was no 
government policy in place to guide the identification of appropriate ‘environmental 
offsets’ or to specify what would be considered acceptable. Similarly, the lack of 
greenhouse gas, geosequestration and energy policies became all too evident
56.  
The policy vacuum created practical problems for the Gorgon assessment. In the 
words of one proponent interviewee
57: 
I think Government has still got a long way to go. One of the things we have struggled 
with is that Government doesn’t, Australia, let alone the State, doesn’t have an energy 
policy, so how do we show how Gorgon fits within the broader energy framework. Until 
some of these real fundamentals are in place, it’s very difficult for Government to say 
this is how your project will be measured. 
In some cases, such as net conservation benefits, the policy gap has subsequently 
been addressed, at least partly as a result of the Gorgon process
58. These examples 
could be termed ‘trickle-up’ since the project assessment could be seen to influence 
more strategic Government decision-making, rather than the other way round, a 
phenomenon that has been observed elsewhere (Bailey & Dixon, 1999; Boothroyd, 
1995; Noble, 2002a; Noble & Storey, 2001). As well as these immediate policy 
deficiencies, the Gorgon assessment also raised challenges to entrenched policy 
                                                                                                                                                              
•  Top level policies, plans and programmes are not necessarily consistent or well-linked, 
especially when responsibility is divided between different bodies, and therefore do not 
necessarily clearly frame the lower-level assessments; 
•  Planning cycles are rarely as streamlined in practice as the tiered approach applies; 
•  Capacity to conduct assessments at different tier levels likely to be limited; 
•  There may be a significant time lapse between the development of a proposal and of a related 
project; 
•  In many cases SEAs are not done at all and therefore strategic issues have to be included in 
EIAs. 
Nooteboom (2000) does find evidence of tiering in practice but acknowledges that most of the case 
studies that lead to this conclusion demonstrated a formal link between the respective levels of 
decision-making, which is often not the case. 
56 These gaps were raised by industry groups during the DoIR retrospective review, emphasising that 
business in general prefers ‘fixed goalposts’ to policy ambiguity. 
57 Gorgon interviews – ChevronTexaco (8). 
58 The EPA has subsequently issued a Position Statement on environmental offsets (Environmental 
Protection Authority, 2005) Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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beliefs and traditions, often through the public consultation processes. For example, 
questions were raised about the private sector exploitation of non-renewable natural 
resources: development projects such as Gorgon have traditionally been viewed in 
overwhelmingly positive terms in Western Australia and elsewhere, due to their 
contributions to economic development and prosperity. Submissions to the Gorgon 
process questioned this assumption, as well as raising issues about the future of the 
development and use of non-renewable resources within a sustainability context 
(ChevronTexaco, 2003b). Although the assessment processes, with their narrowly 
defined question, did not provide a space within which such questions could be 
addressed, this demonstrated how sustainability assessments of project proposals 
could open up deeper questions relating to fundamental aspects of society and its 
institutions. This analysis begs the question of what value sustainability assessment 
might have within an inadequately tiered system with many embedded policies and 
practices that are clearly unsustainable, a question to which I return in subsequent 
chapters. 
4.2.7 Institutional arrangements 
The Western Australian bureaucracy, like many others in the western world, is 
separated into agencies with demarcated and often competing roles. The Gorgon 
assessment process was coordinated by the agency responsible for promoting 
exploration and development of resources (DoIR), with the support of agencies 
responsible for regulating their activities (the EPA and Conservation Commission in 
this case). The assessment process was correspondingly split down these lines, 
resulting in the two competing pieces of advice presented to Cabinet. As discussed 
previously, this approach was at least partly a function of the institutional 
arrangements in Western Australia, and led to the obvious conflicts and value 
clashes that have been discussed in Section 4.2.5. 
This divide can be attributed the Western Australian EPA being broadly restricted to 
providing advice on environmental matters and not being permitted to consider 
social or economic issues (Bache et al., 1996). Lack of capacity, particularly for 
social and economic assessment, which was a factor in the appointment of 
consultants to conduct this part of the assessment was also an issue. ‘Institutional 
unwillingness’ that may have been present due to long histories between some Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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agencies (see Section 3.3.10) (Glasson, 1996; Glasson & Gosling, 2001). 
Notwithstanding the views on the role of elected Government in integrating 
competing concerns discussed previously, the undesirability of this situation in 
which one side ultimately ‘won’ and the other ‘lost’ suggests the need for a body to 
play a more integrative, holistic function in the interests of generating more 
sustainable outcomes.  
The possible need for institutional reform for sustainability assessment in Western 
Australia was highlighted early on in the discussions of the 2002 Sustainability 
Assessment Working Group (see Chapter 2), where some members argued that 
institutional structures and regulatory support were a pre-requisite to conducting 
sustainability assessments. This view was eventually subjugated to the more 
pragmatic ‘learning by doing’ approach ahead of any possible future regulatory or 
institutional reform. This debate over the relative importance of institutional 
arrangements for sustainability assessment is reflected in the literature where calls 
for appropriately supportive institutional, and particularly legal structures are 
strong
59 (for example Partidário, 2003) and yet there is an opposing view that the 
absence of such frameworks should not restrict the practice of impact assessment 
(Partidário, 1999). The calls for institutional reform for sustainability assessment 
arise from three main concerns: achieving ‘integration’ across the spectrum of 
sustainability issues, ensuring that decision-making and coordination roles are 
undertaken at an appropriate level and location within a bureaucratic structure, and 
ensuring that sustainability assessment is linked to other initiatives for sustainability 
(Jenkins et al., 2003). 
The question of institutional reform was also raised during the interviews, with one 
interviewee highlighting the difficulties of adopting a sustainability approach within 
the ‘silos’ of Government, “There’s got to be trust and I think that’s why I think this 
integrated team would be a much better approach” and
60: 
                                                         
59 Sheate et al. (2003, p7) identify three models of institutional integration that can equally be applied 
to sustainability assessment: constitution/legislative model; process/strategy model (“co-ordinated 
government-led strategy”), and the ad hoc institutional model which “may exist outside of a centrally 
co-ordinated strategy”. See also Glasson and Gosling (2001). 
60 Interviews – ChevronTexaco (8). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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I’m sure that sustainability…[is] going to take different attitudes and a different set of 
skills...and that’s a problem. It’s always a problem for State Government in having to 
make those sorts of changes and get the sort of people that can operate in a different 
environment altogether. 
Dovers (2001, p22-23) recalls the Australian Federal body called the Resource 
Assessment Commission (RAC), which examined complex and strategic projects 
from a holistic perspective and reported directly to the Prime Minister and which 
was “a rare, explicit [sustainability]
61 institution”. The RAC undertook three 
inquiries between 1989 and its abolition in 1993
62, and was generally considered to 
be a successful and innovative body (Stewart & McColl, 1994)
63.  
Jenkins et al. (2003) point out that the institutional arrangements that might be 
necessary for the implementation of sustainability assessment in Western Australia 
go beyond merely integrative bodies. They propose a framework or strategy for 
sustainability assessment in Western Australia that incorporates regional 
sustainability plans and includes sustainability assessment of existing unsustainable 
practices as well as proposed initiatives. The framework includes mechanisms to 
address issues arising from the assessment processes that require government action, 
in contrast with existing environmental assessment processes that generally only 
allow for proponent conditions. Such a framework would support the notion of 
‘trickle-up’ discussed in Section 4.2.6, whereby project-level assessments raise 
issues that must be addressed at other levels and other areas of Government decision-
making.  
Institutional reform for sustainability poses significant challenges (Dovers, 2001), 
however, and it seems unlikely that it will be attempted in Western Australia until 
considerable further experience has been gained of sustainability assessment.  
                                                         
61 Dovers uses the term ‘ecologically sustainable development’ here reflecting the terminology in 
Australia in the early 1990s. 
62 These were mining at Coronation Hill in the Kakadu conservation zone; forest and the timber 
industry, and coastal zone management (Stewart & McColl, 1994). 
63 Dovers (2001, p22-23) suggests that its demise was due to: “a change of Prime Minister (Hawke to 
Keating) and of policy style; impatience with detailed inquiry, and a preference for partisan lobbying; 
bureaucratic sensitivities and jealousies; unreasonable expectations that yes/no answers could be 
provided; animosity by some sectors who felt that their interests had not been served; unease at the 
exposure of the inevitably political nature of decisions, even after exhaustive assessments (especially 
with the Coronation Hill case); and a convenient target for cost-cutting”. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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4.2.8 Politics, power and interests 
There were concerns that the Gorgon assessment process, which in following the 
EIA process placed its faith in technical data to enable Cabinet to make the ‘right’ 
decision, was ultimately controlled by political power and interests both within and 
outside the bureaucracy. As described in Chapter 3, several representatives of the 
environmental agencies perceived that DoIR, by virtue of its position as project 
manager of the assessment process, wielded excessive power that was not always 
used appropriately. In turn, both DoIR and the environmental agencies believed that 
the proponent had undue power in the process, both as the provider of most of the 
data required by the process and by virtue of its far greater access to members of 
Cabinet.  
The Gorgon process was designed and conducted collaboratively, but the 
responsibility for project management rested with DoIR
64 giving it and the pro-
development discourse a considerable degree of authoritative power. This was 
manifested in different ways. Firstly, as already discussed, the debate was framed in 
support of the exploitation of the Gorgon gas resource and of the proponent’s 
position of ‘Barrow or nothing’. This was explicitly evident in the call for 
expressions of interest for the Expert Panel, which described the duties of the 
purpose of the ESE process as being to investigate the implications of the ‘de-
stranding’ of the Gorgon gas resource. 
As also discussed previously (see Section 3.3.10), DoIR maintained control of the 
process through its running of Reference Group meetings, where the environmental 
agencies at times accused DoIR of using manipulative power. Their accusations 
against DoIR ranged from the deliberate manipulation of meeting minutes to more 
general statements concerning the permeation of a DoIR ‘flavour’ throughout the 
proceedings”
65. As discussed previously, although there appeared to be general 
satisfaction with DoIR’s management of the process during the data collection stage, 
this changed during the preparation of advice to Cabinet and the negotiation of the 
enabling legislation, when DoIR’s manipulative power was felt more explicitly by 
                                                         
64 DoIR’s CEO was chair of SIAC and his representative the chair of the Reference Group, and 
therefore the Gorgon ESE project manager was a DoIR officer. 
65 Interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (6). Similar sentiments were also expressed by a 
representative of community groups (12). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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the other agencies represented on the Reference Group. DoIR was then accused of 
rushing documents to Cabinet without adequate time for other agencies to provide 
comment, and ignoring comments made. Other facets of the power imbalance were 
levels of resourcing and perceived or actual access of the different agencies to 
representatives of elected government and the media. Some felt that DoIR was 
stronger in these regards than the environmental agencies, particularly the 
Conservation Commission, which had only recently been formed at the time of the 
Gorgon assessment.  
The impact assessment has little to contribute with regard to the machinations of 
power affecting impact assessment processes. I return to this issue in Chapter 5, 
where I approach it from a different perspective. 
4.3  Reflections on the reflections 
The purpose of the analysis in this chapter has been to draw lessons from the Gorgon 
experience that might contribute to the development of principles to guide future 
sustainability assessment in Western Australia and elsewhere. At this point I pause to 
reflect upon the nature of the themes that emerged from the Gorgon experience and 
which I have analysed in the preceding section, before moving to extract the lessons 
learnt so far from the analysis. 
4.3.1 The nature of the themes 
The themes discussed in Section 4.2 fall into two broad and interrelated categories: 
process and context. Issues that are predominantly related to process include: 
influence on decision-making, including process methodologies and consultation and 
engagement; the basis for sustainability decision-making (the sustainability decision-
making protocol); and integration and trade-offs. Relevant aspects of context include 
policy context and institutional arrangements.  
The notion of ‘the question’ guiding the sustainability assessment is usefully 
conceptualised as the nexus between process and its context, since, as demonstrated 
in Section 4.2.1, the articulation of the question is heavily influenced by the 
prevailing policy, institutional and legislative context. The question in turn defines 
the shape of the assessment process itself, commencing with dictating the process Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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methodology and thus the extent to which the assessment can influence the 
development of the proposal.  
Straddling and pervading both process and context are the less tangible themes of the 
facts and values divide, and the influence of power. The impact assessment literature 
upon which the analysis in the chapter is based has much to say on process, but 
relatively little on the broader context in which the assessment is conducted, and 
even less on these subjective dimensions. The most common observation on these 
latter categories is that they can contaminate and reduce the integrity of the 
assessment process, and should be ‘addressed’ in order to allow impact assessment 
to better perform its role of providing information to decision-makers.  
Against this backdrop, I turn now to the task of extracting what lessons I can from 
the Gorgon experience as I have seen and analysed it.  
4.3.2 The lessons of Gorgon 
Despite its limitations, Gorgon did, as had been hoped, provide valuable lessons to 
guide subsequent sustainability assessment processes, particularly with respect to 
developing better process methodologies. Since DoIR’s retrospective review of the 
Gorgon process was never finalised or released, this study represents the first formal 
attempt to document the successes and failures of Gorgon.  
The conclusions I draw from Gorgon in relation to external, regulatory processes of 
sustainability assessment are: 
1.  Sustainability assessment should be promoted as a proactive tool that 
commences early enough to meaningfully influence the proponent’s planning 
process. In practice this will require the early engagement between proponent 
and Government. 
2.  The questions framing the assessment should be open, encouraging the 
consideration of alternatives, the incorporation of different value sets, and the 
generation of creative, mutually supportive outcomes. Ideally they would be 
strategically framed to encompass issues beyond the technicalities of the 
proposal, but it is realised that strategic issues are the responsibility of Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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Government, while many of the proposals likely to be subject to 
sustainability assessment in Western Australia are private projects. 
3.  Sustainability assessment processes should meaningfully engage the 
community in ways that extend beyond ‘instrumental’ forms of consultation, 
such as the release of documents for public comment, to facilitate the 
incorporation of community values into decision-making. 
4.  Each sustainability assessment process should be guided by clearly defined 
decision criteria in the form of ‘a sustainability decision-making protocol’ 
that ‘operationalises’ sustainability for the decision at hand and includes 
relevant sustainability factor acceptability limits and aspirational objectives 
or targets for each factor where possible. The protocol should guide the 
process of developing the proposal, including the consideration of 
alternatives and the refinement of the preferred alternative, and therefore 
must be established sufficiently early to enable this. It should also form the 
basis for the subsequent regulatory approvals process, and should be 
developed in consultation between Government, proponent and community 
to incorporate the sustainability aspirations of each.  
5.  Effective integration of competing concerns, and the environmental, social 
and economic dimensions of sustainability, would be facilitated by a body 
whose role is to consider the proposal from an holistic sustainability 
perspective.  
6.  The prevailing policy context has a significant influence over the 
sustainability outcomes of an individual project, in a process of ‘trickle-
down’, which suggests that higher level strategic decisions should also be 
subject to sustainability assessment. The project-level assessment can, in 
turn, shape this context through the identification of policy gaps and 
anomalies in a process of ‘trickle-up’. This would be facilitated by an 
institutional framework designed to ensure that identified issues are 
addressed. 
7.  Sustainability assessment is an inherently value-laden and political process, 
and must recognise and embrace these characteristics if it is to be effective. Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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This requires an alternative conceptualisation to the ‘information provision’ 
model of EIA upon which the Gorgon assessment was founded. 
4.4  Conclusion 
The main perceived benefits of the Gorgon ESE process over statutory EIA, as 
articulated by several participants in the course of my research interviews, were that 
it ensured that a certain amount of data relating to social and economic impacts was 
in the public domain, and that it catalysed closer relationships between the various 
agencies
66. However, the escalating levels of conflict between agencies towards the 
final stages of the process tend to suggest that these relationships were of a rather 
dysfunctional nature, with the potential to hinder rather than aid future collaboration. 
Above all, there was an overwhelming sense on the part of those opposed to the 
development on Barrow Island that the juggernaut of resource development had won 
out once more and that sustainability had not only not been served, but had perhaps 
been rendered impotent. It can thus be argued that Gorgon was an example of 
“ethical and political choices masquerade as technical judgements, reinforcing 
prevailing norms and existing structures of power” (Owens et al., 2003, p7). 
The Gorgon experience did, however, provide opportunities for learning. The lessons 
I have extracted from the Gorgon experience represent the first tentative steps 
towards developing principles for the practice of sustainability assessment in 
Western Australia, which might also contribute to more generally applicable theory-
building for sustainability assessment.  Most satisfactory are those conclusions that 
relate to issues of process, and these I take up in Chapter 6 and develop further in the 
light of my second case study, the sustainability assessment of the South West 
Yaragadee (SWY) water supply development. 
Less satisfactory are the conclusions the analysis has enabled me to draw relating to 
issues of context, values and power. This is evidence of the persistence of an 
underlying tone in much impact assessment literature that seems to rather petulantly 
complain that well-designed impact assessment processes would be so much more 
effective if only the world were more rational and more organised. While this may 
be true, it is rather unsatisfactory, since it implies that impact assessment has no 
                                                         
66 Gorgon interviews – EPA/Doe (14); DoIR (9). Chapter 4: Learning from Gorgon 
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value in a world that is not only imperfectly structured and organised but embraces a 
rich diversity of people, values, worldviews and political realities. The important 
issue is how impact assessment in general, and sustainability assessment in 
particular, can be meaningful and relevant in such a world. 
Fortunately for the future of the practice, a growing number of impact assessment 
theorists and practitioners has recently begun to question the foundations upon which 
much practice is based, and particularly to challenge the dominance of the 
‘information provision’ model of impact assessment that is the primary source of the 
noted focus on methodology and technique at the expense of a deeper contextual 
understanding. In Chapter 5, I join the crusade for this deeper understanding that I 
believe is necessary to the development of more meaningful, effective and ‘worldly-
wise’ impact assessment.Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
5.1  Introduction  
The previous discussion of the Gorgon case study through the lens of the impact 
assessment literature found that while strong conclusions could be drawn in relation 
to assessment methodologies and even appropriate institutional structures and 
arrangements for sustainability assessment, there remained some outstanding and 
perplexing concerns. Perhaps the most significant of these were that the process was 
characterised by deep value rifts and the marginalisation of certain viewpoints, and 
that technical data did not bridge this divide nor lead to increased consensus; that the 
pro-development lobby and DoIR were perceived to have excessive power in the 
process; and that there appeared to be little relationship between the assessment 
process and the final political decision. 
The first point, relating to the interplay between competing values and the 
knowledge generated through the assessment process, and corresponding recognition 
of the intractability of the Gorgon issue, was of particular interest, since the inherent 
and apparently irreconcilable value clashes between the pro-development and green 
lobbies characterised the Gorgon assessment process in my eyes (Pope et al., 2005, 
p410)
1. When values are not explicitly recognised, no amount of scientific data or 
technical knowledge can resolve such policy dilemmas, which have been called 
‘intractable policy disputes’ or ‘wicked problems’. As was the case in the Gorgon 
assessment, such a situation can be expected to degenerate into a ‘dialogue of the 
deaf’, which has been defined as
2: 
a policy controversy, deadlocked even after extensive deliberation and research, in which 
stakeholders (including policy makers and public managers) talk past each other, 
advancing arguments that are scientifically valid but that differ fundamentally from each 
other. Scientific research and expertise – so important as a problem-solving strategy in 
                                                         
1 Through my studies in public policy at Murdoch University, and in particular a unit entitled Policy, 
Technology and Democracy, I had become aware of the work of Rein and Schön (1996) and Dorothy 
Nelkin (1975), amongst others, which will feature later in this chapter . This was a revelation to me as 
a professional engineer and management consultant, trained as I was to believe in the absolute truth of 
technical data. This new awareness fuelled my fascination with the interplay of competing values and 
worldviews that for me characterised the Gorgon assessment process. 
2 Van Eeten (1999, p186) notes the institutional, as well as interpersonal aspects of ‘dialogues of the 
deaf’, “The forces at work are...of an institutional nature, involving coalitions of actors whose views 
and capacity to listen to one another are to a great extent conditioned by the causal assumptions and 
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policy making – becomes a, if not the, bone of contention in these issues (van Eeten, 
1999, p186 emphasis in original).  
The Gorgon debate thus generated ‘more heat than light’ (Sabatier, 1987) and, as 
discussed previously, the conflict became more obvious as the assessment process 
neared its conclusion, with emotions running particularly high during the drafting of 
the final advice to Cabinet and the enabling legislation. DoIR was accused of 
‘holding all the power’ at this point of the process and of ‘showing its true colours’ 
in its apparent support for the project. It became clear that the power relations 
between the different government agencies were as much a part of the process as 
their differing values sets. The question of the relative power held by the proponent 
and the State was also raised. Indeed, discussions of power must be included along 
with considerations of knowledge and values. According to Litfin (1994, p30), 
“Since knowledge is inseparable from power even in pure science, the links should 
be even stronger when science is implicated in policy problems”. The Gorgon 
process was clearly exposed as being “multi-dimensional, defined by an interactive 
relationship between knowledge and power, science and politics” (Litfin, 1994, p11).  
Furthermore, it was considered by most of those involved that the final political 
decision to grant the proponent access to Barrow Island was made irrespective of the 
volumes of technical data that had been generated. This reflects the oft-cited concern 
that ‘politics’ too often ignores or over-rides the conclusions of an impact assessment 
(Deelstra et al., 2003; Leknes, 2001; Wood & Jones, 1997), a tendency that has been 
the subject of many discussions at IAIA conferences
3. It has been suggested that this 
is often due to the “exercise of economic and political power by those for whom the 
results might be inconvenient”, that is, ‘wilful neglect’ (Owens et al., 2003, p17)
4.  
My purpose in this chapter is to move beyond the process-oriented discussion of the 
previous chapter to relocate impact assessment within its political context, since 
impact assessment is “political to its roots, and the interplay of power and value is 
inescapable at every step” (Richardson, 2005, p350).  To do this, I firstly explore the 
conceptual origins of impact assessment as a policy tool and then discuss how it has 
                                                         
3 For example, the session entitled “Integration of SEA and decision-making” at IAIA’04 in 
Vancouver. 
4 The corollary is also valid, that impact assessment can be a political tool used to legitimise 
controversial projects (Beattie, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Wilkins, 2003), and it could also be argued that 
this occurred in the case of Gorgon. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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evolved in ways that perhaps do not do justice to the vision of its founders, leaving it 
poorly equipped to engage with real-life political decision-making. Following the 
example of a number of contemporary authors, particularly SEA theorists, I then 
look to the policy literature for insights, developing a conceptual framework to guide 
my exploration of the interplay between knowledge, values and power in the Gorgon 
process.  
5.2  The problem with impact assessment 
As previously discussed, the Gorgon assessment was modelled on the Western 
Australian EIA process, which in turn reflects what has been called the ‘information 
provision’ model of impact assessment (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004). 
According to this model, the purpose of impact assessment is to provide objective, 
value-free and context-independent data to political decision-makers who then weigh 
up the competing information to make a value-based decision. It is assumed that the 
influence of the impact assessment is limited to this decision point (McDonald & 
Brown, 1995)
 5. In the analysis of the perceived failure of traditional impact 
assessment to influence real-world political decision, accusatory fingers are 
increasingly pointed at processes that reflect this model, which, it is argued, is as 
pervasive as it is unrealistic (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004). The Gorgon 
experience exemplifies a general disquiet and a sense that all is not well for 
traditional impact assessment in a world where values and politics are troublesome, 
powerful decision-makers unheeding, and analytical data is but “a supporting player 
in the drama of policy making” (Weiss, 1991, p309)
6. 
The issues raised allude to the inherent subjectivity operating in and around the 
policy process which cannot be ignored, in the specific forms of the political forces 
and the values of those involved. This is uncomfortable ground for many impact 
assessment practitioners, since subjectivity in any of its forms is often viewed with 
suspicion and problematised, though at the same time increasingly recognised as a 
                                                         
5 The separation of objective analysis from political decision-making was similarly the basis of the 
‘assessment for sustainability’ model promoted in Chapter 2. Although this was far more strongly 
aligned with a comprehensive vision of sustainability, it is also a justified target for accusations of 
rationalism and the separation of analytical ‘facts’ from political ‘values’. 
6 Rather than being the basis upon which rational decisions are made, the provision of information can 
be equated with ‘one hand clapping’ since it disregards the influence of the political context and the 
willingness of people to listen and act upon that knowledge (Weiss, 1991). Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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fact of impact assessment life (Owens et al., 2003; Wilkins, 2003). As Beattie (1995, 
p109) has said in relation to EIA:  
Most environmental professionals have entertained one or more of these notions about 
EIAs at some point in their professional live [sic]. Our response, however, is often to 
decry the lack of scientific rigour, to complain about the imposition of ‘values’ into a 
scientific endeavour, and to mutter darkly that ‘politics’ is tainting the rational, objective 
enterprise that constitutes the ideal of environmental impact assessment.  
In response, an increasing number of contributors to the literature have argued the 
need for impact assessment to more fully acknowledge its own inherently subjective 
nature. It has been pointed out that values and discretion affect every stage of the 
impact assessment process from screening to the final decision, including the steps 
of boundary setting, data collection and analysis, and even more overtly in the 
assessment of impact significance and acceptability. Thus, it is argued, the outcome 
of the assessment is dependent upon the values of those involved and does not reflect 
some notion of value-free objectivity (Beattie, 1995; Lawrence, 1997; Richardson, 
2005; Wilkins, 2003).  
I noted in Chapter 1 that impact assessment has been inadequately theorised, and 
specifically, there are now calls for impact assessment theory-building that not only 
recognise but embrace subjectivity, politics and values (Beattie, 1995; Dalkmann, 
Jiliberto Herrera, & Bongardt, 2004; Lawrence, 1997). Contributing to the project of 
theory-building, Bartlett and Kurian (1999) argue that, although rife and often 
unchallenged, the information provision model is not the sole modus operandi of 
impact assessment. They distinguish five other ways in which EIA might influence 
environmental performance, either directly or indirectly
7. Thus it has been 
recognised for quite some time that the provision of information at the final decision 
point is only one of the ways in which EIA and the knowledge it generates can 
influence decision-making (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004; McDonald & 
Brown, 1995; Wood & Jones, 1997). 
                                                         
7 Bartlett and Kurian’s (1999) other models are: the symbolic politics model, the political economy 
model, the organisational politics model, the pluralist politics model, and the institutionalist model. 
Taking a slightly different tack, Cashmore (2004) argues that models and also processes of impact 
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At this point it is perhaps worth quoting theory sceptic Archibugi’s
8 disparaging 
comments on the related field of planning theory and its intention of clarifying the 
practice of planning (Archibugi, 2004, p425): 
[I]t is as if, confronted with a dark pond (planning) in which objects at the bottom can 
only be seen in an obscure, deformed way, people would throw stones (planning theory) 
into the pond, in the hope of being able to clarify and better define the objects. Instead, 
all they would accomplish would be to muddy the situation further and make 
comprehension impossible. 
Far from endorsing this view, I align myself with the argument that improved 
conceptual understanding is necessary for better practice (Bina, in press; Cashmore, 
2004; Keeley & Scoones, 1999; Richardson, 2005; Simeon, 1976). Furthermore, the 
suggestion has often been made that impact assessment might glean conceptual 
insights from related fields such as policy and planning
9  (Bailey & Dixon, 1999; 
Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Lawrence, 2000; Nitz & Brown, 2001) from which it has 
arguably become isolated (Bina, in press; Nitz & Brown, 2001)
10. This is appropriate 
because impact assessment
11 was developed as a policy tool that seeks to inform and 
support policy decision-making by “identifying, predicting, evaluating and 
mitigating the biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development 
proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made” 
(International Association for Impact Assessment, 1999)
 12. It is also potentially 
fruitful since policy theory has developed significantly in recent years and therefore 
has much to offer impact assessment theorists (Owens et al., 2003).  
                                                         
8 Archibugi (2004) observes an ‘explosion’ of theory on and about planning (analogous to policy 
theory) to the detriment of actual improvements in planning practice. He considers this ‘philosophical 
talkativeness’ to be distracting from the real task of improving the ‘methods and techniques’ of 
planning. 
9 Policy is most broadly understood as “whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 1978, 
p3). Planning is closely a related field of which land use planning is one common type.  
10 Conversely, Robert V. Bartlett (1989), one of the early commentators on the development and 
implementation of the US National Environmental Policy Act 1969, lamented that impact assessment 
had not at that time received the attention it deserved from policy scholars, a situation that does not 
appear to have significantly changed. 
11 This is the IAIA definition of EIA. As my intent in this chapter is to consider the conceptual origins 
of impact assessment and EIA can be considered to be the origin of the present field of impact 
assessment (see Chapter 2), I rely heavily on EIA, rather than SEA literature in this discussion. I 
return to the special case of sustainability assessment more specifically in Chapters 7 and 8. 
12 Furthermore, as Owens et al (2003) argue, impact assessment can be considered as a specific form 
of policy analysis. They use the UK term ‘policy appraisal’ here, rather than ‘policy analysis’, but 
also note that some authors (for example de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 2002) use the terms ‘analysis’ 
and ‘appraisal’ synonymously.  Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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Following this lead, I also turn to the policy literature in search of an enhanced 
conceptual understanding of the Gorgon process and of impact assessment more 
generally, starting with a brief review of the origins of impact assessment and its 
evolution as a product of its times.  
5.2.1 The origins of impact assessment 
The origins of impact assessment as it is understood today are generally considered 
to be in the United States’ National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (NEPA), which 
applies to the activities of government agencies and which provides the legislative 
backing and essential components of EIA (Bartlett, 1986, 1989). It supplemented 
existing practices such as cost benefit analysis (CBA), planning, programme 
budgeting (PPB), cost-effectiveness analysis and technology assessment (Bartlett, 
1989; O'Riordan & Sewell, 1981)
13.  
One of the main purposes of NEPA was to facilitate the use of good science in 
decision-making, and the influence of the environmental sciences on its development 
is implicit throughout the legislation (Bartlett, 1986)
14. It was also intended to 
improve the procedural rationality of bureaucratic decision-making that could affect 
the quality of the environment by imposing procedures aimed at protecting the 
environment (Bartlett, 1986). The procedural aspects of EIA as required by NEPA 
were articulated formally in 1978 in the guidelines prepared by the President’s 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a body established under Title II of 
NEPA. These guidelines specifically require the identification of potential 
alternatives to the proposal, an analysis of the impacts to guide the selection of the 
preferred alternative; and a statement of the reason the preferred option was chosen 
(Jain, Urban, Stacey G. S., & Balbach H. E., 1993).  
                                                         
13 NEPA was enabled by a climate of increasing concern for environmental issues in the United States 
(Caldwell, 1997; O'Riordan & Sewell, 1981; Weston, 2000) and the vision and persistence of 
individuals such as Lynton Caldwell (Amy, 1990). Bartlett (1989, p1) also notes that NEPA, and 
specifically its requirements for EIA built upon “the historical efforts of some bureaucrats, legislators, 
and government reformers to analyze the likely consequences of possible government actions prior to 
adoption and implementation”. Bartlett (1989) goes on to cite examples such as the settlement of the 
western United States, river basin planning by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and urban and 
natural resource planning 
14 For example, Bartlett (1986, p94) argues that the requirements for Environmental Impact 
Statements (EISs) under Section 102(2)C of the Act “obviously necessitated recourse to science; 
otherwise, the required discussions of ‘environmental impact’, ‘irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources’, and ‘the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity’ could be little more than a 
collection of empty phrases”. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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Despite the importance of technical data and procedure to NEPA, Bartlett (1986) 
emphasises that science and process alone should not be seen as demonstrating 
rationality. Rather, NEPA calls for ecological rationality that seeks “to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in perfect harmony”, that 
complements political, social and economic rationalities (Bartlett, 1986). There is, 
therefore, a normative, or value-based, element to NEPA that emphasises the 
importance of the ends and not merely the means. Ecological rationality calls for an 
interdisciplinary use of science and particularly ecology (Bartlett, 1986) so that EIA 
is a form of ‘practical reason’ (Bartlett, 1990). The overarching aim of NEPA was 
therefore to develop ‘social intelligence’ with respect to the environment, where 
procedural rationality was considered important to the aim of furthering substantive 
ecological rationality (Bartlett, 1986). In addition to using science within a multi-
disciplinary framework and employing processes designed to facilitate ecologically 
rational bureaucratic decision-making, EIA was intended as a fundamentally 
democratic process, reflecting a long relationship between environmentalism and 
participatory democracy and the desire for increased public involvement in decision-
making that had begun by the time NEPA was drafted (Paehlke, 1990; Weston, 
2000)
15.  
Although Caldwell envisioned a multi-disciplinary practice, impact assessment has 
arguably evolved into a discipline in its own right
16, particularly since the inception 
of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA). This is evidenced, 
despite some notable exceptions, by literature in this field being highly self-
referential and largely concentrated in few scholarly journals
17. A consequence of 
this has been an isolationist preoccupation with methodological improvements in a 
way that attempts to separate ‘rational’ analysis from its political context, to the 
                                                         
15 The role of public participation in impact assessment, however, has always been contentious. 
Fairfax asserts that participatory processes in decision-making ante-dated NEPA and that NEPA, in 
fact, limited the effectiveness of participation by its inherent rationality and focus on the production of 
reports, “While it cannot be conclusively demonstrated, the public involvement that NEPA has 
induced is so formal, so predictable, and so proposal-orientated that it seems to have stifled 
meaningful dialogue between citizens and agencies” (Fairfax, 1978, p746). 
16 This same argument has been made in relation to the ‘disciplines’ of planning (Archibugi, 2004) 
and policy analysis (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Simeon, 1976). 
17 The three main impact assessment journals are Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Journal 
of Environmental Assessment, Policy and Management, and Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 
(the journal of the IAIA). Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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detriment of theory-building and the higher purpose of impact assessment (Caldwell, 
1989; Cashmore, 2004; Nitz & Brown, 2001; Weston, 2000). 
Despite Bartlett’s repeated protestations that this was not the intent (Bartlett, 1986, 
1989, 1990), it is often argued in the literature that current practices and theory of 
impact assessment in general have been inspired by the rational-comprehensive 
model of policy analysis embodying assumptions of technical positivism and 
instrumental rationality (Amy, 1990; Caldwell, 1989; Fairfax, 1978; Kørnøv & 
Thissen, 2000; Lawrence, 1997, 2000; Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001; Nitz & Brown, 
2001; Scrase & Sheate, 2002; Smith Korfmacher, 1998; Weston, 2000)
18. This is 
evidenced by the prevalence of terms such as ‘objective’, ‘systematic’ and 
‘comprehensive’ in the literature (Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001). Because of this 
perception, and because the policy theory I draw upon later in this section has 
developed in response to the perceived limitations of this model, I  briefly review the 
fundamental tenets of the rational-comprehensive policy model. In the discussion 
that follows, I concentrate upon environmental assessment in its two forms: project-
level EIA and strategic-level SEA, since arguably the theory and practice of 
sustainability assessment have drawn more on these two types of impact assessment 
than any others. Whereas social impact assessment has been influential in some 
jurisdictions (Vanclay, 2004), this has not been the case in Western Australia
19. 
5.2.2 The rational-comprehensive policy model 
The ‘rational-comprehensive’ model of policy analysis is grounded in the twin 
Enlightenment principles of positivism and instrumental rationality (Durning, 1999; 
F. Fischer, 1987; Flyvbjerg, 1998a; Litfin, 1994; March, 1982). Positivism is the 
epistemological basis of the natural sciences in their search for the ‘truth’ that exists 
‘out there’, waiting to be discovered (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003b) and ‘instrumental 
rationality’ is a process of determining the most efficient means to a pre-defined 
end
20 (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The rational-comprehensive policy model is 
                                                         
18 Lawrence (2000), however, observes differences between EIA and the rational planning model, the 
former more obviously considering limits (through scoping), risks, uncertainties etc, and the latter 
more overtly considering problem definition, goals and objectives and alternatives. 
19 It has been noted that social impact assessment has always taken a less positivistic approach than 
EIA, being inherently concerned with issues such as social equity (Lawrence, 2000). 
20 Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that this predominance of instrumental over value rationality is not limited 
to the practices of policy analysis and planning but rather has been prevalent throughout society since 
the Enlightenment.  Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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founded in procedural rationality, or ‘reason systematically applied’ (Lawrence, 
2000). It can be described in four broad steps
21 as follows (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; 
Lindblom, 1959, 1979):  
•  Identify the policy goal to be achieved, and the values relevant to this goal; 
•  Identify all the policy alternatives by which this goal may be achieved; 
•  Analyse the significant consequences of each alternative; 
•  Select the alternative that best achieves the goal and aligns with the values of 
the first step. 
In applying this model, complex social issues are divided up into ‘policy problems’ 
and goals are designed to address these problems. These goals are established in the 
realm of politics, which is quite separate from the technical process of policy 
analysis based upon the type of technical, particularly quantitative information that 
lends itself to comparative analysis (Amy, 1987; Faludi, 1973; F. Fischer, 2003b)
22. 
In this sense, ‘rational’ has come to mean technically neutral and value-free in a 
further endorsement of the Enlightenment faith in the objectivity of science 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998a; Litfin, 1994; Weston, 2000)
 23.  
The rational-comprehensive model grants a privileged role to experts, particularly 
bureaucratic policy professionals, who by virtue of apparently holding all the 
knowledge that is considered relevant to policy-making, also hold the power (Keeley 
& Scoones, 1999; Schön, 1983). Amy (1987, p56) explains that in this model policy 
analysts are represented as neutral, value-free experts within the political system: 
[I]n much the same way that eunuchs were thought safe to be allowed to work in harems, 
policy analysts who are technocrats and thus ‘neutered’ politically are considered safe to 
be included in the policymaking process
24. 
                                                         
21 There are many variations on this model; for example Davis et al, (1988) provide a version 
consisting of six steps. 
22 Hajer and Wagenaar (2003a) assert that this separation was the raison d’être of traditional policy 
analysis. 
23 According to Flyvbjerg (2001), Weber uses the term ‘occidental rationalism’ for instrumental 
rationality, again highlighting the dominance of this form of rationality in the history of western 
thought. 
24 Amy (1987) goes on to suggest that policy analysts themselves have sought to maintain this 
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The location of this rational and value-free decision-making within the institutions of 
government derives from the work of Max Weber in the 19
th century and his belief in 
the increasing rationalisation of society through the workings of a specialised 
bureaucracy (Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001; Weston, 2000). This system is sustained 
by representative democracy, whereby policy experts are separated from society and 
their political masters (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003a). The theme of separation 
continues when the bureaucracy itself is divided into separate departments
25, which 
has serious implications for the implementation of policy approaches designed to 
promote sustainability, as demonstrated by the inter-agency disagreements that 
characterised the Gorgon process. Simplification and separation are therefore the 
twin themes of the rational-comprehensive approach to policy analysis: means are 
separate from ends; politics are separate from policy analysis; facts are separate from 
values; bureaucratic policy makers are separate from each other, from politics and 
from broader society; policy processes are separate from their context (Flyvbjerg 
1998)
26; and rationality is separate from power (Flyvbjerg, 2002)
27. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on replicable data is at the expense of holistic understanding, and 
“complex issues are avoided or improperly simplified” (Boothroyd, 1995, p85). In 
all these ways, the model underestimates “the confusion and complexity surrounding 
actual decision making” (March, 1982, p36). 
5.2.3 The evolution of impact assessment 
The authors of NEPA and the United States Council on Environmental Quality 
Guidelines intended that EIA would enforce a methodological framework that 
involved the comparison of alternative means of achieving a policy goal, and that the 
potential environmental impacts of each alternative would inform the selection of the 
preferred alternative, if not form the basis of the selection (Jain et al., 1993). These 
steps mirror those of the rational-comprehensive model of policy analysis that 
                                                         
25 A typical western bureaucracy may include agencies with responsibility for the environment (in 
Western Australia the Department of Environment, the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management); social issues (for example, the Department of Community Development) and for 
various economic sectors (including the Department of Industry and Resources, the Department of 
Fisheries, the Department of Agriculture, amongst others) 
26 ‘Rationalisation’ therefore means the systemisation and routinisation of administrative and 
decision-making processes (Cotgrove, 1975). 
27 The separation of rationality from power is manifested in impact assessment whereby the 
assessment is the precursor to a political decision, as in the case with EIA in Western Australia and 
also in my ‘assessment for sustainability’ model for sustainability assessment discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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dominated policy thinking at the time of NEPA’s inception  (Davis et al., 1988; 
Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Lindblom, 1959). As already discussed, EIA was to 
promote ‘ecological rationality’ through the application of this ‘procedural 
rationality’ to reform bureaucratic decision-making processes.  
Many have argued, however, that bureaucratic decision-making processes have not 
been reformed through the conduct of EIA, in terms of either procedural or 
ecological rationality. Instead, EIA has become an ‘add on’ to decision-making, 
often in the form of a report stapled to the back of a proposal (Fairfax, 1978), 
providing only ‘window dressing’ and a perceived legitimacy (Amy, 1990; Bartlett, 
1990). Specifically and despite the repeated assertions already mentioned, it is not 
easy to argue that EIA, as practised today, follows the rational-comprehensive policy 
model in terms of process.  This is evidenced by project EIA being now almost 
universally conducted as a reactive process undertaken after key decisions have been 
made (see Chapters 2 and 4), and places far less emphasis on problem definition, the 
development of goals and objectives and the formulation of alternatives
28 than does 
the rational-comprehensive policy model (Lawrence, 2000). 
The main reason for this lack of serious consideration of alternatives may be that 
despite NEPA’s application to government decision-making in the USA, in most 
countries, including Australia, EIA is applied most commonly to private projects. It 
is not generally in the proponent’s interests to consider alternatives to its preferred 
option that has been developed to meet its own financial and strategic objectives, as 
highlighted by the Gorgon case (Wood, 2003). Arguably it is easier for governments 
to legislate processes for bureaucratic decision-making than private decision-making.  
While EIA procedures commonly do not embody the essentially proactive qualities 
prescribed by the rational-comprehensive model, EIA is still often highly 
proceduralised as a result of being backed by legislation and associated guidelines. 
                                                         
28 Commonly missing from many EIA processes is the comparison of alternatives, which is an 
important step in the rational-comprehensive model (Lawrence, 2000). The consideration of 
alternatives is a requirement of NEPA, as well as the legislation in countries including Australia (at 
the Commonwealth level through the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999), The Netherlands, and South Africa, but not New Zealand or the European Union (Wood, 
2003). This requirement, however, is rarely well implemented, and in general alternative designs 
dominate rather than real alternatives (Steinemann, 2001). The lack of consideration of alternatives 
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The evidence of the rationalistic underpinnings of much EIA practice and reflection 
includes a “preoccupation with procedure” (Lawrence, 1997, p80), which can be 
traced to the very earliest days of NEPA (Weston, 2004). Furthermore, the 
assumption that better science leads to better EIA and therefore better decisions was 
for a long time dominant in the EIA literature (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999).  
Several inter-related explanations for this have been offered. Firstly, EIA as required 
and defined by NEPA reflects the prevalence of the rational-comprehensive and 
other decisionist policy models in the late 1960s (Caldwell, 1989; Weston, 2004) and 
the general faith in science prevalent at the time (Cashmore, 2004)
29.  Secondly, 
most impact assessment practitioners have tended to have been trained in fields such 
as the natural sciences or engineering (Scrase & Sheate, 2002) and hence EIA and 
some forms of SEA have reflected ecological and resource management disciplines 
(Caldwell, 1989; Sheate et al., 2001). Thirdly, NEPA’s notions of ‘ecological 
rationality’ appear to have been simply over-ridden by the dominance of the 
technical and economic rationality that is the “defining feature of modern industrial 
societies” (Bartlett, 1990, p84) and which is embedded within its institutions 
following the Weberian tradition (Dryzek, 1990; Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001). 
Fourthly, Boothroyd (1995) suggests that the project orientation of most EIA 
invokes a technical approach that lends itself to science-based analysis. 
The emphasis on science has been recognised as a ‘double-edged sword’ for impact 
assessment. In the words of Lynton Caldwell (1989, p8):  
Development of science-based analytical technique has been essential to the reliability 
and credibility of EIA. Yet the professionalization of EIA entails a predictable risk – the 
adumbration of purpose by technique.  
Furthermore, there has always been a tension between science’s assumptions of 
neutral rationality and the requirement for public involvement in EIA, which appears 
to assume that the public will believe and trust the experts and not challenge the 
assessment on the basis of values (Weston, 2004), but at the same time, high quality, 
                                                         
29 This faith is reflected in the tools and techniques available at the time to support decision-making 
that have influenced the practice of impact assessment (for example, risk assessment, cost benefit 
analysis, life cycle analysis, various forms of modelling, and biological surveys), which embody 
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reproducible science is seen as critical to the perceived credibility of a transparent 
process open to scrutiny by the public (Boothroyd, 1995)
 30. 
It appears that the emphasis on procedure and technique, at the expense of a 
meaningful engagement with political realities, has underpinned EIA’s failure to live 
up to original expectations (Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Lawrence, 2000). Cashmore 
(2004, p404) follows Caldwell (1993) when he suggests that: 
While there is a general consensus that EIA has led to enhanced consideration of 
environmental factors in decision-making, its achievements appear most favourable when 
compared with past neglects and failings, rather than when measured against sustainable 
development goals.  
Similarly, Boothroyd (1995, p89) argues: 
At its best, EIA’s immediate output is mitigation of identified impacts, with longer term 
benefits including social learning for preventative work at future design stages. At worst, 
EIA procedures obfuscate the fundamental sustainable development issues…lulling 
people into a complacency that costly technical EIA activity is guarding against 
deleterious development, while giving the impression of genuine public involvement and 
sensible environmental management. 
The limitations of EIA as commonly practised are often cited as the raison d’être for 
the emergence of SEA as strategic-level supplement to EIA. Interestingly, variations 
on the rational-comprehensive model, complete with an emphasis on consideration 
of alternatives, now appear in the SEA literature in various guises. Recalling the 
debate between calls for flexible versus formal SEA methodologies discussed in 
Chapter 4, SEA theorists view the rational-comprehensive model as either a 
representative model of decision-making into which SEA may be proactively 
integrated (see for example Thérivel, 2004) or a guide for how SEA might shape 
planning and decision-making processes themselves (T. B. Fischer, 2003; Noble & 
Storey, 2001). The call for formal and fixed procedures in SEA echoes calls from 20 
years earlier for very similar methodologies to apply in EIA in the interests of 
reforming bureaucratic processes. Some SEA practitioners, therefore, appear to be 
                                                         
30 Weston (2004) notes that it was the growth of science in the 1960s that first led to increased 
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rediscovering aspects of good EIA practice that were originally included in NEPA 
but never properly implemented
31.  
I argued in Chapter 4 that sustainability assessment should be promoted as a 
proactive tool that commences early enough to meaningfully influence the 
proponent’s planning process, but did not distinguish between the formal versus 
flexible methodological approaches. Now, however, I make the case for a formal 
framework for the sustainability assessment of project proposals that reflects the 
original NEPA goal of procedural rationality. 
5.2.4 The case for procedural rationality 
The argument for flexible SEA procedures and methodologies is a rejection of the 
rational-comprehensive policy model, and a recognition that real-life policy 
processes do not lend themselves to either the positivism or instrumental rationality 
embedded within it (Bailey & Dixon, 1999; Renton & Bailey, 2000). This point is 
well made, but recalling the original NEPA intention of ‘procedural rationality’, 
which was specifically not meant to imply either positivism or instrumental 
rationality but to transform bureaucratic decision-making (Bartlett, 1986), it is worth 
examining these promoted process methodologies more closely.  
Broadly, these formal procedures or frameworks for SEA are based on process steps 
including “a problem, need, or opportunity to be addressed; goals, objectives, and 
criteria; the generation and evaluation of alternatives; and explicit links to 
implementation” (Lawrence, 2000, p608). Using the terminology of my earlier 
analysis, and drawing on Noble and Storey’s (2001) proposed 7-step framework for 
SEA
32, I submit that an appropriate process framework for sustainability assessment 
would be: 
                                                         
31 Thérivel (1992, p21) attempts to justify this apparent reinvention of the methodological by arguing 
that even if EIA were to return to the original intentions of NEPA with regard to alternatives, “this 
still does not allow for an assessment of alternatives in early stages of planning, as would be provided 
for by SEA”. Bina (in press), however, argues that two other ‘features’ of SEA were included in 
NEPA but never properly implemented and thus forgotten until reinvented by SEA theorists: the 
application to strategic decision-making (policies, plans and programmes) and the consideration of 
cumulative effects. If this is the case, it appears that EIA as a tool was always intended to do 
everything that is now attributed to SEA. 
32 Noble and Storey (2001, p502) propose a 7-step framework for SEA “designed to determine the 
option(s) that provide the most benefit/least damage to the environment”, which Noble (2002b) later 
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1.  Identify the goal and the related question to be addressed;  
2.  Establish a ‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ defining sustainability 
goals and criteria for the decision, and identify other goals and constraints;  
3.  Identify alternatives and options to meet the goal;  
4.  Identify the impacts of each alternative; 
5.  Select and enhance the preferred alternative.  
This framework is clearly based upon the rational-comprehensive policy model, 
which at first appears somewhat of a dilemma since this model has been so widely 
discredited and criticised (Davis et al., 1988; Lindblom, 1959; Schön, 1983). Many 
of these criticisms, however, are inaccurate when considered in the light of discrete 
planning processes such as the development of a project proposal, since “[i]n certain 
planning situations a linear and ordered process of this kind may be a realistic 
expectation” (Scrase & Sheate, 2002, p288). 
The first criticism is that the rational-comprehensive model of policy-making 
assumes a fixed policy ‘decision-point’, which is often not the case in real-life policy 
situations. Fischer (2003a, p8) cites the work by Majone and Wildavsky (1979) in 
which “the content of a policy is seen to evolve as it moves through the policy 
process” from formulation to implementation. It is, however, often the case in 
sustainability assessments where there is usually, particularly in the case of project 
proposals, a specific decision made as to whether or not to approve the proposal. 
This is not to ignore that many smaller decisions are made throughout the assessment 
process, from scoping to defining alternatives and deciding who should be consulted 
(Wilkins, 2003), but the final approval decision does provide a focus. 
The second criticism relates to the impossibility of defining desirable policy 
outcomes in the first place, at least independently of the existing policy context 
(Lindblom, 1959, 1979). In the context of project-level impact assessment, the goals 
of a proposal are usually defined by the proponent in accordance with their 
commercial and strategic objectives. I have argued in Chapter 4, however, that 
sustainability assessment calls for the alignment of projects with societal goals and 
visions for sustainability, and therefore the development of a proposal does provide 
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criteria; evaluating the potential impacts; determining impact significance; comparing the alternatives; 
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an opportunity to establish these goals and develop a sustainability decision-making 
framework. This represents a significant step forward that, at the very least, 
orientates the process towards the achievement of positive societal outcomes rather 
than simply focusing on the minimisation of negative impacts and the defence of the 
proponent’s preferred option, which is the legacy of EIA (Gibson, 2001). It also 
forces attention to the question being asked, which potentially might lead to a more 
open or even strategic question, and encourages the consideration of alternatives
33.  
The third criticism relates to the foundations of the rational-comprehensive policy 
model in positivism and therefore its reliance on technical cause and effect 
information (Davis et al., 1988; Schön, 1983). Some might consider that even the 
identification of the process steps listed above forces the assessment process into 
instrumental rationality, but this does not need to be the case. The basic procedural 
steps may simply provide a framework and “the content of assessment pursuant to 
these procedures would be expanded to become more holistic in scope and systemic 
in method” (Boothroyd, 1995, p116). Although positivism traditionally informed the 
methodologies applied in procedurally rational processes, they are not inseparable 
bed-fellows, that is, there is nothing to say that the work undertaken within each step 
should be technical or positivistic. Instead, each step might represent a ‘framework 
for negotiation and compromise’ (Cashmore, 2004) or a ‘unit of reflexivity’ 
(Wagenaar & Cook, 2003), a concept to which I return in later chapters.  
I therefore submit that a formal procedural framework is appropriate for 
sustainability assessment, particularly at the project level, since it forces attention to 
matters such as the question being asked, the sustainability decision-making 
framework, and the consideration of alternatives that EIA experience suggests might 
otherwise be neglected. While I agree that there is indeed much that impact 
assessment can learn from policy theory, the value of the latter lies not in devising 
more appropriate impact assessment processes as advocated by the ‘flexibility’ 
school of thought, but as a source of conceptual insights that can contribute to impact 
assessment theory building. I turn now to the field of policy theory to explore the 
extent to which it might provide the kinds of conceptual insights that could aid in 
                                                         
33 The idea of considering a private project proposal in the context of public policy goals is somewhat 
controversial (Pope et al., 2005), but this is potentially where the sustainability assessment of complex 
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explaining the Gorgon experience and contribute to the process of sustainability 
assessment theory-building. 
5.3  A way forward: Looking to policy theory  
Increasingly, the broader field of policy studies is promoted as a way out of the 
persistent malaise caused by the perceived inability of many impact assessments to 
engage with political realities to influence decision-making. Impact assessment 
practitioners, it is argued, must learn from the related fields of policy and planning, 
fields that are better theorised and which have moved beyond their rationalist roots.  
Harold D. Lasswell (see for example Lasswell, 1951) is generally considered to be 
the father of the policy sciences, which he originally conceived to help to adjust 
“modern democratic practices to the realities of a modern, techno-industrial society” 
(F. Fischer, 2003a, p3). The intent of the policy sciences was to study the policy 
process itself, as well as to provide better information to policy-makers (F. Fischer, 
2003a; Hoppe, 1999)
34. In accordance with Lasswell’s vision, the field today has two 
interrelated arms, often termed policy analysis (policy science in the policy process) 
and policy theory (policy science of the policy process)
35. Using this distinction, the 
rational-comprehensive policy model discussed previously is a structured approach 
to policy analysis, and one that has been the subject of extensive critique over the 
past 60 years. Arguably, policy theory has largely developed in reaction to the 
increasingly obvious limitations of the rational-comprehensive model and the 
artificial simplifications and separations inherent within it. Reminiscent of the 
laments of impact assessment practitioners, policy theorists have observed that 
(Landsbergen & Bozeman, 1987, p627): 
policy analysis often provides rational approaches to policy only to find that 
policymakers have less interest in rationality than in politics. Thus, policy analysis fails, 
not because of internal (analytical) shortcomings, but because of external (political, 
historical, resource) constraints.  
                                                         
34 Fischer (2003a) prefers the term ‘policy science’ to Lasswell’s plural form ‘policy sciences’. To 
avoid overtones and potentially negative connotations of the natural sciences, I will use ‘policy 
studies’. 
35 Terminology varies, however, and Ham and Hill (1993) have demonstrated the blurred boundaries 
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Policy theorists have sought since the time of Lasswell to better understand real-life 
policy making, often in response to ‘policy crises’ that fail to reflect the conventional 
wisdom (Daneke, 1989), and have arguably been far more adventurous and 
successful than theorists of impact assessment in this regard. The result is that, upon 
first glance, the vast and complex body of literature on policy theory invokes a 
daunting image of Archibugi’s (2004) ‘muddy pond’ of theory, and it is to this pond 
that impact assessment theorists have turned in their quest for clarity.  
5.3.1 Linking impact assessment and policy theory 
Contributions to the literature linking impact assessment and policy theory draw on a 
broad spectrum of policy theories. They generally make two main points: firstly that 
impact assessment does not operate in reality in accordance with principles of 
rationality, but more closely approximates alternative decision theories; and secondly 
that other policy models beyond decision theory have lessons to offer impact 
assessment. The former often focus on EIA, and the latter on SEA, reflecting the 
argument for flexible methodologies based on ‘how decision making really works’. 
Various behavioural decision theories are commonly invoked, as are group theories 
and a range of other policy theories. A recurring theme is the idea that different 
approaches to impact assessment should be applied depending on the nature of the 
issue under consideration (Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Lawrence, 2000; Leknes, 2001; 
Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001). 
For example, Weston (2000) focuses solely on behavioural decision theories and by 
examining each step of the process makes the argument that EIA is best viewed as a 
‘mixed scanning model’ (Etzioni, 1967), as others have done in relation to health 
impact assessment (Bekker, Putters, & Van der Grinten, 2004) and SEA (Nilsson & 
Dalkmann, 2001)
36. The conclusion drawn in all cases is that values are an inherent 
part of impact assessment that must be recognised, although it is unclear what 
implications this might have in practice.   
An emphasis is also placed on values and subjectivity by those who note the 
increasing emphasis on communicative or argumentative models in the planning and 
policy field, and call for more deliberative and collaborative impact assessment 
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processes as a counter to the tendencies towards positivism and rationality (Kørnøv 
& Thissen, 2000; Nilsson & Dalkmann, 2001)
37. In contrast, Leknes (2001) retains 
the science-based information provision model of EIA  but demonstrates that the 
EIA process and the information it generates may be utilised in ways that could be 
explained by several different theoretical models: the rational-comprehensive model, 
where information is treated as objective input to the approval decision; neo-
institutionalism, whereby the EIA process operates as a superior institutional 
procedure; and negotiation, or group theory, in which EIA data becomes strategic 
ammunition.  
Other contributors also use different models to explain SEA case studies: for 
example, group theories (or negotiation), Kingdon’s (1995) notion of policy 
entrepreneurs, Sabatier’s (1987) three levels of beliefs; and Rein and Schön’s (1996) 
frame reflection (Deelstra et al., 2003); or the rational comprehensive model, 
communicative planning and planning as a social struggle (Hilden, Furman, & 
Kaljonen, 2004). Conclusions are drawn to improve the practice of SEA, although 
these are not necessarily linked back to the models.  
Still others take a similar approach from a theoretical perspective without case study 
analysis. Lawrence (2000) draws recommendations for the practice of EIA from five 
different planning theories, the rational-comprehensive model and four others that 
challenge its assumptions of positivism and instrumental rationality, essentially 
undertaking the same process but without using case studies. Nitz and Brown (2001) 
preface their analysis of the policy cycle as a source of inspiration for improved SEA 
with a brief mention of the decision theories and Sabatier’s (1987; 1993) Advocacy 
Coalition Framework.  
Thus there have been some brave attempts to rescue impact assessment from its 
isolationism by engaging with the policy literature in ways that acknowledge the 
implicit subjectivity of impact assessment and also locate it more explicitly within its 
political and social context. Each contribution discussed offers something towards a 
deeper conceptual understanding of impact assessment and suggestions towards 
improving its practice. The value of this work, however, is limited by its ‘scattergun’ 
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approach, whereby various policy theories and models of policy analysis have been 
invoked with little or no justification given for their selection over other models. 
Neither has there been any attempt to distinguish between the various models and 
theories, or to consider how these might relate to one another in an overarching 
framework that draws these contributions together into a comprehensive and 
integrated theory of impact assessment. Furthermore, little insight is provided into 
the interrelationships between values, knowledge and power that characterise policy 
processes and which were so evident in the Gorgon example. Seeking clarity, I 
turned to the original sources of various contributions to policy theory. 
5.3.2 Conceptualising policy theory 
As I delved into the policy literature, I began to discern in it a pattern. Having 
become aware of an evolving field called ‘integral theory’
38, I discovered that the 
heuristic at its heart provided the conceptual framework through which policy 
processes and theories of policy could be understood and reconciled
39. The founder 
of integral theory, Ken Wilber, argues that any aspect of life and experience has four 
dimensions. These are represented as quadrants in Figure 5.1, which are formed by 
two axes that acknowledge the tensions between the individual/collective and the 
exterior/interior (or objective/subjective) dimensions. Each quadrant is home to 
particular characteristics of an issue and also to different epistemologies and 
perspectives on knowledge. The two right-hand quadrants are the exterior or 
objective quadrants, and the forms of knowledge they represent can thus be acquired 
by observation and descriptive forms of analysis. The left-hand quadrants are the 
interior, or subjective quadrants, and as such they represent forms of knowledge that 
have depth and thus require interpretive approaches to access (Wilber, 1995, 2000). 
                                                         
38At this point I must acknowledge my indebtedness to William Varey of the Forsyth Consulting 
Group, in Perth Western Australia who introduced me to Ken Wilber’s Integral Theory.  
39 As Riedy (2005, p48) notes, “integral theory has developed into a lively field of inquiry with 
numerous contributors from diverse disciplines across the world. Much of this recent work has 
focused on theoretical and practical applications of integral theory to specific disciplines, resulting in 
new fields like integral ecology, integral politics and integral business. The Integral Institute 
(www.integralinstitute.org), established in 1998, has accelerated the development of integral theory 
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Fig 5.1: The four quadrants of integral theory (derived from Wilber, 2000) 
Specifically, the exterior individual quadrant is the ‘it’ quadrant. It is the realm of the 
natural sciences, or Aristotle’s ‘epistme’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001), which in the context of 
impact assessment translates to knowledge about the causes and effects of specific 
impacts. This knowledge is assumed to be objective, value-free and factual. It is 
formal, abstract and theoretical and derives from an individual’s cognitive abilities 
(Beiner, 1983; Ruderman, 1997) and therefore can be called ‘embrained knowledge’ 
(Lam, 2000). The exterior individual quadrant is also home to studies of the 
behaviour of individuals. 
The lower right exterior collective quadrant is the ‘its’ quadrant. It is home to the 
structures, systems and institutions of society, as well as its processes and practices, 
or what Aristotle has called ‘techne’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Systems theory is an 
example of a exterior collective field of study. Exterior collective knowledge can be 
called ‘encoded knowledge’, taking the form of the rules and procedures and 
institutionalised patterns of behaviour  (Lam, 2000). 
Individual 
Collective 
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The interior collective quadrant is the ‘we’ quadrant and is the domain of culture and 
the collective values, beliefs, frames and meanings that underpin and guide 
behaviours and practice. Lam’s (2000) ‘embedded knowledge’ resides in these 
shared understandings. The focus here is on the collective, and therefore appropriate 
methods of inquiry include hermeneutics and cultural anthropology. Policy analysis 
or impact assessment that embraces this form of subjectivity reframes practice as a 
form of applied ethics, or Aristotles ‘phronesis’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Owens et al., 
2003)
40. 
The interior individual quadrant is the ‘I’ quadrant. It is home to personal emotional, 
intellectual and spiritual development. Fields of study based in the interior individual 
quadrant include psychology, philosophy and phenomenology. One form of interior 
individual knowledge has been called ‘embodied knowledge’, which is derived from 
‘doing’ rather than ‘knowing’ (Lam, 2000).  
Integral theory provides an alternative to both the reductionism of modernism and 
postmodern relativism that is entirely divorced from objective reality
41. According to 
Riedy (2005, p52):  
Integral theory attempts to reintroduce the idea of universality, while retaining the 
postmodern understanding of difference and diversity. It seeks to integrate objective and 
subjective ways of understanding the world into a coherent epistemological framework 
that responds to the way people actually experience reality. 
While integral theory itself is highly complex and multi-faceted, the heuristic is a 
relatively simple framework for understanding complex issues from different 
perspectives that together provide an integrated whole (Slaughter, 1998). In the 
following analysis I argue that each contribution to policy theory is primarily located 
within one of the quadrants, and that the framework permits the reconciliation of 
apparently competing theories. This framework not only structures my analysis of 
                                                         
40 Phronesis is “the product of a shared understanding” (Ruderman, 1997, p410), whereby policy 
analysts offer ‘wise counsel’ on matters pertaining to what is good and right in the form of arguments 
that embody the ‘facts’  within their contextual stories (F. Fischer, 2003b; F. Fischer & Forester, 
1993; Flyvbjerg, 1993; Jennings, 1987; Majone, 1989; Ruderman, 1997; van der Knaap, 1995). 
41 Integral theory thus has much in common with Giddens’ ‘Theory of Structuration’ which seeks to 
reconcile agency (exterior individual) and structure (exterior collective) and also a hermeneutical 
perspective (interior collective) with functionalism and structuralism (exterior collective) (Giddens, 
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the policy literature but provides a framework for discussions of learning in Chapter 
6 and sustainability in Chapter 7.  
Exterior policy theory 
Behaviourism is an 'exterior individual' approach to policy theory that focuses on the 
actions of participants in the policy process, and of which decision theories and actor 
theories are examples. The rational-comprehensive model discussed previously is an 
idealised example of decision theory. Decision theories seek to explain how 
individuals make decisions, and particularly bureaucrats acting as “cogs in a 
Weberian machine” whose role is to deliver pre-determined policy goals in 
according with politically determined values (Keeley & Scoones, 1999, p16). 
Contributions since the time of Lasswell have sought to address the limitations of the 
rational comprehensive model by recognising various limits to pure rationality and 
attempting to incorporate some more subjective elements (see for example Dror, 
1964; Etzioni, 1967; Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 
1973)
42.  
Actor theories also focus on individual behaviours but extend beyond bureaucratic 
actors, Kingdon’s (1995) ‘policy entrepreneurs’ being one example. By discussing 
how these entrepreneurs operate within a ‘garbage can’ of political complexity 
(Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) to exploit windows of opportunity represented by 
the alignment of ‘problems, policies and politics’ in order to place issues on the 
policy agenda (Kingdon, 1995), Kingdon thus recognises the complex and subjective 
political world. This ‘organised anarchy’, however, is imported as the backdrop 
against which his entrepreneurs behave, rather than being part of his explanatory 
theory.   
Other perspectives on policy move from consideration of the behaviours of 
individual decision makers to examine the structures and forms of social 
organisation within which they act (Weston, 2000), emphasising “the pre-eminence 
of the social whole over its individual parts (i.e., its constituent actors, human 
subjects) (Giddens, 1984, p1) and may thus be classified as 'exterior collective' 
                                                         
42 For example, Lindblom (1959, 1979) challenges the separation of policy goals (equated to ‘values’) 
from means. March (1982, p32), however, notes that rather than recognising values as “a basic feature 
of political visions of decision-making”, most decision theory assumes that conflicting values can be 
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theories
43. Group theories, whereby policy is viewed as the result of a struggle 
between groups representing competing and relatively fixed interests or values, is 
one example (Dye, 1978)
44. Forms of ‘neo-institutionalism’, which consider the 
influence of various aspects of social and political context ranging from bureaucratic 
structure to the policy environment, to general social settings, to the global political 
economy (see for example Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Rein & Schön, 1993; Simeon, 
1976) also fall into this category
45.  
Systems theory, or ‘functionalism’ (Giddens, 1984) is another exterior collective 
approach, which views policy making as “a response of a political system to forces 
brought to bear upon it from the environment”, where the environment is “any 
condition or circumstance defined as external to the boundaries of the political 
system” (Dye, 1978, p37). Systems theory approaches assume that policy 
environments, or contexts, are ‘predictable and controlled’ (Lawrence, 2000). One 
well-known example is Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework, which seeks to 
empirically relate knowledge, interests and beliefs in a causative model (Sabatier, 
1987, 1993)
46. 
The exterior policy theories, whether individual or collective, are united in their aims 
of ‘objectivity’, in many cases proposing causal models that are theoretically 
provable (F. Fischer, 2003b). This is evidenced by a concern with determining the 
‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ variables in these models (see for example Dye, 
1978; Simeon, 1976). Fischer (2003a) labels this body of work ‘empiricist’ or 
‘positivist’, since it retains the Enlightenment faith in positivism and rationality 
                                                         
43 The concept of the policy cycle, consisting of agenda-setting, policy analysis and decision, 
implementation and evaluation is also a collective exterior conceptualisation (Bridgman & Davis, 
2004). 
44 Lindblom (1979, p524) understood this. He distinguishes between his inter-related theories of 
‘disjointed incrementalism’ and ‘mutual partisan adjustment’ in relation to this point, where the 
former is primarily analytical and the latter is “to some extent a substitution of politics for analysis”. 
45 Whereas the study of institutions in political science traditionally focused on describing the 
structures and legal arrangements of the various bodies in the political system, neo-institutionalism 
recognises that the structured patterns of behaviour that become embedded in organisations influence 
the content of policies (Dye, 1978). Institutions in this sense include both organisations and codified 
social interactions such as norms, conventions and rules (Dovers, 2001). 
46 Sabatier (197, 1993) speaks of policy subsystems that are affected by the external factors 
surrounding them, dividing these into two categories: relatively stable parameters and dynamic 
(system) events. The former include basic attributes of the problem area, basic distribution of natural 
resources, fundamental cultural values and social structure. The latter includes changes in 
socioeconomic conditions and technology, changes in governments and key personnel, and policy 
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despite taking a broader perspective and considering more elements than the 
rational-comprehensive model. Subjectivity considerations are sometimes embodied 
into these models in the form of fixed entities labelled ‘politics’, ‘values’, ‘deep 
beliefs’ and the like, and given their place in models of policy-making alongside 
other components of the policy machine where it is assumed that they are constant in 
nature and even potentially controllable (F. Fischer, 2003a; Lawrence, 2000).  
This process of rationalisation, however, robs these subjective elements of their 
depth and meaning, relegating empiricist policy theories to what has been termed 
‘flatland’ (Wilber, 2000). Furthermore, empirical models have failed to adequately 
describe the policy process in any case. Fischer (2003b, p209) argues that the 
problem lies in a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the social, “The 
social sciences have neither developed anything vaguely resembling the promised 
causal, predictive ‘science’ of society, nor has their subfield, the policy sciences, 
been able to provide indisputably effective solutions to pressing social and economic 
problems”
47. Therefore new approaches to policy theory are required that move from 
descriptive to interpretive forms of analysis. 
Engaging with the interior dimensions 
In response to these limitations, policy and planning theorists have begun to 
acknowledge the interior, or subjective, dimensions of policy making, through 
application of the interpretive social sciences. As a critique of positivism (Jennings, 
1987), as well as descriptive social sciences (Bradbury & Rayner, 2002)
48, 
interpretive social science seeks to uncover the meanings of behaviours and actions 
to those who constitute them and those outside them; to make sense of actions in 
terms of the intentions of the action, which in turn are guided by ‘conventions, rules 
and norms’; and to highlight the interconnections between the different aspects of the 
social and political context in which the action occurs. Interpretive social science 
thus seeks to spin a ‘web’ of understanding.  
                                                         
47 Fischer (2003b) extends his argument to the physical sciences, citing contributions from chaos 
theory and quantum physics that have shown that even the physical world can no longer be considered 
stable or fixed. 
48 Bradbury and Rayner (2002) specifically discuss the potential contribution of interpretivism to 
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'Interior individual' approaches have been applied within planning by advocates of 
the communicative planning model, which utilises the psychoanalytical approaches 
of critical theory to explore internal belief systems and frameworks of individual 
planners engaging in their craft (Hillier & Gunder, 2003). The same notion is found 
in Lasswell’s ‘contextual orientation’ to policy analysis in which policy analysts, 
acting on behalf of society, seek emancipation from “those psychopathological and 
ideological forces which constrain or destroy the freedom and reason of a person” 
(Torgerson, 1985, p244). 
Analogously, 'interior collective' approaches to policy theory seek to excavate the 
underlying meanings that shape society, and therefore policy practice, at the 
collective level. Into this category falls the work of Rein and Schön on frame 
reflective policy analysis (Rein, 1976; Rein & Schön, 1993, 1996), and the 
sociologists of science (see for example Wynne, 1996) who have pointed to the 
social construction and value-laden nature of  science (Bradbury & Rayner, 2002; F. 
Fischer, 2003b; Ravetz, 1999). 
Engagement with the interior world of hidden meanings is the defining characteristic 
of what has come to be known as the ‘post-empiricist’ policy orientation, which 
embraces ethics, values, beliefs, meanings and all the dimensions of policy making 
that extend beyond the immediately obvious into the contextual depth. The post-
empiricist turn does not reject the descriptive or objective, but the focus becomes its 
relationship with the normative or subjective (F. Fischer, 2003a). The notion of 
policy discourses and storylines makes a significant contribution to post-empiricist 
policy theory by providing a means by which the hidden forces operating within a 
policy context and indeed a society can be articulated and explored. Their use has 
been demonstrated to great effect in relation to acid rain (Hajer, 1995); ozone 
depletion (Litfin, 1994); climate change (Bulkeley, 2000); spatial planning (Healey, 
1999) and forestry (Hillier, 2000). The importance of context in shaping policy 
processes is increasingly acknowledged (Dryzek, 1982; Owens & Cowell, 2002), 
and in the terminology of the integral framework, the interior and exterior collective 
dimensions together comprise the cultural and socio-political context of policy 
making. Following Dryzek (1997), discourses and storylines can be conceptualised 
as contextual ‘software’, while institutions are the ‘hardware’.  Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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In the spirit of an integral approach, policy discourses provide a perspective from 
which other policy theories, including actor and group- or interest-based  
perspectives can be reconciled within a holistic model (Keeley & Scoones, 1999). 
For these reasons, I discuss policy discourses and storylines in more detail before 
returning to consider the Gorgon experience on this basis. 
5.3.3 Discourses and storylines  
Like policy argumentation, discourses and storylines are based in language. 
However, whereas an argument leads to a conclusion to demonstrate how things 
should be, discourses and storylines articulate in language how things are (F. 
Fischer, 2003a). The concept brings together several bodies of work to link concepts 
like ideology, discourse, frame, narrative and storyline (F. Fischer, 2003a). Although 
these linkages remain somewhat ambiguous
49 and even the leading theorists have 
been observed to use some terms interchangeably (Dryzek, 2004), the concept has 
great potential both as an analytical tool and as a means for reshaping policy in 
practice.  
A policy discourse can be defined as (Hajer, 1995, p44):  
a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, 
and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities
50.  
Policy discourses are effectively the ‘tracks’ along which policy proceeds
51 (F. 
Fischer, 2003a). They are inherently collective; rather than considering individual 
beliefs, values and behaviours, the question turns to “the social norms and 
conventions that constrain and enable what can be acceptably said” (McGregor, 
2004, p594). Dryzek (1997, p8) describes the nature of discourses thus: 
A discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables 
those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into 
coherent stories or accounts. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgements and 
contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and 
                                                         
49 For example, Fischer (2003a) notes that discourse and ideology are not the same thing, but they 
intersect, and the relationship between these two concepts is the subject of debate. 
50 Hajer (2003b), like Dryzek (1997, 2005), focuses less on linguistic elements of discourse and more 
on the institutional practices within which discourse are produced. 
51 Fischer (2003a) uses the example of Keyensian economics versus monetary policy here.  Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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disagreements….The way a discourse views the world is not always easily 
comprehended by those who subscribe to other discourses. 
Discourses and storylines operate at different levels of policy-making and in society 
as a whole, for example within a particular political institution, or between members 
of a policy-subsystem, or within a broader social system, or at the global level, 
corresponding to the layered or nested elements of context (F. Fischer, 2003a; 
Healey, 1999; Rein & Schön, 1993). Fischer (2003a, p75) uses the idea of levels to 
distinguish between discourses and storylines, suggesting:  
discourses play a broad structuring role, under which political stories and narratives are 
told which not only reflect these general systems of meaning but also work them out in 
the concrete practices of the everyday world of social action
52.  
He goes on to argue that, “To understand the world around them, most people do not 
rely on comprehensive discursive systems for their cognitions. Instead, they rely on 
storylines” (F. Fischer, 2003a, p86).  
Following Fischer (2003a), Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (1997; 2005), I use ‘discourse’ 
to mean structuring frameworks that operate at a macro or societal level, analogously 
to ‘policy paradigms’(Hall, 1993; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Laws & Rein, 2003) or 
‘frames’ (Rein & Schön, 1993)
53, and ‘storyline’ to mean micro-level narratives that 
help us to make sense of specific policy issues or problems (Hajer, 2003a). The 
                                                         
52 Fischer (2003a, p75) is speaking of the highest level of discourse when he says, “At this cultural 
level, discourses function epistemically to regularize the thinking of a particular period, including the 
basic organizing principles of social action (such as the rules of feudalism or capitalism). Functioning 
as deep socio-linguistic structures, discourses organize the actors’ understandings of reality without 
them necessarily being aware of it. In the Foucaultian sense of the terminology, such epistemic 
discourses have formative or constitutive power that structures basic social definitions, meanings, and 
interactions in a socio-cultural system. As large encompassing systems of meaning embedded in and 
transmitted by culture, macro discourses constitute the ‘residua’ of a society’s or a group’s collective 
memory. They do so primarily in the form of stories that can be taken as the engrams basic to our 
modes of thinking and action”.  
53 For my purposes, the terms discourse, frame and policy paradigm may be used interchangeably, as 
demonstrated by the similarities of the following definitions: according to Howlett and Ramesh (2003, 
p233), a policy paradigm “thus informs and holds in place a set of ideas held by relevant policy 
subsystem members…that shapes the broad goals policy-makers pursue, the way they perceive public 
problems, and the kinds of solution they consider for adoption”. Laws and Rein (2003, p173) speak of 
frames as “a particular way of representing knowledge, and as the reliance on (and development of) 
interpretive schemas that bound and order a chaotic situation, facilitate interpretation and provide a 
guide for doing and acting”. Another closely related concept is Wittgenstein’s Weltbilder, or ‘world 
images’ (van der Knaap, 1995). Laws and Rein (2003, p174), however, also use the term frames to 
equate to storylines when they say “frames are a special type of story”. The important points here are 
that this was one of the first attempts to explicitly relate frames to discourses and storylines (see Laws 
and Rein 2003) and that ‘frame’ can be used at both the macro and micro levels. To avoid confusion, I 
will prefer ‘discourse’ and ‘storyline’. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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stories told about policy situations can in turn reveal the broader structuring frames, 
paradigms or discourses to which the policy actors subscribe (Healey, 1999; Rein & 
Schön, 1993). Storylines are thus a form of ‘short-hand construction’ that “function 
to condense large amounts of factual information intermixed with the normative 
assumptions and value orientations that assign meaning to them” (F. Fischer, 2003a, 
p87). They “help people to fit their bit of knowledge, experience or expertise into the 
larger jigsaw of a policy debate” (Hajer, 2003a, p104)
54.  
Discourses and storylines do not exist in isolation but are constantly interacting, 
influencing and being influenced by, other discourses. They are grounded in 
empirical practice and take form through action (Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Wagenaar, 
2003b)
55. They are functions of their place and time, and more specifically of 
physical environments, history, culture, power arrangements (McGregor, 2004), 
while also shaping context through language (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003c; Lopes, 
Theisohn, & Program, 2003). 
Fundamental to discourses and storylines are the interior collective elements of 
socio-cultural values, beliefs and norms (F. Fischer, 2003a). They explicitly embrace 
interior dimensions of a social reality excluded by rational choice theory, such as 
culture, ideas and religion (Jachtenfuchs, 1996). Perhaps most importantly, 
discourses and storylines are artefacts of meaning, and thus provide a means of 
excavating and exploring from a hermeneutic or interpretive perspective the 
intangible and ever-fluid meanings framing policy making (Yanow, 2003)
56. This is 
not to dismiss policy discourses and storylines as relativist and entirely divorced 
from empirical ‘reality’, since it is possible to subscribe to both a hermeneutic 
epistemology and a realist ontology (Dryzek, 1997; Litfin, 1994). 
                                                         
54 Flyvbjerg (2002) gives examples of stories, which he calls ‘rationalities’ in relation to the Aalborg 
Project in Denmark.  
55 Wagenaar and Cook (2003, p146) recall Gidden’s structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), Polanyi’s 
tacit knowledge, Bourdieu’s habitus and Dewey’s pragmatism, all of which acknowledge that “social 
order is constantly reproduced in the course of acting in and upon it” in recognition of the reflexive 
relationship between actors and their environment. 
56 In an analogous argument, Yanow (2003) distinguishes between culture static anthropology 
referring to race-ethic or nationality groups, and ‘cultural and symbolic anthropology’, where culture 
has an orientation towards the symbolic, and artifacts such as language, objects and acts represent 
values, beliefs and feeling constituting human meaning. The former is static and empiricist, while the 
latter is fluid and post-empiricist. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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The difference between the descriptive (exterior collective) systems theory approach 
and the interpretive (interior collective) analysis of discourses is highlighted by the 
debate between Sabatier and his co-researchers on one hand, and Hajer and Fischer 
on the other (refer to F. Fischer, 2003a; Hajer, 1995).  In critiquing Sabatier’s (1987, 
1993) model of policy stability and policy change, Hajer and Fischer do not reject 
the concept of core beliefs, but challenge that they are clearly defined and that they 
are common to all members of Sabatier’s ‘advocacy coalition’ (F. Fischer, 2003a). 
Instead, they argue that the main unit of analysis should be the discursive storyline 
shared by members of a ‘discourse coalition’
57.  
While some have conceptualised discourse as “the sets of ideas or beliefs” that 
“serve to constrain policy actors” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p16),  this is a 
somewhat mechanistic and negative way of considering discourses or frames that 
does not do justice to their inherent fluidity and subjectivity (Dryzek, 1982). Laws 
and Rein (2003, p179) cast the discourses that frame policy processes in a positive 
light, arguing that effective practice depends upon taken-for-granted assumptions 
that are not open for scrutiny, that shape “what is discussable, what is realistic, what 
is natural” and thus we rely to some extent upon discourses and frames embedded in 
practice and the institutions of practice
58. They, however, like Dryzek (1997, p20), 
believe that discourses can and should be managed through processes of reflexivity 
and awareness so that individuals are not simply “subject to the discourses in which 
they move, and so seldom able to step back and make comparative assessments and 
choices across different discourses”
59. I return to this argument in Chapter 6. 
Discourses and storylines provide a meta-analytical tool to enable better 
understanding of the nature of intractable policy issues, and particularly the 
                                                         
57 The storyline is made up of facts, values, ideas and beliefs woven together in different ways by 
different members of the coalition (Hajer, 1995). The attraction of a particular storyline to a policy 
actor may have less to do with core beliefs and facts than with emotional responses to an issue and the 
desire to be part of a community (in this case the coalition). Beliefs and values in this model are hard 
to pin down and may not be as strongly held as Sabatier (1987, 1993) suggests, and when challenged, 
policy actors may contradict themselves in relation to their core beliefs. However, they remain loyal 
to the storyline (F. Fischer, 2003a). 
58 In this way, they highlight the links between the exterior and interior dimensions of context, which 
I discuss further later in this chapter. 
59 Dryzek (1997) also challenges the idea of hegemonic discourses dominating in certain times and 
places, believing that there will be a variety of discourses operating. For example, despite the 
hegemony of industrialism in the 1960s, this began to disintegrate and allow for the variety of often 
competing environmental discourses that now co-exist. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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relationships between knowledge, power, values, institutions, societal context 
(Forester, 1993b; Keeley & Scoones, 1999; Litfin, 1994). The discourse becomes the 
focal point of the examination of the policy issue in a way that “takes the 
relationship between knowledge, power and policy as the centre of analysis” (Keeley 
& Scoones, 1999, p5).  
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, this more interpretive analysis enhances and 
reconciles actor, interest and structural policy theories by emphasising that the 
behaviour of policy actors and the nature of the structures and institutions in which 
they operate are not ‘givens’ to be analysed in an empirical, deterministic sense, but 
should be recognised as being socially constructed and shaped by stories and 
discourses at various levels (F. Fischer, 2003a). For example, Keeley and Scoones 
(1999, p28) reconcile discourses with actor and interest models of policy by 
explaining how “interests are shaped by larger discourses, but…these discourses are 
also shaped actively by political interests” and that, whereas actor-based approaches 
to policy demonstrate the role of individual agency in generating knowledge, the 
behaviour of those actors is influenced by structures and discourses
60. 
I now proceed to consider the dominant storylines in the controversial Gorgon 
assessment process as the basis for a deeper analysis of the case study.  
5.4  Revisiting the ‘wicked problem’ of Gorgon 
In this section, I return to the observations made in the introduction to this chapter, 
now better equipped to understand them, using the concept of policy discourses and 
storylines as the starting point for the analysis
61. This analysis draws together several 
of the policy theories introduced previously, including discussions of the influence of 
policy actors and institutions, demonstrating how they are united by the thread of the 
stories themselves. It demonstrates that policy discourse theory aids in understanding 
issues of context, knowledge, values and power, as well as many other aspects of the 
                                                         
60 Similarly, Jachtenfuchs (1996) demonstrates that ideas and interests need not be perceived as 
competing theories of policy, since ideas contribute to frames and worldviews (that can be considered 
analogous to discourses in this sense), which then define and shape interests. Furthermore, discourse 
approaches to public policy support a structuration argument (Giddens, 1984, 1990) whereby 
“structure and agency continuously and recursively interact” (Keeley & Scoones, 1999, p28). 
61 Here, I adopt a Foucaultian concept of discourses as a structuring, somewhat rigid and constraining 
framework. In Chapter 6 I will return to the important idea that discourses and storylines are also 
flexible and reflexive (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003). Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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case study already considered through the lens of impact assessment literature in 
Chapter 4. In particular, I re-examine the issue of framing (‘asking the right 
question’) in light of policy discourses.  
5.4.1 Deriving the stories of Gorgon 
There is little methodological rigour in identifying the stories of Gorgon, since “[a] 
discursive practices approach, with its resistance to unidirectional causal 
explanations, offers little in the way of methodological tidiness” (Litfin, 1994, p7). 
Even a perhaps over-simplified model of the discourses and storylines that entwined 
the Gorgon process, however, can illuminate aspects of the interplay between 
knowledge, values, power and institutions, and between Gorgon and its broader 
social and political context, in a way that has not been possible through the lens of 
rationality rife within the theory and literature of impact assessment. 
The competing discourses framing the Gorgon debate were alluded to in Chapter 3. 
In very broad terms, the Gorgon debate can be considered to have been divided 
along ‘pro-development’ versus ‘green’ lines. The essential difference between the 
two was that the pro-development discourse gives precedence to socio-economic 
development, while the green discourse has a higher degree of concern for 
environmental protection and conservation. The storylines constructed within each 
discourse in relation to sustainability could perhaps be articulated along the 
following lines. 
The pro-development storyline: Gorgon represents a vast and significant source of 
economic wealth to Western Australia, which is a good thing in itself and which in 
turn will deliver socio-economic benefits to the community, net conservation benefits 
and ensure the ongoing management of Barrow Island. The environmentalists are 
just being hysterical in their opposition to the proposal because any risks to 
conservation values can be managed. 
The green storyline: Barrow Island is a sacred place and its protection is a high 
societal priority. Industrial activity should not be located in such places, especially 
when alternatives are available. The risks to the unique conservation values of 
Barrow Island are too great to permit this proposal to go ahead. This applies 
especially to activity that involves exploiting non-renewable resources and Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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generating greenhouse gases. This is just one more example of big business and the 
economic agenda winning out over the environment. 
These different stories were typified in Chapter 3 by a newspaper article and a press 
statement by the Conservation Council of WA respectively.  
The former, reproduced in Box 3.2, concluded with the line:  
The economic argument is relatively simple. Whether it wins out against soft furry 
animals and prowling perenties remains very much an open question (Wilson, 2003). 
In contrast, the latter, reproduced in Box 3.3, raised concerns about the various 
environmental risks associated with the proposal, including issues of potential 
quarantine breaches and the consequent introduction of pests and weeds, and the 
contribution of the proposal to climate change, concluding: 
There are too many unanswered questions…. 
Alternatives exist.  Gorgon on Barrow is not worth the risk (Conservation Council of 
Western Australia, 2003). 
The pro-development storyline mirrors the hegemonic macro-discourse of economic 
growth and development that grips Western Australia and the Western world in 
general, while the green storyline challenges this perspective, placing less concrete 
and more value-based issues at the centre of its argument. These alternative 
viewpoints pervaded every aspect of the Gorgon assessment process and generated 
two competing ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 1995). The ‘green’ discourse coalition 
included the EPA, DoE, Conservation Commission and CALM as well as 
environmental community groups and NGOs, while the ‘pro-development’ discourse 
coalition included DoIR, the Gorgon JV, the Expert Panel, and various industry 
lobby groups
62. While there were subtle variations in their perspectives
63, members 
of each coalition broadly subscribed to one of these two storylines. 
                                                         
62 For example, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Chamber of Mines. 
63 For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, the EPA/DoE was seen as being more pragmatic and 
accepting of industrial development than the Conservation Commission/CALM,and there were 
differences in perspective between DoIR and the proponent, points I also discuss further in this 
chapter. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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5.4.2 Discourses, institutions and the bureaucracy 
As discussed previously, the Western Australian bureaucratic structure, similar to 
many others, consists of agencies that deliver essential services such as education, 
health and welfare, plus others which support various economic sectors (Healey et 
al., 2003). It applies what Thacher and Rein (2004, p463) call a ‘firewall’ model of 
dealing with competing values within the bureaucracy, in which “they distribute the 
primary responsibility for each of several conflicting values among separate 
institutions, ensuring that each value has a vigorous champion”
64. In the Gorgon 
assessment, the ‘vigorous champions’ for resource development (DoIR) and the 
environment (EPA/DoE and the Conservation Commission/CALM) respectively, 
reached a point at which their different perspectives became irreconcilable, resulting 
in the two opposing pieces of advice being presented to Cabinet (Allen Consulting 
Group, 2003; Conservation Commission of Western Australia, 2003; Environmental 
Protection Authority, 2003)
65. The ‘firewall’ thus became an insurmountable barrier 
between the bureaucratic components of the competing discourse coalitions. 
Following the argument that “discourses can become embodied in institutions” 
(Dryzek, 1997, p19) or that institutions can be conceptualised as ‘frames frozen in 
time’ (Jachtenfuchs, 1996), it can be argued in the most simple terms that these two 
groups embody the pro-development and green storylines respectively. As Dryzek 
(1997, p19) observes, “When this happens, discourses constitute the informal 
understandings that provide the context for social interaction, on a par with formal 
institutional rules” and these shared norms and perceptions of the world become 
more important than formal knowledge in shaping the organisation (Berger, Flynn, 
Hines, & Johns, 2001; Dovers, 2001; Dryzek, 2004).  
This is not to say that DoIR as an organisation has no concern for the environment, 
or that the EPA disregards economic realities. As previously discussed (in Chapter 
3), DoIR attempted throughout the process, arguably until the final preparation of 
                                                         
64 Boggs (1993, p30) recalls Senator Jackson’s observation upon the introduction of NEPA in the 
United States that “today’s institutional reality – numerous agencies governing different natural 
resources with fractionated, separate policies – still reflects our early national goals of resource 
exploitation, economic development, and conquest”. 
65 The EPA Bulletin and the Conservation Commission advice were strongly aligned in opposition to 
the development. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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advice to Cabinet, to play ‘the honest broker’
66. The agency also considered itself 
well-equipped to take a ‘broader, almost societal view’
67 of resource development 
projects that took into consideration environmental and social, as well as economic 
and state development issues. This assertion was, however, greeted with scepticism 
by the environmental agencies, who could not find evidence that DoIR was anything 
but ‘unashamedly pro-development’
68.  
In the same way that DoIR expressed concern for the environment, representatives of 
the environmental agencies were not unilaterally opposed to resource development. 
One EPA/DoE interviewee said in response to a question about the relationship 
between natural resource projects and sustainability
69: 
On the resource development front, WA is a resource-driven State; it always has been 
and always will be. We need to recognise that. The whole economy is based on resource 
development. My personal perspective on environmental management of development, is 
making sure that if we do have development, we don’t mess up the environment, that we 
do it properly from an environmental perspective, so we don’t have unreasonable 
environmental impacts, recognising that they always have some effect. So, it is entirely 
pragmatic to say that we are a resource driven state. We can either row against it or get 
involved with making sure we do it properly.  
This view, which proved generally reflective of the attitudes and behaviours of the 
EPA/DoE highlights the pragmatic approach to the relationship between industrial 
development and the environment, in contrast with the more ‘deep green’ guiding 
philosophy of the Conservation Commission/CALM. DoIR’s attitude towards 
environmental protection and the EPA/DoE’s towards resource development are 
examples of what have been called ‘precarious values’, that is, values genuinely held 
but “not firmly entrenched in an organization’s character and core commitments” 
(Thacher & Rein, 2004, p470), and are therefore not integral to the dominant 
discourses that shape the functions of the organisation.  
The influence of institutions, and particularly bureaucratic structures on policy 
processes has been recognised by the neo-institutionalists as discussed previously 
                                                         
66 Gorgon interviews – DoIR (10). 
67 Gorgon interviews – DoIR (9). 
68 Gorgon interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (6). 
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(Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Persistent divisions reflecting competing frames are of 
concern with respect to the introduction of sustainability as a policy framework, 
since “[i]t is these divisions, discourses and practices which now seem to trap 
government in modes of thinking and acting which lack the flexibility to respond to 
new ways of living” (Healey et al., 2003, p61) and 
 “despite the excitement and 
mobilizing energy released by new ways of thinking and new ways of doing things, 
the ‘mainstream’ of governance activity carries on with ‘business as usual’” (Healey 
et al., 2003, p62)
70. Despite the hope with which it began, the Gorgon experience did 
little to reconcile competing discourses, and in fact may have further damaged some 
already precarious relationships
71. 
5.4.3 Policy actors 
It is important to recognise that organisations are made up of individual actors, and 
to consider the relationship between the organisation and the actors working within it 
(Keeley & Scoones, 1999; Thacher & Rein, 2004). Although actors retain some 
degree of autonomy, their behaviour is guided to some extent by the norms and rules 
of the organisations within which they work, which are in turn shaped by their 
defining discourses. The organisation thus supplies the “political and organizational 
context in which actors interpret their self-interest” (F. Fischer, 2003a, p30). Fischer 
(2003a, p28) explains the relationships between institutions and actors operating 
within them as follows: 
It is not that institutions cause political action; rather it is their discursive practices that 
shape the behaviours of the actors who do. Supplying them with regularized rules, 
standards of assessment, and emotive commitments, institutions influence political actors 
by structuring or shaping the political and social interpretations of the problems they have 
to deal with and by limiting the choice of policy solutions that might be implemented. 
The interests of actors are still there, but they are influenced by the institutional 
structures, norms, and rules through which they are pursued. 
There were individuals within DoIR who were committed to the agency’s 
responsibility to manage a fair and equitable process and who were in some degree 
                                                         
70 As van Eeten (1999, p186) stresses, this fragmentation means that the “means needed to develop 
and implement policy on an issue, and the means to block such action, are scattered across the policy 
community, both inside and outside government”. 
71 Gorgon interviews – DoIR (9). Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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of conflict at times with those who remained committed to the agency’s advocacy 
role of behalf of industrial clients. Then later in the process it was suggested that the 
more overt use of power by DoIR and the subsequent marginalisation of the 
environmental agencies was caused by a change of project manager within DoIR. 
These examples illustrate the variability of actor behaviour within an organisation, 
even though all of these actors were guided by the pro-development discourse. In the 
first case, two slightly different storylines can be discerned: the first argues that ‘the 
best way we can help our client is to run a squeaky clean process’, while the second 
says that ‘we have two agencies lobbying for the environment, so it is our role and 
duty to advocate for our client’
72. The relative merits of these two storylines were 
debated several times within DoIR during the Gorgon process, as discussed 
previously (see Chapter 3). 
However, the interaction between structure and agency works both ways, and the 
behaviour of actors influences and shapes discourses and institutions as much as the 
other way around. This is Giddens’ (1984)  ‘Theory of Structuration’, which has 
been adopted in planning theory through the work of Patsy Healey and others (see 
for example Healey, 1999; 2003). Booher and Innes (2002, p225) “share with 
Giddens (1984) the idea that agents enact structure within constraints and agency can 
gradually change structure”
73.  
5.4.4 Framing ‘the question’ 
The ‘question’ framing the Gorgon assessment was, “Are the potential impacts of 
constructing a gas processing plant on Barrow Island acceptable?” Jachtenfuchs 
(1996, p2) observes that “any definition of a problem contains ideas about the 
legitimate order of things”; that is, that the question reflects a particular discourse or 
storyline with its inherent beliefs, values, and assumptions about the way things 
work and the way they should work
74. As discussed previously, this question has its 
roots in the EIA process in Western Australia which, in common with jurisdictions 
around the world, largely reflects the pro-development storyline that ‘industrial 
                                                         
72 Gorgon interviews – DoIR (9). 
73 Booher and Innes (2002, p225) continue, “The networked patterns of action in an informational 
society, with the rapid communication and change that are the norm today, suggest that deep structure 
may change more quickly now than at other point in history”. 
74 Jachtenfuchs (1996, p29) suggests that frame competition “is the struggle between competing 
problem definitions” (see also Chapter 6). Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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development is good as long as any adverse environmental impacts can be managed 
to acceptable levels’. This storyline in turn is a reflection of the powerful global 
discourse of industrial development and economic growth. 
The question guides how an issue is defined, what options can be considered, and 
what outcomes are acceptable (F. Fischer, 2003a; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Litfin, 
1994; Rein & Schön, 1993). It is therefore an expression of discursive and 
institutional power; according to Schattschneider (1960, p68), “those who can 
determine what the debate is about run the country” (cited in Davis et al., 1988, 
p117), and similarly, “Power signifies establishing not only who may speak but also 
how they may speak” (Pellizzoni, 2001, p61). The Gorgon question not only 
excluded any real consideration of alternative locations for the development, but 
marginalised philosophical opposition to the proposal and sidelined discussions of 
important policy issues such as long-term energy strategies for Western Australia 
and the future of resource development in the state. As discussed previously it was, if 
not the wrong question, then certainly a very limiting one. 
5.4.5 Power 
As Flyvbjerg (1998a, p5) argues in the introduction to his book Rationality and 
Power, “The central question, in addition to who has power and why they have it, is 
how power is exercised”. I have previously described the authoritative power 
invested in DoIR as project managers of the Gorgon assessment process, the impact 
this had in ‘flavouring’ proceedings
75, and the perception of some that this power 
was abused
76. Furthermore, many considered that the proponent, ChevronTexaco on 
behalf of the Gorgon JV had the most power in the process, partly by virtue of its 
control over the data collection phase
77 and therefore, to some extent, over what 
information it would provide to Government
78.  
                                                         
75 Gorgon interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (6). Flyvbjerg (2002) points out that power 
determines what counts as knowledge and therefore the dominant discourse of those in power 
becomes reality. 
76 Gorgon interviews – EPA/DoE (14); Conservation Commission/CALM (6). 
77 Following on from the preceding discussion, this power was derived in part from the existing EIA 
procedures, in a reflection of the suggestion that power is the effect of the establishment of procedures 
and mobilisation of forces, rather than a prerequisite for it, and this is particularly so if the procedures 
and practices become codified (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
78 As one interviewee said, “It probably comes down partly to scoping but much more than scoping it 
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From a Foucaultian perspective it can be argued that the power maintained by DoIR 
and the proponent derives from the dominance of the pro-development discourse in 
Western Australia (Berger et al., 2001; Howitt, 1995). This power is transmitted via 
the discourse “into the fine grain of action (the practices of agency) performing 
persuasive, justificatory, co-coordinative and directive work” (Healey, 1999, p27). 
This in turn is a function of the global hegemony of the drive for economic growth 
and the discourse of the market economy, which elevates the status of business 
groups and particularly multi-national corporations to a more powerful status than 
governments (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). This discourse remained unchallenged by 
the Gorgon assessment; as Howitt (1995, p391) has observed, “The power structures 
that support project-centred developmentalism are made virtually invisible by most 
impact assessment procedures”.  
The power of this discourse underpinned the decision by Cabinet on 8
th September 
2003 to grant the proponent access to Barrow Island. Recognition of this led me and 
others to question whether any consideration was given to the extensive data set 
generated through the assessment process in making this decision. The underpinning 
rationality of the decision is apparent in the Premier’s press release of that day (see 
Chapter 3), which opens with the words, “Groundbreaking environmental benefits 
will flow to the North-West following the signing today of the State Agreement for 
the $11billion Gorgon gas development”
79. 
5.4.6 Knowledge and use of data 
Perhaps one of the most significant observations of the Gorgon process was that 
despite the hope of actors within DoIR that the ‘facts would speak for themselves’ 
and therefore that sufficient technical data would lead to a consensus position within 
the bureaucracy at least in favour of the proposal, this was not borne out. In fact the 
opposite was true: rather than moving towards consensus as the process progressed 
and more and more data was generated, the opposing sides became more and more 
                                                                                                                                                              
They’re going to put in as much as they have to in the areas they don’t want to and put in as much as 
they want to in the areas they want to”. (Gorgon interviews – EPA/DoE (14)). 
79 Media statement issued by the Premier Dr Geoff Gallop on 9
th September 2003. Available online 
URL: http://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/media/media01-05.nsf [Accessed 22nd June 2005] Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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firmly entrenched, and arguably the EPA/DoE moved closer to the ‘deep green’ 
discourse embodied by the Conservation Commission/CALM
80.  
This should have come as no surprise, however, since it has long been recognised 
that “facts and statistics are seldom sufficient to bring about changes in behaviour” 
(Majone, 1989, p39). Furthermore, beyond the confines of this example and the 
individuals involved, it is well understood that arguments about facts generally mask 
much deeper value conflicts, and much has been written on the nature of policy 
controversies (Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1996; Jasanoff, 1987; Sabatier, 1987; van 
Eeten, 1999). Rein and Schön (1993, p148) suggest that science fails to resolve 
policy disputes when the parties in the debate are operating from different ‘frames’ 
or storylines
81: 
When people disagree about a policy issue, they may be able to examine the facts of a 
situation and determine who is right; policy disagreements arise within a common frame 
and can be settled in principle by appeal to established rules. But policy controversies 
cannot be settled by recourse to facts alone, or indeed by recourse to evidence of any 
kind. Because they derive from conflicting frames, the same body of evidence can be 
used to support quite different policy positions.  
The conflicting frames or storylines of Gorgon were at the heart of the disagreements 
about the quantity and quality of the data generated through the assessment process, 
and shaped how the data were interpreted and used, as was described in another 
context by Nelkin (1975). As discussed previously, the pro-development side 
generally considered the data adequate or even excessive, in the case of the 
proponent, with the green side disputing this and pointing out gaps and deficiencies. 
                                                         
80 This was evidenced by the wording of the EPA bulletin, and specifically the use of the word 
‘principle’ which led one DoIR interviewee (9) to argue that the EPA had stepped outside of its 
mandate. The bulletin says, “Given the very high environmental and unique conservation values of 
Barrow Island, which are reflected in its status as a class A Nature Reserve, it is the view of the EPA 
that, as a matter of principle, industry should not be located on a nature reserve and specifically not on 
Barrow Island” (Environmental Protection Authority, 2003). 
81 A fundamental characteristic of such problems is that they are ‘trans-scientific’, meaning that 
although they can be defined in terms of science and draw heavily on science, the questions they raise 
cannot be answered by science, at least not within any reasonable time frame (Majone, 1989; van 
Eeten, 1999; Weinberg, 1972). Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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In this regard, CALM’s questioning of the data was perceived by the proponent to be 
a deliberate strategy to undermine the credibility of the proposal. For example
82: 
We understand that one strategy is to sow seeds of doubt in Government’s mind that this 
isn’t a good enough basis, we haven’t got all the information, you can’t make this 
decision, is, if I was in their shoes, I’d probably be saying the same thing, it’s a 
reasonable strategy for them to adopt to delay, defer etc. And so we shot ourselves in the 
foot by providing a lot of that information already, so it has weakened us. 
Perhaps more importantly, these conflicting storylines shaped how the data was 
filtered and interpreted by each side of the debate, with the result that ‘experts’ and 
‘counter-experts’ (Litfin, 1994) reached entirely different conclusions upon detailed 
examination of the issue from their different perspectives. ‘Factual’ or descriptive 
data is given meaning by the interior lens of belief system through which it is viewed 
(van Eeten, 1999) and hence “political values and scientific facts become difficult to 
distinguish” (Litfin, 1994, p35). In the words of Rein and Schön (1993, p145), 
“What can possibly be the basis for resolving conflicts of frames when the frames 
themselves determine what counts as evidence and how the evidence is 
interpreted?”
83  
As already observed, adding to the data set did not result in a movement towards 
consensus, and the assessment degenerated into a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. In the words 
of van Eeten (1999, p187):   
This is what it all adds up to: a policy community is confronted with conflicting 
arguments, each ‘true’ on their own terms to the exclusion of the other, each supported by 
a part of the community, and each pointing in a different direction for policy action. The 
potential for fruitful deliberation, analysis and learning is seriously reduced because of 
the incommensurability of the arguments. Talking to each other gives way to talking past 
each other, and institutional deadlock is the answer. 
                                                         
82 Gorgon interviews – ChevronTexaco (5). This reflects Nelkin’s (1975) observation that those 
opposing a decision need not muster equal evidence, and that casting doubt may be sufficient. 
83 A similar conclusion was also reached by Litfin (1994, p6) in her analysis of the Montreal Protocol, 
“It became increasingly evident that ‘knowledge’ was not simply a body of concrete and objective 
facts but that accepted knowledge was deeply implicated in questions of framing and interpretations 
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The Gorgon experience also supports Nelkin’s (1975, p51) view that “while expert 
advice can help to clarify technical constraints, it is also likely to increase conflict” 
and Bradbury and Rayner’s (2002, p20) observation that: 
the basis for disagreement on policy issues involving high decision stakes and a high 
degree of uncertainty is social rather than technical and that a focus on improved 
technical or descriptive analysis serves to polarize rather than resolve controversy.  
The question of quarantine management on Barrow Island was the focus of much of 
the controversy. One DoIR interviewee reflected “it has ended up being a passionate 
polarisation” and “I think that quarantine risk became a tool to reinforce the 
passion”
84. Another particularly controversial topic was the proponent’s alternatives 
sites analysis, which was reviewed under a confidentiality agreement by the Expert 
Panel on behalf of DoIR. There was a perception, however, that the credibility of the 
consultants comprising the Expert Panel was limited, not through any lack of 
professionalism, but simply because by virtue of their backgrounds in the oil and gas 
industry, the individuals were bound to be supportive of the proposal and to endorse 
the pro-development discourse in general
85. There was, therefore, reluctance on the 
part of others to accept the conclusion of the review, which supported the 
proponent’s ‘Barrow or nothing’ position
86. This is an example of Nelkin’s (1975, 
p51-52) assertion that “the extent to which technical advice is accepted depends less 
on its validity and the competence of the expert than on the extent to which it 
reinforces existing positions”, emphasising the robustness  of the existing positions 
and the discourses and storylines upon which they were founded
87.  
Given the lack of success in reaching consensus through consideration of technical 
data
88, I raised the question in the interviews as to whether this data could have been 
dispensed with altogether and whether the decision could have been made on purely 
philosophical, or at least purely political, grounds. One interviewee responded as 
                                                         
84 Interviews – DoIR (9). 
85 Gorgon interviews – Conservation Commission/CALM (6). 
86 As Weiss (1977, p543) has pointed out in relation to how data is used in political processes, 
“(v)alues dissensus…precludes use”. 
87 Sabatier (1987; 1993) makes a similar point in relation to the resilience of ‘core beliefs’. 
88 Reflecting Boggs’ (1993, p32) point that, “Knowledge produced under adversarial regimes tends to 
lose value as fact or science, because players regard it instrumentally as a tool for their own interests”. Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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follows, reflecting on the role that information can play or appear to play, in debates 
that are fundamentally about values
89: 
Other than with respect to a handful of issues, I don’t think we are able to do that overtly, 
even if that’s what we’re doing covertly. The thought that popped into my mind is 
attitudes to the death penalty, but even those are sometimes dressed up in technical 
considerations, like what if we get it wrong? Although I suspect most people come at it in 
a strictly moral sense. I suspect that even if you could shove a Cabinet in a room and get 
a philosophical decision they would express it in some other way. So I don’t think we are 
comfortable with philosophical decisions expressed as such. The Wilderness Society’s 
Tasmanian campaign did have that component to it, but they also had the arguments and 
economics because they clearly thought they didn’t want to take the risk that the 
philosophical one would be sufficient. 
Reflecting further on the relationship between interpretive, or interior, and 
descriptive, or exterior data, another significant feature of the Gorgon assessment 
was that all data generated fell into the second category. Even the social analysis was 
limited to a descriptive approach mirroring a natural sciences methodology and 
involving “the development and analysis of mass-balance descriptions of social 
systems that use inventories and accounting systems for the stocks and flows of 
people, money, raw materials, pollutants and so on” (Bradbury & Rayner, 2002, 
p17). As Bradbury and Rayner (2002, p24-25) note: 
A frequent criticism of descriptive analyses is that they fail to address the meaning of 
proposed policies to affected groups. As a result, resolution of the policy problem 
becomes more difficult: opponents continuously raise new technical issues that cannot be 
answered definitively and people’s perception that no-one is responsible for addressing 
the ethical and social issues of concern to them exacerbates the overall level of concern 
and the difficulty of implementing policy. The research also shows the existence of 
differing cultures or rationalities – including those of the experts and implementing 
agencies – that typically underlie the policy debates, and the need to address these 
differences by engaging all the participants in constructive, civilised debate. 
I return to the matter of incorporating interpretive knowledge in assessment 
processes in Chapter 6. 
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5.5  Conclusion 
I commenced this chapter by reflecting on the failure of the ‘information provision’ 
model of EIA, upon which the Gorgon assessment process was based, to engage 
meaningfully with its socio-political context or to recognise the interplay between 
knowledge, values and power in the policy process. I followed the lead of others in 
turning to policy theory in search for a conceptual framework through which these 
dimensions of the Gorgon process could be usefully explored. 
A four-quadrant heuristic from integral theory, which acknowledges the tensions and 
interactions between the exterior and interior, and individual and collective 
dimensions of reality, provided a framework within which the various dimensions of 
the ‘policy universe’ could be located and reconciled. Of particular relevance to 
policy studies are science and behaviour (exterior individual), institutions and 
processes (exterior collective), and meanings, values and ethics (interior collective), 
and the theoretical contributions that place these at the centre of their analysis. I 
found that the post-empiricist notion of policy discourse and storylines is a 
particularly useful construct that can be used to explain the relationships between 
these different elements of the ‘policy universe’ and to demonstrate the contribution 
made by the different theories. A deconstruction of the two primary and competing 
storylines of the Gorgon assessment, focused by an integral perspective, provided the 
basis for my contextual exploration of the relationships between knowledge, values, 
institutions and power in the Gorgon assessment. 
The crisis of confidence in impact assessment, generated by the resilience of the 
‘information provision’ model coupled with increasing awareness of its limitations, 
has led impact assessment theorists in several directions, of which policy theory is 
only one. For example, new impact assessment processes are gradually evolving that 
place a greater emphasis on inclusive and collaborative approaches to decision-
making and which consequently assign quite different roles to science and 
knowledge (Cashmore, 2004; Owens et al., 2003). Others have argued that impact 
assessment processes, even in their current form, may influence decision-making in 
ways that extend well beyond the ‘fixed decision point’ upon which attention is 
normally focused (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999). Along these lines is it increasingly 
argued that impact assessment is best conceptualised as a process of learning. I take Chapter 5: Sustainability assessment in context 
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up this point in Chapter 6, where I continue the task of theory building for 
sustainability assessment by engaging with the emerging concept of policy learning 
in the context of my second case study, the South West Yarragadee (SWY) 
sustainability assessment.Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Chapter 6: Policy learning through the South West 
Yarragadee assessment 
6.1  Introduction 
The Gorgon assessment was the first attempt by the Western Australian Government 
to undertake a sustainability assessment of a complex and strategic project. Although 
a brave attempt, it was not a particularly illustrious start as the discussion of the 
preceding chapters demonstrates. The Gorgon assessment was the backdrop against 
which the sustainability evaluation of the South West Yarragadee (SWY) water 
supply development commenced in 2004. Although the organisations and individuals 
involved were not the same, the Gorgon process had been watched with considerable 
interest by the whole Western Australian policy community engaged with the 
sustainability agenda
1. The general feeling was that in this second trial the 
sustainability assessment process must overcome as many of the observed limitations 
of the Gorgon process as possible; in short, the sentiment expressed was ‘we don’t 
want to do another Gorgon’. This was, of course, an entirely appropriate response 
within a ‘learning by doing’ framework where the aim is to reflect upon and learn 
from past experiences.  
In the story of learning by doing sustainability assessment in Western Australia, the 
lessons of Gorgon thus provided the starting point for the development of a suitable 
process by which the sustainability of the SWY water supply proposal could be 
assessed, and so the methodology I apply here is more deductive than was the case in 
my analysis of the Gorgon process. My first aim in this chapter, therefore, is to use 
the conclusions of Chapter 4, which related primarily to issues of process and 
institutional and policy context, to evaluate the extent to which the developers of the 
SWY process learnt from Gorgon and to refine the lessons learnt
2.  
As the SWY assessment process evolved, however, it became clear that not only had 
lessons been learnt from the earlier Gorgon experience, but entirely new challenges, 
and therefore learning opportunities, were arising on an almost daily basis. Perhaps 
                                                         
1 I use this term following Kingdon (1995). 
2 Note that the structured analysis to follow may give the impression of a far more formal and 
systematic piece of action research than was actually the case. My own role in the development of the 
SWY assessment process was peripheral at best, since I did not become actively involved until early 
in 2005 when much of the work had already been done, and my analysis of the Gorgon assessment 
(Chapter 4) was not complete at this time. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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of the greatest interest and cause for excitement was the realisation that the 
sustainability assessment process had demonstrably catalysed forms of learning that 
extended well beyond merely the mechanics of ‘how to do’ sustainability assessment 
and into the stories and assumptions that framed the proposal itself. Recalling the 
language of Chapter 5, the unfolding SWY experience demonstrated that learning in 
impact assessment can facilitate 'interior', as well as 'exterior' forms of learning, 
making this a significant point of difference between the Gorgon and the SWY 
assessment processes.  
In this chapter I analyse the SWY sustainability assessment as a process of policy 
learning. The potential of various forms of impact assessment as learning processes 
has been noted by contributors to the impact assessment literature who have drawn 
on policy theory in making their arguments (Bina & Wallington, 2004; Diduck & 
Mitchell, 2003; Owens et al., 2003; Sánchez-Triana & Ortolano, 2001; Scrase & 
Sheate, 2002)
3. In the analysis, I build upon the work of my predecessors by 
retaining the heuristic introduced in the previous chapter as my conceptual 
framework, and discussing the exterior and interior, individual and collective 
dimensions of learning with the context of sustainability assessment.   
6.2  Policy learning and the South West Yarragadee
4 
The SWY sustainability assessment is still in progress at the time of writing in 
October 2006. It has proved a rich and complex case study of which much can and 
should be written. My specific interest, however, was in distinguishing the forms of 
learning that occurred within and as a result of the sustainability assessment process, 
with the aim of contributing to theory-building for sustainability assessment. 
Accordingly, I directed my data gathering efforts, particularly my interview 
questions, along these lines (see Appendix A). 
                                                         
3 Although the learning potential of impact assessment has long been recognised, in practice this 
purpose tends to be relegated to a supporting role in the information provision model. As Caldwell 
(1989, p10) has noted, “Development of EIA and its associated analytic techniques demonstrates a 
capacity for technical learning and, beyond that, for social learning. But this capability fails to achieve 
its purpose if the qualitative purposes for which EIA was invented are restricted to the exposure of 
environmentally bad proposals”. While EIA has often been seen as a tool of cognitive, technical 
forms of learning (Glasbergen, 1996), it is increasingly observed that it can extend well beyond such a 
limited role. Van der Knaap (1995, p190) explicitly recognises normative dimensions when he defines 
policy-orientated learning as “the processes in which policy actors strive to improve and perfect 
public policy and its underlying normative assumptions through the detection and correction of 
perceived imperfections”. 
4 This section draws heavily from Pope (2006a) and Pope and Grace (2006). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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6.2.1 Introducing the South West Yarragadee case study 
The sustainability assessment of the South West Yarragadee water supply 
development was briefly introduced in Chapter 1. The proponent is the Water 
Corporation of Western Australia
5, which is seeking approval to extract 45 GL/yr of 
groundwater from the Yarragadee Formation aquifers in the South West of Western 
Australia, for delivery to the Integrated Water Supply Scheme (IWSS) that services 
Perth
6. The proposal includes up to ten production bores; a plant to treat the water for 
iron, manganese and dissolved carbon dioxide; borehead pipelines and a connecting 
trunk main (Strategen, 2006b). 
The SWY has been considered an IWSS water supply option for many years, and 
was included in the 1995 study Perth’s Water Future (Water Authority of Western 
Australia, 1995). At that time, however, the effects of climate change in drastically 
reducing rainfall and run-off into the dams had not been realised, and it was 
estimated that the SWY would not be required until after 2021. In the face of water 
shortages and consequent political and public pressure, the Water Corporation has 
adopted a ‘security through diversity’ strategy, which calls for the simultaneous 
progression of a number of water supply options. These include seawater 
desalination, wastewater recycling (including through aquifer recharge), other 
groundwater supplies, water trading, and water conservation. It is in this context that 
the sustainability assessment of the SWY proposal has been conducted. The Water 
Corporation’s position is summarised in the proposal documentation, entitled The 
South West Yarragadee water supply development: Sustainability 
evaluation/Environmental Review and Management Programme (ERMP) (Strategen, 
2006b, p1-10): 
Water supply sources should not be considered as competing or alternative options where 
the selection of a ‘preferred option’ implies rejection of the other options. For example, 
                                                         
5 The Water Corporation is mandated by the Water Services Licensing Act 1995 to provide water 
services to most locations within Western Australia (two notable exceptions are Busselton and 
Bunbury, both of which fall within the South West – see footnote 19). The Corporation employs 2000 
people and generates approximately A$1.2 billion in revenue per year (Strategen, 2006b).  
6 The IWSS is described in the SWY Sustainability Evaluation/ERMP (Strategen, 2006b, p1-3), “The 
Integrated Water Supply System (IWSS) is the integrated combination of surface and groundwater 
sources and their distribution system that services Perth, Pinjarra, Mandurah, Harvey, Waroona and 
the Goldfields and Agricultural Water Supply. Sources supplying this system currently extend as far 
south as the Harris Dam, and through this, the system is connected to the Great Southern Towns 
Water Scheme”. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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while the South West Yarragadee water supply development and a second desalination 
plant might be seen as competing alternatives, the selection of one as the preferred 
alternative does not mean that the other is rejected and will, therefore, never be built. 
Sustainable and viable water sources to meet a continually increasing demand base 
should be only considered as being competitive (or as alternative options) in terms of 
timing. The fundamental question to be considered in terms of whether a source should 
be developed (included in a source development plan) is not whether there are other 
better alternatives, but rather, whether the source can be developed sustainably or not. If 
it can be developed, the timing is a question for the planning process to consider in terms 
of demand, economics and practicalities. 
The SWY proposal is controversial because of its potential environmental impacts 
and because of the perception within the South West region that local water is being 
misappropriated for the benefit of the city. There is apprehension within the South 
West community that future economic opportunities may be limited by a lack of 
available water available in the region, a sentiment articulated throughout the 
assessment as ‘futures foregone’. The State Water Strategy (Government of Western 
Australia, 2003a) permits the inter-regional transfer of water
7, as long as the 
‘reasonable regional needs’ of the community from whence the water is taken are 
met, but the concept of ‘reasonable regional needs’ was ambiguous at the time of the 
SWY assessment, and the community has found little comfort in it
8.  
The SWY sustainability assessment was different from that of Gorgon in some 
important ways. Firstly, it related to a public project rather than a private one, since 
the proponent, the Water Corporation of Western Australia is a wholly-owned 
Government enterprise. Secondly the assessment was conducted as part of the 
process of developing the final proposal, that is, it was an ‘internal’ assessment, 
conducted by consultants on behalf of the Water Corporation, rather than an 
‘external’ assessment by Government regulators
9. The Water Corporation 
                                                         
7 There is a long history of inter-regional water transfers in Western Australia. The Perth to 
Kalgoorlie pipeline constructed by engineer C.Y. O’Connor in 1901 to provide water to the goldfields 
is an important part of the history and mythology of development in the State. 
8 One interviewee pointed out with respect to ‘reasonable regional needs’ that “all three terms are 
uncertain. What are the needs? We better establish what they are. What’s the region? As far as people 
in the south west are concerned, that’s anything south of Mandurah. And what’s reasonable?” (SWY 
interviews – Project Team (2)). 
9 The SWY documentation (Strategen, 2006a) distinguishes between the ‘sustainability evaluation’, 
conducted by the proponent in the process of finalising the proposal, and the subsequent 
‘sustainability assessment’ conducted by the regulators as part of the project approvals process (see Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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determined that a sustainability assessment was the most appropriate framework for 
the finalisation and assessment of the SWY proposal by virtue of the complexity of 
the issues it encompassed
10, its controversial nature given opposition from the 
communities of the South West, and the ongoing commitment of the Water 
Corporation to sustainability
11. 
The SWY proposal was originally conceived as a joint project between The Water 
Corporation and the Waters and Rivers Commission (WRC). Relationships between 
these two organisations have been somewhat uneasy since they were separated out 
from the old Water Authority of Western Australia through the 1995 corporatisation 
process. As the service provider, the Water Corporation retained most of the 
resources and political power, while the WRC has been perceived as being under-
resourced and lacking in capacity to fulfil the requirements of its Act. This situation 
has no doubt contributed to the “shocking relationship”
12 between the two 
organisations that has prevailed throughout the SWY process. One member of the 
Project Team explained
13:  
I am not sure what happened in their organisation, but they decided after a little over a 
year, that they would hand the baton to us. So they were stepping back and giving it to us 
to run with, so that wasn’t a good start. There was already…some conflict between us 
and them because the staff in the department probably viewed [the transfer of proponent 
responsibility to the Water Corporation] as a reflection on them [and a perception] that 
they couldn’t deliver
14.  
                                                                                                                                                              
also Chapter 1).The sustainability evaluation commenced when the proposal was still in a conceptual 
stage, although a considerable amount of work had already been done and it would be fair to say that 
the proponent had some strong ideas about how the development should proceed before the 
assessment commenced. Clearly Gorgon demonstrated the limitations of commencing an assessment 
process too late in the process when key decisions had already been made, and SWY sought to 
address this to some extent, both as a result of learning from Gorgon and because, as a public utility, 
the Water Corporation arguably had a greater responsibility to engage the wider community in 
decision-making than did the private proponents of Gorgon, particularly with respect to high profile 
and controversial proposals such as the SWY.  
10 These included “strategic considerations like inter-basin transfer; climate was no doubt going to get 
raised; competition; regional rights and all that kind of stuff” (SWY interviews – Project Team (2)). 
11 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
12 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
13 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
14 There was a point in the process where the EPA argued that the proposal to be assessed should not 
be the Water Corporation’s project proposal, but rather a more strategic water management plan for 
the region that would be developed by the WRC, but the idea was not pursued. The decision to assess 
the project proposal does present certain challenges; in the words of one Project Team interviewee, 
“The problem is, it is all the other users that are going to come on board in the next twenty years Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Under this scenario the SWY proposal has two major regulators: the WRC for water 
licensing under the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914, and the EPA operating 
under the EIA provisions of the Environmental Protection Act 1986
15. The two 
regulatory bodies have partially overlapping mandates since each falls within the 
portfolio of the Minister for the Environment. Although the WRC theoretically has a 
greater ability than the EPA to consider social and economic implications of water 
allocation decisions under its legislation, in practice it has limited capacities in these 
areas
16.  
The SWY process designers attempted to overcome this perceived lack of statutory 
abd institutional support by including in the institutional structure a Sustainability 
Panel
17, which was responsible for providing integrated sustainability advice to the 
proponent at various points in the process as well as to elected Government at the 
conclusion of the process. The innovation of the Panel proved an institutional 
enhancement, but also presented certain challenges that I discuss later. In practice, 
the final decision as to the acceptability of the proposal as presented in the 
Sustainability Evaluation Report will be made by the Minister or Cabinet based upon 
advice from the EPA, WRC and the Sustainability Panel.  
Although the SWY sustainability assessment has been categorised as ‘internal’ by 
virtue of its role in refining and enhancing the project proposal, its ultimate 
                                                                                                                                                              
while our proposal is still going. What the EPA wants to know is: ‘How is the [WRC] going to 
manage all the other users?’ They are probably confident that we can manage our impacts” (SWY 
interviews – Project Team (2)). 
15 A water removal permit from the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) is 
also required due to the location of bores within National Parks. 
16 The proposal must also meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), under which it has been classed as a ‘controlled 
action’ by virtue of its proximity to wetlands of international significance. 
17 The SWY Sustainability evaluation/ERMP describes the role of the Panel as follows (Strategen, 
2006b, preamble), “A Sustainability Panel has been established under the auspices of the 
Government’s State Water Strategy as an independent body to provide advice to the Government and, 
as appropriate, to decision-making authorities at various stages of the sustainability assessment 
process. The Sustainability Panel will report to Government through the State Water Council and 
Cabinet. The Sustainability Panel provides transparent and independent advice on the proposal and 
provides a mechanism for integrated evaluation of social, economic and environmental factors. In 
preparing its advice, the Panel will assess the Sustainability Evaluation and will consider all the public 
submissions made during the 12-week public comment period, together with the Water Corporation 
response to those submissions, as well as the EPA report and recommendations. All Sustainability 
Panel advice is made publicly available. The Sustainability Panel may advise on all sustainability 
factors. Such advice is separate and additional to formal State or Commonwealth agency assessment 
procedures. The Sustainability Panel will maintain confidentiality on the authorship of all individual 
public submissions and on any organisation submissions that request such confidentiality”. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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conclusion remains the external regulatory approvals process. As developers and 
coordinators of the sustainability assessment process, this left the Water Corporation 
and its consultants (Strategen) with the unenviable and perhaps unrealistic task of 
‘managing’, or at least attempting to influence, the various regulators within the 
overall process. The analogy was drawn to “a pawn, surrounded by bigger pieces”
18. 
The many institutional challenges of the SWY assessment are discussed in detail in 
Section 6.3.3
19. 
Both the Gorgon and the SWY processes were overseen by a Project Team. In the 
case of Gorgon, this was the SIAC Reference Group consisting of officers from 
relevant government agencies and regulatory bodies, while SWY was coordinated by 
a team led by the Water Corporation, Strategen and the sub-consultants. The 
difference in membership reflects the stage of decision-making at which the 
sustainability assessment was conducted and in turn had important implications for 
the process. Whereas the Gorgon Reference Group included members of the 
competing discourse coalitions, members of the SWY team were broadly ‘on the 
same side’, that is they shared the aim of developing the best possible, most 
sustainable SWY proposal.  
The South West Yarragadee water supply development: Sustainability 
evaluation/Environmental Review and Management Programme (ERMP) (Strategen, 
2006a, 2006b, 2006c) was released for public comment in February 2006 for a 
period of three months. At the time of writing in October 2006, the proponent is 
preparing responses to these submissions and the Sustainability Panel is in the 
process of preparing its advice to Government. 
                                                         
18 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
19 The situation was further complicated for the Water Corporation by the presence of two local water 
authorities within the South West region, Aqwest in Bunbury and the Busselton Water Authority. 
These organisations have existed for approximately 100 years and their jurisdictions have never been 
within the mandate of the Water Corporation or its predecessors. Consequently there has traditionally 
been an uneasy relationship between the Corporation and the two smaller organisations, which was 
exacerbated by the SWY proposal. One interviewee spoke of “a fairly indifferent relationship between 
the two local urban water suppliers at Bunbury and Busselton and the Water Corporation and an 
unwillingness of the two to share any infrastructure”, noting that “if there had been a different 
relationship, then logically you would have had some degree of interconnection between the 
infrastructure that was being built and those existing, to improvise” (SWY interviews – Project Team 
(3)).  Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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6.2.2 A personal experience 
My involvement in the SWY assessment commenced in July 2004 when the Director 
of Strategen, consultants to the Water Corporation, approached me to ask if I would 
be interested in playing an advisory role to the Project Team on matters relating to 
sustainability assessment processes
20. My consulting role in the SWY process was 
quite informal and consisted mainly of attending meetings and workshops and 
contributing to the discussions that determined how the sustainability assessment 
process should be managed. This included several meetings of the Sustainability 
Panel, where I variously represented the Sustainability Policy Unit (SPU) of the 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC), the Water Corporation and Strategen, 
and myself as a researcher.  
One contribution I was able to make came about through my friendship and 
professional association with the Water Corporation’s sustainability manager, who 
asked me, in August 2004
21, to assist her in reviewing a draft of the SWY scoping 
report. At the same time, she was assisting me in my role in DPC in planning for a 
workshop on sustainability assessment, which was held in September 2004 (refer to 
Chapter 1). Through our ongoing discussions we had both become convinced that 
‘asking the right question’ was a cornerstone of effective sustainability assessment, 
and it was not clear to us what question was being asked of the SWY assessment. In 
response to our concerns, the Project Team developed a diagram representing the 
SWY assessment process as a cycle (see Figure 6.1). Other points of discussion, to 
which I contributed were offsets for potential negative impacts and how they might 
be managed, the meaning of ‘integration’ in sustainability assessment, the criteria for 
                                                         
20 My involvement commenced with a meeting at the Strategen offices on 19 July 2004 with the 
company director. Although we had not met in person prior to this, he had recently undertaken work 
with the DoIR on the implementation of the recommendations of the Keating Review of the project 
approvals system (Government of Western Australia, 2002b), which I discussed in Chapter 1 and had 
become aware of my role there, particularly my contribution to the Gorgon retrospective review 
process, as well as of my work with the Water Corporation. I was also well known to the Water 
Corporation; having commenced my engineering career with the organisation in 1989. I had also 
undertaken a number of consulting contracts there from 2000-2004 in the areas of environmental 
management and sustainability. 
21 This meeting was held at The Water Corporation on 10 August 2004. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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an acceptable proposal within a sustainability context, and how trade-offs could be 
evaluated for acceptability
22.  
My particular research interest was in the SWY as a learning process, and so I turn at 
this point to briefly review the growing body of literature on ‘policy learning’. I then 
draw on this literature to describe the different forms of learning that can be 
discerned from the SWY experience.  
6.2.3 Introduction to policy learning 
Most commentators agree that the term ‘policy learning’ was first coined by Hugh 
Heclo in his 1974 book Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. Heclo defined 
policy learning as “a relatively enduring alteration in behaviour that results from 
experience” (Heclo, 1974, p306), a definition consistent with the idea of ‘learning by 
doing’. Since Heclo, the term has been adopted by a range of researchers and policy 
practitioners all proposing slight variations of Heclo’s theme. The uniting concept in 
the literature, however, is the recognition that learning in its various forms, and 
particularly the knowledge acquired through learning processes, has a role to play in 
the policy process
23.  
Policy learning theory accepts that policy analysis and impact assessment processes 
cannot be accurately described as an objective process of information provision, and 
hence knowledge and information are not the ‘answer’ to policy questions but both 
inputs to and results of learning processes
24. At the same time it acknowledges the 
counter position that policy making is best described as a power struggle and 
strategic manoeuvring between competing interests (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2004), 
that is, the ‘group theories’ of policy discussed in Chapter 5. Thus policy learning 
and power plays are viewed as two components of the complex process of 
developing public policy. The particular contribution of learning in this context was 
eloquently expressed by Heclo (1974, p304) himself: 
                                                         
22 In addition, I drafted certain sections of the Sustainability Evaluation/ERMP, specifically Chapter 1 
Section 1.2 ‘What is a sustainability assessment?’, Chapter 3 Section 1.2 ‘International experience in 
sustainability assessment of major projects’; and Chapter 6 Sections 3.1 – 3.3 relating to the 
application of trade-off rules to the proposal. 
23 Owens and Rayner (1999) refer to this as the ‘knowledge perspective of policy making’. 
24 Learning has been equated with incrementalism in relation to organisational strategic planning, and 
contrasted with the rational-comprehensive model (Brews & Hunt, 1999). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Politics finds its sources not only in power but also uncertainty – men collectively 
wondering what to do…Governments not only ‘power’… they also 
puzzle…Policymaking is a kind of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf….Much 
political action has constituted a process of social learning expressed through policy. 
Heclo’s original definition embodies two important points: firstly that learning must 
be accompanied by change, and secondly that learning arises from experience. Both 
of these may be, and have been, disputed, as the contours of policy learning have 
been further explored (see for example Huber, 1991; Waddell, 2005). The evolving 
body of policy learning literature was reviewed by Bennett and Howlett (1992) in 
another important and much-cited work. They recognised that different contributors 
to the literature had sometimes significantly different interpretations of the core 
concepts, and they endeavoured to expose and describe these differences by 
considering the various descriptions of policy learning processes in the context of 
three questions: Who learns, what do they learn and what are the effects of this 
learning on policy itself?
25 These questions remain useful as a starting point in 
discussions, and I address them in the course of my analysis. 
Most contributors to the literature recognise different forms of policy learning, 
sometimes distinguishing between technical and conceptual learning, social and 
cognitive learning, experience-based and future-orientated learning, or individual 
and collective learning (see for example Fiorino, 2001; Glasbergen, 1996; Waddell, 
2005). Some refer to first-, second- and third-order learning (Hall, 1993; Scrase & 
Sheate, 2002; Waddell, 2005); while others attempt to translate Argyris and Schön’s 
(Argyris, 1999; 1996) single-loop, double-loop and triple-loop learning from an 
organisational to a public policy context
26. It is often argued that these forms of 
learning may evolve into each other (Caldwell, 1989; Fiorino, 1999). 
Although the point is well made that different forms of learning play a role in policy-
making generally and in assessment more specifically, these terms are not used 
consistently throughout the literature. To avoid this complication, I start from a 
                                                         
25 Similarly, Kemp and Weehuizen (2004) suggest that policy learning research should identify the 
form of learning taking place, what is being learnt, how it is being learnt, and should also consider a 
learning explanation for policy change alongside other explanations. 
26 Single-loop learning involves the detection of errors and an acceptance of new knowledge that may 
be utilised in the pursuit of set objectives, while double-loop learning involves the transformation of 
values and assumptions (Poncelet, 2001). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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different point and use the four-quadrant heuristic introduced in Chapter 5 to guide 
my analysis. This model, derived from integral theory (Wilber, 2000), recognises the 
epistemological distinctions between the exterior and interior, and between the 
individual and the collective dimensions of learning, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
6.3  Exterior learning in the South West Yarragadee 
Exterior learning, also termed ‘technical learning’ (Fiorino, 2001; Glasbergen, 1996) 
or ‘single-loop learning’, can be either individual or collective. The former includes 
the acquisition of scientific knowledge, while the latter develops institutional and 
process-orientated knowledge of the type that was the subject of the discussion in 
Chapter 4 of learning from Gorgon. In this section, I build upon the lessons of 
Gorgon through an analysis of exterior learning in the SWY case study. 
6.3.1 Impact-oriented learning 
It is well recognised (see Chapter 5) that real-life policy decisions are more complex 
than the ‘information provision’ model would suggest; however, technical learning 
about impacts, or ‘learning to know’ (Nicolescu, 1997), by which knowledge about 
causes and effects is gained through the application of scientific methods, remains 
fundamental to the practice of impact assessment. This form of learning can occur in 
relation to an individual decision, and over time, where decision-makers learn about 
actual impacts of past decisions through monitoring and cumulative effects 
assessments. The learners may be the scientists carrying out the studies, the impact 
assessment practitioners or policy analysts who process it, or members of the broader 
community who are involved through community engagement and consultation 
processes (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003). 
In the SWY case, a number of scientific and technical studies were conducted that 
greatly enhanced the understanding of the hydrogeology of the region (Strategen, 
2006c) and which generated information used to modify technical aspects of the 
proposal such as the location of bores
27. The data and the models from which they 
were derived are now available to aid in the future management of the aquifer. The 
knowledge gained through the scientific investigations also helped to shape the 
views of members of the Sustainability Panel; in the words of one, “They gave me 
                                                         
27 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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greater comfort about the fact that probably it wouldn’t do damage and if it would do 
damage, it could be identified early enough so the damage could be stopped”
28. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the juxtaposition of the data emerging from the 
various studies enabled the much sought-after and often elusive ‘integration’, a point 
I explore in Section 6.3.2. 
The point was also made several times that in the unexplored vastness of Western 
Australia impact assessment processes are often the means by which technical and 
ecological knowledge is gained. One interviewee said
29: 
We know a lot more about Western Australia now because we have had development 
here that has paid for an environmental assessment to discover what the environmental 
possibilities are. This is a classic case - $10 million worth of studies. They now have a 
much better model of Yarragadee and how it works”.  
Another acknowledged this but argued that this situation is often problematic from 
the perspective of the project proponent
30: 
That means that part of the problem of doing resource business in [Western Australia] is 
that it is being done against the background of this gap of knowledge, so on the one hand 
it means that we dare not do anything because we might be damaging something 
valuable, but on the other hand, it might not be valuable at all, it is just that we haven’t 
actually done the work to find out. That just puts up some additional problems [for 
proponents]. 
6.3.2 Process-oriented learning 
Process-oriented learning is a form of institutional learning, and its importance to 
impact assessment practice is reflected in persistent calls for improved impact 
assessment process methodologies (T. B. Fischer, 2003)
31. Collective exterior 
learning, like the individual form of  technical learning discussed in the preceding 
section, is instrumental, but has a greater potential to extend beyond the sphere of an 
individual decision as the learning becomes embedded in practice and in 
                                                         
28 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
29 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
30 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1) 
31 As discussed in Chapter 5, the case for improved procedural methodologies is usually posed as an 
alternative to the argument that impact assessment should ‘learn from’ and ‘shape itself to’ policy and 
decision-making processes. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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‘institutional memory’ as ‘the way we do things’ (Jachtenfuchs, 1996)
32. ‘Learning 
to do’ (Nicolescu, 1997) is commonly based upon past experience and leads to 
incremental change (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Fiorino, 2001; Heclo, 1974). This is 
‘learning by doing’, the form of learning to which this research was always intended 
to contribute. As one Gorgon interviewee said
33:  
As a Government you just don’t put yourselves through this process to say, well, we did 
the Barrow thing in 2003/4 and then we kind of shelved it. You clearly want, with the 
investment made, to get a return from that investment in public policy formulation terms, 
by saying, ‘What have we learnt? What should we discard? What more do we need to 
do?’ 
The evidence for 'learning by doing' comes mainly from a comparison of the Gorgon 
and SWY case studies, showing where the latter was improved by virtue of lessons 
learnt from the former. The following discussion draws upon the process-oriented 
recommendations made in Chapter 4, discussing the SWY experience in the light of 
Gorgon observations and also highlighting some additional points of learning that 
became apparent through the experience of the SWY. 
The ‘question’ 
I argued in Chapter 4 that the ‘question’ framing an assessment determines what can 
be discussed and addressed within the process and what cannot. It therefore 
embodies aspects of context, including earlier decisions and defines the process of 
assessment. As one interviewee reflected, “With any sustainability assessment, you 
really have got to put the effort in at the beginning to actually think about what 
questions you are asking”
34.  
As a result of the Gorgon analysis, I recommended in Chapter 4 that: 
The questions framing the assessment should be open, encouraging the consideration of 
alternatives; the incorporation of different value sets; and the generation of creative, 
mutually supportive outcomes. Ideally they would be strategically framed to encompass 
                                                         
32 The evolution of the ecological modernisation discourse that I discuss in detail in Chapter 7 (Berger 
et al., 2001; Christoff, 1996; Hajer, 1995) can be viewed as an institutional learning process 
“according to which the existing institutions internalized the ecological dimension into their thinking 
but without addressing this cultural critique” (F. Fischer & Hajer, 1999, p3). Cultural critique, as I 
discuss later, arises from interior learning. 
33 Gorgon interviews – Expert Panel (3). 
34 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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issues beyond the technicalities of the proposal, but it is realised that strategic issues are 
the responsibility of Government, while many of the proposals likely to be subject to 
sustainability assessment in Western Australia are private projects. 
The questions framing the SWY process were: 
•  Is the proposal to extract 45 GL/year from the Yarragadee formation aquifers 
for supply into the IWSS acceptable? and  
•  What is the most sustainable way of developing this water source?  
The first question is a threshold question similar to the one framing Gorgon. The 
second question is considerably more open and reflects a different relationship 
between the assessment and the process of developing the proposal in this case. 
Whereas the Gorgon assessment was conducted entirely reactively (as dictated by 
existing regulation of private sector resources exploitation proposals), the SWY was 
more proactive and therefore had a far greater influence on the final proposal. Open 
questions guiding proactive assessment processes provide the greatest opportunities 
for maximising the net benefits of a proposal (Morrison-Saunders & Thérivel, 2006; 
Pope & Grace, 2006; Pope et al., 2005). 
Despite this improvement over Gorgon, the SWY questions were specifically related 
to only one water source and did not allow higher level strategic questions (for 
example, “What is the best way to provide public water supply”) that would have 
allowed the SWY to be compared with other potential sources, to be asked
35. It was 
suggested that this was a function of the Water Corporation, as an engineering 
organisation responsible for service delivery, being “very focused on providing the 
solutions to a problem”
36. The narrowly defined question effectively separated the 
assessment of the SWY proposal from the wider context of water management in 
Western Australia, and created particular challenges for the Sustainability Panel, as I 
discuss later.  
The point was made during the interview process that the framing of the questions 
was not only unstrategic but confrontational to the people of the South West, who 
viewed the proposal as an unfair appropriation of their resource by wasteful city 
                                                         
35 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
36 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
      237 
dwellers. It was suggested by one member of the Project Team that perhaps a better 
question, bringing an important “degree of commonality”, might have been, “What is 
the future of water in Perth and the South West?”
37.  
In summary, the SWY assessment was framed more openly than Gorgon, and I argue 
in the following sections that this led to an improved process and more sustainable 
outcomes. The question was, however, insufficiently strategic to embrace all of the 
dimensions of the broader context that were relevant to the decision, and this created 
tensions and additional challenges. 
Basis for decision-making: The ‘sustainability decision-making 
protocol’ 
Although Gorgon was framed by a threshold question, the basis for the 
determination of ‘acceptability’ within a sustainability context was unclear. 
Reflecting upon this, I made the following recommendation in Chapter 4:  
Each sustainability assessment process should be guided by clearly defined decision 
criteria, in the form of ‘a sustainability decision-making protocol’ that ‘operationalises’ 
sustainability for the decision at hand, and includes relevant sustainability factor 
acceptability criteria and aspirational objectives or targets for each factor where possible. 
The protocol should guide the process of developing the proposal, including the 
consideration of alternatives and the refinement of the preferred alternative, and therefore 
must be established sufficiently early to enable this. It should also form the basis for the 
subsequent regulatory approvals process, and therefore should be developed in 
consultation between Government, proponent and community to incorporate the 
sustainability aspirations of each. 
In contrast with Gorgon, the SWY assessment did commence with the development 
of a sustainability decision-making protocol, which included the sustainability 
factors that were considered relevant to the decision in each case
38, and aspirational 
                                                         
37 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
38 The scoping process, that is the identification of relevant factors, determined requirements for both 
the qualitative social analysis and the scientific and technical studies. One interviewee said, “It gave 
much clearer direction to the Water Corporation about what they should be thinking about in 
assessing the project, and perhaps that’s the strength of it. It helps proponents understand what the 
issues are” (SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8)). While the same argument could be made 
with respect to the scoping of the Gorgon assessment, the difference between the two cases was the 
clear articulation of aspirational objectives and acceptability criteria for the SWY assessment. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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objectives and acceptability criteria for each factor
39. The protocol was defined in the 
SWY scoping report (Strategen, 2005), which was eventually approved by the EPA, 
the WRC, the Sustainability Panel and the Commonwealth Department of 
Environment and Heritage (Strategen, 2006b). 
The process of developing the protocol was informed by the sustainability principles 
of the State Sustainability Strategy (Government of Western Australia, 2003b), 
criteria identified by the WRC, the Social Values and Impacts Study conducted by a 
division of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO) (Australian Research Centre for Water in Society, 2003), comments on the 
draft scoping report received from the community and the Sustainability Panel, and 
the EPA’s draft Position Statement on environmental offsets (Environmental 
Protection Authority, 2005). The EPA Position Statement defines ‘critical 
environmental assets’ that became the environmental ‘acceptability limits’ for the 
proposal (Strategen, 2006a)
40.  
Although the sustainability objectives could not be quantitatively or unambiguously 
defined, as I advocated earlier (Pope et al., 2004), they proved invaluable in 
establishing the boundaries within which the proposal was to be developed (Pope et 
al., 2005). The apparent tension between some of the objectives, particularly the 
social and economic issues relating to the most appropriate use of the water source, 
was the catalyst for the shifts in the conceptualisation of the proposal, an important 
point which is discussed further in Section 6.4.  
Even with a clearly defined protocol, however, there was considerable debate around 
the question of what constituted ‘acceptably sustainable’. While evaluating negative 
impacts against acceptability criteria is well within the normal scope of 
environmental impact assessment, with considerations of significance at the fore 
(Sippe, 1999), acceptability in relation to aspirational objectives was discovered to 
                                                         
39 The notion of acceptability limits or ‘bottom lines’ reflects the view, reconfirmed for the SWY 
proposal at the May 2005 workshop, that  the environmental standards should not be lower for 
sustainability assessment than they would be for EIA alone, and that the proposal should not generate 
significant adverse impacts on an already fragile environment. 
40 There was some debate about whether the notion of ‘critical environmental assets’ would apply to 
the SWY proposal, since it is a ‘public good project’ for which exemptions may be sought. The EPA, 
however, was unwilling to unequivocally classify the proposal in this way, and hence the issue 
remains open for debate during the external regulatory assessment process. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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be considerably more nebulous. These positive outcomes were less clearly defined 
and it had to be determined whether the standard was to be the achievement of each 
individual objective to give a positive outcome with respect to each sustainability 
factor, a positive outcome in each overall account (that is environmental, social and 
economic), or simply a positive overall outcome. The third case would clearly allow 
for some trading off of the environment for socio-economic gain and was therefore 
rejected. The final decision, made at a workshop involving members of the Project 
Team on 11 May 2005, was that an acceptably sustainable proposal would require a 
net benefit in each ‘account’ (that is environmental, social and economic), but that a 
net benefit with respect to each factor would also be sought
41.  
This clarified the process and its intentions considerably, but the challenge remained 
as to how performance against some of the more qualitative objectives might be 
measured in the process of determining whether the proposal was finally acceptably 
sustainable. It was generally concluded that it would be a matter of determining 
‘when it feels right’. Above all, as the information came in, the Project Team became 
more and more confident that the proposal did not represent significant 
environmental risks and addressed the community’s sense of ‘futures foregone’ (see 
Section 6.4)
42. In the words of another interviewee, “I do think that where we got to 
at the end is something that will lead to major benefits and will lead to good 
sustainability considerations”
43. Another said, “I think the product that has been 
delivered …is a really good one, and I guess all involved can be proud of what’s 
been developed”
44. For another, social considerations were the most significant 
issue
45: 
Once the ‘futures foregone’ was taken away, that social fatal flaw was removed. That 
would have been a fatal flaw for me. It would have been. I think if that hadn’t been 
                                                         
41 There was also some debate about whether or not achieving each of the environmental objectives 
would automatically mean a net positive environmental outcome. This is possibly not the case, since 
some objectives are phrased as neutral statements so it would be possible to have some insignificant, 
but still adverse impacts with respect to some objectives that may outweigh positive outcomes with 
respect to other objectives (Notes from 11 May 2005 workshop).  
42 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
43 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
44 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
45 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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resolved, it would have been very difficult to keep on – it was like you would have had to 
ride roughshod over that part of it and say, ‘Well, we got two parts of it right’
46. 
The relationship between the Water Corporation’s protocol and the regulatory 
decision-making process is ambiguous
47, and it remains unclear whether the 
regulators will fully accept the Water Corporation’s methodology and protocol. With 
a certain amount of despair, one member of the Project Team reflected
48: 
What’s happened with the project is that we developed what we believed was a good 
sustainability evaluation, and it is, I think it is a good effort. It is then lobbed into the 
regulatory...assessment …and [WRC] are probably ignoring it. They are saying, ‘Well, 
no, that’s not what we wanted’. And they are actually doing their own work. And they are 
doing their own little matrix which says, ‘This is how we are going to make the 
decision’…So, what was the point? 
It can therefore be concluded that while the SWY represents a significant 
improvement over Gorgon by virtue of its sustainability decision-making protocol, 
the SWY experience emphasises the importance of engaging regulators in the 
protocol development to ensure alignment with their expectations and decision-
making processes. 
Process methodology 
As previously noted, the second of the two questions framing the SWY assessment 
supports a proactive approach to sustainability assessment in which the assessment 
helps to shape the final proposal. This aligns with the process methodology 
recommendations made in Chapter 4, where it was argued: 
Sustainability assessment should be promoted as a proactive tool that commences early 
enough to meaningfully influence the proponent’s planning process. In practice this will 
require the early engagement between proponent and Government. 
I expanded on the discussion in Chapter 5 where I argued for a formal 
methodological framework commencing with the identification of the goal and the 
                                                         
46 It was also suggested that sustainability was gradually enhanced in several ways, and not only ways 
directly related to the project itself; for example, water planning and other policy deficiencies were 
addressed, and an adaptive approach to environmental management developed and proposed, which 
became part of the overall proposal (SWY interviews – Project Team (9)). 
47 This issue pertains to the role of the regulators in such sustainability assessment processes, a point 
to which I return in Section 6.3.3. 
48 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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related question to be addressed, followed by the establishment of the sustainability 
decision-making protocol, the identification of alternatives and options, the analysis 
of impacts, and the selection and enhancement of the preferred alternative. However, 
the SWY approach was somewhat different: rather than issues and strategic 
objectives, the starting point was a ‘rubbery proposal’, and there were no distinct 
alternatives on the table describing different ways by which the objective of 
developing the aquifer could be achieved
49. Instead, the process of finalising the 
proposal to make it ‘as sustainable as possible’ was iterative and has been 
represented as a circle (see Figure 6.1).  
The circular diagram clarified that the process of assessing impacts, evaluating their 
acceptability against defined objectives and targets (the sustainability decision-
making protocol), and identifying necessary modifications, mitigations and offsets, 
would continue until the proposal was deemed acceptably sustainable. While this 
may seem quite a straightforward process in concept, in practice it left considerable 
room for debate as discussed previously. The informality of the SWY assessment 
process, however, was cited by several interviewees
50 as a vital factor in enhancing 
creativity and positive outcomes, and something that should be retained in future 
assessment processes
51. Along similar lines, Gibson et al. (2005, p131) argue that 
“there are good reasons for avoiding a proliferation of rules. The pursuit of 
sustainability requires creativity as well as commitment and clarity of agenda”. 
Accordingly, several participants in the process concluded as a result of their 
involvement that if sustainability assessment were to be legislated in Western 
Australia, it should be guided by principles rather than by a fixed methodology that 
could become restrictive and stifle creativity
52. Some of the suggested principles 
were the simultaneous consideration of social, environmental and economic issues; 
timeliness; transparency, community involvement; a values-based approach to social 
impact assessment; and a philosophy of adaptive management. 
                                                         
49 The proponent, however, argued that although the process did not set out to compare alternatives, 
there were some technical options available, including well-field configuration; piping and 
infrastructure routes; staging of the supply development, as well as various impact mitigation and 
offset opportunities (Strategen, 2006b). 
50 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8), Project Team (7). 
51 This harks back to Glasbergen’s (1996) observation (see Chapter 1) that processes that are less 
constrained by past practices and resilient institutions  have the greatest transformative potential 
52 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4 and 8); Project Team (7). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Figure 6.1: The SWY sustainability assessment framework (source: Strategen 
(2005)) 
Community engagement  
Formal community engagement in Gorgon was limited to commenting upon 
documentation, and I consequently made the following recommendation in Chapter 
4: 
Sustainability assessment processes should meaningfully engage the community in ways 
that extend beyond ‘instrumental’ forms of consultation such as the release of documents Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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for public comment, facilitating the incorporation of community values into decision-
making. 
The broader community, and particularly the community of the South West region, 
was engaged in several different ways through the SWY process. Firstly, a Social 
Values and Impacts Study was commissioned by the WRC in 2003, in which the 
views of regional and metropolitan communities were sought (Australian Research 
Centre for Water in Society, 2003). Other forms of engagement included 
communication through the Community Reference Group (CRG), issue 
identification studies, market research, public information sessions and ‘walk-ins’ 
through major regional centres, interviews with interest groups, local residents and 
other identified stakeholders, technical information progressively being made 
publicly available, focus groups, and public review of the draft Scoping Report and 
Sustainability evaluation/ERMP, and response to comments (Strategen, 2006b). 
One member of the Project Team identified the community engagement as one of the 
two aspects of the SWY process that most improved upon the Gorgon experience, 
the other being the scoping process already discussed. He said, “I felt on the social 
side we should do a lot differently in terms of consultation and empowerment for the 
local community, or the regional community in particular”
 53, and, referring to the 
Water Corporation:  
I think they did a lot more this time than they had done before. They set up 
a…Community Reference Group which I am not sure they had done before at this stage 
of a project. 
The CRG was established as the forum through which the proponent could 
disseminate information about the proposal and its potential impacts as it became 
available, and the community representatives could bring issues forward and could 
also challenge the proponent. It was also hoped that it might be a mechanism by 
which appropriate mitigation and offset measures might be identified and discussed, 
although this only happened to a limited extent in practice
54. As such the CRG was 
more of an information exchange than a deliberative forum, most of its members 
                                                         
53 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
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held fast to the positions they held as representatives of the broader community, 
whether for or against the proposal
55.   
The Water Corporation’s aim with respect to the CRG was mainly to just “keep 
people round the table”
56. In the first few meetings, the sheer volume of information 
with which the proponent ‘bombarded’ the group was a problem in terms of the 
amount of time consumed by these presentations. As the process progressed, greater 
percentages of time were able to be spent in discussions, which were productive for 
the community representatives and the proponent alike, particularly when the topics 
of discussion included the potential for community monitoring of the project and 
involvement in a water futures study. One interviewee said
57:  
When we started to get to that sort of level and allowed for it to go just where it needed to 
go then we started to get some good stuff back, and I think that’s where people felt that 
they were being heard.  
The same interviewee also said:  
There certainly was a point where the Project Team felt that they weren’t fighting it any 
more, they were now fighting for what they could get from it, which was a change…and 
then it was a case of starting to contribute more constructively to where it was going. 
A member of the Sustainability Panel cited the benefits of the consultation process as 
being that it “brought a whole range of information to members of the community 
that they would not otherwise have had access to”. It also empowered the 
community, allayed some community fears, and “educated the Water Corporation” 
and “made a lot of people within the Water Corporation realise that consultation can 
be a very positive thing”
 58. It led to the formation of relationships between the Water 
Corporation and members of the community
59, and therefore the groundwork for 
future water planning in the South West, and for the community monitoring of the 
SWY project
60, an idea that emerged from the CRG
61. 
                                                         
55 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
56 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
57 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
58 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). In making these comments, the interview was referring 
both to the CRG and to the values-based social impact assessment process.  
59 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
60 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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One interviewee favourably compared the engagement process with previous models 
of seeking social benefits from development projects in Western Australia, 
whereby
62: 
Businesses put in police stations or community halls or recreational jetties. What you get 
with that is minimalist and a compliance response by the businesses, whereas if they 
actually have to engage with the community, you get a better process. 
The opposing view was also expressed, however, that the CRG was merely a 
‘posturing exercise’ and that it had ‘no teeth’ in the overall process, since it lacked 
statutory backing
63. This interviewee advocated integrated land and water 
management in the South West through a collaborative partnership between 
government regulators and the community, similar to other Western Australian 
models such as natural resource management. 
In addition to the CRG and other information mechanisms, a social impact 
assessment was conducted by a consultant member of the Project Team using a 
qualitative, values-based approach. This work essentially captured the ‘stories’ 
through which each of the communities in the region cast the SWY proposal. The 
result of this work was the emergence of ‘futures forgone’ as a primary concern. 
These results fed directly into the sustainability decision-making protocol in the final 
report (Strategen, 2005), and the social impact assessment process gathered 
important information that contributed to the learning process. 
In conclusion, the SWY process engaged the community more effectively than did 
Gorgon, particularly through the CRG and the values-based approach to the social 
impact assessment. The CRG, however, was limited in practice to a mechanism for 
providing information and receiving feedback, rather than a being a forum for 
deliberation. Furthermore, CRG membership was limited to ‘the usual suspects’ and 
did not engage the wider community
64. There is, however, potential to utilise the 
community capacity enhanced through the SWY process in more innovative ways in 
the future, and particularly in the South West Water Futures Study that has been 
proposed as a result of the SWY assessment (Strategen, 2006a). With respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
61 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
62 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
63 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (5). 
64 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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recommendations from Gorgon, the social impact assessment process was an 
important mechanism for incorporating community values into the decision-making 
process, which in turn contributed to the reframing of the proposal, which I discuss 
further in Section 6.4. 
Integration, trade-offs and offsets 
As discussed previously, the term ‘integration’ in sustainability assessment often 
refers to ‘horizontal integration’, or the interactions between the different 
sustainability considerations of a proposal
65. These interactions are either supportive 
(win/win/wins) or conflicting (trade-offs), where trade-offs in turn can be 
categorised as ‘between pillars’ or ‘within pillars’, the latter also being known as 
‘offsets’. Following the complete failure of the Gorgon assessment process to 
demonstrate any horizontal integration of sustainability considerations, a great deal 
of effort in the SWY assessment was put into the question of how an integrated 
sustainability assessment might best be conducted. The inter-linkages between the 
various sustainability factors and the predicted impacts they represent is emphasised 
in the SWY Sustainability evaluation/ERMP (Strategen, 2006b). Offsets, as a form of 
mitigation measure, were an integral part of the SWY process as reflected in the 
circular process model.  
It was also decided that another acceptability test should be applied to the final 
proposal and the trade-off rules proposed by Gibson (2006; 2005) were selected as 
an appropriate yardstick. Box 6.1 is an extracted section of which I was the author, 
from the SWY Sustainability evaluation/ERMP, explaining the use of these rules 
within the context of the SWY sustainability assessment (Strategen, 2006b). 
                                                         
65 As described in Chapters 2 and 4, other forms of integration include vertical integration or tiering 
and the integration of the assessment with the process of developing the proposal (Lee, 2002). It has 
also been frequently argued that the ‘three pillar’ model of sustainability, upon which most theories of 
horizontal integration are grounded, fails to acknowledge the essentially integrative nature of the 
sustainability concept (Gibson, 2006). I explore this further in Chapter 7.  Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Box 6.1: The use of the Gibson trade-off rules 
 
 
The Sustainability Evaluation/ERMP of the South West Yarragadee Water Supply 
Development proposal has involved only a limited comparison with alternatives, as 
the fundamental proposal is not an alternative to other major sources of water such as 
desalination, water trading, water use efficiency gains, or other surface water or 
groundwater sources. The decision being requested is whether this source can be 
considered for development as part of a broader source development program. In this 
context, the issues to be addressed by the sustainability evaluation are: 
• the contribution of the proposed development to sustainability in Western Australia 
• the acceptability of the final proposal within a sustainability context. 
To assist the decision makers in assessing the contribution of the proposal to 
sustainability in Western Australia, and its acceptability within a sustainability 
context, the outcomes and processes for the development were evaluated against the 
sustainability principles of the State Sustainability Strategy. They have also been 
evaluated against a sustainability decisionmaking tool emanating from some very 
recent work from Canada, termed here the “Gibson tradeoff rules” (Gibson, Hassan, 
Holtz, Tansey, & Whitelaw, 2005). 
Evaluation of the overall proposal in the context of the Western Australian 
sustainability principles is vital to the assessment process, since sustainability 
assessment should be a process for determining whether a proposal can be considered 
to make the best possible contribution to sustainability (Gibson 2005). The principles 
are an articulation of what sustainability means in Western Australia. This evaluation 
looks at the proposal as a whole, and also at the level of the three accounts of 
sustainability – the environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainability. It 
asks whether the proposal as a whole can be considered to make a positive 
contribution to sustainability overall, and to each of the three accounts. 
Assessment against the Gibson tradeoff rules plays an important supplementary role in 
the sustainability decisionmaking process. As already stated, the aim of sustainability 
assessment should always be to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes with respect to 
sustainability objectives, since to begin with an assumption that tradeoffs are 
unavoidable will compromise the assessment and limit opportunities to find these  Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Source: Strategen (2006b, Chapter 6)  
These rules are summarised as follows (Gibson et al., 2005):  
•  Maximum net gains; 
•  Burden of argument on trade-off proponent; 
•  Avoidance of significant adverse effects; 
•  Protection of the future; 
•  Explicit justification; 
•  Open process. 
Indicators were established for each rule and the SWY proposal was reviewed 
against these indicators, as well as against the sustainability principles of the State 
winwinwin outcomes. The Gibson tradeoff rules arise from the acknowledgement that 
despite the best efforts of planners and decisionmakers, almost every decision offers 
both advantages and disadvantages and, therefore, the process of making any decision 
inherently involves tradeoffs since gains are rarely achieved in one area without some 
losses in another. The question then is whether the losses (which we may also term as 
adverse impacts or tradeoffs) are acceptable. It is important to bear in mind that 
finding ways to manage tradeoffs is a “last resort” option and should not be the 
starting point of the assessment.In applying the Gibson tradeoff rules to this proposal, 
it is acknowledged that a decision to approve this proposal will involve making 
tradeoffs, just as a decision not to approve it would also involve tradeoffs. The 
tradeoffs equate to the adverse impacts, as well as the lost opportunities for positive 
impacts, that would result from a decision to approve, or not approve, the project.  
The Gibson tradeoff rules provide the basis for dealing with tensions and conflicts that 
may be identified in the process of applying a well considered set of sustainability 
principles. They can be used to guide the evaluation of the acceptability of a proposal 
within a sustainability context by examining the acceptability of the inherent tradeoffs 
that would be made in approving the process. 
They are therefore an extremely valuable tool to aid sustainability decisionmaking. 
They also have the advantage of having been developed outside Western Australia, 
which effectively allows crosschecking our decisionmaking processes in an 
international context. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Sustainability Strategy (Government of Western Australia, 2003b). It was concluded 
that (Strategen, 2006b, p6-19)
66: 
the proposal is considered to be sustainable in terms of providing a net social, economic 
and environmental benefit. This conclusion is supported by the evaluation of the proposal 
in terms of comparison with the principles of the State Sustainability Strategy and the 
Gibson tradeoff rules…that is able to demonstrate practical compliance with those 
principles and rules.  
Integration in the SWY, however, went beyond this recognition of interactions to 
influence the way in which the studies were conducted, the data gathered and the 
results interpreted
67. For example, the data generated through the various economic 
and environmental studies supported the values-based social impact assessment 
process, since as issues were raised the consultant was able to make a judgement 
about the extent to which the community’s expressed fears were technically 
grounded. The social consultant “needed to know enough to know that these fears 
were unfounded”
68. Similarly, the economic consultant incorporated equity issues 
arising from the social values study into the economic efficiency analysis, “I think it 
gave us a greater interest in the equity issues than we would have traditionally 
had”
69. Based on these successes, it was suggested during the interviews that the 
ultimate form of integration in sustainability assessment would be greater 
interdisciplinary collaboration among the Project Team and the application of a 
‘human ecological approach’
70 .  
It appears that the more proactive approach to sustainability assessment adopted in 
the SWY case bears out the great hope expressed in the State Sustainability Strategy 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003b) that an integrated approach, in which the 
                                                         
66 This application of his work was reviewed by Professor Robert Gibson himself, who expressed 
some concerns that the trade-off rules had been taken somewhat out of the context of his holistic 
framework for an integrated approach to sustainability assessment (Gibson, 2006), particularly since 
the proposal did not fully consider alternatives nor the indirect impacts of the project (for example the 
potential impacts of increased industry in the region facilitated by the water supply). 
67 For example, it was suggested that, “On the environmental side of it was that it became fairly clear 
that the bore holes which were placed there for maximum hydrological impact, were going to have 
negative environmental impacts unless shifted, so they shifted them. That may well have happened in 
the environmental assessment process without the social and economic part of it. But the social and 
economic part of it was there and helped them to decide where it could be still economic to do and 
would not impact on communities as well” (SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4)). 
68 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
69 SWY interviews – Project Team (3). 
70 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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full spectrum of sustainability issues are considered together
71, has the potential to 
catalyse learning, new ways of thinking and ultimately more sustainable outcomes. 
One Panel member said
72:  
I learnt that sustainability assessment does work and that the world will move in this 
direction, however slowly. It was very confirming really. That the State Sustainability 
Strategy, which is based on those principles, will have a life, because I can see that as 
people take these ideas and work them through, it does actually weave some magic. 
6.3.3 Context-oriented learning 
In Chapter 5, I described neo-institutionalist policy theories that recognise that the 
power embedded in rules, organisations and institutions should not be 
underestimated (Wilber, 2003). Awareness and change towards policy and 
institutional arrangements that might be supportive of sustainability is thus one form 
of exterior collective learning, and the potential for impact assessment to contribute 
to this process has been increasingly observed. Drawing on Argyris and Schön’s 
concepts (1996), Lawrence (1997, p95) argues that: 
EIA theory-building and practice should not simply adapt passively to context. Such a 
single-loop learning approach (i.e., satisfy existing government variables) is inconsistent 
with the purpose of EIA. In seeking to affect the environment positively, EIA may need 
to challenge governing variables and reshape context. The double-loop approach to EIA 
theory-building can contribute to systemic change in theories and practice
73.  
The importance of political context to a project proposal was emphasised by one 
interviewee, who observed
74: 
You can’t put a neat little barrier around your project. You draw in all this baggage and 
history from everywhere…So there are so many layers and when you get a project like 
this, you are not dealing with a proposal, you are dealing with something much bigger 
and more sinister and vague. So the politics of it all was outrageous.  
                                                         
71 Particularly in response to an open question (Morrison-Saunders & Thérivel, 2006; Pope et al., 
2005). 
72 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4) 
73 This idea is reflected in several of Bartlett and Kurian’s (1999) models of EIA. For example, their 
‘political economy model’ “alters financial opportunities, risks, and constraints, with the attendant 
internalization of externalities leading ultimately to anticipation and prevention of environmental 
harm” (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999, p419). Closely related are the ‘organisational politics model’ and the 
institutionalist models, which seek changes in procedures, missions and cultures. 
74 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Since political context can be conceptualised in terms of the ‘hardware’ of 
institutions that embody the ‘software’ of culture, history, meanings, values and 
stories, as discussed previously, contextual change may occur as a result of both 
exterior and interior forms of learning. The former are the main subject of the 
following discussion.  
Policy context 
The subject of the SWY sustainability assessment was a specific project proposal, 
which was assessed in the context of the high-level State Water Strategy 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003a) but in the absence of any more tangible 
plans relating to water management and allocation in the South West
75. Neither did it 
include a comparison of the SWY with other potential water sources. Given its 
mandate to provide integrated advice on the sustainability of the proposal to Cabinet, 
some members of the Sustainability Panel felt these gaps acutely and felt ‘uneasy’ 
about the way the proposal had been framed
76 and that their role had been 
‘compromised from the beginning’
77. In the words of one Panel member
78: 
In fact everybody on the Panel, were very highly concerned about the fact that this was 
just one project and we were reviewing it like a mining lease or a mining project and 
there was no context in which to actually apply any analysis. So the ‘compared with 
what?’ stuff came up and the ‘how does it fit into the longer term strategy?’ came up… It 
is really I think one of the biggest flaws in the whole thing.  
Some additional ‘scene-setting’ material was subsequently added to the 
documentation at the request of the Panel to explain the previous policy decisions 
and the context within which the assessment was to be conducted, “including climate 
change issues as a backdrop to the project itself and why it was being assessed”
79. 
The need for a water allocation plan in the South West, however, and for a process 
by which the ‘reasonable regional needs’of the South West community, required by 
the State Water Strategy (Government of Western Australia, 2003a) could be 
                                                         
75 One interviewee noted, “From about 1998 there has been no substantial water planning done, yet 
there are people responsible for it”, referring to the WRC (SWY interviews – Project Team (9)). 
76 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
77 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
78 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
79 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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determined became increasingly clear as the assessment progressed. One member of 
the Sustainability Panel said
80:  
One of the things that has come out of that is a very clear recognition that you’ve got to 
have better planning in place. We didn’t have a State Water Plan, we don’t have Regional 
Water Plans, we don’t measure the use of water properly, we don’t have any sort of 
irrigation plan. We’ve got more work to do on allocation issues in WA, so that whilst 
there’s been a recognition that there are those gaps, the fact that this project has come 
forward and had to be assessed, has highlighted the gaps even more strongly than they 
might have been before. It has actually galvanised the government into taking some more 
concerted action
81. 
Ultimately the SWY proponent and its consultants have actually made policy 
recommendations in the gap areas as a result of the assessment (Strategen, 2005), but 
to an extent that many of those involved found inappropriate
82:  
But what has to be taken into account with this one is that the proponent was actually 
doing a lot of the big picture planning work which should already have been in place, and 
which the government probably should have initiated many moons ago.  
This view was reiterated by several other interviewees
83, with one specifically 
calling for sustainability assessment to be applied within a planning, rather than a 
project, context to facilitate serious consideration of alternatives
84. Still others, 
however, held the opposing view that the State Water Strategy (Government of 
Western Australia, 2003a) provided an adequate policy context within which the 
                                                         
80 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
81 It has been noted elsewhere that it is common for major projects to drive and even encompass 
strategic planning (Hacking & Guthrie, 2006) through a process of ‘trickle-up’ (Pope & Grace, 2006) 
and this phenomenon also occurred in the Gorgon case study (see Chapter 4).  As a direct result of the 
SWY sustainability assessment, the Water Corporation has proposed a South West Public Water 
Supply Future Planning Study be conducted to address future public water supply demand, potential 
sources for public water supply, source development programme for public supply, assessment of 
quality and security of existing public water supplies, a programme for upgrading existing quality and 
security of public water supplies where required, and a programme for new connections to the 
extended IWSS or other sources (Strategen, 2006b, p8-27). In addition, Strategen has prepared a 
position paper on ‘reasonable regional needs’ to guide future water allocation policy. 
82 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). The same interviewee also said, “I think that the ideal 
starting point is to recognise where the gaps are already and start to do that big planning, big thinking 
stuff first, and if you have all that in place…if you have done all the big picture stuff already, you 
know what the environmental constraints are and you know whether there’s sufficient water to allow 
this to happen or not, then it makes the assessment of any particular project that comes forward a lot 
easier”. 
83 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
84 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
      253 
SWY could be assessed, particularly since the Strategy identifies the SWY as a 
potential water source for the IWSS. One said
85:  
We did have a State Water Strategy. It is substantially ‘motherhood’, but a high level 
plan can only ever be motherhood and it has then to be negotiated down to the detail and 
interpreted.  
Others argued that any additional planning in advance of the project assessment 
would have been both impractical and costly. One said, “It doesn’t mean that you 
can’t do these things until you have got all the policy context in place, otherwise you 
would never do anything”
86, while another defended the approach taken by saying
87: 
People often say, we should be doing a sustainability evaluation at a higher level, but 
then if you had done that, you are not going to spend $12 million on SWY and $12 
million on investigating groundwater recharge
88 and $12 million on investigating all your 
options. So you get this whacking great load of information - it’s not going to happen. So 
if you try and do it at the higher level, all you can do is get a sort of a ranking, an 
indication, you have still then got to go in a do a whole lot more detailed work. Imagine 
how long it is going to take to do all of this. 
The political difficulties of such planning were also acknowledged, and one 
interviewee wryly noted the lack of strategic planning on important but unpopular 
issues such as the siting of a new industrial precinct or airport
89. Yet another 
interview warned from an economic perspective of the dangers of top-down 
governmental ‘over-planning’ of resource allocation but saw sustainability 




                                                         
85 SWY interviews – Project Team (3). 
86 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
87 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
88 This comment refers to a study into the potential to recharge groundwater aquifers with treated 
wastewater. 
89 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
90 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
91 Jenkins and his colleagues, writing in Western Australia in 2003, recognised that project 
sustainability assessment should not be considered in isolation but as an element within a broader 
governance framework for sustainability. They highlighted the need for systems to address 
government, as well as proponent, actions arising from sustainability assessments, which would 
include addressing the policy gaps exposed by the assessment; and for higher level planning, 
specifically Regional Sustainability Plans, that would shape the context in which project-level 
assessments could be conducted (Jenkins et al., 2003). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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Participants in the SWY assessment also raised the ‘bigger question’ of traditional 
attitudes to water use in Western Australia, which has one of the driest climates on 
Earth, and one that is likely to become even drier through climate change. Although 
the assessment process, with it relatively narrowly defined question, did not provide 
a space within which such questions could be addressed, this observation 
demonstrates how sustainability assessments of project proposals could open up 
deeper questions relating to fundamental aspects of society and its institutions, a 
point to which I return. 
In summary, the SWY sustainability assessment exposed several policy gaps, 
particularly the lack of a water allocation strategy for the South West and the lack of 
a clear policy on the concept of ‘reasonable regional needs’. While it can be argued 
that it is appropriate that major projects drive policy reform through a process of 
‘trickle-up’, there is also a strong case for Government-led strategic planning in a 
number of key areas such as resource usage, energy and water supply.  
Institutional arrangements 
The Gorgon process, which resulted in two competing assessments, reflected 
sustainability assessment’s ‘bad fit’ with prevailing institutional and regulatory 
arrangements, and particularly the current structure of the bureaucracy (Gibson, 
2006). Several inter-related institutional issues were identified as a result of Gorgon, 
particularly the lack of regulatory support and capacity within Government to 
conduct social, and to a lesser extent economic assessment
92; and the lack of a body 
responsible for providing integrated sustainability advice to Government
93. As a 
result the conclusion was drawn in Chapter 4 that: 
Effective integration of competing concerns, and the environmental, social and economic 
dimensions of sustainability, would be facilitated by a body whose role it is to consider 
the proposal from a holistic sustainability perspective. 
Institutional matters also threatened to become problematic in the SWY case for the 
same reasons. However, as already discussed, the situation was further complicated 
                                                         
92 In the Gorgon case, this led to the appointment of the Expert Panel responsible for the social, 
economic and strategic assessment. 
93 Although the Standing Inter-agency Committee of CEOs (SIAC) was nominally responsible for the 
integration of the environmental, social and economic implications of Gorgon, the decision was made 
to simply present Cabinet with the two opposing pieces of advice arising from the two assessments 
(refer to Chapter 3). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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by at least two other characteristics that were unique to the SWY assessment 
process: firstly that it was built around two statutory processes
94, and secondly that it 
was coordinated by the proponent rather than by Government. The institutional 
arrangements for the SWY, including the Sustainability Panel, are shown in Figure 
6.2. 
 
Fig 6.2: SWY assessment institutional arrangements (Source: Strategen (2005)) 
In the following discussion I explore the implications and challenges of the 
institutional arrangements the SWY, including the role of the Sustainability Panel; 
                                                         
94 EIA under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 conducted by the EPA and water licensing under 
the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 conducted by the WRC. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
  256 
the relationships between the proponent, the Panel and the regulatory bodies; the 
case for and against regulatory reform; and the issue of coordination of sustainability 
assessment processes. 
The SWY Sustainability Panel was appointed at the suggestion of the Water 
Corporation and its consultants to provide feedback to the proponent and to provide 
integrated advice to Cabinet on the sustainability implications of the proposal. The 
Panel has five members, including acknowledged social, economic and sustainability 
experts, together with a local representative with considerable experience in water 
management in the South West. It was generally agreed that the Panel embodied “a 
good range of expertise”
95 and that its role as an independent entity was valuable
96. 
As discussed previously, the Panel made several significant suggestions to the Water 
Corporation, including the need to locate its argument of the need for the SWY more 
firmly within the context of other decisions and water supply options
97. 
Members of the Panel agreed that it quickly developed into a cohesive group. This 
meant that although members each contributed their particular views and expertise, 
there was little conflict or debate over the issues raised and opinions gradually 
converged
98. It was suggested that this was at least partly due to a genuine agreement 
on the issues and that the group would have been willing to debate had serious 
disagreement arisen
99. One Panel member in particular believed that the level of 
agreement was at least in part due to the community representative on the Panel 
                                                         
95 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
96 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (5). 
97 When asked about the role of the Panel, one member set the scene by acknowledging the challenges 
of sustainability assessment and the role of the Panel in contributing to the process, “Well, as near as 
damn we picked a group of people who might just be able to stumble on something that could be a 
sustainability assessment. We were all very aware that there weren’t too many rule books written on 
how to do it, but we had enough of a sense of direction for where we could go with some wise people 
around the table. So the group was set up with strong political connections. As the Chair came from 
the Premier’s Office, it was set up with good scientific and technical people and good representation 
across the sectors. We were charged with guiding this process and advising the Government as to 
whether or not the assessment was a sustainability assessment and could be seen to be fulfilling those 
high ideals”. (SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (5)). 
98 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
99 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). This interviewee went on to say, “But I don’t detect in 
the group… anything but people just saying what they think and trying to accommodate, because I 
think we all realise that if one of us wants to get flaky, you are going to end up with problems, and we 
do have to come to an agreement. I think probably there is a lot of compromise in the sorts of debates 
that we have. Nobody actually presents anything at all in an aggressive or even over definite way, it is 
all posed politely, so I think there are probably a lot more deep feelings around the room that don’t 
come out because of the function that you have. When you are trying to deal with a highly general 
concept like sustainability how can you be definite?” Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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‘coming round’ to the point that he could say, ‘Well, it would be a pity if this didn’t 
go ahead’, suggesting that had this not happened, the other Panel members would 
have “probably been much more negative” about the proposal
100. There was, 
however, a sense of unease that in their cohesion the Panel became “far too close to 
the Water Corporation”
101. The situation was summarised by another Panel 
member
102:  
Over time, for better or for worse, we have tended to become a team. I think that that’s 
very good in the sense that we are each open to each other’s suggestions and have a sense 
of working towards a common goal, but it can be bad in the sense that in any team, 
people make concessions towards a group goal. I think perhaps, to be honest, our group 
goal has become a little bit too closely aligned with what the Water Corp wants.” 
It was suggested that the alignment of the Panel with the Water Corporation was a 
function of the ‘peculiar new situation’ in which the Panel depended upon the Water 
Corporation for data and information, having no resources of its own
103. The same 
interviewee argued for any future Panels to “have some resources to actually 
commission their own bits and pieces”, which might include public hearings, in line 
with the Canadian model. In turn this would require “a clear listing of powers” 
whereby a Panel, like the EPA, could “call people to brief us as we would like”
 104. 
The value of the Panel in providing an overall perspective on the sustainability of the 
proposal role was acknowledged, but it was also recognised that the Panel did not 
overcome all of the problems of bureaucratic and regulatory segregation. One 
interviewee said
105:  
I think a Panel can help, but part of the problem is that if the regulatory process at the end 
of the Panel process then degenerates back into its separate silos, gatekeepers then there 
is actually much less point in having a Panel. 
                                                         
100 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
101 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
102 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
103 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
104 In the Canadian system under the Federal Environmental Assessment Act, the highest level of 
assessment is the Review Panel, whereby a Panel is specially appointed and its Terms of Reference 
and links with other regulatory bodies are established clearly at the commencement of the process. 
The Panel is then responsible for co-ordinating the assessment process, including data gathering and 
community engagement that may be a model that should be considered in Western Australia in the 
future. 
105 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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This comment was made in response to the EPA’s request to the Water Corporation 
and Strategen to separate the environmental discussion and ERMP requirements
106 
from the overall sustainability evaluation, thus disrupting the flow of the 
sustainability argument and raising the issue of the relationship between the EPA as 
a statutory body and the non-statutory Sustainability Panel
107. The EPA’s request 
was seen by some as a function of the ‘gate-keeping’ role played by the regulating 
agencies in the sustainability assessment process and their consequential preference 
to maintain an ‘arms length’ relationship with the proponent and the Panel
108. This 
led Panel members to reflect that the Panel’s “relationship with the EPA is pretty 




Having hit that regulatory wall where suddenly all of this integration has to be picked 
apart again, is a real concern, and it actually devalues the work that has been done by 
quite a considerable extent… EPA and CALM and other agencies are just waiting to see 
what happens, they are not actually going to engage in the process, they are going to wait 
for the outcome…It would be a whole lot more healthy if they were engaged, especially 
if the integrity of their process is going to be maintained.  
Others made similar observations, suggesting that perhaps the regulatory agencies 
may have ‘felt a bit threatened’ by the sustainability assessment in general and the 
Panel in particular, and noted the lack of role clarity, “It has made it very difficult, I 
think, for everybody involved to work out exactly where they fit in, in the scheme of 
things
111”. 
The first formal interaction between the Panel and the regulators occurred towards 
the end of the process when the Panel convened a meeting to which representatives 
                                                         
106 The ERMP is the highest level of assessment under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 
107 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
108 While the EPA interacted with the proponent and its consultants throughout the sustainability 
evaluation, the relationship with the WRC was somewhat antagonistic, and CALM chose to ‘play its 
cards close to its chest’. There was a perception from the Project Team that this reflected to a large 
extent the relationships between the Water Corporation and the regulating agencies, and particularly 
the WRC. One interviewee suggested of the Water Corporation that “frankly they have had the 
expertise, whereas those people who have been trying to catch up with them and regulate them and 
argue with them, haven’t” and “the reality is that Water Corp will continue to do that more than 
happily for as long as there is a regulatory vacuum around it” (SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel 
(1)). 
109 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
110 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
111 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
      259 
of the EPA, WRC and CALM were invited. One Panel member spoke of this 
meeting with some frustration
112: 
Well, we actually tried wherever possible to bring them in. We wanted them to talk to us 
about the kinds of issues that they would be worried about… They tend to operate in 
secret and they start gathering information – it gets its own momentum and it is not part 
of an interchange of discussion, it is not part of a dialogue…The worst of all was CALM 
who, even though we brought them in, refused to even discuss it with us. They said, ‘No, 
we don’t operate that way, we keep our powder dry’. From what I hear they are quite 
happy to shoot it down and on a very flimsy basis, and a basis that could easily have been 
resolved in discussion.  
Another, however, viewed this meeting in a more positive light
113: 
I am not sure whether we felt confident in wheeling people in because you aren’t sure 
really about how seriously you are being taken. I have always had the feeling that this is a 
little wide-eyed advisory group. Now suddenly it seems, because of our role and because 
we are aware now we have to write some sort of report, we have become quite a good 
catalyst to get people together and the last meeting with the agencies was really good in 
that regard. It was fun and you could see all their different tactics. 
It was suggested by several interviewees from both the Panel and the Project Team 
that the regulatory agencies be more actively involved in the sustainability 
assessment process from an early stage
114, “in a contributory way, not just in a 
regulatory way”
 115, perhaps even as members of future Sustainability Panels. In 
addition to the value that the agencies could contribute to “finding solutions to 
problems really rather than just identifying them” it was suggested that there could 
be “a corpus of expert opinion out there which we haven’t really accessed”
116.  
One interviewee, however, reflecting on the apparent degree of convergence of the 
views that occurred within the Sustainability Panel process itself, offered a word of 
caution. Instead of ongoing involvement throughout the process, it was suggested 
that the regulators could be more involved in the scoping phase of the assessment 
                                                         
112 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
113 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
114 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6); Project Team (2, 9). 
115 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
116 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). Similar comments were made by Project Team (9). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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and then ‘bow out’ until the final stages in order to preserve their independence
117. 
Although it was also argued that this was the model that had been applied, since 
“they did all have the opportunity to comment on the Scoping Report, which they did 
quite comprehensively, so they knew exactly what we were intending to do”
118, the 
agencies commenting on the Scoping Report did not involve interacting directly with 
the Panel. One member of the Panel suggested a more appropriate approach
119:  
I think they could have come in and briefed us with, ‘These are the issues that generally 
concern us’. We would like whatever your definition of sustainability is. We would really 
need to be assured of the following sorts of things. That’s not compromising them. It is 
just saying: ‘Look, hello, how do you do, you are a new body, these are the things we 
would like you to take into consideration if you are going to be of use to us’. 
Similar frustrations with regulators were expressed by members of the Project 
Team
120. One spoke specifically of the challenges of coordinating the sustainability 
assessment and its interaction with the various regulatory processes from a 
proponent’s perspective
121:  
Government made a statement that this is what it wanted to do, so you got sort of a 
Government pseudo-policy sitting there that says, ‘We want to do sustainability 
assessment’ without really knowing what it is. Then you have a whole lot of regulators 
and agencies that sort of ignore that and just do their own thing in any case. So, what was 
lacking was any agreement from any of the agencies and regulators about, in fact, what 
was going to be done.  
Accordingly there were calls for Government to take a stronger lead in coordinating 
future sustainability assessments and to clarify the roles of future Panels in relation 
to existing regulatory bodies. Legislative constraints, however, particularly the 
restriction on the EPA to the consideration of biophysical issues (see Chapter 1), 
                                                         
117 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1). 
118 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). 
119 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
120 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
121 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). The same interviewee went on, “So if the State is serious 
about it, then it has got to help in some way. It can’t leave it up to proponents to try and corral 
regulators into doing something, because then it is not going to work. They sit there and say: Get lost. 
We have got all the power. You will do what we ask you to do. And if we don’t like what you have 
done. Stiff” Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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were acknowledged
122. While one interviewee suggested that informal arrangements 
between agencies might be possible given the right ‘personalities’ within the 
agencies
123, another called for “more clout and more obvious connection to the 
Minister”
124. Yet another suggested regulatory and institutional reform that would 
overcome the ‘silo mentality’ of the current structures
125:  
There is major need for institutional change. I think on these major projects you have just 
about got to create a process that integrates all the others together. I don’t think you can 
piggyback. We tried to piggyback and it has been uncomfortable…In my world I would 
have an Integrated Assessment Act. 
The question of whether or not sustainability assessment should have legislative 
backing in the future was also discussed by others. One interviewee reflected
126:  
On the one hand, I think that it’s just inevitable within government that unless something 
is given statutory backing it won’t receive the attention or importance that it ought to 
have. On the other hand, it’s very difficult to frame legislation in such a way that 
preserves some of the dynamism of the sustainability assessment process, and the ability 
to create as you go, which I think has been one of the most exciting parts of the whole 
assessment process from my perspective.  
This latter view was endorsed by other Panel members, who appreciated the 
opportunity provided by the informal structure for the Panel to “do things 
unconventionally” and to be able to “think of things differently and do things 
differently, and actually maybe I guess come up with novel ideas and really 
                                                         
122 SWY interviews – Project Team (2). This interviewee elaborated, “Unless you separate out the 
various bits and say, ‘Right, you have got a Panel, they are going to take advice from EPA, Treasury, 
whoever is going to provide advice on social aspects, but the Government will take advice from the 
panel’. But then you’ve got: Who is going to impose conditions? It is very messy. One way is to make 
the EPA the body that does sustainability evaluation and you change the role or you expand the EP 
Act so they become, if you like, the body that does sustainability evaluations. They have got 
constraints I guess in terms of they are there to protect the environment, so they are going to be 
challenged, because there will be cases where you have to say: Well, we are going to sacrifice that 
environmental value because it is of such benefit to the State. [It’s] difficult. So, as a concept, I guess 
the Panel is a good one, but how it actually gets any power, clout, the respect of the other agencies, 
because they obviously all like to think that they are the last port of call I would think. At the moment 
that tends to be the EPA”. 
123 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). This interviewee went on to suggest that while the 
‘right personalities’ were already incumbent within the EPA, this was not necessarily the case with 
other agencies. 
124 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
125 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
126 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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implement them that way, and really fill in some of the gaps”
 127. Thus there is a 
tension between prescription in law, and the flexibility and creativity that is arguably 
necessary for sustainability. 
The other issue highlighted by the SWY process is that of the coordination of 
sustainability assessment processes and the present lack of a “home [for 
sustainability assessment] within the current institutional arrangements”
128. While 
the Gorgon process was managed by DoIR, the agency responsible for promoting 
industrial development, the SWY was driven and coordinated by the proponent with 
the help of its consultants. It has been recognised for some time that neither of these 
approaches is ideal (Government of Western Australia, 2002b). Project assessment 
coordination responsibilities now rest with a newly established Office of 
Development Approvals Coordination (ODAC) within DPC. While this body has 
specifically been established to manage the assessments of private resource 
development projects, there is no reason why it could not also be responsible for the 
assessment of public infrastructure projects such as SWY.  
In summary, the SWY assessment made a significant contribution to learning by 
including a Sustainability Panel within its institutional structure. While the Panel can 
be considered to have been a successful innovation, by virtue of its ability to 
challenge the proponent and its role in providing integrated advice to Government, 
certain issues also emerged: in particular, the role and status of the Panel compared 
with statutory bodies such as the EPA, and whether or not legislative reform is 
required for effective sustainability assessment. The SWY process, building upon the 
earlier Gorgon experience, has thus been an important source of process and context-
oriented learning that can contribute to the future of sustainability assessment in 
Western Australia and elsewhere. All of these forms of learning can be classed as 
collective forms of ‘exterior’ or ‘technical’ learning. I now go on to consider the role 
of ‘interior’ forms of learning within the SWY case study and sustainability 
assessment in general. 
                                                         
127 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
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6.4  Interior learning and reflexivity 
In contrast with exterior learning, which generates either ‘hard’, ‘factual’ data or 
‘how to’ knowledge through adaptation and the development of appropriate 
responses  in a way that leaves underlying frames, meanings and moral views 
unchallenged (Edwards, Ranson, & Strain, 2002; Weiss, 1977, 1991), interior 
learning generates ‘soft’ knowledge such as new concepts, moral perspectives or 
frames. Interior learning is thus firmly located within a post-empiricist policy 
orientation, that rejects the positivist view of objective knowledge where by ‘facts’ 
are separate from ‘values’ and ‘meaning’ (F. Fischer, 2003a). 
Interior learning excavates and potentially transforms the lens through which the 
world is viewed, but not through an instrumental process as a result of “new 
information and careful logic” (Boothroyd, 1995, p121), but rather through what has 
been termed ‘reflexivity’. Reflexivity has been  defined as “the capacity to develop 
critical awareness of the assumptions that underlie practices, especially the meta-
cognitive, interpretative schemata that constitute worlds” (Edwards et al., 2002)
129. 
The process of challenging unconsidered values and beliefs has also been termed 
‘deliberation’ (Dryzek, 2000; Gundersen, 1995). Reflexivity or deliberation is by 
definition context-dependent (Glasbergen, 1996) and action-based (Gundersen, 
1995; Laws & Rein, 2003; Schön, 1983). The concrete nature and the context-
specificity of impact assessment processes thus provide ideal grounds for such 
learning, in both collective and individual forms, under the right circumstances. In 
the following sections I distinguish between these two forms and explore their roles 
in the context of the SWY case study. 
6.4.1 Collective reflexivity: Towards new frames and storylines 
Policy change through reflexivity is associated with a new way of collective thinking 
(Robinson, 2004)
130, and has been called ‘atypical’ policy change, as distinct from 
                                                         
129 In their analysis of policy learning in EIA, Sinclair and Diduck (2001, p114) use the idea of ‘adult 
transformative learning’ that occurs through “critical self reflection on the underlying assumptions of 
the various parts of one’s meaning perspective or scheme”. 
130 This draws from an anthropological concept of culture that enables the ontological possibility of 
treating collectives – communities of meaning, for example – as “’real’ for analytical purposes” and 
something more than an “aggregate of individuals”, which is a more psychological approach (Yanow, 
2003, p232). Location and membership of groups gives shared meaning. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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‘normal’ policy change (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003)
 131. This can equate to a revision 
of policy goals that is sometimes called ‘conceptual learning’ (Fiorino, 2001; 
Glasbergen, 1996; Sabatier, 1987); ‘double-loop learning’ (Argyris & Schön, 1996); 
or ‘third-order policy change’ (Hall, 1993; Scrase & Sheate, 2002; Waddell, 2005). It 
may take the form of ‘reframing’, or recasting the policy discourses and storylines 
that shape the way in which policy issues are collectively understood, distinguishing 
its effects from those of other forces operating within the policy context such as 
bargaining, strategic power plays or even voting (Argyris & Schön, 1996; 
Jachtenfuchs, 1996; Laws & Rein, 2003)
132. 
In Chapter 5, I deconstructed the two competing storylines framing the Gorgon 
proposal and discussed how the ‘green’ discourse was subordinate to the ‘pro-
development’ discourse. Gorgon was characterised by strategic manoeuvering and 
power plays, and there was no evidence of any learning that might have led to the 
reconstruction of these framing storylines and the construction of new collective 
meanings (Poncelet, 2001). Instead, the policy issue was framed as one of technical 
uncertainty and the consequent focus of the sustainability assessment was on 
gathering data in an attempt to address these uncertainties through technical impact-
oriented learning
133.  
This is perhaps the most significant difference between Gorgon and the SWY, since 
unlike Gorgon, the SWY sustainability assessment process not only permitted but 
encouraged the explicit discussion of values, meanings and the ethical dilemmas 
posed by the proposal. This was exemplified by the consultant responsible for social 
impact assessment, who adopted a values-based approach and set out to explore the 
                                                         
131 An example from transport planning in the UK was the shift towards new storylines of ‘integrated 
transport planning’ and stories that challenged the supremacy of the car over pedestrians and cyclists 
(Owens & Cowell, 2002). 
132 Reframing, however, may not always be a robust indicator of reflexive learning: actors or 
coalitions of actors may deliberately develop new frames or storylines that align better with their 
interests, in a strategic action that does not involve learning (Jachtenfuchs, 1996). An example of this 
is neo-liberal economic theory, which was deliberately formulated to change the ‘tracks’ upon which 
economic policy travelled (F. Fischer, 2003a). Reframing may occur as a result of external factors; for 
example Owens and Cowell (2002) discuss the reframing of the policy issue of aggregate mining for 
road bases in the UK, pointing out that while learning may have contributed to the reframing, the 
reduced availability of suitable quarry locations has also contributed, as has failing demand for 
aggregate. They therefore caution against assuming that the frame shifts occur solely through policy 
learning. 
133 The Gorgon experience thus bears out Forester’s (1993a, p104) warning to planners, “If planners 
render the ambiguous as simply the uncertain, they will fail to learn about the normative and 
contextual dimensions of their work – and their practice is likely to suffer”. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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stories that framed the various communities’ attitudes towards the proposed 
development
134. Thus the social analysis was positioned firmly within an interpretive 
epistemology, in contrast with more the descriptive and quantitative forms of social 
impact assessment conducted in the Gorgon case (see also Bradbury & Rayner, 
2002). One interviewee reflected on these differences, saying
135: 
Yes, you can go and do your studies on tourist numbers and tourist attractions, and you 
can look at planning reports and extract all your statistical stuff from those, but I don’t 
think that really gets you to the heart of why people feel the way they do…I do think that 
having gone and looked at the communities and tried to understand what else was going 
on in the community so you could see where water fits into it all, gave it a context that 
allowed you to say, well, if we do get these sorts of results then this is what people are 
going to understand, why they are going to be concerned, what they are going to say 
about it, and how it might be resolved. I think you are just making assumptions unless 
you actually go and talk to people
136. 
This approach to social impact assessment provided a means for qualitative ‘softer’ 
data in the form of community values and perceptions to be integrated into the 
assessment process along with the ‘harder’ analytical data generated by scientific or 
technical studies. Specifically, the social analysis found that the South West 
communities opposition to the proposal to pump water to the city was founded on a 
storyline of ‘futures foregone’ by the people of the region, that is, the fear that future 
opportunities might be restricted by a lack of availability of water
137. Thus, in the 
public’s mind, the proposal would not meet its social objective of ensuring that 
‘reasonable regional needs’ for water would be met into the future. 
                                                         
134 Arguably, the interpretive approach was more appropriate to SWY than to Gorgon since there is no 
permanent community on Barrow Island with which to consult, and the island is sufficiently remote 
from most of the population of Western Australia to ensure a degree of apathy outside the ‘green’ 
community. 
135 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
136 Similarly, one Panel member said, “The people who are making decisions really had to listen to 
what the community was saying, not only the immediate fears that were being expressed but the 
underlying fears that were informing the initial responses. It’s a deeper assessment than just hearing 
from people about feeling threatened that their economy might not move forward. It’s about saying 
‘you say your economy might be threatened but have you thought about the benefits that something 
like this could bring and are there any actions that could be taken that would shift your opinion about 
on that matter?’. It’s about really understanding what people are thinking and not just listening to their 
initial words or their complaints. And current assessment processes don’t do that effectively at all” 
(SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8)). 
137 Options currently available to the people of the region include drilling private bores for the 
purposes of irrigating crops and grazing animals. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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At the same time, the economic objective of allocating water according to its highest 
economic value suggested that the SWY water resource should contribute to an 
integrated public water supply. In the context of the decision, and in the absence of 
an integrated water scheme in the South West Region where each town has its own 
small water source, this meant that from an economic perspective at least, the 
pumping of the water into the IWSS serving Perth was the highest benefit option for 
its use.  
While this meant that the proposal as it stood met its economic objective, further 
reflection led to the realisation that the economic argument was not to supply the city 
over the country per se, but to supply the community over individuals. When these 
meanings became clear, the solution became obvious: the South West region should 
also be connected to the IWSS, so that water-dependent futures would not be 
foregone and yet the highest economic value of water could still be achieved. Thus 
the result was a new storyline that made sense to the group as a whole (Laws & Rein, 
2003), the creation of a ‘single overarching norm’ that was commensurate with two 
previously competing storylines (Thacher & Rein, 2004). The new storyline was 
simply that ‘the pipe has two ends’ and that ‘water can go both ways’. One Panel 
member summarised
138: 
The turning point for me was when, in that policy learning space that was created for us 
to try and draw these things together, it became obvious that we needed to turn the 
project on its head and see it as an extension of the integrated system rather than being a 
mining of the south west for the needs of Perth. That then enabled us to see it in a 
different way and potentially turn it into a net benefit situation and the detail of that is 
still being worked through, but that for me was the critical point
139.  
The feature distinguishing interior from exterior learning is not the magnitude of 
change, since arguably filling a policy gap as described previouly (exterior) is at 
least as significant as reframing a proposal so that a water scheme is extended from 
                                                         
138 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
139 This was explained in the project documentation, “The proposal concept at the commencement of 
this sustainability evaluation was to supply 45 GL/yr to the IWSS to meet only growing demand in 
areas currently connected to this scheme. However, through the sustainability evaluation, the concept 
has evolved to consider this development as extending the IWSS to the South West. Under this 
concept, the extended IWSS would provide the opportunity of extending public water supply to areas 
in the South West close to the proposed scheme infrastructure and its possible future extensions” 
(Strategen, 2006b, p1-24). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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the city to certain country towns (interior). As the SWY assessment approaches its 
conclusion, however, it is considered by most to have been successful, to a large 
extent by virtue of this reflexive learning process and the potential that it 
represents
140. One interviewee said
141:  
On the social side I thought were the major gains in which I think it helped change the 
proposal in Water Corp’s mind…the social ends and economic ends it set were changed. 
I think that was the big gain.  
Another said
142:  
I think [the shift in the framing of the proposal has] been one of the most interesting parts 
of it, and one of the most exciting parts of the sustainability assessment. It’s been a really 
positive thing. 
The same interviewee continued: 
I mean that’s just a fantastic example of just thinking about an issue differently. In some 
ways, it’s not a huge shift in actual terms of what could be done, it’s just a different way 
of thinking, and that’s what this sort of assessment can achieve.  
Similarly
143:  
For me that was a magic moment and one where I felt that the system had provided a 
solution that would not have happened if we hadn’t had the sustainability assessment 
process.  
The same interviewee also reflected on the conceptual difference between the 
provision of compensation to the South West community in return for the 
‘appropriation’ of the water, which represents an exterior approach, and the interior 
process of reframing that emerged as an alternative and more satisfactory solution
144: 
                                                         
140 One Project Team member reflected on his changing perception of the proposal, and specifically 
his gradual realisation that “this infrastructure was actually going to be tremendous benefit for the 
region” since it is “an enabling piece of infrastructure that could really bring some real development 
opportunities”. Prior to this point, this interviewee struggled with the question of why SWY should be 
favoured over a desalination plant, which would mean “that you could have your cake and eat it too”, 
by supplying the IWSS while preserving the SWY resource for the people of the South West (SWY 
interviews – Project Team (2)). 
141 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
142 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
143 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
144 SWY interviews - Sustainability Panel (4) Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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The phrase ‘future foregone’ was the neat way of summarising what the essence of the 
problem was from the south west…It was this sense that Perth is taking away something 
that they may need for their future – the ‘future foregone’…The phrase that was raised by 
[a member of the Panel] was ‘baksheesh’. That conversation about baksheesh was 
significant because in a way it dramatised that we could do baksheesh, but it would be 
cheating, it would not be a serious addressing of the underlying issues. Baksheesh was 
never going to be more than a temporary giving of something like Gorgon has done – 
their way of buying off the public. It essentially doesn’t work. People see through it. So 
baksheesh was raised and dropped…Then at some point it twigged: No we need to give 
them something more significant, which is that they should be linked to the entire system 
and therefore they are part of a grid with pipes flowing two ways, all kinds of things can 
flow from that in the future, and there is an assured water future. So they play a part in 
giving water to that system, but they are also part of a system that can ensure they don’t 
have a ‘future foregone’.  
Language is the basis of deliberation in groups, through which people can 
communicate shared knowledge and beliefs, and potentially create new meanings 
and new ‘social realities’ that are in turn expressed in language (van der Knaap, 
1995). The change in thinking in the SWY case was reflected in a new storyline. In 
the words of one member of the Project Team
145: 
It was possibly as much as anything, a change in the way we described it, the language 
changed. We really didn’t have to do much to our reports to reflect that, it was really a 
matter of a little bit of restructuring and some different words.  
Some expressed scepticism as to whether this meant the reframing was just a matter 
of ‘spin’, with one interviewee suggesting its significance had been ‘overplayed’ by 
the Water Corporation
146, and questioned whether or not the project would bring real 
benefits to the South West towns. In relation to this concern, one Panel member 
said
147: 
I suppose I would be extremely disappointed if it didn’t happen now. I have got all the 
reassurances that it would… If they had done nothing about it and just gone ahead and 
                                                         
145 SWY interviews – Project Team (3). 
146 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (5). 
147 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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said: Oh, sometime we will do that, then I would have worried, but they are not. They 
seem to be taking it seriously
148.  
Beyond this relatively limited focus, however, there is evidence in the Gorgon and 
SWY case studies of the potential for policy processes to facilitate a level of 
reflexivity that extends beyond the stories framing the decision at hand into the 
deeper context in which the decision-making takes place. In both cases questions 
were raised that challenged some more fundamental stories, and even some of the 
prevailing macro-level political discourses, potential that has been widely observed 
(Argyris & Schön, 1996; Healey et al., 2003; Sinclair & Diduck, 2001). I discuss this 
further in Chapter 7. 
6.4.2 Personal reflexivity 
Consideration of personal reflexivity recognises that, as well as being grounded in 
collective cultural and social norms, the behaviours and actions of individuals are 
shaped by personal frames of reference and beliefs
149. For some participants, 
involvement in the SWY process catalysed a process of deep reflection upon 
personal assumptions and frames. For example, one interviewee said
150: 
This process has started me thinking more deeply about some of those bigger issues… 
I’m not sure what it has achieved for me, but it’s just made me think differently about it 
and more deeply. If it can achieve that for me, just working on one little project in our 
little corner of the world, if we can encourage more of it on other big initiatives and 
strategic projects and get more and more people involved in looking at things that way, it 
is going to have an impact. 
Acknowledging the importance of building reflexive capacity, another interviewee 
said
151:  
                                                         
148 A member of the Project Team referred to the other major project of inter-regional water transfer 
in Western Australia, that I have already mentioned, the goldfields pipeline developed in 1901 to 
bring water from the hills of Perth to Kalgoorlie. He noted that this scheme has gradually extended in 
scope over the years to open up adjacent agricultural regions as well as the Goldfield through the 
supply of fresh water, arguing that the same process can be expected to occur naturally in the SWY 
project, whether or not The Water Corporation chooses to deliberately link up towns from the 
commencement of the project (SWY interviews – Project Team (2)). 
149 This contrasts with the ‘rational actor’ model of understanding behaviour that argues that action is 
based upon information (Caldwell, 1999). 
150 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (8). 
151 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). This suggestion raises the question of who should be 
involved in these deliberative learning processes, and the earlier discussion highlighted the issues Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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I would really love all of my group, each one of them, to get on a Sustainability Panel 
and to go through the learning process that we have gone through. That would be exactly 
the sort of training [they need].  
The growing realisation emerging from these remarks is that involvement in a 
deliberative process, such as a sustainability assessment, that is context-dependent 
and action-oriented, can change the way those involved view the situation at hand 
and the world in general. As discussed previously, the influence of the perceptions 
and mental models of participants in decision-making processes has been recognised 
by communicative planning theorists
152 and others who have considered public 
policy and decision-making through the lens of critical theory
153 (see for example 
Fay, 1975; Forester, 1993a; Hillier & Gunder, 2003), seeking to understand the 
nature of the power structures within which decision-makers operate, in turn 
liberating participants from unseen constraints (F. Fischer, 2003a; Meppem & Gill, 
1998; Torgerson, 1985, 2003).  
The SWY case study provides a tiny glimpse into the transformative potential of the 
interior individual dimensions, which also embraces psychological and spiritual 
transformation that may be conceptualised as ‘learning to be’ (Nicolescu, 1997). I 
expand upon these dimensions in Chapter 7. In the following discussion I consider 
how reflexive learning, both collective and individual is catalysed, how it might be 
facilitated, and what barriers to such learning might arise. 
6.4.3 Catalysing reflexivity 
What catalyses reflexive learning in which assumptions, belief and frames are 
exposed, challenged and perhaps recast? The literature suggests that policy actors, 
whether operating individually or collectively, must experience some form of tension 
that triggers doubt about previously unchallenged aspects of one’s belief system. In 
this vein, Argyris and Schön (1996) speak of the ‘detection of errors’; Fay (1975) of 
                                                                                                                                                              
caused in the SWY process due to the late engagement of regulators. Others have questioned the role 
of politicians, recognising that deliberative processes might not influence the final decision made 
within the structures of liberal representative democracy (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Owens et al., 
2003; van Eeten, 2001), and advocates of deliberative democracy call for the inclusion of the 
community in policy processes, a point to which I return in Chapter 7. 
152 For example, Hillier and Gunder (2003) apply a Lacanian framework to enhance planning theory. 
153 Critical theory is about “the progressive emancipation of individuals and society from oppressive 
forces” (Dryzek, 2000, p20-21) through the development of the “competence of citizens themselves to 
recognize and oppose such forces”.  Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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‘suffering’; Laws and Rein (2003) of ‘uncertainty and doubt’
154; Sinclair and Diduck 
(2001) of a ‘disorienting dilemma’; and van der Knaap (1995) of ‘cognitive 
dissonance’
155. As a result of these tensions,  the inadequacy of an existing frame 
may become apparent  and the psychological discomfort of the dissonance will 
motivate an individual or a group to reduce dissonance by revising underlying 
cognitive schemata (van Eeten, 1999).  
In the SWY case, one important aspect of this tension appears to have been the 
impact data that demonstrated the apparent incommensurability of the economic and 
social objectives of the proposal, coupled with the desire among members of the 
Project Team to find a way to make the proposal acceptable to the community. 
According to the varied recollections of the Project Team members, this frame shift 
probably occurred gradually over time, perhaps commencing with the Water 
Corporation project manager, after which “the idea spread like wildfire”
156. It was 
first articulated at a workshop in May 2005 involving the Water Corporation and 
other members of the Project Team. At this workshop, the results of the various 
studies were presented against the ‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ in a way 
that highlighted the tension between the competing storylines. The protocol therefore 
not only guided technical learning related to an understanding of the potential 
impacts of a proposal, but also facilitated conceptual learning as a result of technical 
learning (Fiorino, 2001; see also Glasbergen, 1996; Laws & Rein, 2003; Scrase & 
Sheate, 2002).  
When asked what enabled this shift, one Panel member said
157:  
The social part was always going to be a problem. We just didn’t know how to handle 
that. It clearly meant you had to find out what the social was, which meant surveying and 
                                                         
154 Laws and Rein (2003, p175) also acknowledge the potential for ‘strategic interplay’ as a driver for 
change, but argue that to focus on this, as has been usual in studies of political processes, is to miss 
the “moments of doubt when accepted stories are challenged or events upset conventional accounts 
and an indeterminate situation arises that requires attention”. They are referring at this point to “the 
interplay between belief and doubt within a frame” as a “struggle that generates efforts to make sense 
of a changing situation and to coordinate action” (Laws & Rein, 2003, p174). “These moments of 
doubt are precisely the moments when systems are open to new insights, ideas and behaviour” (Laws 
& Rein, 2003, p175). 
155 Defined as “a state of doubt whether current knowledge and beliefs are still valid” (van der Knaap, 
1995, p195). 
156 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). 
157 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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relating to the community, and the people who did that did that very effectively and came 
out with some significant issues that really undermined the entire project as it was.  
The tension was clearly between the social and economic objectives, and while some 
interviewees emphasised the role of the social analysis in the process, as above, 
others emphasised the economic
158:  
[The Water Corporation project manager] said that it was the work that [the economic 
consultant] did, where [the consultant] was saying that this is the best use of the water, 
and so it was from that that he started to think about well, yes, it doesn’t need to be 
something that’s just a one-way take. We could actually look at this. And I’m hoping 
that...he would have [also] seen the sorts of issues that people were raising…but I think it 
was the economic argument. 
Tensions are often generated through the juxtaposition of potentially competing 
frames or discourses (Dryzek, 2000), and therefore bringing together groups with 
competing interests and values may provide a mechanism by which strategic action 
may be converted to communicative action, or reflexive learning (Palerm, 2000)
159. 
The tensions may also arise from ‘subsystem interaction’ or ‘venue change’ whereby 
new policy communities come together, or a policy issue is framed in a different way 
than has occurred previously (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). It can also be argued that 
sustainability represents a new venue for the consideration of major project 
proposals, in which different policy subsystems or coalitions come together to make 
joint decisions in a way that they might not have done before.  
Furthermore, sustainability assessment may provide the perfect vehicle for learning, 
since tensions are inherent within the discourse of sustainability itself as it seeks to 
reconcile the environment and development (Owens & Cowell, 2002; Robinson, 
2004), as I discuss further in Chapter 7
160.  This was certainly the case with Gorgon, 
manifested through the SIAC Reference Group, although the tensions generated did 
                                                         
158 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
159 This frame competition often arises within processes of public engagement in decision-making. In 
particular “confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated 
assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects” (Majone, 
1989, p5). In his model of ‘social learning and change’ (SLC), Waddell focuses on the formation of 
new relationships through partnerships between government, business and the community as a 
catalyst for tension and therefore learning (Waddell, 2005). 
160 Owens and Cowell (2002) go as far as to argue that conceptualisations of sustainability that seek to 
‘paper over’ these tensions, in fact do the discourse an injustice by limiting its transformative 
potential, a point to which I return. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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not lead to reframing or learning in this case, for reasons already discussed. The 
inherent and healthy tensions within the sustainability discourse were acknowledged 
by a member of the SWY Sustainability Panel
161: 
There were always tensions between the priorities of the three key areas within 
sustainability, and that’s actually a healthy process and part of the dynamic…that 
different views do get aired and that they get aired in a way that is not too insistent on 
compromise and consensus, because sometimes you just don’t get those things
162. 
6.4.4 Facilitating reflexivity 
While Dryzek (2000, pvi) believes that “deliberation can be a personal decision 
process, in which the individual mulls things over in his or her mind, not necessarily 
a collective social process at all”, others have argued that processes of reflexive 
transformation are more likely to occur within group processes in which one’s 
assumptions and beliefs are challenged by others (Gundersen, 1995)
163. According to 
van der Knaap (1995, p197), in group settings: 
Both the information and the logic with which individuals or groups are confronted may 
differ from their internal schemata. In a dialectic connection, mutual convictions and 
opinion are continuously tested and verified. Some argue that truly innovative learning is 
only possible in processes of collective argumentation: the individual can only learn 
something fundamentally new when her or his learning process involves the assimilation 
of or accommodation to the dynamics of social interaction. 
Group processes have the potential to establish identities, developing shared 
meaning, increasing capacity, develop new heuristics, innovation and institutional 
change, and to deepen knowledge about an issue (Innes & Booher, 2003; Pellizzoni, 
2001). In the words of one SWY Panel member, “It is like if we had all been in 
separate rooms we might have come up with the same solution, but as a group we 
came up with it and who knows who actually thought of it” and similarly, “You had 
                                                         
161 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (1) 
162 Similarly, another said, “What I have seen is that there is too much expression that this process 
will produce better results all round and in my view an inadequate recognition that (1) there are 
always environmental impacts, no development is possible without some environmental impacts, (2) 
there are always social impacts, and more importantly there are always in any major investment and 
major project, always winners and always losers. This process to me is too glossy. It attempts to 
pretend that we can create only winners. I have concerns about that”. (SWY interviews – Project 
Team (3)) 
163 In this way, reflexive learning may equate to social or communicative learning (Diduck & 
Mitchell, 2003; Healey, 2001; Owens & Rayner, 1999; Waddell, 2005). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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to have the all-in-a-room process of integration and a committee that can enable that 
integration”
164. This point alludes back to the discussions of the Sustainability 
Assessment Working Group in 2002 (see Chapter 2) where the potential for 
deliberation for sustainability was identified. 
What then were the characteristics of the SWY process that allowed for interior 
learning and frame shifts to occur? There are a number of contributing factors, most 
of which I have already mentioned: the question framing the assessment was more 
open and strategic and thus allowed ‘room to move’
165; the process was guided by a 
‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ that highlighted inherent tensions within 
the proposal; there was a genuine willingness to revise and reshape the proposal 
through the assessment process, perhaps in turn partly due to the Water 
Corporation’s responsibility to the community as a public utility; and the community 
engagement process deliberately sought to articulate the social meanings of the 
proposal.  
Another factor supporting learning was that the group of consultant and client 
representatives meeting to discuss SWY was considerably more cohesive than 
Gorgon’s Reference Group, since all participants were working for the project in 
some way. Learning through collective decision-making is most likely to occur if the 
parties have some degree of commonality that enables them to participate in 
meaningful discussion (Torgerson, 2003)
166. In contrast, members of the Gorgon 
Reference Group were charged simultaneously with ensuring that their agencies’ 
interests were met, as well as facilitating the assessment process itself
167. 
Owens and Cowell (2002, p162) relate the potential for reflexive learning and 
transformation to ‘institutional spaces’ or apertures in the planning process, which, 
whether purposefully created or not, “take new storylines closer to the heart of 
                                                         
164 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (4). This interviewee went on to point out that the learning 
may not have occurred had the individuals involved not been so well equipped, by virtue of their 
extensive ‘tacit knowledge’ gained through years of policy experience.  
165 Although there was a certain amount of luck that a reframing was possible that still met the broad 
project objective of delivering 45GL/year water to the IWSS. 
166 Several Project Team members expressed the view that the process would have been further 
enhanced by more regular meetings of the team (SWY interviews – Project Team (6 and 9)). 
167 Perhaps the most compromised agency in this sense was DoIR, which struggled throughout with 
accusations of its being the ‘fox in charge of the henhouse’, as discussed previously. The dual role of 
project manager and development advocate generated considerable discussion and soul-searching 
within the agency as well as accusations from outside. Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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decision making”. In the SWY process, these deliberative institutional spaces were 
provided by the Sustainability Panel and the Project Team, both of which had 
influence over the development of the proposal and over the conduct of the 
sustainability assessment process. Both of these groups, however, were strongly 
influenced by the Water Corporation. Perhaps a weakness of the process was its 
failure to provide spaces in which the broader community could have been engaged 
in deliberative processes in a way that might have led to the incorporation of a wider 
range of values into the process (Weale, 2001) and the creation of opportunities for 
deliberation and learning extending beyond the decision-makers to the community at 
large (Blatner, Carroll, Daniels, & Walker, 2001; Sinclair & Diduck, 2001). It was 
suggested by a SWY interviewee that the benefits of deliberation demonstrated by 
the internal groups could be extended into the broader community by involving more 
people in sustainability assessment processes
168:  
It is the old capacity building in a way, but at a community level institutional capacity. If 
we start and do the things we are talking about. It will give people confidence to learn 
too.  
The CRG could potentially have served this purpose, but as already discussed, its 
activities concentrated in assimilating analytical information and facilitating 
technical, impact-oriented forms of learning, reflecting an instrumental form of 
participation (Bradbury & Rayner, 2002)
169. 
Recognition of the potential for broad social learning through involvement in policy 
decision-making is one of the principles behind calls for more inclusive and 
deliberative forms of democracy than commonly occur within Western systems of 
governance. Reflexivity or deliberation is at the heart of deliberative democracy 
(Gundersen, 1995; Warren, 1992)
170, which I discuss in Chapter 7. 
                                                         
168 SWY interviews – Sustainability Panel (6). 
169 In relation to this point, van Eeten (2001, p423) has argued that “repeated displacement of 
deliberation by participation is a core problem undermining the wider use of deliberative practices and 
needs to be addressed”. 
170 Gunderson (1995) emphasises the interpretive dimension of deliberation when he defines 
deliberation as the process of challenging unconsidered values and beliefs. ‘Deliberation’ is a much-
contested term (Elster, 1998). Much has been written about appropriate models and processes for 
deliberation, whether it occurs within or outside the bounds of the administrative state (Dryzek, 
2000). While followers of Habermas might seek ‘communicative rationality’ through the rules and 
restrictions and place their faith in ‘the power of the best argument’ (Innes & Booher, 2003), others Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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6.4.5 Barriers to reflexivity  
As evidenced by the Gorgon assessment, in some circumstances, new knowledge or 
discussion within a group may not necessarily lead to reflexive learning; instead, the 
information may be incorporated into the old frame, which Argyris and Schön 
(1996) term ‘single-loop learning’, or rejected altogether. The first line of defence is 
an individual’s ‘defensive routines’ (van der Knaap, 1995), and it was noted that the 
frame shift that occurred through the SWY assessment process was in no small part 
due to the reflexive capabilities of the Water Corporation project manager
171.  
Power plays an important part, since “[t]he context of power relationships in which 
policy is developed determines learning possibilities to an important degree” 
(Glasbergen, 1996, p176). There will always be those whose interests are not served 
by ‘opening the black box’ and who will therefore seek to limit deliberation and 
reflexivity (Laws & Rein, 2003). Owens and Cowell (2002) argue that power can be 
latent, and ensure that fundamental questions challenging core beliefs can be kept off 
the agenda entirely
172, as occurred in the Gorgon case (see Chapter 5). The balance 
between learning and power plays may depend upon levels of trust between players, 
since where trust is lacking there may be a stronger resolve to maintain beliefs and 
existing frames. The perceived lack of trust between the agencies represented on the 
Reference Group was a recurring theme in the Gorgon interviews
173. 
Diduck and Mitchell (2003) also point out that reflexivity is difficult within a ‘pro-
development political context’. This was very much the case with Gorgon, where the 
                                                                                                                                                              
argue that such processes are likely to exclude those groups who might be less well equipped to 
participate in accordance with such rules (Dryzek, 2000) and envisage a less constrained version of 
deliberation, which embraces argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and 
gossip” (Dryzek, 2000, p1). Other contributors have followed Bohm in turning to the procedures of 
the ancient Greek concept of ‘dialogue’ (Majone, 1989). Roberts (2002, p6) also uses the concept of 
dialogue, which she defines as “the co-creation of new meaning through mutual understanding and 
reciprocal communications between two or more parties” that involves surfacing deep seated 
assumptions and beliefs. 
171 SWY interviews – Project Team (7). 
172 An example is that in transport planning in the UK, car culture itself has not been challenged and 
has continued to operate in a ‘parallel universe’ to attempts at sustainable transport planning, 
ultimately proving more powerful. This was demonstrated by the petrol strikes of September 2000 
following attempts to raise fuel duty (Owens et al., 2003). 
173 Gorgon interviews - Conservation Commission/CALM (7); DoIR (2 and 9). It was suggested by 
one interviewee that advocating for a particular position, as occurred extensively during the Reference 
Group meetings, was indicative of a lack of trust between agencies (Gorgon interviews – DoIR(2)). 
This, however, was refuted by another interviewee who argued that each agency had its own mandate 
and role to play in the process (Gorgon interviews – EPA/DoE (14)) Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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hegemonic pro-development paradigm framed the ‘question’ and shaped the 
assessment process. This created conflict within the Reference Group that was not 
conducive to deliberation and reflexivity and ensured a ‘decide-announce-defend’ 
approach to community engagement that effectively also curtailed opportunities for 
learning within the broader community (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003). 
Unlike the Gorgon Reference Group, the SWY Sustainability Panel was a cohesive 
group that was also generally aligned with the proponent, as already discussed. This 
‘group think’, however, can also undermine deliberation. As Weale (2001, p419) 
notes “creating the conditions under which people feel comfortable with one another 
may inhibit their putting unpopular points of view. The dangers of ‘group-think’ are 
always present when small groups are asked to consider a problem, especially when 
consensus is the goal”. This observation alludes to a tension between learning and 
consensus that I explore further in the following section.  
6.5  Beyond the decision: Learning and change over time 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the potential of deliberation to catalyse 
reframing of assumptions and mental models at both the individual and collective 
levels. Models of communicative decision-making founded on these principles are 
increasingly posed as alternatives to the widely discredited rational-comprehensive 
model of policy making, or the ‘information provision’ model of impact assessment, 
and are particularly prevalent in the field of planning (Lawrence, 2000)
174. Inspired 
by Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, it is common for writings about 
such decision-making models to emphasise their potential to reach a consensual 
conclusion.  
This assumption, however, is now widely discredited, and it is increasingly argued 
that communicative and deliberative processes do not necessarily lead to consensus 
and may simply excavate the nature of underlying conflicts (van Eeten, 1999), 
particularly when applied to ‘wicked’ policy problems (Weale, 2001)
 175. 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, the communicative model retains a focus on a 
specific decision-point, leading to the observation that even if consensus is reached 
                                                         
174 Owens et al. (2003) also refer to an example of communicative impact assessment. 
175 This concern is reflected by one of the debates within the deliberative democracy literature as to 
whether the concept is instrinsically valuable with or without better outcomes, however they are 
defined, and whether consensus is the over-riding aim (Dryzek, 2000). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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among members of a deliberative forum, the final decision-maker may not be 
influenced by the group’s recommendations (Owens & Cowell, 2002). This may yet 
prove to be the case with the external assessment and approval process for the 
SWY
176.  
Certain planning theorists have recently argued that group consensus is not only 
often infeasible, but may be also undesirable. They speak in positive terms of the 
‘agonism’ of residual disagreement, as opposed to the more negative concept of 
‘antagonism’, arguing that disagreement and competing views are not only essential 
to a rich and engaged society, but also represent potential forces of change (Hillier, 
2003)
177. The horizon of these views extends well beyond an individual decision to a 
more long term consideration of change through processes of deliberation and 
learning
178. Rather than consensus over a specific decision, the outcome of 
reflexivity and learning might be “shared meaning and purpose, usable new 
heuristics, increased social and intellectual capital, networks through which 
information and feedback can flow” (Innes & Booher, 2003, p55) or a more diffuse 
process of ‘enlightenment’ and “a generalized sensitivity to concepts” (Weiss, 1977, 
p533). In this conceptualisation, change occurs over time as perceptions and frames 
gradually shift and individuals become linked with networks (Laws & Rein, 2003), a 
point to which I return in Chapter 7. 
Moreover, learning develops capacity for further learning whereby people “become 
capable of more sophisticated undertakings” (Lopes et al., 2003, p22). Accordingly, 
Huber (1991, p89) suggests that “[a]n entity learns if, through its processing of 
information, the range of its potential behaviors is changed”, where an entity may be 
an individual, and institution or organisation, or society as a whole. It can be argued 
that capacity-building is one of the main benefits of deliberative practice (Bryson & 
Bromily, 1993; Michael, 1973)  As capacity is developed, so are the future 
“possibilities for self-transformation” (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003b, p24). It was 
                                                         
176 In the case of sustainability assessment the question must also be raised as to whether any 
consensus (and/or the final decision) adequately reflects ‘sustainability’. 
177 Along the same lines, Owens and Cowell (2002) criticise forms of sustainability that ‘underplay 
conflict’ and assume there is no further need for conflict ‘only for collaboration’ (F. Fischer & Hajer, 
1999, p4), and Flyvbjerg (1998b) suggests that social conflicts are actually the cohesive forces that 
hold ‘modern democratic societies’ together.  
178 This view is in sharp contrast to perceptions of policy learning dating back to Heclo (1974) that 
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argued that the CRG process of the SWY developed a capacity within the 
community
179:  
It did change it. It impacted the way we thought. I think it also enormously influenced 
relationships…and empowered people in the process of influence… So if it never gets up 
on an environmental basis, I think there are some major differences as a result of that 
process.  
By facilitating this form of learning, impact assessment processes can become a 
catalyst for societal change. The Berger Inquiry in Canada conducted in 1977 into 
the Alaska Pipeline provided glimpses of a process in which “political change 
beyond problem-solving is at issue” (Dryzek, 1997, p91) and attention is turned “to a 
larger political and historical context of forces that, though perhaps largely 
continuous over time, are also subject to change” (Torgerson, 2003, p131)
 180. The 
recasting of impact assessment as a transformative process for sustainability has also 
been made (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003). Rees (1988, p274) believes that 
environmental assessment should adopt a ‘radical approach’ that calls for Western 
society to examine the socio-cultural roots of the environmental crisis and to 
“consider seriously whether a change in our basic beliefs and perceptions is not 
essential to get us where we want to go”.  
Furthermore, the analysis of Chapter 5 explored the various dimensions of policy 
processes and the interactions between them, highlighting the respective roles of 
science, the behaviours of individual actors, and the power of institutions and the 
discourses that shape them. Therefore it can be argued that interior learning that 
leads to change in one dimension has the potential, through these interconnections, to 
also facilitate change in others. Chapter 7 is devoted to exploring these arguments 
further, and to ‘putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment’. 
6.6  Conclusion 
The heuristic framework introduced in Chapter 5 has also formed the basis of my 
analysis of the various dimensions of ‘policy learning’ in this chapter, where I have 
distinguished between exterior and interior, and individual and collective forms of 
                                                         
179 SWY interviews – Project Team (9). 
180 The Berger Inquiry is often held up as an early example of sustainability assessment, although the 
term was not in common usage at that time (Gibson et al., 2005). Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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learning, using the SWY sustainability assessment as my case study. In the exterior 
collective, or systems dimension, both process-oriented and context-orientated 
learning were considered. The discussion built upon the conclusions drawn from the 
analysis of the Gorgon case study in Chapter 4, endorsing them in each case but 
drawing additional conclusions. 
Firstly, the SWY assessment was framed more openly than Gorgon and was guided 
by a sustainability decision-making protocol, which together promoted a deliberative 
learning approach that led to improvements to the proposal as a result of the 
assessment. The question, however, was insufficiently strategic to embrace all of the 
dimensions of the broader context relevant to the decision, and this created tensions 
and additional challenges; in particular the boundaries of the assessment did not 
encompass the consideration of alternatives to the SWY as a potential water supply 
source. Although the cyclical process of iteratively evaluating potential impacts and 
modifying the proposal accordingly appears to have been successful in improving its 
overall sustainability, ideally sustainability assessment processes would begin with a 
deliberative and inclusive process commencing with the identification of the ‘right 
question’; followed by the development of a sustainability decision-making protocol; 
and the identification, evaluation and enhancement of alternatives in accordance with 
the protocol. 
Like Gorgon, the SWY assessment generated calls for Government-led strategic 
planning in key areas such as water management, with many participants believing 
this would simplify future project sustainability assessments by providing an 
adequate policy framework, and would enhance sustainability. Specific 
recommendations for South West Public Water Supply Future Planning Study have 
been made as a result of the SWY assessment, and this would provide an appropriate 
opportunity for the process framework I have recommended be adopted and trialled.  
Secondly, while the sustainability decision-making framework that guided the SWY 
assessment formed the basis for consideration of integration, trade-offs, offsets and 
the overall acceptability of the proposal in sustainability terms, it remains to be seen 
whether it will be fully accepted by the two regulatory agencies or whether they will 
apply different criteria in assessing the proposal. Although the regulatory agencies 
reviewed the Scoping Report (Strategen, 2005), the ambiguity over the extent to Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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which they are fully accepting of it emphasises the need for the roles and 
responsibilities of the various bodies involved in a sustainability assessment to be 
clearly defined. 
This is particularly true if the concept of the Sustainability Panel is retained within 
future institutional structures for sustainability assessment, as I argue it should be. In 
advance of regulatory reform, for I argue the time is not yet right in Western 
Australia, the relationships between a non-statutory Panel and the statutory 
authorities must be clarified. At the very least, this requires meaningful regulatory 
input into the development of the sustainability decision-making protocol, and a 
clear understanding of how the Panel’s advice to Government relates to that of the 
regulatory agencies, although a more active engagement of the regulators in 
processes of deliberation would promote further institutional learning and change. 
Furthermore, the sustainability assessment process should be coordinated by 
Government and not by the proponent, and consideration should be given to 
empowering the Panel to conduct its own investigations to limit dependency on the 
proponent for information. 
Thirdly, the SWY experience demonstrated the importance of meaningful 
community engagement through the Community Reference Group (CRG) and the 
values-based approach to the social impact assessment. The latter in particular was 
instrumental in catalysing an interior form of learning. The CRG, however, was 
limited in practice to a mechanism for providing information and receiving feedback, 
rather than being a forum for deliberation. There is potential to utilise the community 
capacity enhanced through the SWY process in more innovative ways in the future, 
and particularly in the South West Water Futures Study.  
Fourthly, the SWY assessment process provided the ‘institutional spaces’, within 
which the Project Team deliberated over the proposal. The sustainability decision-
making protocol highlighted the tensions between the social and economic 
objectives, which in turn catalysed an interior or collective learning that resulted in 
the proposal being reframed from being a water supply for Perth to being a system 
for both the metropolitan and regional areas. This was a significant point of 
difference between the Gorgon and SWY assessment; both were inherently 
controversial projects with competing objectives and tensions, but whereas the Chapter 6: Policy learning through the SWY assessment 
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former degenerated into a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, in the latter case conflict was 
transformed into learning that challenged and reframed the assumptions upon which 
the original proposal was built. In addition it encouraged those involved in the 
process to reflect deeply on their personal worldviews and beliefs, thus also 
catalysing a personal reflexivity. 
In reflexive or interior forms of learning that excavate, reveal and potentially 
transform hidden assumptions, discourses and personal beliefs, lies great potential 
for change. I observed previously how discourses and institutions collectively form 
the context that shapes policy processes. Both case studies have demonstrated the 
potential for sustainability assessment to influence the exterior dimensions of 
context, in terms of policy and institutional change, and the SWY has also hinted to 
the potential for discursive change through sustainability assessment, albeit at the 
micro-level of the storyline framing the proposal. In Chapter 7 I argue that 
sustainability calls for reflexive learning that extends way beyond what has been 
observed in this case study, to reach deeply into the framing discourses of modernity, 
and I explore the potential of sustainability assessment as a mechanism to facilitate 
this process. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into 
sustainability assessment 
7.1  Introduction 
In September 2005, I co-chaired
1 a stream entitled ‘SEA and sustainability appraisal’ 
at the International Association for Impact Assessment’s special topic conference 
‘International Experience and Perspectives in SEA’, held in Prague, Czech Republic. 
The broad purpose of this session was to discuss the relationship between strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) and sustainability assessment
2 and to identify any 
points of distinction. I later wrote in the Editorial of a consequent special edition of 
the Journal of Environmental Assessment, Planning and Management on 
sustainability assessment, “The ultimately defining characteristic of sustainability 
assessment, when compared with EIA, SEA and other forms of assessment, is that it 
is underpinned by the concept of sustainability” (Pope, 2006b, pvi). I went on to 
admit that this is a somewhat facile statement that appears to be stating the obvious, 
but also to point out that ‘obvious’ does not equate with ‘simple’, since very little 
about sustainability can be considered so.  
The purpose of this chapter is to emphatically ‘put the sustainability
3 back into 
sustainability assessment’. At this point in my argument, I have examined the 
conduct of sustainability assessment (Chapter 4), its contextual influences and 
interior dimensions (Chapter 5), and its potential as a process of learning (Chapter 
6). It is therefore time to return to the concept at the heart of sustainability 
assessment theory and practice. Sustainability was also a central concept in my 
                                                         
1 With Barry Dalal-Clayton of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). 
2 I use the more general term ‘sustainability assessment’, noting that ‘sustainability appraisal’ has a 
specific meaning in the UK. 
3 Although some authors use the term ‘sustainability’ as distinct from ‘sustainable development’, the 
two are often conflated and are used interchangeably in Agenda 21, the sustainable development 
blueprint arising from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. In common usage, ‘sustainability’ has become 
shorthand for ‘sustainable development’ (Davison, 2001). Despite this lack of clear distinction, 
Davidson notes that ‘sustainability’ is often associated with a radical environmentalist orientation in 
contrast with the ‘sustainable development’ favoured by government and business and those with 
more conservative aspirations (Davidson, 2000). Similarly, Davison hints that sustainability embodies 
the potential for critique and challenge by suggesting that it is “an essentially contested and culturally 
rich discursive domain” (Davison, 2001, p41), while sustainable development is less contested and 
narrower, as a result of the influence of ecological modernisation arguments, as I discuss in this 
chapter. Throughout this thesis I have preferred the term ‘sustainability’ to ‘sustainable development’, 
because of its dominance within the Western Australian policy context, because it is arguably more 
general than sustainable development, and because its more radical nature better aligns with my 
personal views.  Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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literature review of sustainability assessment processes, reproduced in Chapter 2, 
where I identified three models of sustainability assessment distinguished by their 
implicit interpretations of sustainability (Pope et al., 2004). I have self-critiqued the 
views expressed in this review throughout the thesis, at different points in my own 
learning process, and my need to return to sustainability again at this late point in my 
argument marks another point on the journey
4.  
I commence by reflecting upon my own process of grappling with sustainability, 
before examining the interaction between the concept of sustainability and the 
practices of decision-making exemplified by case studies of sustainability 
assessment in Western Australia. Guiding my research is the primary concern, 
expressed in Chapters 1 and 2 and re-emphasised here, of how sustainability 
assessment as a policy tool might contribute to sustainability. To address this point, I 
review the evolution of the sustainability discourse from a sociological perspective, 
exploring its relationship to modern industrial society. This macro-level analysis 
enables a new level of understanding of the reflexive learning potential of 
sustainability assessment.  
7.2  Grappling with the concept 
My personal process of learning about sustainability began prior to the 
commencement of this research, and was, in fact, my motivation for its undertaking. 
I was not alone in seeking to understand sustainability: all over Western Australia, 
and the world others were doing the same. While my initial forays into the subject 
area were mainly at the conceptual level, my interest quickly took a practical turn as 
I confronted the interaction between the concept of sustainability and decision-
making in the form of the sustainability assessment case studies analysed in this 
thesis.  
7.2.1 A personal perspective 
It is difficult to remember when I first heard the word ‘sustainability’, but I was 
certainly aware of it in May 2001 when I decided to return to Murdoch University to 
undertake postgraduate study towards a Postgraduate Diploma in Policy Studies 
                                                         
4 Chapters 2 and 7 are thus the ‘bookends’ or the delimiters of the particular period of learning about 
sustainability that has been my research process, but of course recognising that the learning process is 
ongoing. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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(Ecologically Sustainable Development) in the Institute for Sustainability and 
Technology Policy (ISTP). This timing coincided with the establishment of the 
Sustainability Policy Unit (SPU) within the Western Australian Department of the 
Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and the early stages of the preparation of the State 
Sustainability Strategy. ‘Sustainability’ was the word of the moment, and ISTP was 
close to the action by virtue of its Director, Professor Peter Newman, having been 
appointed as Acting Director of the SPU. I, along with my fellow students, became 
caught up in the passion and opportunity of the moment (see Chapter 1).  
During 2001 and 2002, I was also undertaking a period of consultancy for the Water 
Corporation of Western Australia, an organisation that was, along with many others 
at the time, grappling with the meaning of sustainability within a corporate context. 
As a consultant to its Environment Branch, I was quickly drawn into these 
discussions. Frustrated at my lack of understanding of the concept, I began to attend 
every seminar, workshop or course available in Perth that had the term 
‘sustainability’ in the title. It transpired that there were many of these, but for a while 
they fuelled my confusion rather then tempering it, since it seemed that everyone 
whose advice I sought in this way had a different view of what sustainability meant. 
This was exemplified by three experiences in particular. I attended a training course 
on The Natural Step process in June 2001, and was inspired by the simplicity of its 
concepts and the clarity of the ‘four system principles’ for sustainability (The 
Natural Step, 2001)
5. Then, in May 2002 I was sponsored by Water Corporation to 
attend a corporate-oriented sustainability seminar entitled Investing in partnerships: 
Making the case and attended by leading members of Perth’s business community. 
Here the focus was the business case for a triple bottom line perspective
6. This was 
quickly followed by the 11
th Annual Students and Sustainability Conference held at 
                                                         
5 These state, “In the sustainable society, nature is not subject to increasing: 1. Concentration of 
substances extracted from the Earth’s crust; 2. Concentrations of substances produced by society; 3. 
Degradation by physical means and in that society; 4. Conditions do not systematically undermine the 
capacity of people to meet their needs” (www.thenaturalstep.org.au).  
6 The speakers at this event were Claude Fussler (Director – World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development); Christian Kornevall (Senior Vice President, Sustainability Affairs – The ABB Group); 
Bart Jan Krouwel (Managing Director, Sustainability and Social Innovation – The Rabobank Group); 
and Jane Nelson (Director, Business Leadership and Strategy – International Business Leaders 
Forum). I also attended the 2003 event, entitled Boards, brands and business models: Beyond the 
triple bottom line, at which the speakers were Sir Mark Moody-Stuart (Anglo-American); John 
Elkington (SustainAbility); Dorothy MacKenzie (Dragon Brand Consulting); Deborah Zemke (Ford 
Motor Company); and Noel Purcell and Ann Sherry (Westpac).  Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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Murdoch University in July 2002, where sustainability seemed to be equated with 
environmental and social activism and alternative lifestyles
7.  
As a result of these and other contrasting influences
8, my views on sustainability 
evolved into an eclectic mix of perspectives. I believed in the need for radical 
societal change, and was frustrated by a purely community-based approach, but for a 
long time argued that this change could only be lead by the corporate sector by virtue 
of its power within the increasingly globalised economy
9. I gradually became 
disillusioned with the corporate world, however, due to my frustrations working 
within it and a perception of a lack of obvious change; the rather self-congratulatory 
rhetoric of the business–oriented seminars where the superiority of western 
economic and political views went unchallenged; and my broader reading
10. I was 
particularly sceptical of the concept of sustainability equalling ‘win-win-win’ 
outcomes, which appeared to be the prevailing view of the business community, but 
which seemed to disregard the concept of ecological limits and to assume that ‘more 
of everything’ was good. It also had little to say on the global sustainability issues 
that were of increasing concern to me. 
I had sympathy with the activists but did not feel at home amongst them, self-
conscious as I was of my conservative middle-class upbringing that showed in my 
appearance and my lifestyle, and my engineering career on the ‘dark side’. So 
instead I placed my faith in the power of Government to bring about change and 
                                                         
7 According to the conference website (www.studentsofsustainability.org), “Students of Sustainability 
(SoS) is the largest student-run environmental based conference in Australia. Each year SoS offers an 
amazing opportunity for students, activists, academics, environment and indigenous groups, and 
members of the wider community from around Australia to come together to share and gain 
knowledge, skills and information on environment and social justice issues. Featuring a vast array of 
inspiring speakers, practical workshops, field trips and empowering activities, SoS is the most 
important event of the year for environmental activists and people wishing to learn more about how to 
create positive social change in their communities”. 
8 At around the same time, I joined the Western Australian chapter of the Australian Corporate 
Citizenship Alliance (ACCA) and attended regular seminars on Corporate Social Responsibility and 
sustainability in a business context. Through different contacts and influences, I became interested in 
the work of Oxfam and its campaign for fair trade, and I began to subscribe to New Internationalist 
magazine and read its stories on the effect of the global political economy on the majority world. In 
my studies, I began to learn about community engagement and governance and grass-roots, ‘bottom-
up’ approaches to sustainability at a local level, an example being the efforts of municipal 
governments in Western Australia to implement ‘Local Agenda 21’ programmes. 
9 In a unit of study entitled ‘Ecologically Sustainable Development’ in first semester 2002, I argued 
this point in a seminar on mining and sustainability. 
10 I found one article on corporate power and political influence in the July 2002 edition of New 
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threw my passion into the State Sustainability Strategy process and the development 
of sustainability assessment processes in Western Australia. It was in this frame of 
mind, and at the first discernible resting point of my learning journey, that I wrote 
the sustainability assessment literature review, a version of which appears in Chapter 
2.  
7.2.2 Sustainability and sustainability assessment in Western 
Australia 
While I was processing my conceptual confusion, the Western Australian policy 
community as a whole was embarking on its own journey towards understanding 
sustainability within a decision-making context. In fact, practice can not be separated 
from conceptual understanding, since it has been argued that it is only through the 
transcription from the conceptual to the practical in the ‘messy world of politics’ that 
the meanings of concepts such as sustainability fully emerge (Owens & Cowell, 
2002)
11. Owens and Cowell (2002) have explored the two-way interactions between 
the concept of sustainability and the UK planning system
12, which in many places is 
the forum for coordinating environmental, social and economic considerations and 
therefore a natural home for sustainability. In Western Australia, for reasons 
described in Chapter 1, one significant natural home for deliberations over the nature 
of sustainability at present is the sustainability assessment of major project proposals 
that are the subject of this thesis
13.  
When the Gorgon assessment process commenced in 2002, the State Sustainability 
Strategy was still in draft, and in the absence of any clear policy direction no real 
attempt was made to clarify what sustainability should mean in the context of the 
Gorgon decision (see Chapters 3, 4 and 6). This was perhaps indicative of a naïve 
assumption that the various parties and stakeholder groups were broadly of a 
common mind in their support of the concept of sustainability. This in turn may be a 
                                                         
11 According to Marquand (1988, p12 cited in Owens and Cowell, 2002), “usable doctrines do not 
spring, fully armed, from a theorist’s brow. They have to be hammered out in the give and take of a 
debate, provoked and shaped by the lived experience of particular societies at particular times”. Thus, 
“In practice, conceptual and operational approaches proceed in parallel”. 
12 ‘Two-way’ in the sense that the concept of sustainability might be expected to influence planning, 
and at the same time, the process of planning itself might be part of the process of exploring the 
meaning of sustainability.  
13 Other ‘nodes’ of sustainability debates in Western Australia include the land development and 
building industries, the corporate sector, certain State Government agencies and local governments 
that are implementing Local Agenda 21 programmes. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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reflection of the observation that while it is hard to disagree in principle with the 
high level ‘concept’ of sustainability, its more concrete ‘conceptualisations’, often 
developed through decision-making practice, are many, varied and often conflicting 
(Denniss, 2005; Dryzek, 1997; Owens & Cowell, 2002; Rein & Schön, 1993)
14. In 
the absence of the depth of understanding that comes through practice and 
experience, the degree of commonality was arguably far greater at the 
commencement of the Gorgon process than it was at its end
15. 
The common understanding amongst the Western Australian policy community in 
2002 was that sustainability meant the integration of the triple bottom line of 
environmental, social and economic concerns, and that the goal was to avoid trade-
offs between these three pillars and to achieve ‘win-win-win’ outcomes 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003b). As I described in Chapters 3 and 4, no 
real integration was achieved in the Gorgon process in which two separate 
assessments, one environmental and one socio-economic, were conducted that could 
not be reconciled. Neither was a ‘win-win-win’ outcome achieved, since the EPA 
argued that the proposed ‘net conservation benefits’ did not constitute an 
environmental ‘win’ (Environmental Protection Authority, 2003).  
Since sustainability was not clearly defined prior to the Gorgon case, the proponent 
attempted to develop its own sustainability principles and objectives, which were not 
necessarily consistent with those eventually developed by the Government (Pope et 
al., 2005). One interviewee said of the proponent’s claims
16:  
But to then go through at the end and say these are our sustainability principles and then 
say blithely that they’ve met all of them is just errant nonsense. So it makes a mockery of 
whole sustainability process as far as I’m concerned….Their sustainability criteria were 
                                                         
14 As Dryzek (1997, p123) says, “It is at the discursive level that dilemmas are dissolved by 
sustainable development, not at the level of policies and accomplishments”. Even more bluntly from 
Denniss (2005), “When was the last time you met someone who was opposed to increasing 
environmental sustainability? Not someone who merely disagreed about the best way to achieve it, 
but someone who actively opposed the concept?” 
15 It must be acknowledged that some tensions may be inherently reconcilable, a point illustrated by 
Owens and Cowell (2002), who argue that while justice is a useful concept to aid sustainability, social 
and environmental justice may conflict in practice with other forms of justice, such as property rights, 
or perhaps mineral rights. Similarly, pluralists acknowledge that “in the everyday world we inhabit, at 
some point the great values begin to contradict each other” (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003b, p21). 
16 Interviews – Community Groups (12). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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erroneous in the first place, and then even if you accepted that they were OK, they didn’t 
meet them anyway, even though they say they did. 
The same interviewee expressed views on sustainability from the ‘green’ 
perspective, challenging the hegemonic discourse of economic growth and 
development and articulating the divide between the ‘green’ and ‘pro-development’ 
perspectives that had begun to open up by this time: 
It always seems to me at the moment that it’s the environment that we’ll trade, not 
anything else. I must admit, I do get a bit worried that sustainability is now the ‘in’ 
concept to use to try to get developments through. And I think if it continues to be 
misused, I for one, from the environment side of things will stop supporting 
sustainability... As much as I think yeah, sustainability is the way to go, I still think we 
overemphasise the economic side of things. So I think we’ve got a way to go on that and 
we’re certainly not there yet. 
The Gorgon process was entirely unequipped to reconcile the competing discourses; 
as was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, its inherently descriptive nature marginalised 
normative issues and the more radical views
17 and arguably served only to highlight 
a fundamental tension between alternative conceptualisations of sustainability. In 
contrast, the SWY process was more successful than Gorgon in integrating the 
‘factual’ and the value-based aspects of the decision. 
The presentation of the SWY case study in Chapter 6 focused on the internal process 
conducted by the proponent and its consultants, and presents the views of the Project 
Team and the Sustainability Panel. As discussed previously, members of these 
groups were considerably more aligned in purpose and perspective than those of the 
Gorgon Reference Group, and therefore ideological arguments did not feature 
prominently in the SWY analysis. Instead, these groups grappled deeply with the 
concept of integration and sustainability, finding ways to maximise mutually 
beneficial outcomes (win-win-wins), assessing trade-offs and finding offsets, and 
generally considering the interactions between sustainability factors and potential 
impacts (see Section 6.3.2).  
                                                         
17 Owens and Cowell (2002, p104) suggest that the interpretation of sustainability principles “is 
mediated by institutions and power” that constrain the options that are available. In this case the 
power was held by the proponent and the Department of Industry and Resources (DoIR) as discussed 
in Chapter 5, and the conceptualisation of sustainability applied to Gorgon, unclearly articulated as it 
was, reflects this. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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As project proposals, both the Gorgon and SWY assessments were confronted with 
the question of what sustainability means in the context of a single decision. One 
Gorgon interviewee suggested only large projects could ever be subject to a 
sustainability assessment in place of EIA since they would be the only ones that 
could demonstrate significant socio-economic impacts to be considered alongside 
environmental impacts. He suggested that in order to consider small mining projects 
within a sustainability framework the sector would have to be considered as a 
whole
18. Furthermore, the principle of intergenerational equity sat uneasily with the 
Gorgon proposal, relating as it did to the exploitation of non-renewable resources.  
In sustainability decision-making, the focus is usually on a specific locality, as was 
the case in both Gorgon and SWY. While this is consistent with a pragmatic 
argument for ‘situated judgement’ (Thacher & Rein, 2004), it raises the question of 
spatial scale since this often determines what is ‘good’
19. Ultimately this evokes the 
relationship between the local and the global dimensions of sustainability, since what 
appears reasonable and even sustainable at the local level may be irrelevant, or even 
in opposition to notions of global sustainability
20. As Gibson et al. (2005, p90) note, 
“For practical decision making in a world facing sustainability problems at multiple 
intersecting scales, reliance on locally situated discourse alone is not workable”. 
Both Gorgon and SWY faced dilemmas of scale and questions of indirect impacts 
outside the bounds of the proposal; for example, a promoted benefit of the SWY 
project was the provision of water to a developing industrial area, and the question 
was raised as to whether the further development of industry in this area was a good 
thing in terms of sustainability
21. The relationship of Western Australians to their 
limited and therefore precious water resources, and particularly the desire of Perth 
residents for European gardens in what is one of the driest climates on Earth, was 
also questioned.  
                                                         
18 Interviews – ChevronTexaco (5). 
19 What is good for a country, for example an airport, may not be good for a locality adjacent to the 
airport (Owens & Cowell, 2002). Owens and Cowell (2002, p148) also note that “local communities 
may not necessarily arrive at conceptions of sustainability or justice that would be regarded as 
defensible in a wider society”. 
20 The discourse itself has different meanings at different levels of consideration; clearly, issues of 
equity and development have different implications within the context of a local community than they 
do at a global scale. 
21 This point was one of many made by Dr Robert Gibson from the University of Waterloo in Canada 
during a presentation to the SWY Sustainability Panel on 30 March 2006. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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Global issues were considered to some extent in both assessments, particularly 
greenhouse gas emissions, but the boundaries of the decisions excluded 
consideration of indirect impacts such as the effects of selling Gorgon gas to China 
to further its industrial development. While a more comprehensive assessment of 
indirect impacts like this would clearly be cumbersome, and would provide no way 
of considering the impact of the Gorgon decision compared with a million other 
decisions affecting the Chinese economy, to most of which sustainability assessment 
will not be applied, such questions allude to a deep challenge to the status quo.  
The experiences of these two case studies and their engagement with the concept of 
sustainability have exposed some of the tensions inherent within the discourse. The 
nature of the tensions can usefully be considered through the lens of ‘integration’, 
which is a recurring theme in most discussions of sustainability. As discussed 
previously, this is usually simplistically limited to discussions of mechanisms by 
which the three pillars of environmental, social and economic might be reconciled 
within sustainability decision-making processes. Integration, however, is more 
complex and multi-faceted than this. As I wrote recently (Pope, 2006b, pvii), 
drawing on Gibson’s (2006) articulation of sustainability as ‘an inherently 
integrative concept’: 
The concept of sustainability is holistic, ambiguous, future-orientated, global, and 
normative, and these characteristics translate into calls for the integration of 
transboundary (and even global) considerations with local; the qualitative and abstract 
with the quantitative and concrete; future considerations with present ones; and the 
particular with the conceptual.  
The case studies each struggled with these tensions in their different ways, and 
through this struggle helped to shape the Western Australian conceptualisation of 
sustainability, although it seemed that sustainability assessment was raising at least 
as many questions as it answered about the nature of sustainability and what it might 
mean for sustainability decision-making in Western Australia. Together with my 
process of reading and researching, my involvement in the Gorgon process in 
particular served to strengthen my view that sustainability calls for a fundamental 
questioning of the trajectory of development. It therefore became important to 
understand the discourse of sustainability in more depth and to relate it to what I was 
observing around me.  Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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7.3  Sustainability: The evolution of a discourse 
Sustainability, or sustainable development, has become the dominant discourse in 
environmental politics, at the international level and particularly in developing 
countries. The discourse of sustainability has its origins in the environmental 
movements of the 1960s, which emerged in reaction to the modern, industrial society 
that defines it (Christoff, 1996; Dresner, 2002; Dryzek, 1997; R. J. Smith, 1996). For 
this reason it is important to briefly review the trajectory of modernity at this point, 
before discussing the evolution of environmentalism and sustainability. 
7.3.1 The institutions of modernity 
Modernity has its roots in the Enlightenment ideal of progress driven by science, 
technology and the instrumental control of the material world through the application 
of reason (Dresner, 2002). As Wagenaar and Cook (2003, fn p139) have noted: 
Modernity is, of course, a notoriously slippery concept, but we understand it here as an 
all-encompassing economic-political-scientific-cultural movement that has its roots in the 
scientific enlightenment, the political revolutionary upheavals of the late eighteenth 
century, and in the industrial revolution of the early nineteenth century. Conceptually, the 
diverse manifestations of modernity are united by a pervasive individualism and a quest 
for mastery of one’s natural and social environment. 
The defining tenets of modernity have been variously identified as capitalism, 
industrialisation, military power and surveillance
22 (Giddens, 1990); faith in 
technological progress and increasing control of nature, belief in positivism and 
rationality, and belief in the superiority of western values and culture
23 (Norgaard, 
2004); “individualism, science, rationality, efficiency, free speech, democracy, 
progress, competition, a ‘Christian’ god, moral superiority, technological know-how, 
male dominance” (Michael, 1993, p82); or nation-states, individualisation, gainful 
employment, exploitation of nature, scientisation and functional differentiation 
                                                         
22 Although industrialisation does not depend upon capitalism and can in fact feature in political 
ideologies ranging from Marxism to fascism (Dryzek, 1997), capitalism has evolved with technology 
into techno-capitalism in which “science, technology, industry and administration interlock in a 
circular process” (Outhwaite, 1994, p21). Or, in the words of Giddens (1990, p57), “Capitalist 
society… is characterised by technological advance as a result of the competitiveness and 
expansionism of capitalism”. In turn this has led to laissez faire government approaches to economic 
management and the evolution of liberalism (Balakrishnan, Duvall, & Primeaux, 2003).  
23 Accordingly, postmodernism responds with views on cultural diversity and interpretivism, and 
highlights that faith in ‘progress’ towards utopia is misplaced, as revealed by the ecological crisis 
(Norgaard, 2004). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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(Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003)
24. Others have emphasised economic growth and the 
increasing integration of the global economy (‘globalisation’) as a characteristic of 
21
st Century modernity (Balakrishnan et al., 2003; Paehlke, 2003)
25.  
I argued in Chapter 5 that positivism and instrumental rationality, the foundations of 
the rational-comprehensive policy model, represent ‘flatland’ (Wilber, 2000), in 
which the exterior elements have been cast adrift from the interior dimensions that 
give them depth and meaning. Separation is the theme of policy ‘flatland’: means 
from ends; politics from policy analysis; facts from values; bureaucratic policy 
makers from each other, from politics and from broader society; policy processes 
from their context. The theme of separation, however, extends well beyond policy 
practice, since assumptions of positivism have shaped the development of modern 
industrial society itself (F. Fischer, 2003b). As a consequence (Slaughter, 1998, 
p523): 
Individuals and cultures were stripped of inner meaning and the external world (including 
the global ecology) was rendered into a set of things, mere resources. Consequently the 
world of modernity was built on the illusion that only half of reality mattered: the 
external, objective, measurable part.  
Thus modernity itself is a manifestation of ‘flatland’ and characterised by the 
dissociation of the ‘big three’ of ‘I’, ‘we’ and ‘it’ (Slaughter, 1998). Modern 
industrial society, in which individuals are separate from their communities, their 
environment, and in many ways aspects of themselves, is the social context within 
which environmental discourses have evolved
26. 
7.3.2 The first and second environmental movements 
Davison (2001)  speaks of the first and second waves of environmental concern. The 
first wave emerged in the post-war years with a message of pessimism and 
                                                         
24 This functional separation results in a fragmented society of specialists, each with a particular 
perspective or epistemology, where nobody can see the whole (Norgaard, 2004). 
25 Globalisation shifts power, “disrupts traditional cultures and societies and changes relationships 
between the individual to his state and community” (Roberts, 2002, p4). 
26 Extending the argument, Giddens (1990, pp16-17) argues that modernity separates “time and space 
into a realm that is detached from immediate experience”, that is, it disembeds social systems from 
their cultural context. Furthermore, market economies have disrupted the sense of connection with 
past and future and obligations and responsibilities to others. “By severing ties of place, kin, and 
occupation, by making tradable and transportable commodities of them, the market undermines those 
institutions which link future harms or well-being to present actions” (Davidson, 2000, p38). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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apocalyptic ‘bad news’, critiquing the basic structures of modernity (Jamison, 2000). 
The discourses included ‘Survivalism’, characterised by the ‘limits to growth’ 
argument, and green radicalism (Dryzek, 1997). The environmental movement 
complemented other reform agendas such as peace, civil rights and feminism 
(Davison, 2001).  
This first wave of environmentalism, however, which emerged from the rich North
27, 
was met with scepticism and accusations of elitism by the nations of the South, 
where concerns about poverty took precedence over environmental issues (Davison, 
2001) and social conditions were more immediately pressing than conditions of 
‘physical sustainability’ (Dresner, 2002). It was unsuccessful in gaining global 
political traction, although the industrialised nations of the North in particular began 
to implement measures to limit the environmental impacts of their activities
28. It 
survives in a few counter-cultural enclaves of the modern world, which were well-
represented at the Students and Sustainability Conference I attended in 2002. 
In contrast with the first, the second wave of environmentalism was characterised by 
optimism
29 that global environmental and development imperatives could be 
reconciled within the institutions of modernity and without challenging the dominant 
‘Promethean’ discourse of limitless economic growth (Davison, 2001; Dryzek, 
1997). In fact economic growth and ‘green capitalism’ were to be the panacea for the 
world’s ills (McManus, 1996; Rees, 1988), and the banner for this movement was 
‘sustainable development’. In the 1980s, the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED), chaired by Gro Brundtland, produced its sustainable 
development manifesto Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987). The Brundtland Commission developed the definition that 
has become ubiquitous: 
                                                         
27 I use the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ to distinguish between developed and developing nations. The 
term ‘Western’, used in other contexts can be taken as equivalent to ‘Northern’. 
28 The US National Environmental Policy Act 1969, discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), is an example of this.  
29 However, Dresner views this apparent optimism as an attempt to put on a brave front, “A Victorian 
would also be struck by the extent to which we, who live in a world that has seen so much progress in 
the last century or so, have lost faith in the ideal of a better world in the future. Unlike Victorians, 
who generally looked to the future optimistically, we tend to look to the future with the feeling that 
optimism is passé. The slogan ‘sustainable development’ is an attempt to sound optimistic which 
reveals a degree of doubt about the future that most Victorians did not share. Our intellectual mood 
would strike them as very similar to Romanticism. They would wonder quite why that has happened” 
(Dresner 2002, p18). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.  
By acknowledging the link between economic development and environmental 
protection at a global scale, sustainable development seemed to be about ‘having it 
all’, including “ecological protection, economic growth, social justice, and 
intergenerational equity” (Dryzek, 1997, p124). There has always been ambiguity, 
however, about the nature of this link and what it means in practice (Davison, 2001), 
and it has been pointed out that it is more defensible at the global scale than in the 
context of policy decision-making at a smaller scale (Gibson et al., 2005). For this 
reason, the environmental movement has viewed sustainable development with deep 
suspicion, “haunted by the dilemma of whether to argue on the terms set by the 
government or to insist of their own mode of expression” (F. Fischer, 2003a, p88) 
along the counter-hegemonic lines of the first environmental movement
30. 
7.3.3 Sustainability, business and public policy 
In contrast with the caution of the environmental movement, business has often 
responded enthusiastically to the mantra of sustainable development, an endorsement 
that has arguably led to a redefinition of the sustainable development discourse 
(Davison, 2001). Some have suggested that adoption and redefinition was a 
deliberate strategy on the part of the business sector. For example, Richard Denniss 
(2005), representing public policy think tank The Australia Institute said in a recent 
newspaper article: 
In a clever rhetorical shift, big business and apathetic governments realised that they 
could placate their critics and protect their friends simply by talking about the importance 
of sustainability. Even better, once they began to talk about sustainability, they could 
begin the process of redefining it. 
Owens and Cowell (2002, p163) offer further analysis along these lines: 
A review of post-Brundtland developments suggests that environment-led interpretations, 
initially acceptable if only on ‘past deficit’ grounds, came to be seen as a threat to core 
aspects of political economy. The response from corporate interests and governments was 
not to reject sustainable development – the Trojan horse was already through the gate – 
                                                         
30 Gibson et al. (2005) argue that despite its reconciliatory nature, sustainable development still 
represented a critique of the status quo. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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but to capture and mould the idea in a variety of ways to produce their own conceptions 
in which growth and competitiveness remained at the core. Thus the shift towards 
‘Panglossian’
31 interpretations in official policy discourse in the UK can be seen as one in 
which dominant political ideologies reasserted themselves.  
In this light, the acknowledgement of the relationship between social inequity and 
environmental degradation inherent within the sustainable development discourse, 
combined with the assumption that economic growth is the panacea for poverty 
(Davison, 2001; Robinson, 2004), has evolved into an assumption about the mutual 
reinforceability of environmental protection and economic growth not just globally 
but at the level of individual business strategies and public policy decisions from the 
level of the nation-state down (Ashford, 2002; Berger et al., 2001; Christoff, 1996; 
Jamison, 2000). With the endorsement of the business sector, sustainable 
development has thus been aligned with the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism, 
in a marriage termed ‘ecological modernisation’ (Davison, 2001; Owens & Cowell, 
2002).  
At the core of the ecological modernisation discourse in all its variations is the belief 
that economic growth can be decoupled from environmental degradation (Barry, 
2003; Christoff, 1996; Hajer, 1995; Weale, 1992). Unlike Brundtland’s sustainable 
development, however, the ecological modernisation discourse explains the nature of 
this link and prescribes how it might be made (Dryzek, 1997): if environmental 
concerns can be built into established processes, then unwanted environmental side 
effects can be designed out at their source (Jamison, 2000)
 32. The message of 
ecological modernisation is that even though the processes of modernisation can be 
considered to have caused many of the world’s environmental problems in the first 
place, further (enlightened) modernisation provides the answers. The key to this 
strategy is eco-efficiency, defined as achieving more with fewer resources, which 
has led to the proliferation of concepts and business strategies such as environmental 
management, cleaner production, waste minimisation, eco-efficiency, ecological 
                                                         
31 Owens and Cowell (2002, p17) take this interpretation from Voltaire’s Candide and Dr Pangloss 
who says ‘all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds’. 
32 Ecological modernisation is thus often described as a deliberate policy strategy by governments to 
shift from a previous ‘end of pipe’ to preventative approaches to environmental protection (Ashford, 
2002; Barry, 2003; Christoff, 1996; Weale, 1992), of which environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
is often cited as an example. Typical policy concepts include the polluter pays principle and the 
precautionary principle. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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consumption, life-cycle analysis and industrial ecology. These aim to internalise 
environmental externalities and to realise economic opportunities arising from the 
increasing demand for ‘green’ products and services (Berger et al., 2001; Davison, 
2001; Gibson, 2001; Jamison, 2000). The role of government in this discourse is to 
facilitate the ecological modernisation efforts of business (Hajer, 1995)
33. 
Ecological modernisation has a shorter horizon than Brundtland’s sustainable 
development, and is silent on issues such as development in the context of the South; 
equity, both intra- and inter-generational (Christoff, 1996; Davison, 2001); and 
social concerns in general, particularly their ‘softer’ dimensions such as ‘social 
cohesion’ (Berger et al., 2001; Giorgi & Redclift, 2000; Pepper, 1999)
34. While 
Brundtland envisaged sustainable development as a new trajectory for industrial 
society, sustainable development redefined as 'weak'
35 ecological modernisation 
excludes any form of critique of the status quo represented by industrial society, 
material growth and consumption (Berger et al., 2001; Davison, 2001; F. Fischer & 
Hajer, 1999; Robinson, 2004).  
From a personal perspective, undertaking this review has enabled me to reconcile the 
competing perspectives on sustainability that so confused me at the beginning of my 
journey. I can see now that in my career as an industrial environmental engineer I 
was an ‘ecological modernist’. My role was to improve the environmental 
performance of the industrial plants on which I worked, through technical 
improvements and environmental management systems. I did not challenge the 
morality of these industries or their place in global politics; in fact, I was oblivious to 
corporate political power altogether at that time. I took any criticism of my 
employers’ environmental credentials as a personal attack, arguing that everything 
that could reasonably be expected of industry in the name of the environment was 
                                                         
33 For example by setting environmental performance standards, to which business is usually 
amenable since they provide a degree of market certainty (Berger et al., 2001; Christoff, 1996); the 
provision of research grants; and supportive regulatory regimes including voluntary agreements and 
partnerships (Berger et al., 2001; Hajer, 1995), consensual negotiations and supportive market 
mechanisms. 
34 Recast in the terms of ecological modernisation, the global aspects of the debate have come to mean 
the globalisation of capital rather than global coordination in achieving sustainability (Davison, 2001). 
Several European commentators have observed that the concept of equity is also missing from the 
European Union Fourth Framework Programme on the Environment, which is couched in the 
language of sustainable development (Berger et al., 2001; Giorgi & Redclift, 2000). 
35 I discuss 'strong' ecological modernisation later in this chapter. Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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being done. I defended the rights of industry and business in general to grow 
responsibly. My mission to internalise sound environmental management practices 
within the business at the micro scale of the individual oil refinery exactly mirrored a 
macro, policy-level application of the discourse of ecological modernity.  
It was from this basis that I first met the idea of ‘sustainability’, and working within 
the corporate sector as I was, the first conceptualisation of sustainability to which I 
was introduced was the ‘three pillar’ model of the triple bottom line (TBL)
36. During 
my period of sustainability initiation, two particularly notable books that crossed my 
desk were John Elkington’s (1997) Cannibals with Forks  and Natural Capitalism by 
Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins (Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 
1999). If these are the Bibles of ecological modernisation as a business strategy, the 
‘integration’ of the ‘three pillars’ or the ‘triple bottom line’ of environmental, 
economic and social concerns is the Holy Grail. This is perhaps the most common 
interpretation of sustainability, found in business strategies and government policies 
alike. Of vague conceptual origins (Marshall & Toffel, 2005)
 37, TBL has a special 
resonance with ecological modernisation, although it does not necessarily share the 
latter’s focus on efficiency, especially in a planning context (Owens & Cowell, 
2002). It also reinstates a version of the social dimension central to Brundtland, 
although the social has reduced in scale from issues of poverty, equity and social 
justice at a global scale to mainly local planning concerns.  
The effect of the incorporation of TBL sustainability into the UK planning system, as 
observed by Owens and Cowell (2002) has been the gradual expansion of the 
concept to include all kinds of issues already taken into account in planning 
processes, such as ‘amenity, townscape and culture’. Sustainability has become 
something of a ‘catch all’ (George, 2001), a trend that is viewed with despair from 
some quarters (Marshall & Toffel, 2005, p674):  
                                                         
36 Variations on the TBL concept exist which either educe the pillars to two (ecological and socio-
economic) or add extras, for example ‘culture’ or ‘political’ (Gibson et al., 2005). 
37 Riedy (2005) notes that the Johannesburg Declaration of 2002 (paragraph 5) refers to three 
“mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development – economic development, social 
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Streets should have sidewalks, and buildings should have wheelchair ramps, but are such 
design features aspects of sustainability? More environmentally friendly goods and 
services are desirable, but does that make them or their use sustainable?  
The TBL conceptualisation of sustainability raises all conceivable objectives to the 
same level and perceives sustainability as a balancing act between the competing 
values and policy goals represented by the three pillars. It is inherently reductionist, 
as I have argued in Chapter 2. It emphasises the potentially competing nature of the 
‘three pillars’ (Gibson, 2001), making trade-offs between them are all but inevitable, 
as exemplified by the Gorgon case study
38. Furthermore, while many efforts and 
even improvements over previous practices have been made by business, 
governments and others in the name of the TBL, ecological modernisation and 
sustainable development, there is no evidence that any of these are bringing us any 
closer to a safer, more equitable and more ecologically sustainable world (Marshall 
& Toffel, 2005; Owens & Cowell, 2002). Despite these limitations, the TBL is the 
discourse underpinning most sustainability assessment practice and writing, 
including the Gorgon and SWY case studies. 
7.3.4 The rationalisation of sustainability?  
The discourse of sustainability has thus evolved as a product of modernity. Whereas 
the first wave of the environmental movement, however, was couched in cultural and 
normative, rather than technical terms (Davison, 2001), and used “the ecological 
crisis to reflect on the practices, values, knowledges and institutions of industrial 
society and therefore to rethink social relationships” (Davidson, 2000, p40), the 
second wave has become imprisoned within the exterior-focused modernist ‘flatland’ 
and rationalised
39 (Davison, 2001). This is particularly evident in the mainstream 
                                                         
38 Owens and Cowell (2002, p140) note that jobs frequently appear in pro-development arguments, 
where sustainability is presented as “a national project of progress and growth, where providing jobs 
for a community with high unemployment and limited economic opportunities could outweigh the 
minimal environmental effects that a well-managed quarry would cause”. 
39 Rationalisation is a characteristic of modernity itself, “the negative side of the Enlightenment 
project” (R. J. Smith, 1996, p29). Davison (2001) suggests that the rationalisation of the discourse is 
epitomised by the proliferation of suites of sustainability indicators. Another example is Dobson’s 
(1996) typology of sustainability discourses, which is based upon four dimensions: what should be 
sustained; why; and object(s) of primary and secondary concern, where objects of concern relate to 
needs and wants, now and in the future, and human and non-human; and the allowable degree of 
substitutability between human-made and natural capital. Another is Dresner’s (2002, p167) concern 
with the difficulty of predicting “the extent to which new knowledge and technology will be able to 
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discourses of Government and business, who favour the TBL conceptualisation of 
sustainability
40. 
Missing from the rationalised version of sustainability, it is argued, are the interior 
dimensions, the norms, ethics, and values (Davison, 2001; Slaughter, 1998). 
Similarly, cultural diversity has been “relegated to a care for the diversity of 
folklore” (F. Fischer & Hajer, 1999, p8), at the expense of a fuller, anthropological 
understanding of culture as “the implicit systems of meaning and frames of reference 
that underpin the various institutional practices through which we conduct 
environmental politics” (F. Fischer & Hajer, 1999, p6), out of which views on 
preferred social orders emerge (Davison, 2001; Jamison, 2000)
41. Local perspectives 
are often limited to expression within instrumental consultation processes in which 
participation becomes an add-on designed to contribute “a user-friendly aspect to the 
hardware of technocratic development” (Davison, 2001, p53).  
The concern from some quarters is that countercultural movements have been 
‘swamped’ by ‘sheer political force’, driven by those whose interests lie in 
maintaining the status quo, who have strengthened their stranglehold by ‘colonising’ 
the language of social critique and adopting and redefining the discourse of 
sustainability (Davison, 2001, p42). The result is that there is no unique language 
available with which to express these counter views, and that as the sustainability 
discourse is reduced, important meanings are lost (F. Fischer & Hajer, 1999; 
McGregor, 2004; Rees, 1988; Rydin, 1999). The danger is that by losing language 
and meaning, society’s collective capacity for social critique through normative 
reflection upon how we should live is reduced. The marginalisation of the interior 
and normative in the prevailing conceptualisations of the sustainability discourse 
“does not compel existing institutions to reconsider the normative and cultural 
assumptions and premises underlying their operational practices” (F. Fischer & 
Hajer, 1999, p4). The assumption is made that the existing structures of modern 
                                                         
40 A particularly rationalist view emerged during the SWY interview process when one interviewee 
said, “I suppose I am a bit of an economic imperialist in that I believe that sustainability is only really 
conceptually a more extensive and systematic version of cost benefit analysis” (SWY interviews – 
Sustainability Panel (1)).  
41 Fischer and Hajer (1999, p6) go on to argue, “It is our conviction that the discourse on 
environmental policy is plagued by the fact that it has been cut off from the cultural dimension of 
environmental politics. Given that environmental discourse emerged in large part as a cultural critique 
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technological society provide the appropriate tracks upon which future development 
should travel (Davidson, 2000; Rees, 1988)
42.  
In this context “sustainability now seems to have more to do with sustaining the 
status quo than it does with sustaining the environment” (Denniss, 2005)
43. This begs 
the questions: ‘How sustainable is the status quo?’ and ‘How sustainable is 
modernity?’ While it can be argued from a philosophical viewpoint that any 
uncritical trajectory of development is dangerous (see for example F. Fischer, 2003b, 
p216), why is social critique important? I briefly consider these questions in the 
following section. 
7.4  The state of the world 
Global society in 2006 is a very long way from being sustainable. Slaughter (1998, 
p519) describes it as: 
islands of affluence in seas of poverty and despair; technical virtuosity amid global 
pollution and species extinctions; profound insight into the structure of the universe 
contrasted with a nihilistic, often angry pop culture endlessly lost in it own hostility and 
fear. 
It is not my intent here to review the data that describes the state of the world;  I 
believe it is well-known and obvious to those who care that the gap between rich and 
poor is increasing; non-renewable resources are being depleted; renewable resources 
are being depleted at far greater rates than can be replaced; social unrest is rife; 
human-induced climate change is now exerting its influence, not least upon the 
scarce water resources of Western Australia; ecosystem integrity is decreasing and 
species are becoming extinct. As Gibson et al. (2005, p14) observe, “If the 
extraordinary popularity of the sustainability language reveals only one thing, it is 
widespread recognition that what prevails today is not sustainable and that changes 
of some sort are needed”. 
                                                         
42 Davison (2001) argues that the ‘spaceship Earth metaphor’ that galvanised environmental concern 
in the 1960s and 70s has become a metaphor for how this spaceship might be overhauled and 
improved to extend its life. 
43 Denniss (2005) continues, “Coal mining companies champion the need to sustain jobs and exports 
while impeding serious attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Farming groups cite the need to 
sustain their local communities when opposing attempts to reduce the amount of water they take from 
dying rivers to irrigate their crops. And [genetic modification] companies claim that they simply want 
to invent sustainable crops when they oppose environmentalists seeking moratoria on the release of 
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My concern is that the causes of unsustainability are structural and cultural and reach 
deep into the foundations of modern industrial society, the same foundations that go 
unchallenged by sustainability recast along rationalised lines (Boyle, Thomas, & 
Wield, 2000; Davidson, 2000; Davison, 2001; Dovers, 2001; Pepper, 1999)
44. These 
have not only become taken for granted and therefore ‘insufficiently problematised’ 
(Slaughter, 1998) but have become institutionalised (Davison, 2001)
45.  
7.4.1 The institutions of unsustainability 
Davison (2001, p39) speaks of the “globalised institutions of the technological 
society” as sources of global unsustainability, enumerating  the spread of 
hyperconsumerism in the North
46; oppressive conduct by transnational corporations, 
especially in Southern countries; colonial legacy in the postcolonial corruption and 
collusion in many Southern governments; hegemony perpetuating the continued use 
of fossil fuels; and the marginalisation of woman and indigenous peoples (Davison, 
2001, pp47-48). Accusatory fingers have equally been pointed at the tendency of the 
market economy to concentrate wealth and promote inequality, which is itself a 
cause of environmental and social problems (Boyle et al., 2000; Pepper, 1999), and 
“the simplistic need to maximise returns on capital for private shareholders” (Boyle 
et al., 2000, p225), an imperative that provides the platform for the behaviours of 
transnational corporations operating in the South
47. Similarly, international 
organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and bi- and multi-lateral trade agreements are often cited as 
institutions of unsustainability, since it is argued that their policies and actions 
subordinate environmental and social concerns (Dresner, 2002)
48.  
                                                         
44 By way of summary, Slaughter (1998, p519) articulates these as “economic growth, globalization, 
the pre-eminence accorded to science and technology, and man’s conquest of nature”. 
45 This view contrasts with that which sees “a number of discrete environmental problems that may be 
resolved by separate action to each one of the – ‘growing pains’, largely incidental to the mainstream 
of a growing economy” (Caldwell 1999, p5). 
46 Dresner (2002) observes the power of consumerism, noting that even the collapse of communism 
was not based on political ideals but on the envy of consumer goods, when Eastern economies could 
not keep up with Western ones. 
47 Furthermore, while the social and environmental aspects of policy are at least partly addressed by 
‘civic politics’, the economy is not; much of the power within neo-liberalism rests with business 
rather than governments, much less civil society. The dangers of this were argued in the recent book 
and documentary film The Corporation (Bakan, 2004) . 
48 Similarly it has been observed that within the European Union, while resource exploitation is 
constrained to some extent by environmental regulation, such regulation is not permitted to create a Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
      303 
Others argue more fundamentally, however, that the inherent characteristics of 
modern, capitalist, industrialised society that support these institutions and 
organisations are themselves the root causes of unsustainability (Pepper, 1999). In 
particular the incompatibility of perpetual economic growth with long-term 
ecological viability has been noted (Davidson, 2000; Hajer, 1995). According to 
Fischer and Hajer (1999, p5): 
The ecological crisis is the (unintended) consequence of some of capitalism’s essential 
features, such as the continued reliance on economic growth and its insatiable desire to 
create new markets, as well as its use of such growth to create space for political 
interventions (thus avoiding active redistribution of resources).  
Owens and Cowell (2002, p128) follow a Marxist line in arguing that: 
There is an innate tendency in capitalist modes of production to expand and chase profit-
making opportunities from region to region, creating problems of social injustice, 
environmental degradation and resource depletion. 
In this context, it has been suggested that perhaps the greater danger of a 
rationalised, and particularly a tripartite TBL definition of sustainability, is that it can 
be used to promote economic growth and competitiveness as a legitimate end in 
itself, rather than a tool for greater intra-generational equity as envisaged by 
Brundtland, and thus as a promoter of the unsustainable status quo (Denniss, 2005; 
Owens & Cowell, 2002). The juggernaut of economic growth, however, hardly 
needs the support or otherwise of the discourse of sustainability and its proponents. 
Paehlke (1990) draws attention to the work of Kann (1986) and Lauber (1978) who 
note that economic growth is driven by the power of corporate and political elites, 
which are becoming ever more powerful through global economic integration 
(Paehlke, 2003). Economic growth in Western Australia reached a massive 14 per 
cent in the June quarter of 2006, compared with the same period in 2005, fuelled by 
resource projects such as Gorgon (O'Brien, 2006). Times are good, complacency is 
rife, and passion for changing the world is hard to find. Within ‘flatland’s’ absence 
of depth and meaning, there is a tendency to seek gratification in the material 
rewards that economic booms make available, which further fuels the demand for 
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goods and drives the global economy to even more unsustainable heights (Norgaard, 
2004). 
7.4.2 Reflexive modernity and the Risk Society 
Despite the hegemony of the rationalised discourse of modernity and the bleak 
direction in which it is leading society, ‘chinks in the armour’ are appearing in the 
form of the “perception of dysfunctions, costs and dangers” within modernity itself 
(Slaughter, 1998, p520). Giddens (1990, p45) identifies four indicators of the failure 
of the Enlightenment vision that more knowledge leads to better control: differential 
power; the realisation that empirical knowledge alone does not provide an adequate 
basis for choice between different value positions
49; the impacts of unintended 
consequences; and reflexivity, whereby “knowledge of that world contributes to its 
unstable or mutable character”. In turn, the principles of the Enlightenment itself, 
including positivism and instrumental rationality and the power of expertise that 
“drove the Industrial Revolution, which, in a word, created the modern world” 
(Slaughter, 1998, p520) have increasingly been called into question and ultimately 
reformed (Beck et al., 2003). In this lies hope. 
Ulrich Beck argues that society has moved from what he calls ‘first modernity’ to 
‘second modernity’ or ‘reflexive modernity’, which he conceptualises as the Risk 
Society (Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 2003; Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994). The Risk 
Society is evidenced by unforeseen circumstances such as ozone depletion (Litfin, 
1994); the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear disasters; and the ‘mad cow 
disease’ scare in the UK (Weston, 2004)
 50. Extreme weather events recorded in 
recent years around the world, such as Hurricane Katrina in  New Orleans, could also 
be seen in this light with respect to human induced climate change These crisis 
events were the realisation of unpredictable and high consequence risks of an 
uncritical faith in science, which can be seen as the ‘unforeseen side-effects’ (Beck 
et al., 2003) or ‘externalities’ of modernity (Latour, 2003)
51. It is in the context of 
                                                         
49 Thus, ‘wicked policy problems’ as discussed in Chapter 5 and characterised by the Gorgon case 
study are themselves symptoms of the inherent failings of the modern project. 
50 Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (Carson, 1963) brought one such example into the public 
consciousness. 
51 The theory of the Risk Society has significant implications for the practice and theory of impact 
assessment, since its core argument is that unknowable risks can lead to unpredictable impacts. One 
of very few theorists have engaged with the nature of the society within which assessment is 
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this ‘second modernity’ that the concept of sustainability as I have described it has 
emerged and evolved (Gibson et al., 2005)
52. 
Beck also calls his Risk Society ‘reflexive modernisation’, because of modernity’s 
own undermining of its own foundational ideas, “Our central thesis is that the side-
effects of modern Western society eventually put its touchstone ideas into question” 
(Beck et al., 2003). For Beck these touchstone ideas include nation-states, 
individualisation, gainful employment, exploitation of nature, scientisation and 
functional differentiation
53. The transition to the Risk Society is accompanied by “a 
progressive undermining of the social authority wielded by the twin institutional 
edifices of science and technology” (Gleeson, 2000). Latour (2003, p36) elaborates: 
‘Reflexive’ means, in my reading of it, that the unintended consequences of actions 
reverberate throughout the whole of society in such a way that they have become 
intractable. Thus, ‘reflexive’ does not signal an increase in mastery and consciousness, 
but only a heightened awareness that mastery is impossible and that control over actions 
is now seen as a complete modernist fiction. In second modernity, we become conscious 
that consciousness does not mean full control.  
Reflexive modernity is characterised by instability, the potential for chaos, conflict 
between competing frames, and periods of rapid change, the effects of which can 
ultimately be positive and supportive of sustainability (Innes & Booher, 2003; Laws 
& Rein, 2003)
 54. Change occurs as societal risks, and awareness and manifestation 
of those risks, increase. As a result,  previously accepted ideas become open to 
challenge, putting issues of economic organisation and political change back on the 
agenda, and permits consideration of these issues within the framework of modernity 
(Dryzek, 1997). Critique and challenge are the hallmarks of the social movements 
that have “held out other possibilities, the seeds of quite different futures” 
                                                                                                                                                              
technocratic decision-making and argues that this poses a crisis for EIA, since “the public, including 
project authorization decision makers, have little real faith in the outcome of assessments”. The 
conceptualisation of EIA as a learning process is an alternative that fits more usefully with the notion 
of the risk society, and I return to this argument later in this chapter. 
52 Gibson et al. (2005) see this as the resurgence of an old idea, where the ‘old sustainability’ was 
grounded in a pre-Enlightenment consistency and security. 
53 See also Section 7.3.1. 
54 It has been suggested that the separations and losses of modernity are at the heart of this instability 
and chaos: in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas L. Friedman (2000) says, “It seems to me that 
there is something inherently unstable about a world that is being knit together tighter and tighter by 
technology, markets and telecommunications, while splitting apart wider and wider socially and 
economically” (cited in Roberts, 2002). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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(Slaughter, 1998, p520), and which are reinvigorated by the realities of the Risk 
Society . The re-emergence of civil society can therefore be characterised as an 
effect of reflexive modernity, and the perception of risks and loss in faith in science 
employed by expert decision-makers that characterise it (Bang, 2004; Dryzek, 2000; 
Friedmann, 1998; Glasbergen, 1996; Jasanoff, 1996; Laws & Rein, 2003; Owens, 
2000; Petts, 2003)
55. The emergent ‘Network Society’ represents a new, 
decentralised social and political order in the form of social movements and civil 
society organisations, as an alternative, or at least a supplement to, the formal 
institutions of Western representative democracy (Bang, 2004; Hajer & Wagenaar, 
2003c; M. Smith, Law, Work, & Panay, 1999; Waddell, 2005; Warren, 1992). 
The Risk Society and reflexive modernity have further implications for societal 
learning, since the traumatic events themselves, which Sabatier calls ‘external 
shocks’, can be catalysts for learning (Fiorino, 2001; Sabatier, 1993)
56. Even more 
profoundly, the sense of unease inherent to the Risk Society may provide the tension 
that may catalyse the frame shifts or reflexive learning discussed in Chapter 6, since 
“evidence that the modern world has put its future at risk is persuasive of the need to 
critically examine the direction toward which future-shaping actions appear to be 
tending” (Caldwell, 1999, p11). As Jasanoff (1996, p64) points out, “While we 
worry  about the global impacts of human depredation – endangered species, 
encroaching deserts, polluted oceans, climate change, the ozone hole – we are also 
forced to ask questions about who we are, what places we belong to, and what 
institutions and communities govern our basic social allegiances”
57. The willingness 
of a society and the individuals within it to reflect and learn is magnified in a world 
characterised by uncertainty and change (Dryzek, 2000; van der Knaap, 1995). I 
consider the relationship between the Risk Society, learning and sustainability later 
in this chapter.  
                                                         
55 Owens (2000, p1142) observes a general disillusionment with institutions, whereby the public is 
“aware of commercial imperatives, sceptical about politics, and distrustful of the competence and 
impartiality of regulatory frameworks”. 
56 Macro-level social change can have the same effect; according to Glasbergen (1996, p182) in 
relation to the opening up of Eastern Europe, “In the interplay of these new social forces, 
environmental policy has to change. New concepts are needed in order to bring the problems under 
control”. 
57 Similarly, Dryzek (2000, p6) has noted, in a world in which traditions, including  belief in 
positivism and rationality, are becoming less pervasive, “reflexive choice across discourses becomes 
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At this point it is important to note that my belief in the need for fundamental 
structural change at a societal level has been so strong that it is only recently that I 
have begun to understand that this view of sustainability and what it means is only 
one view among many. It was largely through my involvement in the International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) conferences, which are attended by 
delegates from a cross section of developed, developing and economically 
transitional nations, that I really understood that sustainability has different meanings 
and different power as a discourse within different contexts. I can see now that 
economic growth with due consideration of environmental and social impacts, a 
model that I derided in Chapter 2 and have not considered since, may be an entirely 
legitimate conceptualisation of sustainability in some cases
58, since economic growth 
in the Southern context delivers food, health and education, rather than plasma-
screen televisions and mp3 players. The core of the distinction is of course 
Brundtland’s notion of needs and the distinction, arguable and contextual though it 
is, between needs and wants.  
Gibson et al. (2005, p100) also note the difference between sustainability 
requirements between developing and developed nations, arguing: 
The situation is very different in places where the level of material consumption and 
associated biophysical system burdens is already disproportionately high, and where 
insecurity is centred on the protection of property rather than the absence of it. In such 
circumstances, serious contributions to sustainability require a shift in emphasis from yet 
more material gain to minimally material improvements. In other words, the sufficiency 
and opportunity requirement in wealthy contexts demands a decoupling of well-being 
from material growth. 
My perspective reflects the context within which I live and work: that is, a Western 
country with a high standard of living and a fixation with economic growth and 
consumerism
59. From this privileged position, I believe that it is both appropriate and 
morally essential that we Westerners (or Northerners) should reflect upon ourselves, 
                                                         
58 Furthermore, the several months I spent in 2004 visiting community development projects in 
Nicaragua taught me that sustainability is almost a meaningless concept in places defined by poverty, 
lack of opportunity and oppression, although it heightened my desire to contribute to changing the 
structures that manifest these social issues. 
59 This is the subject of two enlightening books by Clive Hamilton of the Australia Institute, whose 
work has been of great influence to me, entitled Growth Fetish (Hamilton, 2003)and Affluenza 
(Hamilton & Denniss, 2005). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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our attitudes and the effects of our belief systems in supporting the institutions of 
unsustainability. It is from this position that I now turn to consider the relationship 
between the discourses of sustainability and the societal-level reflexive learning and 
change that I have argued is necessary in the name of sustainability. 
7.4.3 Hope for the future: Trojan horses and magic 
The Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy is entitled Hope for the Future 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003b), and in this brief section I consider the 
hope that lies within the discourses of sustainability, particularly within the Western 
Australian context.  
Firstly, and more generally, it can be argued that despite the limitations of 
Brundtland’s sustainable development in the eyes of those seeking more radical 
social change, and its subsequent further reduction to a form of business-oriented 
ecological modernisation, the transformative potential of the discourse was never 
completely rationalised to the point of being lost. Instead, as already mentioned, in 
some quarters sustainable development was perceived as a ‘Trojan horse’ through 
which more radical social and cultural change, perhaps more aligned with the first 
wave of the environmental movement with its challenges to the institutions of 
modernity, could be achieved (Owens & Cowell, 2002)
60.  
At first glance the Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy appears to be 
located in the rationalised discourse of ecological modernisation with a TBL 
interpretation and a Panglossian bent, which is not unexpected given the prevailing 
pro-development policy paradigm (see Chapter 1). Sustainability is defined as 
“meeting the needs of current and future generation through an integration of 
environmental protection, social advancement and economic prosperity” 
(Government of Western Australia, 2003b, p24)
61. This conceptualisation is also 
reflected in the sustainability principles, the first three of which (entitled Long-term 
                                                         
60 Although others have counselled caution with respect to the Trojan horse model; for example 
Davison (2001) cites Winner (1986, p54) who argues that, “Victories won in this way are in other 
respects great losses. For they affirm in our word and in our methodologies that there are certain 
human ends that no longer dare be spoken in public. Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, 
even soldiers of virtue eventually suffocate”. 
61 The consultation draft of the document produced one year earlier posed a different definition that 
was widely criticised through the submission process, which had at its heart assumptions of ‘win-win-
wins’ (Government of Western Australia, 2002a). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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economic health; Equity and human rights; and Biodiversity and ecological integrity 
respectively) align with the economic, social and environmental ‘pillars’, with 
another specifically calling for ‘net benefits’ or ‘win-win-wins’ from development 
projects (Government of Western Australia, 2003b, p30).  
However, there is more to the Strategy and the way sustainability has been 
interpreted in Western Australia than may initially meet the eye. The WA principles 
were largely drawn from the work of Robert Gibson in Canada (Gibson, 2001), and 
follow his commitment to crossing the boundaries between the three pillars and 
including a moral or ethical dimension that is generally missing from rationalised 
versions of sustainability. The principle of Hope, vision, symbolic and iterative 
change (Government of Western Australia, 2003b, p30), further emphasises a thread 
of the intangible and the interior, alongside the dominant exterior components.  
I first became conscious that our conceptualisation of sustainability had perhaps 
evolved in a different form from what might be typical in other jurisdictions in an 
email exchange with a UK colleague about the terminology of ‘sustainability’ versus 
‘sustainable development’. He preferred the latter, calling the former ‘loose and 
meaningless’, while I preferred the former. Our cross-purposes conversation 
perplexed me so much that I organised a discussion session at ISTP entitled What 
does sustainability mean to you?, which was held on 5
th May 2005. In preparation I 
wrote a short document, in which I explained:  
I felt that my colleague’s views on sustainable development were somewhat rigid, in a 
way that the concept of sustainability as it is being discussed and implemented even at 
the policy level in Western Australia through the State Sustainability Strategy doesn’t 
seem to be. In fact, it has been suggested that the ‘looseness’ and ‘fuzziness’ of the 
concept has actually been the greatest strength of the Strategy, since it has allowed people 
to find their own creative ways to make the concept meaningful. Perhaps as a result, the 
idea of sustainability has evolved into something a little different in WA from other parts 
of the world. So, if we are different, how are we different? 
Following the ISTP discussion, which was attended by some 20-30 people exhibiting 
a broad range of perspectives on what sustainability meant to them, I wrote some 
notes on the topics we discussed, in which I reflected: Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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Perhaps I set the direction of the discussion in commencing by describing a conversation 
I had with Peter
62 about how sustainability in Western Australia might be different from 
sustainability or sustainable development in other places, at least in a policy sense. In that 
conversation he suggested that perhaps the meaning we attach to sustainability has a 
spiritual component which may be lacking elsewhere, and that this spirituality might 
actually be the elusive glue of integration between different aspects of sustainability, such 
as the environmental, social and economic pillars of the triple bottom line.  
Peter picked up this theme during the discussion by proposing that ISTP should 
collaborate on a book entitled ‘The Magic of Sustainability’, the magic arising from the 
incorporation of ethics, values and spirituality into the work that we do in the name of 
sustainability, the practical actions through which we try to make the world a better place 
and to create enduring value. The processes and practices in which society engages, 
including economic processes, should be guided by a set of values. 
I do not intend to conduct an extensive review of the discourse of sustainability in 
Western Australia, but simply wish to put forward my view that despite the apparent 
rationalism and pro-development flavour of the Strategy and indeed in Western 
Australian public policy generally, there is a depth here that moves beyond the 
‘flatland’ of a truly rationalised ecological modernist approach to also embrace 
interior dimensions. Furthermore, while it has been argued in different contexts that 
the ‘softer’ elements of the discourse are all too easily marginalised and prevented 
from influencing the practices of decision-making (Davison, 2001; Owens & Cowell, 
2002)
63, as was indeed demonstrated by Gorgon, the values-based approach of the 
SWY case study offers hope that this may not necessarily be the case, in Western 
Australia at least, even though the starting point may have been the TBL win-win-
win model of sustainability. Since the meaning of ‘sustainability’ evolves through 
action and as a function of “administrative and legal traditions, ecological problems 
                                                         
62 Referring to Professor Peter Newman. 
63 For example, Davison notes that while Brundtland speaks of ‘cultural and spiritual values’, this is 
merely soft wrapping for what is essentially a hard, technical discourse (Davison, 2001). Thus such 
values are acknowledged but then immediately sidelined. Similarly, in their study of UK planning 
decisions, Owens and Cowell (2002) found higher-level concepts such as equity, futurity, precaution, 
holism and global stewardship and the like were relegated to ‘motherhood’ statements in planning 
documents, and there was little to describe how the plan might contribute to such goals. There is a 
danger that, at the practical level of individual assessments and decisions, such principles are 
translated to objectives and criteria that tend to be technical and lacking the higher level, less tangible 
qualities of sustainability, and revert to TBL categories (Hacking & Guthrie, 2006).  Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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and political cultures” (Owens & Cowell, 2002, p9)
64, the Western Australian 
experience suggests that the possibility of an integral sustainability that survives and 
even flourishes between the cracks of the rationalised discourse.  
7.4.4 Towards an integral sustainability 
I have argued that the current trajectory of modern, industrialised society is 
fundamentally unsustainable, and that the cultural assumptions and discourses upon 
which it is founded remain unchallenged in an exterior 'flatland' that marginalises the 
interior dimensions of reality. In the mainstream of policy and business, furthermore, 
the discourse of sustainability has itself become limited to the same exterior 
dimensions that define modernity. The result is that change in the name of 
sustainability is all too often incremental and limited to peripheral aspects of the 
problems facing global society, failing to engage with their psychological and 
cultural roots (Maiteny, 2000). I argue that in place of this rationalised discourse, 
change towards a more sustainable society requires an integral conceptualisation of 
sustainability.  
Recalling the framework and language of previous chapters, an integral approach to 
sustainability takes an holistic perspective that acknowledges and embraces the 
exterior and interior, individual and collective dimensions of reality and the inter-
relations between them (Slaughter, 1998; Wilber, 2000)
65. An integral sustainability 
thus considers the role of science, of behaviours and actions, and of institutions and 
social structures in shaping the world, but pays equal attention to the interior 
dimensions that underpin them. As Maiteny (2000, p342) argues, “All (these) 
dimensions…are necessary for any human system to function effectively and 
sustainably. Exclude one and the whole becomes dysfunctional, partial and 
distorted”. The concept of an ‘integral sustainability’ thus represents the fullest 
understanding of ‘integration’ as applied to sustainability and sustainability 
assessment.  
                                                         
64 Owens and Cowell (2002) demonstrate regional variation in the interpretations of sustainability in 
regional plans, and correlate these with the prevailing political imperatives, and particularly the 
tension between growth and constraint. 
65 Maiteny (2000, p339) reflects all four dimensions when he speaks of “the mutual dependence 
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From the perspective of the interior collective, integral sustainability invites us to 
“wander outside the ‘black box’ of technology into the wider worlds of culture and 
history” to supplement “the analytical tool-kit of business management with other 
frameworks of interpretation” (Jamison, 2000, p259). Through this level of deep 
understanding we find room for ethics and values and questions of what is right 
(Davison, 2001)
66. This perspective permits recognition that the causes of 
unsustainability that are culturally grounded in the discourses of modernity, shape 
the structures of society, and give form to the behaviours and agency of individuals 
within it (see Chapter 5). With this recognition comes the potential for the deep 
reflexivity and critique I have argued is necessary in the name of sustainability.  
An integral sustainability also emphasises the contribution to the formulation of 
reality of the interior individual dimensions, encompassing psychological and 
spiritual aspects, in a way that does not appear often in discussions of public policy 
(Maiteny, 2000). In turn, the way that individuals within a society seek fulfilment is 
collectively expressed in the prevailing culture, and therefore social change requires 
transformation at the individual level, transformation that involves the heart and not 
just the head (Beck, 1995; Christopher, 1999; Maiteny, 2000; Slaughter, 1998). 
Whereas the modern technological society reinforces the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ of human development, in the form of individualism, self-interest, 
egotism and a ‘poverty of the higher self’, sustainability calls for the development of 
individuals’ responsibilities, values, ethics and reflexive capabilities (Davidson, 
2000; Norgaard, 2004; Robinson, 2004)
67.  
A transformation towards personal sustainability is marked by a shift from seeking 
joy in material consumption to other forms of fulfilment such as personal 
development, community work or spiritual practice (Norgaard, 2004). This shift may 
                                                         
66 Owens and Cowell (2002) illustrate the limitations of an approach to sustainability that relies 
heavily on the natural sciences and other forms of technical analysis that produce ‘facts’, using the 
example of conservation. Ecological science can contribute to the debate by providing data about the 
effects of habitat quality on a species, for example, but cannot do this unambiguously or define what 
level of precaution should be applied. Neither can it tell us whether the protection of this species is a 
good thing in the first place. 
67 Emphasising the importance of the interior individual, Maiteny speaks of the ‘inner limits’ of 
sustainability in contrast with the more commonly discussed ‘outer limits’ of the Club of Rome’s 
Limits to Growth. He (2000, p355) argues that, “new beliefs and meanings – including religious – that 
cause less ecological pressure will not emerge until [they are] seen as legitimate ways of seeking 
internal psychological sustainability”.  Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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be catalysed by a deep sense of unease that emerges “when we begin to doubt the 
integrity and meaningfulness of what we are doing” (Maiteny, 2000, p350). This 
uneasiness is, in turn, a form of the tension discussed as catalysts for personal 
reflexivity in Chapter 6, but is more profound than the mainly cognitive discomfort 
discussed there. Rather it is a kind of ‘post-modern’ angst and sense of 
powerlessness arising from the sense of social dislocation and alienation experienced 
by many in the Western world, and by the uncertainties of the Risk Society. Its 
transformative potential extends beyond reflection and questioning to a search for 
deeper meaning and the reformulation of fundamental values (Beck, 1992, 1995; 
Christopher, 1999; Maiteny, 2000).  
Such transformation from materialism to forms of psychological or spiritual 
nourishment would have the tangible effect of curbing the consumerism that is rife 
within Western societies and thus reducing the demand on the Earth’s resources. It 
would also “help restore respect and care for other human beings as well as for the 
natural environment on the planet Earth” (Narayanan, Marinova, & Kenworthy, 
2006a, p5). Other pathways for change can also be identified: as Maiteny (2000, 
p355) observes, “The more individuals who take responsibility for their own 
personal…development and find new ways to tackle it, the more legitimate such 
change will become to other individuals, setting up a positive feedback process”. 
This in turn builds capacity so that ‘the evolved capabilities of the human mind and 
culture’ equip humanity to comprehend the consequences “of its accelerating, far-
reaching impact upon its environment and thereby upon itself” (Caldwell, 1999, p7), 
and beyond comprehending, to bring about change.  
The need for personal transformation towards sustainability is reflected in calls for 
individuals to develop ‘ecological consciousness’ (Christopher, 1999), 
‘environmental rationality’ (Gundersen, 1995) or ‘ecological enlightenment’ that 
provides a “phenomenological correction to a political economic understanding of 
the environmental crisis” and by extension to issues of sustainability (Beck, 1995, 
p125). Ecological consciousness moves past a cognitive, information-driven 
perspective on the nature of the environment and sustainability, to reach an holistic 
understanding of the relationships between self, society and nature and to break 
down the artificial barriers that the modern project has placed between them Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
  314 
(Christopher, 1999). Recalling the ISTP discussion mentioned previously, this 
reconnection and reintegration is the hope of those who call for a spiritual dimension 
to sustainability and to find links between spiritual practice and sustainable 
communities (Chile & Simpson, 2004; Narayanan et al., 2006a; Narayanan, 
Marinova, & Kenworthy, 2006b).  
Integral sustainability is thus a journey towards change, a journey that embraces all 
of these dimensions of reality, and whose ultimate destination is a reconnection of 
the separations of modernity in a way that is sustainable
68. As Slaughter says (1995, 
p173, cited in Slaughter, 1998): 
[W]hen a right relationship is re-established between people, culture and technology a 
whole new world of options emerges. This is the key which unlocks the future, takes us 
beyond the collapse of industrialism, moves us decisively beyond the abyss, proves that 
there can indeed be ‘light at the end of the tunnel’
69. 
7.5  Sustainability assessment for sustainability 
At this point I return to the question with which I commenced my research: How can 
sustainability assessment contribute to sustainability? Although I believed in 2003 
that I had already answered this question, the trajectory of this research is testament 
to my gradual process of disillusionment with my early ideas and emergence of new 
ways of understanding the depths of this issue. I begin here by reflecting on my 
learning process to articulate a new argument for the potential contribution of 
sustainability assessment to a more sustainable future, within the context of the Risk 
Society. 
7.5.1 A top-down approach? 
In 2003 I advocated a Government-led, top down approach to sustainability 
assessment based on a clear definition of what was and was not sustainable (Pope et 
al., 2004). Through the course of my research, as documented in this thesis, I 
gradually became aware of limitations of this approach, and have come to realise that 
                                                         
68 Somewhat ironically, boundaries between nation states are already being broken down at the same 
time that boundaries between individuals and society are being strengthened (Roberts, 2002). 
Similarly, Dryzek (2000, p6) speaks of the ‘well-guarded boundaries’ between humanity and nature, 
compared with the less well-guarded ones between states. 
69 While this reconnection may appear utopian, it should not be dismissed as an impossible dream, 
since, as Caldwell (1999, p12) points out, “[T]he unprecedented material achievements of the 
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my proposed solution was based in a rationalised conception of decision-making that 
is politically naïve as well as practically difficult (Chapter 4). With the wisdom of 
hindsight, I realise that this proposal was a product of my education and professional 
life as an industrial environmental engineer, coupled with my growing concern for 
the future of the planet, a belief in the power of Government, and a concern with the 
prevalence of the Panglossian win-win-win conceptualisation of sustainability.  
I was not alone in my calls for a ‘top down’ approach to managing environmental 
and sustainability issues
70. Strong Government has often been seen as an unfortunate 
but necessary evil, particularly by those who adhere to a survivalist orientation 
(Dryzek, 2005). For example Paehlke (2004) reviews the work of Ophuls (1977) and 
Heilbroner (1974) (whom he categorises as neo-Hobbesian and neo-Malthusian 
respectively), who independently and regretfully reached the conclusion that 
environmental imperatives were incompatible with the principles of democracy, and 
that strong government represented the only possible solution to the ecological crisis.  
Various recommendations are made as to what might be required of such 
Government in the name of sustainability. For example, Weale (1992) argues that 
Government should facilitate a process of ecological modernisation
71, while 
Christoff (1996, p488) elaborates: 
Such state activity would entail an integrated regulatory environment and strong 
structural and process cross-linkages between different parts of the state and development 
of a synoptic and reflexive use of environmental information in policy formation and 
implementation.  
Speaking specifically of impact assessment as a tool for sustainability, Dovers 
(2002) advocates strategic environmental assessment (SEA) as a tool for reform in 
the hands of strong government. He suggests that SEA should be applied to any 
decision that has the potential to affect patterns of settlement and governance, 
production and consumption, and to the structures and institutions of society, in 
somewhat the same way as Australian policies and laws were reviewed in the 
                                                         
70 Interestingly, Gundersen’s (1995) research found that as individuals increased their ‘ecological 
consciousness’ they began to call for stronger government. 
71 Weale (1992) also suggests that the success of ecological modernisation as a policy discourse in 
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context of the National Competition Policy
72. Similarly, it has been suggested that 
impact assessment processes be applied as a matter of policy to existing 
unsustainable practices (Jenkins et al., 2003). 
Any call for strong Government to address issues of unsustainability, however, sits 
uneasily within the neo-liberal political economy, in which the primary role of 
Government is to support and facilitate economic growth and innovation. The 
assumption is that common interests are ‘whatever the invisible hand cranks out’ 
(Ophuls & Boyan, 1992), despite that markets are designed to meet our potentially 
unlimited wants and therefore work in direct contradiction to the idea of limits 
(Gundersen, 1995). Paehlke (1990, p196) has called this ‘the politics of laissez faire’, 
and warns of the dangers of a system in which private interests through their 
relationships with the bureaucracy have come to determine public interests, and 
“individual decisions add up to an ecologically destructive macro-decision”. Even if 
strong Government were a modern political reality, change towards sustainability 
would also depend upon what Passmore (1974, p183) calls “the implausible 
assumption that the authoritarian state would be ruled by ecologist-kings”. That is, 
even if we had strong leadership, as opposed to laissez-faire governance, it is 
unlikely that these leaders would be of a green persuasion and perhaps even less 
likely that they would ‘know what to do’ (Szerszynski, 1996).  
Similarly pessimistic, Dresner (2002, p139) examines sustainability as a sociological 
and political project, drawing parallels with communism and noting, “The paradox is 
that sustainability is a philosophy based firmly on the notion that attempts to 
transform nature are likely to be self-defeating, but is itself committed to 
transforming society and control its future direction” through command and control 
Government. Furthermore (Dresner, 2002, p168): 
The central idea of Progress was that rationality could be used to master nature and to 
build a better society. Sustainability is a rather similar idea in that its implementation also 
requires the use of rationality and science. The main difference is that it is less optimistic 
about our ability to ‘master’ nature. But the belief that we will actually be able to achieve 
something like sustainability seems to be based on optimism that it is possible to predict 
                                                         
72 It has been recognised, however, that policy-level assessment is notoriously difficult and 
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or direct the future and that it will prove possible to persuade people to act not just 
rationally, but with altruism towards future generations. It could be said that the search 
for sustainability is the continuation of modernity by other means
73.  
In addition to its practical limitations, however, the strong Government model of 
reform reinforces a rationalistic orientation and thus remains in ‘flatland’ (Slaughter, 
1998), where the focus is on better information and better processes, but the 
paradigms,  discourses and institutions of the status quo remain unchallenged 
(Owens & Cowell, 2002). It may, in fact, intensify the rationalisation process by 
“bringing the environment under more direct control of experts through the increased 
institutional control of the environment” (R. J. Smith, 1996, p26)
74. 
Perhaps most importantly, the top-down approach to sustainability governance sits 
uneasily within the context of the Risk Society, which defies such forms of control. 
Rather than viewing the emergence of a reflexive form of modernity as a threat to 
sustainability (as argued for example by Dresner, 2002)
 75, however, the current 
period of change and uncertainty should rather be understood as an opportunity for 
learning and change (Christoff, 1996; R. J. Smith, 1996). I have argued earlier that 
change towards sustainability calls for social critique supported by the reflexive 
capacity of individuals. I submit here that sustainability assessment provides an 
appropriate forum for critique, not through a voice of protest crying from outside the 
mainstream of society, but rather working within the institutions of modernity 
exploiting the ‘chinks in the armour’ of the Risk Society.  
                                                         
73 Relatedly, Gibson et al. (2005, p90) have noted, “Many of the profoundly regrettable actions of the 
modern era have been characterized by the hubris of authorities attempting to impose a single, simple 
vision of enlightenment, civilization and/or progress”. 
74 In the literature review of Chapter 2, I argued against the three pillar or TBL inherently integrative 
sustainability principles to overcome some of these concerns (see also Gibson et al., 2005). My intent 
was to retain some of the less tangible dimensions of the sustainability discourse in this way, although 
this proved difficult in practice as documented in Chapter 4 (see also Hacking & Guthrie, in press 
2006). In retrospect, this was an attempt to include subjective or interior elements in a strictly rational 
process that was based on a notion of absolute definitions of sustainability and a conceptualisation of 
sustainability as a ‘state’ (Pope, 2004a). 
75 To some advocates of strong government, reflexivity is the enemy of the sustainability project, 
firstly since it is the way in which ‘we got into this mess’ (Dresner, 2002, p140), and secondly 
because increased risk and uncertainty prevents a blueprint for reform being drawn up. Dresner sees 
little hope in this route since, “In an irony of history, the rhetoric of sustainability was adopted onto 
the political agenda in the 1990s at precisely the same time that the classical political philosophies 
that could support its concern (democratic socialism and social democracy) were being abandoned by 
politicians on the centre left as they moved towards neoliberal free market ideology” (Dresner, 2002, 
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7.5.2 Sustainability assessment for integral sustainability and 
change 
Recalling the argument of Chapter 6 that sustainability assessment can catalyse 
interior learning and reflexivity, I now submit that it is through these mechanisms 
that sustainability assessment can realise its greatest potential for societal change 
towards sustainability, a potential that has long been recognised in forms of impact 
assessment dating back to NEPA (Bartlett, 1986; Boggs, 1993; Paehlke, 1990). The 
need for both individual and collective learning within this macro context has been 
recognised (Michael, 1993, p83): 
The situation is so serious that there is now no ethical or operational alternative other 
than to accept the great risks and effort involved in becoming learners as persons and 
institutions. 
In the following discussion I consider the possibilities for learning within 
sustainability assessment, and specifically how they might contribute to an integral 
sustainability that embraces its exterior and interior, collective and individual 
dimensions and that might in turn contribute to a positive process of societal change.   
Firstly, collective reflexivity, through which new shared realities are constructed (F. 
Fischer, 2003a; Poncelet, 2001) can and must extend beyond the storylines framing 
an individual proposal, as in the SWY case, to extend deeply into the macro-level 
discourses of modernity; in other words deliberation “connects the first-order 
discursive practices in the institutions with the second-order critique of the 
institutions themselves” (F. Fischer, 2003a, p228). The potential for such multi-
layered reflexivity was noted in Chapter 6, drawing from the case studies, in which 
‘bigger questions’ were asked, although not answered, and also from the literature 
(Argyris & Schön, 1996; Sinclair & Diduck, 2001). Healey et al (2003, p67) argue 
that unless the changes “penetrate into the deeper cultural level, such shifts may only 
have limited impact on practices”
76. 
                                                         
76 Similarly, Owens and Cowell (2002, p24) conclude that there has been a significant change in the 
discourse of planning but reserve judgment as to whether this is “associated with sufficient power to 
challenge dominant paradigms of growth”. They question the ability of planning processes alone to 
drive change, paralleling the calls within the impact assessment literature for a deeper understanding 
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Specifically, sustainability assessment can be a facilitated social process by which 
the problems, anxieties and issues of the Risk Society can be given focus and 
articulation through the lens of the decision at hand, and a forum through which they 
might be kept contestable in a way that catalyses learning (Gottweis, 2003; Meppem 
& Gill, 1998). This will be by necessity an incremental process that proceeds 
decision by decision but which should not lose sight of the ultimate goal: as 
Boothroyd (1995, p122) has argued:  “The trickle-down growth paradigm – which is 
at the root of the problem – needs to be explicitly revealed and confronted, policy by 
policy, decision by decision”
77. The purpose of sustainability assessment is therefore 
not to answer questions, but to permit them to be asked. 
In this way, sustainability assessment can be a process of what has been termed 
‘reflexive ecological modernisation’, whereby discourse of ecological 
modernisation, as discussed earlier, takes on a more radical orientation aligned with 
the learning perspective through a linkage with the notion of reflexive modernity 
itself (Hajer, 1995). Change is driven from within the institutions of modernity 
through learning and reflexive transformation. This equates to Christoff’s ‘strong’ 
ecological modernisation that operates “in the broad and reflective manner of 
ecological critique which fundamentally questions the trajectories of industrial 
modernity” (Christoff, 1996, p496) and stands “in opposition to industrial 
modernity’s predominantly instrumental relationship to nature as exploitable 
resource” (Christoff, 1996, p495)
 78. 
I argued in Chapter 6 that tension, or ‘cognitive dissonance’, provides the catalyst for 
reflexivity and forms of learning that lead individuals and groups to excavate and 
reconsider the often hidden assumptions and beliefs upon which their opinions and 
views are grounded. The concept of sustainability itself is a rich source of these 
tensions, and therefore decision-making processes that actively engage with it, such 
as sustainability assessment, are fertile grounds for the kind of transformative 
learning that is a necessary precursor to an integral sustainability. In both the Gorgon 
and SWY case studies, the dimensions of sustainability as an integrated concept 
                                                         
77 Similarly, Gibson et al. (2005) conclude, “It is about making the world better, one undertaking at a 
time”. 
78 Similarly Weale (1992, p31-32) suggests that the gradual internalisation of environmental concerns 
can eventually lead to this crossing of “the line from mechanical to moral reform”.  Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
  320 
were exposed and the inherent tensions wrestled with in ways that were sometime 
productive and sometimes not. As Robinson (2004, p382) has said, however, “The 
power of the concept of sustainability, then, lies precisely in the degree to which it 
brings to the surface these contradictions and provides a kind of discursive playing 
field where they can be debated”. A Panglossian perception of sustainability ‘papers 
over’ these tensions (Owens & Cowell, 2002) and in avoiding them fails to 
acknowledge the gift of ‘agonism’ (Hillier, 2003) (see Chapter 5) 
Beyond consideration of the specific tensions within the discourse of sustainability, 
it is important to retain the idea that the concept of sustainability itself is ambiguous 
(Rydin, 1999)
79, ambivalent and ‘essentially contested’, defying “definition, 
resolution and closure” (Davison, 2001, p61). In this lies its political value and 
strength (Davison, 2001; Dryzek, 1997; Gibson et al., 2005; Robinson, 2004; Rydin, 
1999), not just to keep everyone at the table under false pretences, but to provide the 
catalyst for reflexivity and a discursive space, or “axis around which discussion can 
occur” (Owens & Cowell, 2002, p14). In Davison’s (2001, p4) words: 
In considering the idea of sustainable development, we need to hold the central ambiguity 
of notions like ‘development’ and ‘sustainability’ before us. We need to uphold this 
ambiguity publicly, or so it seems to me, because only in this way are we likely to be 
stimulated to think deeply and openly about the nature of our latemodern crisis. The 
slavish pursuit of absolute certainty has long fed the roots of modernity’s predicament. It 
is extremely concerning, therefore, that the discourse of sustainable development is 
becoming increasingly dogmatic, technocratic and hegemonic
80. 
The practical implications of retaining a degree of ambiguity within decision-making 
and sustainability assessment must be considered, particularly since Chapters 4 and 6 
promote the idea that each sustainability assessment should be guided by a 
‘sustainability decision-making protocol’, comprising the sustainability ‘factors’ to 
be considered and objectives and acceptability criteria for each as appropriate. For 
this I may well be accused of taking a reductionist stance that seeks to convert the 
                                                         
79 The denial of the power of ambiguity reflects the erroneous view that there is a right and wrong and 
the goal is to persuade others of the right answer, and that “[a]mbiguity is a linguistic veil which can 
be lifted to revel the truth” (Rydin, 1999, p468).  
80 Similarly, Robinson (2004, p374) argues that “Diplomats are familiar with the need to leave key 
terms undefined in negotiation processes and in much the same way the term sustainable development 
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ambiguous to the well-defined, in much the same way as did my ‘assessment for 
sustainability’ model of Chapter 2.  
As I have argued throughout this chapter, however, I now agree with Owens and 
Cowell (2002) that the idea of operationalising a predefined and widely-accepted 
understanding of sustainability is erroneous
81, although I believe that a primary level 
interpretation of the concept is important to guide and frame a sustainability 
assessment process
82. Furthermore, the protocol does not need to be reductionist in 
spirit, although it may appear to be so in form. While in some cases the protocol will 
call for scientific data predicting impacts that can then be assessed against the 
defined objectives and acceptability limits, as Owens and Cowell (2002, p54) argue 
in relation to technical approaches, “What matters is that policies be defensible, 
which may require deliberation and judgment as well as science”
83. Deliberation 
provides a counter to reductionism, and the protocol can serve the purpose of holding 
a deliberative space in which deeper level interpretations may emerge, and value 
judgments through practical reason can be made. In this way, there is still room for 
the ambiguity of the concept and tensions inherent in the choices to be made, which 
might be concealed at the beginning of the process, to be revealed
84. The SWY case 
study exemplified this. 
Deliberation within processes of sustainability assessment, however, can precipitate 
not just the readjustment and clarification of goals and interests exemplified by the 
SWY case study, but also the more fundamental value realignment within 
individuals that I have argued earlier is essential to an integral sustainability 
(Poncelet, 2001; Warren, 1992). For example, Gundersen (1995, p5) argues 
                                                         
81 Owens and Cowell (2002) argue, “Planning is not so much a mechanism for implementing 
sustainable development as an important forum in which different interpretations come to be 
contested and defined. There is no prior conception of sustainability (as opposed to the broader, 
consensual concept) independent of this process” (Owens & Cowell, 2002, p8). 
82 The Gorgon case demonstrated the need for a protocol, while the SWY highlighted its effectiveness 
as a catalyst for learning despite that most objectives and criteria could not be defined in any rigid, 
quantitative sense, and desired outcomes often only became apparent through the process of decision-
making and in the context of the whole. 
83 Similarly, Gibson et al. (2005, p91) argue, “We can keep our decision criteria visible and available 
for debate. Clear and openly debated criteria and rationales for evaluations and decisions at least serve 
the interests of greater accountability and easier learning from mistakes. Hopefully in most cases they 
will also foster better initial decisions”.  
84 At one level it may not even matter how well the protocol is defined in the first instance as long as 
it serves this purpose, and it may be quite appropriately challenged and redefined throughout the 
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confidently that “political deliberation and environmental rationality are linked: 
political deliberation enhances environmental rationality”. Speaking specifically of a 
collective process of ‘environmental deliberation’, he suggests that this “challenges 
citizens to move beyond their present beliefs, develop their ideas, and examine their 
values. It calls upon them to make connections, to connect more firmly and fully 
with the people and world around them” and thus provides an antidote to modern 
separation (Gundersen, 1995, p10). Thus deliberative sustainability assessment, as 
well as more autonomous spiritual and psychological development, may facilitate the 
emergence of individual ecological consciousness. 
For reflexive learning, either collective or individual, to be transposed into structural 
change, discursive and value changes must be linked to institutions and practices 
(Gundersen, 1995; Jamison, 2000)
85, and it has been observed that within a broad 
policy and institutional context generally inhospitable to sustainability, institutional 
change fails to materialise
86 (Dryzek, 1997; Owens & Cowell, 2002). Time and a 
degree of luck are often cited as necessary ingredients in the coupling of contextual 
‘software’ and ‘hardware’. For example, Kingdon (1995) suggests a fortuitous 
alignment of what he calls the three streams of ‘problem, policy and politics’ 
facilitated by ‘policy entrepreneurs’, an argument tentatively endorsed by Owens and 
Cowell (2002) in their study of UK transport policy. Others propose that this 
connection is most likely to result from some form of external shock or crisis that 
might be sufficient to change the tracks along which a policy subsystem travels 
(Sabatier, 1987).  
Both these theories depend upon political realities in that they require an 
“unmistakable public recognition of the need for change” (Caldwell, 1999, p12) 
before change is likely to occur. This implies the need for a ‘critical mass’ of 
‘ecologically conscious’ individuals gradually transforming their political contexts 
through their actions and by contributing to a new collective consciousness. These 
individuals may act by joining the groundswell of social reform movements that 
                                                         
85 Similarly, Giddens (1990, p155) has argued, “We must keep to the Marxist principle that avenues 
for desired social change will have little practical impact if they are not connected to institutionally 
immanent possibilities”. 
86 For example, in their analysis of transport planning in the UK, Owens and Cowell (2002) speak of 
the ‘parallel universe’ phenomenon whereby decision-making processes might be deliberative and 
inclusive in reaching a recommendation but having no influence on the institutions and organisations 
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operate outside the institutional mainstream but provide a glimpse of possible futures 
and also contribute to their realisation (Giddens, 1990; Pepper, 1999). Although 
perhaps slower (Slaughter, 1998, p521): 
critique, protest, and perception of dysfunction are all starting points for recovery. 
Women did win the vote. Environmental awareness did spread and become a mainstream 
concern. A truly vast range of social innovations – from trade unions to alternative 
technology and permaculture – have sprung up around the world
87.  
Social movements also provide a potential link between local and the global levels of 
change, whereby “each individual protest (is) part of a larger conversation” (Laws & 
Rein, 2003, p203)
88. Although the idea of reformist movements operating outside the 
mainstream societal institutions recalls the marginalisation of the first environmental 
movement, social reform movements have recently been reinvigorated by the 
gradual emergence of the ‘Network Society’, as discussed previously. 
The transformative potential of a radically-orientated ecological modernisation is 
generally linked with arguments for enhanced democracy, to which I alluded in 
Chapter 6 (Ashford, 2002; Barnet, 1981). The substantive benefits of broad 
community engagement processes were discussed briefly in Chapter 4, and it can 
now be more clearly seen that they can be categorised as either ‘exterior’ or 
‘interior’. Examples of the exterior benefits  include the opportunities for members 
of the public to learn more about policy decisions and to contribute ‘lay’ knowledge 
to complement the contribution of the technical ‘experts’, often leading to a greater 
acceptance of the final decision and an increased trust in the responsible institutions 
(F. Fischer, 2003a). On the other hand, reflecting an interpretive understanding of 
policy processes as a form of phronesis (see Chapter 5), it has also been argued that 
the ethical dimensions of policy making can only be embraced through inclusive and 
deliberative processes, since it is only possible in this way to know what is right 
(Owens, 2000). In the words of Sagoff (1987, p290), “The exact nature of the public 
                                                         
87 Despite the relatively recent transition to reflexive modernity, critique and reform have in fact 
always been inherent within modernity. Examples include those whose jobs were replaced by 
machines during the industrial revolution, those such as Marx who fought for alienated workers 
within the capitalist system, the early environmentalists, Rachel Carson and others (Slaughter, 1998). 
88 Laws and Rein’s (2003) study related to communities affected by waste management sites. They 
found that Communities link up with other communities and exchange ideas and strategies, leading to 
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interest or the public good cannot be determined apart from political judgment and 
deliberation”. 
However, where the goal is an integral sustainability, the greatest benefit of inclusive 
and deliberative processes lies in their potential to facilitate interior learning and 
reflexivity. The processes of developing new shared frames of meaning that 
penetrate and challenge the discourses of the unsustainable status quo
89, and of 
facilitating the emergence of ecological consciousness, are likely to be enhanced by 
the deliberative participation of a wider cross-section of people with correspondingly 
diverse worldviews and beliefs. Echoing the sentiments of the SWY interviewees 
who spoke of their wish that ‘everyone could be involved’ in such processes (see 
Chapter 6), wider engagement in sustainability assessment processes can also 
contribute to achieving the critical mass within “an emerging counterhegemonic 
consciousness: one that the victims of increasing failures within the mainstream 
approach to sustainable development might need to draw on before long” (Pepper, 
1999, p30)
90. 
My argument for deliberative sustainability assessment does not advocate a 
Habermasian ideal of ideal communication with the aim of achieving consensual 
decision-making, but rather, recalling the discussion in Chapter 6, concentrates upon 
the potentially transformative effects of deliberation and reflexive learning extending 
beyond the immediate decision. Furthermore, while calls for deliberative and 
inclusive policy processes evoke the tensions between the macro-level structuring 
Foucaultian, and micro-level communicative Habermasian conceptions of discourse 
(Dryzek, 2000; F. Fischer, 2003a),  “[a] more sophisticated view understands an 
interaction between the larger forces of social change and the more gradual struggles 
that take place in and through the institutions” (F. Fischer, 2003a, p229). 
Deliberative sustainability assessment thus operates between the cultural and the 
structural dimensions, and between the specific and the contextual, to facilitate an 
iterative process of learning and change towards an integral sustainability.  
                                                         
89 Dryzek (2000) emphasises the importance of critique in his model of deliberative democracy. 
90 A similar argument has also been made in relation to impact assessment, which has been perceived 
as a ‘democratic window’ into the bureaucratic state and an enhancer of change (Paehlke, 1990). Chapter 7: Putting sustainability back into sustainability assessment 
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7.6  Conclusion 
It can not be denied that sustainability is ‘an essentially contested concept’ (Davison, 
2001). To paraphrase George Orwell, however, I have argued in this chapter that 
some conceptualisations of sustainability are more equal than others. From the 
context of a comfortable life in the rich North, sustainability calls upon us to 
examine the foundations of our society and to question whether they enable the 
protection of the environmental and ecological integrity, and whether they permit 
others, removed from us in place and time, opportunities to meet their own needs. 
While there have long been those who have criticised the current trajectory of 
modernity, their voices have often fallen on the deaf ears of institutions within which 
it is unquestioned. The perceived rationalisation of the discourse of sustainability has 
exacerbated this problem and led many to despair. 
I submit that sustainability assessment provides a mechanism through which critique 
and transformation may enter the citadel of these institutions. Its power and potential 
as a process of learning and reflexivity arises from the inherent tensions within the 
discourse of sustainability, which provide the catalysts for deliberation and learning, 
and which are amplified by the uncertainties and unease inherent to the Risk Society. 
Sustainability assessment can thus be a mechanism not just to enhance the 
sustainability of individual decisions, but to support the emergence of an integral 
sustainability that recognises the importance of science and the power of institutional 
structures, but also calls for a reflexive questioning of the foundational assumptions 
upon which they are constructed, and for personal and cultural transformation.  
It is only by understanding the world in a way that encompasses both the exterior 
and the interior, the individual and the collective dimensions, and all the multi-
dimensional complexity of social reality (Fischer 2003b) that change becomes 
possible. In my concluding chapter, I draw together the threads of my argument to 
consider how sustainability assessment might be conducted and facilitated to support 
this process of learning and change.Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability 
assessment 
8.1  Introduction 
The journey that began with literature-induced confusion, sustainability assessment 
working groups, and a growing conviction that the Gorgon assessment process 
conducted by the Western Australian Government neither served well as an example 
of sustainability assessment nor contributed to sustainability itself, has led me down 
many paths to this point, where it is time to interweave the various threads of my 
argument. From the beginning, my purpose has been to contribute to the process of 
theory building for sustainability assessment. Recalling Cashmore’s (2004) assertion 
that the starting point for developing a theory of impact assessment should be a clear 
articulation of its substantive purpose, supported by an understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that might contribute to this purpose, my thesis in its simplest form is 
that sustainability assessment should serve to enhance both the sustainability of the 
proposal at hand and the sustainability of the context within which it is conducted, 
and that it should do so by facilitating learning within a process framework that 
encourages deliberation and reflexivity. The primary purpose of sustainability 
assessment is, therefore, not to answer questions but to permit their being asked.  
My view that the purpose of sustainability assessment is to contribute towards 
sustainability has not changed from the beginning of my research process, while my 
understanding of the way it might achieve this purpose has shifted considerably. 
Through the process of personal learning and reflexivity that has led to this 
fundamental change of perspective, I have developed a conceptual model through 
which the dimensions of learning through sustainability assessment, and the potential 
for change to result from this learning, might be understood. This model 
acknowledges the interrelatedness of exterior and interior, and collective and 
individual dimensions of knowledge, public policy, and ultimately society as a 
whole, and I argue that change towards sustainability calls for learning and capacity 
development in all of these dimensions. Though my research has been grounded in 
the context of Western Australia in the period from 2002 to 2006, and the stories I 
tell relate to this time and place, the conceptual framework is universal and 
transferable. I believe it may offer hope to other Western jurisdictions struggling to Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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incorporate sustainability into policy decision-making within a culture of neo-liberal 
obsessions with economic growth and consumerism. 
In this concluding chapter I begin by recalling the journey, drawing particularly on 
the analyses of Chapters 5, 6, and 7 and identifying the contribution of each to 
addressing my first research question: How can sustainability assessment contribute 
to sustainability? Then, again following Cashmore (2004, p415), who argues that 
procedures must be developed as a product of “an exhaustive understanding of the 
purposes of [sustainability assessment]
1 and the causal processes utilised to achieve 
these purposes” and that “[p]rocedural provisions are the means to an end, not the 
theory nor the end itself”,  I revisit my second research question: How should 
sustainability assessment be conducted to maximise this contribution? Here I build 
upon the discussions of application and process methodologies begun in Chapter 4 
and continued in Chapter 6.  
I submit my thesis in a mood of optimism, believing as I do that although only small 
steps have been made, the Western Australian experiences demonstrate the potential 
for sustainability assessment to be a tool for change towards sustainability.  
8.2  Recalling the research journey: Towards understanding 
the contribution of sustainability assessment  
Following the introductory remarks, methodological overview, and establishment of 
the context for this thesis in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 represented the first recorded stage 
in my journey towards understanding the potential contribution of sustainability 
assessment to a more sustainable society. Here I described the initial confusion 
shared by members of the Western Australia policy community as we came together 
to try to understand sustainability assessment and how it might be applied in Western 
Australia, and I presented my initial views on how sustainability assessment could 
contribute to sustainability based upon a review of the impact assessment literature 
(Pope et al., 2004). I have reflected on this early view continually throughout this 
thesis, documenting my process of reflexivity and learning. 
The story of the integrated, strategic assessment of the proposed Gorgon gas 
development on Barrow Island, told from the perspectives of those involved, was the 
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subject of Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 was devoted to extracting lessons from the 
Gorgon experience, mainly by analysing the case study against the impact 
assessment literature. I drew a number of conclusions for appropriate process 
methodologies and institutional arrangements for sustainability assessment that 
provided the basis for the comparison of the Gorgon assessment with that of the 
South West Yarragadee (SWY) water supply development in Chapter 6.  
The final conclusion of Chapter 4 was that while much could be learnt in this way 
about aspects of process, and appropriate institutional arrangements for sustainability 
assessment, aspects of the Gorgon experience remained perplexing from the 
perspective of the ‘information provision’ model of EIA (Bartlett & Kurian, 1999) 
upon which it was based. The focus and main strength of the impact assessment 
literature, which has become isolated from the more generic field of policy theory, 
lies in what I have called the ‘exterior’ dimensions of practice, particularly the 
quality of the science that informs decision-making, appropriate process 
methodologies, and supporting institutional arrangements, while all but a few 
theoreticians have failed to engage meaningfully with the ‘interior’ dimensions. In 
particular ‘values’, ‘power’ and ‘politics’ have often been viewed as troublesome in 
a field that retains its links to assumptions of positivism and instrumental rationality, 
and maintains vestiges of the belief that the purpose of impact assessment is to 
provide technical, value-free and context-independent information to political 
masters who take it fully into account when making their decisions.  
Chapter 5 began by acknowledging that the naïveté of the ‘information provision’ 
model of impact assessment has long been recognised, but noting that impact 
assessment in general remains under-theorised, particularly with respect to these 
‘subjective’ or interior aspects. It has also been frequently suggested that to 
overcome this problem, impact assessment theorists should turn to the related and 
more conceptually advanced field of policy theory. This was the path I followed in 
Chapter 5, where I firstly revisited the work of those impact assessment practitioners 
who had engaged with the policy literature. I found an erroneous argument for 
‘procedural flexibility’ in which the ‘baby’ of structure was thrown out with the 
‘bathwater’ of the rational-comprehensive model of policy analysis, and well-
intentioned but 'scattergun' attempts to engage with various explanatory policy Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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models. These were devoid of any overarching conceptual framework and 
consequently of limited value in contributing to either theory-building or practice. 
While agreeing with my predecessors that impact assessment should indeed learn 
from policy theory, I diverged from them in calling for ‘procedural rationality’ in the 
form of a guiding framework for sustainability assessment, which I discuss in 
Section 3 below, and in developing a conceptual framework through which the 
apparently competing policy models could be reconciled into an integrated whole. 
As a means of structuring my review of policy theory and its relationship to impact 
assessment, I introduced a heuristic framework drawn from integral theory (Wilber, 
1995) that distinguishes four dimensions of reality and four corresponding 
epistemological approaches, represented by the ‘quadrants’ formed by the tensions 
between collective and individual, and exterior and interior orientations. In the field 
of public policy this translates primarily into recognition of the links between science 
and behaviourism (exterior individual), institutions and processes (exterior 
collective), and meanings, values and ethics (interior collective), and the internal 
world of the individual actor (interior individual). I observed that the post-empiricist 
notion of policy discourse and storylines is a particularly useful construct through 
which the relationships between these different elements of the ‘policy universe’ 
may be explained and the contribution made by the different theories demonstrated. 
Simply speaking, the language and meaning of discourses become embedded in the 
institutions that in turn shape the behaviours of the policy actors. A deconstruction of 
the two primary and competing storylines of the Gorgon assessment, focused by an 
integral perspective, provided the basis for my exploration of the relationships 
between knowledge, values, institutions and power. 
Together with enabling a deeper understanding of the Gorgon case study, this 
analysis demonstrated the value of the integral framework in providing an 
overarching conceptual lens through which matters of public policy can be viewed 
more holistically than is possible from any single epistemological perspective. Of 
particular importance are the collective dimensions of public policy, both exterior 
and interior, that represent the intertwined ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ respectively of 
the socio-political context. The analysis of Chapter 5 thus emphasised the influence 
of context upon impact assessment and decision-making, in contrast with the Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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discussion of Chapter 4, where contextual matters were limited to noting the 
potential of sustainability assessment to influence aspects of context such as 
institutional arrangements and higher-level policies, in a process of ‘trickle-up’.  
I retained the integral framework in Chapter 6 where I explored the concept of 
learning in sustainability assessment in the specific context of my second case study, 
the sustainability assessment of the SWY water supply development. The SWY 
assessment demonstrated ‘exterior’ learning from Gorgon in the form of a vast 
improvement in process methodologies and institutional arrangements, bearing out 
the implicit hope in the Government’s ‘learning by doing’ approach to sustainability 
assessment. More importantly, I pointed out that some of these innovations, 
particularly the more open ‘question’ and the deliberately value-based approach to 
the social impact assessment, which was in turn guided by a clearly defined 
‘sustainability decision-making protocol’, also facilitated forms of ‘interior’ learning 
or reflexivity that led to the reframing of the proposal itself and the emergence of a 
new storyline. Specifically, the tension between the economic and social objectives 
provided the catalyst for a shift in the thinking of the project team that resulted in the 
project being reframed as a water supply for the whole South West of Western 
Australia rather than simply for the metropolitan area of Perth. While policy 
discourses and storylines are collective lenses of understanding, the case study 
analysis also hinted at the transformative potential of a personal form of reflexivity, 
since as a result of their involvement in the process, certain participants began to 
think more deeply about issues of sustainability and to question previously-held 
assumptions.  
In contrast with the earlier chapters in which I drew on the more general 
environmental assessment theory upon which sustainability assessment, at least in 
Western Australia, is based, in Chapter 7 I returned to the concept of sustainability 
itself, which is at the heart of sustainability assessment and which is its 
distinguishing feature. A review of the evolution of the sustainability discourse 
against the backdrop of modern industrial society enabled me to locate the various 
stages of the development of my thinking within the trajectory of the macro 
discourse. It has been argued that the discourse of sustainability has become 
rationalised, at least in the mainstream of business and neo-liberal policy making. Its Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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voice of reflexivity and critique has been marginalised by modernity itself, where 
depth and meaning have been collapsed into an objective ‘flatland’, and the interior 
has become cast off from the hegemony of exterior epistemologies (Slaughter, 
1998). Reflecting on the current state of the world and the power of the ‘institutions 
of unsustainability’, which are in turn underpinned by the fundamental tenets of 
modern industrial society, and particularly perpetual economic growth, I argued for 
the need to transcend ‘flatland’ in the name of global sustainability.  
Specifically, I argued for an ‘integral sustainability’ that would embrace the interior 
as well as the exterior dimensions of reality, and through which the separations of 
modernity could be sustainably reconnected. An integral sustainability calls for the 
reflexive excavation and transformation of personal and collective frames of 
understanding, as exemplified by the SWY case study. This transformation, 
however, must extend beyond the storylines framing a specific policy issue or 
assessment into the deeper discourses structuring modern industrial society, and into 
the interior motivations and beliefs of the individuals involved, to facilitate the 
development of what has been called ‘ecological consciousness’. The emergence of 
ecological consciousness involves a shift away from seeking well-being through 
material gain and towards a transformation that enables an holistic understanding of 
the relationships between self, society and nature (Christopher, 1999). My own 
process of learning through the course of my research journey, through which my 
understanding of the world has altered from that of an eco-modernist engineer bound 
within the exterior world of ‘flatland’ to also embrace the interior dimensions of 
reality and the interpretive social sciences, is evidence of such transformation. 
An integral sustainability is a journey towards change for a better and more 
integrated future. Simply put, since context shapes actions and behaviours, and 
discourses are the ‘software’ of context given form in the institutional ‘hardware’, 
change is precipitated through learning and reflexivity through which discourses and 
institutions are challenged and reformed from within. Although the SWY case study 
example demonstrated this reformatory potential only in the low level context of the 
storyline framing a specific decision, the potential demonstrated through both case 
studies for sustainability assessment to raise the ‘bigger questions’ leads me to 
believe that over time, sustainability assessment can contribute to more fundamental Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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discursive, and thence structural, change. The Gorgon assessment in particular 
alluded to the potential of sustainability assessment to facilitate reflection extending 
deep into the discursive layers of context, since the pro-development storyline of 
Gorgon had deep roots in the economic structure and culture of Western Australia, 
and indeed in modernity itself, representing the Enlightenment message of 
exploitation and control. This gradual process of change is enhanced and facilitated 
by the actions of those ecologically conscious individuals who have overcome the 
separation and isolation of a modernist ‘flatland’ to reconnect with themselves, their 
communities, society and the planet Earth. As individuals begin to question and 
challenge themselves, they can (Wilber, 1995, p197): 
create a ‘cognitive potential’ in the form of new worldviews…that in turn feed back into 
the ongoing mainstream of social institutions, until the previously ‘marginalised’ 
worldview becomes anchored in institutional forms, which then catapult a collective 
consciousness to a new and higher release. 
I found hope for an integrally sustainable future in many places. Cracks are 
appearing autonomously in the foundations and institutions of modernity through the 
emergence of what has been labelled the Risk Society, bringing a rejuvenation of 
civil society and the strengthening of interconnected social movements that remain a 
force for change. The angst and insecurity inherent to the Risk Society also represent 
a catalysing force for personal transformation towards ecological consciousness. I 
believe, furthermore, that the discourse of sustainability itself has retained its interior 
dimensions and therefore its critical capacity, despite its apparent reduction to a 
weak form of ‘ecological modernisation’ or the ‘triple bottom line’.  
Deliberative sustainability assessment can build upon these sources of hope and 
magnify their transformative potential in several ways. Firstly, the ambiguous 
concept of sustainability itself is a rich source of the kinds of tensions that catalyse 
reflexivity and provide ‘grist for the mill’ of learning at many levels. Secondly, the 
development of ecological consciousness may be  enhanced by involvement in 
deliberations of the kind generated by processes of sustainability assessment 
(Gundersen, 1995). Although the SWY case study emphasised deliberation within 
the project team and the members of the appointed Sustainability Panel, arguments 
for deliberation are most commonly linked with those for inclusivity and community Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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engagement, particularly in the discourses of deliberative democracy discussed in 
Chapter 7. Inclusive and deliberative sustainability assessment processes provide 
opportunities across the spectrum of society for learning and the development of 
ecological consciousness and ‘social intelligence’ towards the environment (Bartlett, 
1986). The belief that inclusive and deliberative processes can ultimately deliver 
structural change remains one of the great, and often articulated hopes (Barnet, 1981; 
Blatner et al., 2001; Paehlke, 1990). 
Having wandered far and wide from my early view that sustainability assessment 
should be a ‘top-down’ tool of strong government designed to determine whether or 
not a proposed action is sustainable, I submit instead that sustainability assessment 
can best serve the cause of sustainability, at global as well as local levels, by 
facilitating learning in all its dimensions; not only practical exterior learning about 
impacts, process methodologies and institutional frameworks, but reflexively 
learning that excavates and transforms the interior assumptions and beliefs that 
underpin our actions. Far from being merely a process of evaluating or even 
improving an individual decision, the highest potential of sustainability assessment 
is as a deliberative mechanism to support the emergence of an integral 
sustainability, through which the separations of modernity might be overcome, and 
the trajectory of modernity re-aligned towards sustainability.  
8.3  Conducting sustainability assessment: Processes and 
institutions 
The previous discussion has summarised my journey in reaching the conclusion in 
response to my first research question that sustainability assessment can best serve 
sustainability by engaging with both the practical exterior and the interior depth of 
practice, and encouraging learning in all these dimensions. Interior learning was the 
focus of Section 8.2, evident in my argument for its facilitation in the name of 
integral sustainability, and my own learning journey. In this section I return to an 
exterior focus upon issues of process and context in presenting my argument in 
response to the second research question, of how sustainability assessment can best 
be conducted in order to achieve this purpose. Most importantly, however, it is 
presented in the context of an integral understanding of the dimensions of policy 
processes: the exterior and the interior, the collective and the individual. I commence 
by locating processes for sustainability assessment within this framework, before Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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presenting my argument as to how it should be conducted and facilitated as a policy 
tool for sustainability. 
8.3.1 Locating sustainability assessment processes 
The discursive ‘software’, the institutional ‘hardware’, and the interactions between 
them that collectively comprise socio-political context, are all-important in shaping 
policy processes and therefore must also be the focus of efforts towards change for 
sustainability. In Chapter 7 I discussed ways in which discursive change towards 
sustainability might become institutionalised through some coupling action or event, 
but here my focus is on institutional reflexivity whereby institutions may be 
reformed from within. Just as the discourse of sustainability must be located within 
modernity, the potential for learning and change through sustainability assessment 
can best be realised by its institutional location within the administrative state, liberal 
democracy and ultimately modernity itself, as a contributor to the process that has 
been called ‘reflexive ecological modernisation’ (Hajer, 1995).  
This argument is founded on faith in the reflexive capacity of existing institutions 
(van Eeten, 2001). The Western Australian experiences of sustainability assessment 
have demonstrated this capacity and its transformative potential at the micro level of 
bureaucratic organisations through the willingness of members of these organisations 
to engage in the ‘learning community’ that has developed around sustainability 
assessment in the State. Others have extended this argument to higher level 
discourses, including the institutions of representative democracy (Weale, 2001) and 
the macro level institutions of modernity (Boothroyd, 1995). Existing institutions 
can be reformed by reconnecting them with values, meanings and ethics through 
deliberative practices, thus reforming the institutions by reforming the way in which 
they are operated (Gundersen, 1995). 
This argument aligns with Bartlett’s (1990, p82) view that EIA should act as a 
‘worm in the brain’ of the administrators responsible for its application. He says, 
“Such strategies involve dismantling or transmogrifying the administrative state 
from within – gradually and not entirely predictably – while remaking individual 
values and patterns of thinking and acting”. The founders of EIA recognised that 
reflexivity is context-dependent (Glasbergen, 1996) and action-based (Gundersen, 
1995; Laws & Rein, 2003; Schön, 1983) and that the concrete nature and the Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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context-specificity of impact assessment processes provide ideal grounds for 
learning, under the right circumstances. The nature of the discourse of sustainability 
itself, however, with its inherent tensions and ambiguities, and its interior and critical 
dimensions, makes the sustainability assessment an inherently far more powerful 
vehicle for institutional reflexivity than the science-orientated practice of EIA. 
The epicentre of this model for reform though is the individual sustainability 
assessment, facilitated by Government in the case of Western Australia, and focused 
upon a specific proposal or decision. It is in this setting and in grappling with the 
situational complexities that the process of questioning, excavating and reforming 
begins and which, as my case analysis has demonstrated, can extend far and deep 
and generate profound transformations.  Sustainability assessment must therefore 
embrace and reconnect the collective, individual, exterior and interior dimensions of 
the decision at hand, sustainability itself, and ultimately the societal context of the 
decision at all its levels, since it is only when we develop a way of understanding the 
world that encompasses all these dimensions is change possible. This represents the 
fullest understanding of ‘integration’ as applied to sustainability and sustainability 
assessment. 
At the heart of this reflexive potential are well-designed process methodologies that 
can provide the deliberative space in which learning and reflexivity might be 
promoted (Boothroyd, 1995). In this way, the institutions and processes influence 
and enable discursive change. By way of example, I argued in Chapter 6 that the 
open question framing the SWY assessment, which was a process improvement over 
the Gorgon assessment, provided the necessary space that ultimately led to the 
reframing of the proposal. This too was understood by the founders of EIA when 
they argued for ‘procedural rationality’ as the mechanism through which institutional 
learning and ‘ecological rationality’ would be facilitated. I argued in Chapter 5 for a 
structured methodological framework for sustainability assessment that shapes the 
process of decision-making but is well-distanced from assumptions of positivism and 
instrumental rationality. Although procedural rationality has often been conflated 
with these tenets of modernism, largely through the persistence of the rational-
comprehensive policy model and the information provision model of impact 
assessment, each procedural step is more usefully conceptualised as a focus for Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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discussion, deliberation and learning (Petts, 2003). I return to this point below, 
following consideration of appropriate process frameworks for sustainability 
assessment.  
8.3.2 Process frameworks for sustainability assessment  
Drawing from the two case studies and the literature upon which my analysis was 
based, I submit the following conclusions in relation to good practice sustainability 
assessment processes. Firstly, a structured process framework will generally enhance 
the practice of sustainability assessment, by forcing attention to matters that may 
otherwise be assumed or buried. The broad process steps should be: 
1.  Identify the goal and the related question to be addressed;  
2.  Establish a ‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ defining sustainability 
goals and criteria for the decision, and identify other goals and constraints;  
3.  Identify alternatives and options to meet the goal;  
4.  Identify the impacts of each alternative; 
5.  Select and enhance the preferred alternative. 
Each of these five process steps should be conceptualised as a deliberative space, and 
it is important that the processes of engagement and deliberation themselves are 
guided by procedures. As Boothroyd (1995, p93) notes “formal procedures which 
require public involvement help promote fundamental debate and heuristic thought 
and ought to be part of all impact assessment protocols”. Such procedures should 
reflect the greater purpose of deliberation, that extends beyond the delivery of its 
substantive benefits discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, to the development of an integral 
sustainability. 
Both the Gorgon and SWY case studies highlighted the importance of ‘asking the 
right question’. The ‘closed’ Gorgon question was a source of great frustration since 
it did not permit the meaningful consideration of alternative sites. The more ‘open’ 
question framing the SWY opened the door that enabled the assessment process to 
significantly contribute to the development of the proposal, both in terms of its 
refinement using mitigation and offset measures, and the reflexive learning process 
that led to the reframing of the proposal and the development of a new storyline. Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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Both case studies, however, were project-level sustainability assessments and 
therefore by definition the questions framing them were insufficiently strategic to 
embrace all of the dimensions of the broader policy context relevant to the decision, 
that is, they excluded the ‘big questions’. This created tensions and uncertainties, 
particularly since both were affected by significant policy gaps. While sustainability 
assessment of project proposals will presumably continue in Western Australia in 
accordance with government commitments (Government of Western Australia, 
2002b, 2003b), the SWY example in particular highlighted the need for these efforts 
to be supplemented by higher-level planning facilitated by government, in key 
strategic areas such as water, energy and mineral resource management. 
Recommendations for water planning have been made as a result of the assessment 
(Strategen, 2006a). In other words, more strategic questions must be asked, and 
sustainability assessment along the lines I advocate is an appropriate framework 
within which society may arrive at its answers. The identification of the question 
itself should be a deliberative process. Simply asking ‘What is the question?’ and ‘Is 
this the right question?’ catalyses debate, as was the case in the SWY process, since 
the question demarcates what is within and what is outside the scope of the 
assessment. In these debates lies important potential for learning.  
I posed the concept of a ‘sustainability decision-making protocol’ in Chapter 4, 
where I defined it as an operationalisation of the concept of sustainability for the 
decision at hand, incorporating both aspirational objectives and acceptability 
criteria
2. I endorsed it in Chapter 6 where I argued that, in the SWY, case it assisted 
by clearly articulating the tensions between economic and social objectives that in 
turn led to reflexivity and reframing. I then revisited it in Chapter 7 in light of my 
argument for embracing the inherent ambiguity of sustainability within decision-
making. Although the idea of a defined protocol appears to be in conflict with 
ambiguity, the protocol can serve the purpose of holding a deliberative space in 
which deeper level interpretations may emerge, along with value judgments and 
practical reason. In this way, there is still room for the ambiguity of the sustainability 
concept and tensions inherent in the choices to be made, which might be concealed 
at the beginning of the process, to be revealed. Deliberation over the development of 
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the protocol may in fact be one of the richest sources of learning, since the 
ambiguities and tensions of sustainability are at its heart. 
Neither Gorgon nor the SWY assessments considered project alternatives in any 
meaningful way. Arguably, the circular, iterative SWY process framework was 
effective in this project application in that it delivered a better proposal than would 
have been the case without the sustainability assessment. Real and diverse 
alternatives, however, must be considered when more strategic planning is 
undertaken, and ideally the SWY proposal would have been assessed within a 
sustainability framework against other potential water sources for the South West of 
Western Australia. Similarly, a better, more sustainable outcome of the Gorgon 
assessment would have been possible had alternative sites for the gas processing 
facilities been meaningfully considered, if not higher level alternatives concerning 
energy development in WA (Pope et al., 2005). 
The sustainability decision-making protocol also provides the basis for the final two 
steps in the framework: selecting between alternatives, and enhancing the preferred 
alternative for sustainability. This last stage involves the identification of potential 
mitigation and offset measures and the evaluation of the acceptability of any trade-
offs made. It is useful to note here that offsets and trade-offs relate to the concept of 
integration, which has been a topic of conversation in relation to sustainability 
assessment in Western Australia since the earliest days, as elsewhere. I have already 
discussed the holistic meaning of integration, but integration is complex even when 
it is limited to exterior concerns. The term has commonly been applied to mean the 
interactions between the ‘three pillars’ of environmental, social and economic 
considerations, that is ‘horizontal’ integration, and particularly efforts to achieve the 
highly desirable but usually elusive ‘win-win-win’ outcomes. Integration can also 
refer to consideration of the interrelations between specific factors or impacts of a 
proposal, which may be mutually reinforcing (as in ‘win-win-wins’) or opposing (as 
in trade-offs). Offsets can be applied in Western Australia when there are residual 
(but not significant) environmental impacts in an attempt to achieve a net positive 
environmental outcome (Environmental Protection Authority, 2005). They can be 
conceptualised as trade-offs within a ‘pillar’ of sustainability rather than between 
pillars (Pope, 2006b). Beyond horizontal integration, furthermore, sustainability also Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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requires the integration of local and global concerns, both now and in the future 
(Gibson, 2006) 
8.3.3 Governance for sustainability assessment 
In Chapter 2, I made the distinction between ‘external’ sustainability assessment 
conducted by Government as an approvals process, of which Gorgon was an 
example, and ‘internal’ sustainability assessment as a process through which 
proponents seek to improve their proposals. While increasing numbers of businesses 
are applying sustainability assessment to guide their internal decision-making, with 
no subsequent external assessment, the focus of my analysis has been the regulatory 
process and its reflexive potential within the institutions of government. Although 
the SWY assessment was conducted internally by the proponent and its consultants, 
it was undertaken in discussion with the regulatory bodies which, at the time of 
writing in October 2006, are assessing the final proposal for approvals purposes. 
Furthermore, the SWY Sustainability Panel, of which I wrote in Chapter 6, was 
appointed by Government and hence this sustainability assessment included both 
internal and external aspects. 
It is still too early in the evolution of sustainability assessment in Western Australia 
to make absolute recommendations for appropriate institutional and governance 
arrangements. Interviewees were divided in their views following the SWY 
assessment as to whether sustainability assessment should be legislatively backed, 
with some arguing that this was necessary to ensure full implementation of 
government commitments and others expressing concern that legislation would 
reduce the potential for the creativity believed to have been vital to the relative 
success of the SWY assessment. While it may be possible to draft legislation that 
permits a degree of flexibility while adhering to agreed principles, and finds a 
balance between these tensions, it is too early to make this decision, and further case 
study analysis is required. 
The experiences and the frustrations with sustainability assessment in Western 
Australia, however, have highlighted the incompatibility of the current bureaucratic 
structure with the integral concept of sustainability, and demonstrated the case for 
deliberate, as well as reflexive, institutional reform. There is considerable merit in 
further experimentation with the Sustainability Panel model, whereby the Panel Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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provides integrated advice to Government and also has the ability to engage with and 
challenge the proponent. In advance of regulatory reform the relationships between a 
non-statutory Panel and the statutory authorities must be clarified. At the very least 
this requires meaningful regulator input into the development of the sustainability 
decision-making protocol, and a clear understanding of how the Panel’s advice to 
Government relates to that of the regulatory agencies. A more active engagement of 
the regulators in processes of deliberation would promote further institutional 
learning and change. Furthermore, the sustainability assessment process should be 
coordinated by Government and not by the proponent, and consideration should be 
given to empowering the Panel to conduct its own investigations to limit dependency 
on the proponent for information. 
8.4   Future research directions 
There are several directions for future research arising from this project, in Western 
Australia and elsewhere. The methodological framework for sustainability 
assessment I have proposed should be tested in the real-life context of a preferably 
strategic-level planning process, of which the proposed South West Water Futures 
Study would be an ideal example. Such research would involve monitoring the 
attitudes and views of the people involved, both individually and collectively, 
throughout the process for the purpose of documenting their sustainability learning 
journeys.  
A national or international comparative study of the deliberative potential of 
sustainability assessment, and other planning and decision-making processes in other 
jurisdictions would provide insights into how deliberation and learning might be best 
facilitated. Such research would involve the identification of cultural, institutional 
and process factors that influence effective deliberation within a sustainability 
decision-making context. 
8.5  Conclusion 
I commenced this research project with the view that sustainability is a fixed state or 
destination with definable characteristics, and that the role of sustainability 
assessment should be to determine whether or not a proposed action is consistent 
with the achievement of this state. My journey has led me to reconceptualise my 
understanding of sustainability and sustainability assessment. Rather than some kind Chapter 8: Towards a theory of sustainability assessment 
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of steady-state fixed point, the destination to which I believe sustainability 
assessment may assist in leading us is in fact another journey, a journey 
characterised by reflection and reflexivity, experimentation and shifting, and a 
gradual realignment towards a society in which the institutions of unsustainability 
are reformed and consideration of the ‘state of the world’ induces hope for the future 
rather than fear and dread. 
Sitting at my desk in Western Australia in October 2006, though, it is easy to feel 
dread. Global warming is making its presence felt, particularly in the dwindling of 
water resources in Australia, the war in Iraq continues and global terrorism remains a 
threat, and there is little evidence of social dislocations and global inequities being 
overcome. Furthermore, the rate of economic growth in the State has just hit 14 per 
cent and our community seems to be in the grip of a rampant consumerism that is 
fuelled by the economic boom and that also creates demands for its continuation into 
an unsustainable perpetuity, on the back of the trajectory of global economic 
integration and corporate power.  
Yet amongst all this stand the discourse of sustainability and the hope within it to 
which my case studies of sustainability assessment point. Progress on the journey 
towards sustainability might be slow, but sustainability assessment can play a role in 
facilitating it and moving it along, little by little. My argument asserts that 
sustainability assessment can contribute towards sustainability by facilitating 
learning that extends beyond the practical and exterior dimensions to reach deep into 
the interior world of meanings, to build personal and collective capacities for 
reflexivity and reconnection. By the application of a process framework in which 
every stage is a deliberative space where many are invited to join the discussion and 
to learn, these processes have the potential to extend from the context of the specific 
decision situation into the nested hierarchy of discourses and storylines that shape 
each level of our global context, touching, excavating and potentially reforming 
them and the institutions that embody them towards a more sustainable future. By 
reconnecting values and ethics with institutions, individuals with communities, 
society with nature, and bridging all the divides that modernity has constructed, I 
believe that a future beyond dystopia is possible. 
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Appendix A: Indicative interview questions 
1  Gorgon questions 
1.  What is your role within the Gorgon process? 
2.  What is your organisation’s role? 
3.  How do you see the objectives of the Gorgon process? 
4.  To what extent do you think this process could be described as a sustainability 
assessment? 
5.  Tell me about how you perceive sustainability. 
6.  How have your ideas on sustainability evolved? 
7.  How well do you think this process embodies sustainability principles? 
8.  What is the role of Government with respect to sustainability? 
9.  What were your thoughts about the process when it first started? 
10. What are your thoughts now? 
11. How well has the process met your original expectations? 
12. Has the ESE assessment process helped Government to make a decision? 
13. How well has the two-level assessment approach worked? 
14. What aspects of the process do you believe have been the most effective? 
15. What aspects have been the least effective? 
16. What are the characteristics of a good sustainability assessment process? 
17. What do you think the Cabinet decision will be? 
18. What do you think it should be? 
19. In participating on this process, what has been the driving motivation of your 
organisation? 
20. What do you believe has been the driving motivation of other organisations? 
21. How important do you believe the development of the Gorgon gas reserves are to 
WA? 
22. What do you think of the proponent’s ESE document?  
23. What do you think of the proponent’s attitude generally? 
24. What does conservation mean and how important is it? 
25. What are net conservation benefits (NCBs) about?   368 
26. What is the purpose of an open consultative process? 
27. How open and consultative has this process been? 
28. Have you felt empowered or constrained by the process? 
29. Do you have any comments about the way the data has been collected and presented 
in this process?   369 
2  SWY questions 
 
1.  How well has the SWY sustainability evaluation process met your original 
expectations? 
2.  What aspects of the process do you believe have been the most effective? 
3.  What aspects have been the least effective? 
4.  What have been the most interesting? 
5.  What challenges have arisen in the course of this sustainability assessment process? 
6.  What do you think are the characteristics of a good sustainability assessment 
process? 
7.  Have your views on sustainability assessment changed as a result of your 
involvement in the SWY sustainability evaluation? 
8.  Tell me about how you interpret the concept of sustainability. 
9.  In relation to this case study, what would constitute and ‘unsustainable’ outcome? 
10. How have your ideas on sustainability evolved through your involvement in this 
process? 
11. How well do you think this process embodies sustainability principles? 
12. How do you think consultation and deliberation contribute to sustainability 
assessment processes? 
13. How consultative and deliberative has this process been? 
14. Have you felt empowered or constrained by the process? 
15. Have you been heard? 
16. Do you feel that the process has enabled people with different views and value sets 
to be heard? 
17. To what extent do you think consultation and deliberation has influenced the process 
and the proposal? 
18. Has your involvement in the SWY sustainability evaluation led you to change your 
views on any other matters, for example, the proposal itself? 
19. If so, what led to your change in views? 
20. Did you develop any skills that may be useful in the future? 
21. Did you build any relationships or networks that may be useful in the future?   370 
22. Did the group achieve a sense of collective identity? 
23. Did the participants feel that they learned anything new in the partnership process? 
What were the major things learned, both about the environmental concerns at issue 
and the other stakeholders involved? Did this constitute single- or double-loop 
learning? Was this learning shared by the other participants? 
24. What ideas or decisions were produced by the partnership that constitute a marked 
shift from how environmental concerns have been addressed in the past? 
25. What skills were developed that may contribute toward more effective participation 
in future multi-stakeholder collaborative processes? 
26. What novel institutional capacities along the lines of new professional networks and 
new social relations were generated that may improve the efficacy of future 
environmental problem solving efforts? 
27. What level of collective identity was achieved among the partnership participants 
that might indicate the degree of ownership and responsibility that they have for the 
decision made and the actions taken? What other individual level forms of learning 
were induced, and how might these affect future environmental conflicts and 
problem solving?  371 
Appendix B: Sustainability assessment conference 
paper 2003 
Sustainability Assessment: What is it and how do we do it? 
 
By: Jenny Pope 
Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy, Murdoch University 
Paper presented to the Second Meeting of the Academic Forum of Regional 
Government for Sustainable Development,  
Fremantle, Western Australia  
17-19 September, 2003 
Abstract 
Sustainability assessment is increasingly viewed as an important tool to aid in the shift 
towards sustainability, and commitments are made in the State Sustainability Strategy 
(Consultation Draft) to introduce broad-reaching sustainability assessment processes in 
Western Australia. However, this is a new and evolving concept and there remain very 
few examples of effective sustainability assessment processes implemented anywhere in 
the world. 
Sustainability assessment is often described as a process by which the implications of an 
initiative on sustainability are evaluated, where the initiative can be a proposed or 
existing policy, plan, programme, project, piece of legislation, or a current practice or 
activity. However, this generic definition covers a broad range of different processes, 
many of which have been described in the literature as ‘sustainability assessment’, or a 
similar term. This paper goes beyond the generic definition to examine the fundamental 
question of what sustainability assessment could, and should, be.  
It does this firstly by reviewing the different approaches described in the literature as 
being forms of sustainability assessment and evaluating them in terms of their potential 
contributions to sustainability. Many of these are actually examples of ‘integrated 
assessment’, derived from environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA), but which have been extended to incorporate social   372 
and economic considerations as well as environmental ones, reflecting a ‘triple bottom 
line’ (TBL) approach to sustainability.  
It is concluded that to deserve the title of ‘sustainability assessment’, the assessment 
process must seek to determine whether or not an initiative is, or is not, sustainable, 
rather than seeking to minimise unsustainability or even to achieve improvements which 
may still not result in a sustainable practice. To avoid confusion, this paper uses the term 
‘assessment for sustainability’ for processes that have this aim. 
‘Assessment for sustainability’ firstly requires that the concept of sustainability is well-
defined, in terms of sustainability criteria against which the assessment is conducted. 
The paper compares ‘triple bottom line’ approaches  and principles-based approaches to 
developing such sustainability criteria, concluding that the latter are more appropriate, 
since they avoid many of  the inherent limitations of the triple bottom line as a 
conceptualisation of sustainability. Some alternative sets of principles-based 
sustainability criteria are presented and their implications briefly discussed. 
1  Introduction 
Sustainability assessment is increasingly advocated as an important tool to contribute to 
the shift towards a more sustainable society. The Western Australian State Sustainability 
Strategy (Consultation Draft) includes commitments to introduce broad-reaching 
sustainability assessment processes in Western Australia, and describes a future in 
which “sustainability assessment forms the basis of all government decisions and is 
embedded into all levels of government activity” (Government of Western Australia 
2002, p41). However, this is a new and evolving concept and there remain very few 
examples of effective sustainability assessment processes implemented anywhere in the 
world. 
Available definitions of sustainability assessment include: 
•  “Sustainability assessment is…a tool that can help decision-makers and policy-
makers decide what actions they should take and should not take in an attempt to 
make society more sustainable” (Devuyst 2001a, p9); or   373 
•  “The aim of sustainability assessment is to ensure that plans and activities make 
an optimal contribution to sustainable development” (Verheem 2002a).  
However, as this paper will seek to demonstrate, these definitions are sufficiently 
generic to describe a broad range of different processes, many of which have indeed 
been called ‘sustainability assessment’ or some similar term in the literature. This paper 
seeks to examine the concept of sustainability assessment more deeply, using examples 
of processes discussed in the literature to address the fundamental question of what 
sustainability assessment could, and should, be.  
The concept of sustainability, or sustainable development, is clearly the basis of 
sustainability assessment. Sustainable development was first described by the 
Brundtland Commission in 1987 as “development that meets the needs of the current 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (WCED 1987). Sustainability demands the protection of resources and 
ecological integrity over the long term, combined with great improvements in human 
well-being, especially among the poor (Gibson 2001). 
Since the Brundlandt Commission, many alternative definitions of sustainability have 
been proposed and diverse interpretations of the concept made. Many of these are based 
upon the ‘three pillar’ or ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) concept of sustainability, which 
requires the integrated consideration of environmental, social and economic issues. The 
implications of different definitions and interpretations of sustainability that underpin 
the different approaches to sustainability assessment will be discussed. 
The theory of sustainability assessment currently available in the literature has largely 
evolved from work undertaken by practitioners of environmental assessment (EA), 
including project environmental impact assessment (EIA), and more recently strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA), which in turn has been influenced by policy analysis 
techniques (Sheate et al 2001; Sheate et al 2003). Therefore the approaches to so-called 
sustainability assessment described in the literature strongly reflect these processes.  
The purpose of this paper is to clarify what the term ‘sustainability assessment’ should 
mean if it is to fulfil its potential as a tool for promoting sustainability. Such   374 
clarification is an essential prerequisite to meaningful discussions on the development of 
sustainability assessment processes in Western Australia and elsewhere.  
It begins by reviewing the practices of EIA and SEA and then examines the ‘integrated 
assessment’ processes that have been derived from EIA and SEA by the inclusion of 
social and economic, as well as environmental, considerations in the process. These 
integrated assessment processes are discussed in terms of their aims with respect to 
sustainability, and the question asked as to whether they go far enough. The TBL 
approach to sustainability, upon which these integrated assessment processes are based, 
is considered, and alternatives to the TBL approach are also discussed.  
2  Environmental Assessment Processes 
When considering the concept of sustainability assessment and reviewing the literature 
available on the subject, it is useful to consider its conceptual origins. Sustainability 
assessment is generally viewed as a tool in the ‘family’ of impact assessment processes, 
closely related to EIA applied to projects and SEA applied to policies, plans and 
programmes (PPP’s) (Therivel and Partidario 1996).  
The literature reflects a widely-held belief that environmental assessment processes such 
as EIA and SEA can and do make valuable contributions towards sustainability. In some 
cases it is suggested that this contribution arises directly from the integration of 
environmental considerations into decision-making (see for example Sheate et al 2003; 
Wood 2002), while others suggest that EIA and SEA provide a sound basis that can be 
extended to include broader sustainability concerns (Gibson 2001; Verheem 2002a; 
Partidario 2003).  
The following sections briefly describe and discuss the two major forms of 
environmental assessment, EIA and SEA, to provide the necessary background for 
subsequent discussions the contribution of environmental assessment to sustainability.  
2.1  Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is generally applied to project proposals and 
“aims to identify the significant environmental effects of proposed activities to decision 
makers and the public and to identify ways to avoid or reduce environmental damage”   375 
(Devuyst 1999, p460). EIA can be considered to be a ‘baseline-led’ process which 
typically involves comparing the impacts of a proposed action with baseline conditions 
(Smith and Sheate 2001), and to determine whether or not the potential impacts are 
acceptable, unacceptable, or manageable with appropriate controls (Sippe 1999). 
EIA processes have been embedded in legislation around the world for the past 30 years 
and have been generally very successful in identifying and mitigating the potential 
environmental impacts of project proposals (Sippe 1999).  
However, the limitations of traditional EIA are also well understood and documented. 
Dalal-Clayton and Sadler (2002) discuss some of the factors constraining traditional 
EIA, particularly the late stage in the decision-making process at which EIA is applied, 
which means that questions such as whether, where and what type of development 
should occur have already been addressed.  
Dovers goes further in suggesting that: “EIA is fundamentally flawed in being orientated 
almost totally towards projects. EIA misses regional impacts, cumulative impacts of 
multiple projects over time, and may allow environmental death by a thousand small 
cuts. EIA rarely caters for consideration of alternatives to a project, but leads to either 
approval or rejection, or amelioration of impacts deemed unacceptable” (Dovers 2002, 
p24).  
The need to assess the environmental implications of decisions made at much higher 
levels of decision-making was recognised, and the concept of strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) has evolved rapidly over the past decade to address this gap and to 
provide a means for assessing the environmental implications of policies, plans and 
programmes (PPP’s) (Therivel and Partidario 1996). 
2.2  Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
As already briefly discussed above, strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is 
broadly defined as the environmental assessment of policies, plans and programmes 
(PPP’s) (Therivel and Partidario 1996), in contrast with EIA, which is generally applied 
to project proposals.    376 
Noble describes the theoretical relationship between EIA and SEA as follows: “Ideally 
SEA and EIA are considered in sequence where SEA proactively examines a broad 
range of alternatives and selects the preferred course of action, and EIA is initiated 
“reactively” to determine in greater detail the potential impacts of the preferred 
alternative” (Noble 2000, p210).  
This is an example of ‘tiering’, also known as ‘the trickledown effect’ or ‘vertical 
integration’, by which assessments conducted at the higher levels of decision making 
influence and guide those conducted at the lower levels. This should ensure that 
environmental issues are dealt with at the appropriate level, resulting in a streamlined 
process with minimal repetition (Therivel and Partidario 1996; Sadler and Verheem 
1996; Marsden 2002; Nooteboom 2000). 
Partidario distinguishes between different levels of decision making as follows: 
•  “Policy:  Road-map with defined objectives, set priorities, rules and 
mechanisms to implement objectives; 
•  Planning:  Priorities, options and measures for resource allocation according 
to resource suitability and availability, following the orientation, and 
implementing, relevant sectoral and global policies; 
•  Programme:  Organized agenda with defined objectives to be achieved during 
programme implementation, with specification of activities and programme 
investments, in the framework of relevant policies and plans; 
•  Project:  A detailed proposal, scheme or design of any development action 
or activity, which represents an investment, involves construction works and 
implements policy/planning objectives” (Partidario 2003, p8) 
Despite the fact that many writers have also pointed out that tiering does not function 
quite so neatly in practice (Nooteboom 2000; Noble 2002; Jones 2003), it remains an 
important concept for planning and assessment processes. 
Within the broad definition of SEA as environmental assessment of PPP’s there has 
been considerable debate as to how it should be approached (Sheate et al 2003) and as a   377 
result “there are several definitions of SEA stemming from the many ideas over its role 
and purpose (Sheate et al 2001, p6). 
For example, it is recognised that SEA can be used as a tool to evaluate PPP’s already 
developed or as an integral part of the development, assessment, amendment, 
implementation, monitoring and review of PPP’s, i.e. applied at all stages of the life of a 
PPP (Sheate et al 2003). However, the use of SEA as a proactive design tool rather than 
a reactive evaluation tool tends to be favoured in the literature (Dalal-Clayton and 
Sadler 2002; Brown and Therivel 2000) In the definitions provided above, Partidario’s 
use of the term ‘planning’ rather than ‘plans’ is deliberate, as she seeks to emphasise the 
importance of the planning process rather than the outcome of that process (the plan). 
Similarly, she advocates that SEA should be part of the strategic planning process rather 
than an evaluation applied to a completed plan (Partidario 2003).  
For the purposes of this paper, and based upon the work of a number of writers, the 
different forms of SEA can be considered to fall into two broad categories: ‘EIA-driven’ 
and ‘objectives-led’ (Partidario 1999; Partidario and Eggenberger 2000; Sheate et al 
2001; Sheate et al 2003). 
2.2.1  EIA-driven SEA 
EIA-driven SEA is typically applied as a reactive process that aims to evaluate the 
environmental impacts of a policy, plan or programme for which decision-making is 
well advanced or complete against a baseline, to evaluate the acceptability of the 
impacts and to identify potential modifications to improve the environmental outcomes 
(Sheate et al 2001; Sheate et al 2003; Sippe 1999). Essentially, it is a project-level EIA 
process applied to a PPP, or “EIA writ large” (Sheate et al 2003).  
Partidario (2003) suggests that an EIA-driven approach is reflected in some early 
definitions and SEA legislation, including The US National Environmental Policy Act 
(1969).  
2.2.2  Objectives-led SEA 
The literature also describes a range of SEA processes that can be considered to be 
‘objectives-led’. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘objectives-led’ will be used to   378 
refer to SEA in which the potential impacts of a policy, plan, programme or strategy are 
assessed against a series of aspirational environmental objectives, rather than against a 
baseline  (Smith and Sheate 2001; Twigger-Ross 2003). Objectives-led SEA is derived 
from policy analysis rather than from EIA (Sheate et al 2001; Sheate et al 2003). 
Clearly, a well-defined set of environmental objectives is an important prerequisite for 
this form of SEA.  
Reflecting the principles of tiering discussed earlier, these objectives must be consistent 
and compatible with those applied at higher and lower levels of decision-making. 
Ideally, environmental assessments conducted at higher levels of the planning hierarchy 
would establish appropriate objectives for decision-making processes at the lower 
levels, although it is recognised that processes are rarely so streamlined in practice 
(Nooteboom 2000).  
Objectives, or goals, describe the purpose of a policy, plan or programme, and for the 
purposes of this discussion the two terms will be considered synonymous.  They should 
reflect a broad strategic vision, such as ‘sustainability’ or ‘sound economic growth’ 
(Noble 2000) and should also reflect a balance between community values, development 
objectives and national and global trends (Partidario 2003).  
Therivel (1996) points out that while some objectives may be explicitly stated, others 
will be implicit, resulting from a number of incremental decisions made in political 
processes. The full list of objectives for a PPP can be derived from the explicit 
objectives, discussions with the competent authority and decision-makers, higher and 
lower level PPP’s and other sources.  
2.2.3  Environmental Assessment and Sustainability 
As previously discussed, the potential for environmental assessment processes such as 
EIA and SEA to contribute to sustainability has been widely recognised. Some believe 
that this contribution arises directly from the integration of environmental considerations 
into decision-making (see for example Sheate et al 2003; Wood 2002), while others 
suggest that EIA and SEA provide a sound basis that can be extended to include broader 
sustainability concerns (Gibson 2001; Verheem 2002a; Partidario 2003).    379 
Gibson points out that “environmental assessment processes….are among the most 
promising venues for application of sustainability-based criteria. They are anticipatory 
and forward looking, integrative, often flexible, and generally intended to force attention 
to otherwise neglected considerations” (Gibson 2001, p1) although he also recognises 
that “environmental assessments are not the only vehicles for specifying sustainability 
principles, objectives and criteria” (Gibson 2001, p19). 
The two views of the potential contribution of environmental assessment to 
sustainability correspond to two different concepts of sustainability. It is important to 
note at this point that sustainability is a difficult concept to define in a way that is 
meaningful and sufficiently practical to allow sustainability to be operationalised. It has 
been suggested that the difficulty arises because sustainability is a concept like ‘love’, 
‘hope’ or ‘freedom’, and as such tend to remain ‘fuzzy’ until applied in a specific 
context (Government of Western Australia 2002). This situation is not aided by the fact 
that many alternative theoretical formulations and applications of sustainability have 
been developed, which are founded upon common concerns and principles, but which 
have different emphases (Gibson 2001).  
This paper does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of alternative 
conceptualisations of sustainability, but does seek to highlight where appropriate how 
this alternative views are embedded into the various documented approaches to 
‘sustainability assessment’. 
For example, the suggestion that environmental assessment itself contributes to 
sustainability reflects the view that “environmental impacts are at the core of 
sustainability concerns” (Sadler 1999, p12) and that “specifically, the concern is about 
the continuing or accelerating throughput of energy and raw materials, beginning with 
resource extraction and ending with pollution and residuals” (Sadler 1999, p15). This is 
consistent with a ‘deep green’ ecological sustainability model that can be represented as 
three concentric circles, the outer representing ecology, the middle representing society 
and the inner representing the economy (Gibson 2001). This view of sustainability 
emphasises that the source and sink functions provided by natural resources are finite,   380 
and that sustainability therefore means finding a way to live within the limits of natural 
systems (Sadler 1999; Diesendorf 1997). 
On the other hand, the suggestion is often made that environmental assessment should 
contribute to sustainability by extending its scope to include social and economic 
considerations along with environmental ones (Marsden and Dovers 2002). This reflects 
the ‘three pillar’ or ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) model of sustainability, which is often 
conceptualised as three intersection circles repesenting the environment, society and the 
economy (Gibson 2001). This form of extension of environmental assessment results in 
a form of triple bottom line integrated assessment (Twigger-Ross 2003). 
The term ‘triple bottom line’ was popularised by John Elkington of SustainAbility. In 
his book Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business, he 
describes the evolution of the concept within a business context: 
“The sustainability agenda, long understood as an attempt to harmonize the traditional 
financial bottom line with emerging thinking about the environmental bottom line, is turning 
out to be much more complicated than some early business enthusiasts imagined. 
Increasingly, we think in terms of a ‘triple bottom line’, focusing on economic prosperity, 
environmental quality, and – the element which business has tended to overlook- social 
justice” (Elkington 1997, p2). 
Whereas the Brudtland Commission presented a two pillar model reflecting environment 
and development concerns, the three pillar triple bottom line model separates the 
development issues into social and economic factors, emphasising that “material gains 
are not sufficient measures or preservers of human well-being” (Gibson 2001, p7). 
For the purposes of this paper, the triple bottom line can be considered an interpretation 
of sustainability that places equal importance on environmental, social and economic 
considerations in decision-making.  
By far the majority of processes attempting to expand environmental assessment to 
address broader sustainability issues reflect a triple bottom line approach to 
sustainability. Triple bottom line integrated assessment is examined further in the 
following section.   381 
3  Triple Bottom Line Integrated Assessment 
The integration of environmental, social and economic considerations within an 
assessment process is an example of ‘horizontal integration’, in contrast with the other 
forms of integration identified by Lee (2002): ‘vertical integration’ (also known as 
‘tiering’ or the ‘trickledown effect’ as discussed previously) and ‘integration into 
decision-making’ which embodies the concept of assessment processes as a fundamental 
component of the decision-making process. Horizontally integrated assessment 
processes for sustainability reflect the widely-recognised principle that sustainability 
assessment requires the consideration of environmental, social and economic issues 
(Sadler 1999; Devuyst 1999), and reflect a triple bottom line approach to sustainability.   
Such extension to include all three pillars of the triple bottom line could conceivably 
occur within all three of the environmental assessment processes described thus far: 
EIA, EIA-driven SEA and objectives-led SEA. For the purposes of this discussion, two 
terms will be used: ‘EIA-driven integrated assessment’, derived from EIA and EIA-
driven SEA, and ‘objectives-led integrated assessment’. Although the latter is derived 
from objectives-led SEA, an objectives-led integrated assessment approach could 
equally be applied to project-level proposals. 
Both of these approaches can be considered to be examples of ‘sustainability appraisal’, 
as defined by Sheate et al (2001); ‘integrated sustainability appraisal’ as discussed by 
Eggenberger and Partidario (2000) or ‘integrated impact assessment’ (Sheate et al 
2003). Similarly, Lee (2002) uses the term ‘sustainability assessment’ to describe a 
special form of horizontally integrated assessment, which takes into consideration 
economic, environmental and social impacts, a definition which applies equally to EIA-
driven and objectives-led integrated assessment.  
The term ‘integration’ implies that integrated assessment should be more than the sum 
of separate environmental, social and economic assessments. Eggenberger and 
Partidario (2000) remind us that “the principle that the sum of the parts does not equal 
the whole is widely acknowledged” and suggest that “integrating in fact means that a 
new entity is created where new relationships are established, bearing on individual   382 
entities that have specific characteristics and specific dynamics but in combination act in 
a different way”.  
Brookes (2002) supports this view, suggesting that integrated assessments should 
demonstrate added value; that is they should be more than the sum of their parts. In 
other words, integrated assessment should consider the relationships, synergies and 
conflicts between the impacts (Gibson 2001). 
The aim of integrated assessment is articulated by Post et al (1997): “It aspires to 
describe – from the perspective of an identified problem or proposed project – the 
relations between the human communities concerned, their economic organization and 
their actual resource base. It qualifies, quantifies, and, as far as possible, values the 
effects of proposed and alternative interventions on the three (economic, social and 
natural) subsystems and their intersystem relations. It attempts to identify beneficial 
interventions and to fully expose unavoidable trade-offs”. 
Therefore, both EIA-driven and objectives-led integrated assessment should not only 
consider the environmental, social and economic implications of proposals, but should 
also examine the interrelations between these three pillars of the triple bottom line. In 
the case of EIA-driven integrated assessment, this means that potential interlinkages 
between TBL impacts must be identified, while objectives-led integrated assessment 
also requires the identification of interlinkages between TBL objectives. 
The two broad approaches to triple bottom line integrated assessment are discussed in 
more detail below. Examples of their application in practice are also provided.   
3.1  EIA-driven Integrated Assessment 
EIA-driven integrated assessment is analogous to EIA and EIA-driven SEA, except that 
social and economic impacts are considered as well as environmental ones, in an 
integration way. George describes the application of EIA-driven integrated assessment 
to international trade agreements, noting that “the prime aim of such an appraisal, often 
referred to as a sustainability impact assessment (SIA) is to identify mitigation measures 
through which adverse impacts might be minimised or avoided” (George 2001, p96).    383 
As already discussed, to be truly integrated, the interrelations between the three ‘pillars’ 
of impacts must be considered (George 2001), since it has been recognised that “the 
combined impacts, positive and negative, of the sets of measures as a whole, are likely 
to be more than the simple sum of the impacts of their constituent measures because of 
synergistic effects” (Lee and Kirkpatrick 2001).  
The difficulty of developing and conducting EIA-driven integrated assessment processes 
in practice has been recognised. This may be due to the fact that jurisdictions which do 
assess the social and economic, as well as environmental impacts of proposals tend to do 
conduct three separate assessment processes, and therefore inconsistencies in the 
methods and paradigms of sectoral assessment processes may inhibit implementation of 
more integrated approaches (Lee 2002). 
Recognising this, Eggenberger and Partidario (2000) identify five different levels of 
integration: substantive, methodological, procedural, institutional and policy, and 
suggest that these can be progressively implemented. Similarly, Scholten and Post 
(yeear?) propose a staged approach to the integration of separate assessment processes, 
beginning with integration of timing of individual sectoral assessment processes, 
although recognising that this will not guarantee good communication or good process. 
The next stage would bec a detailed scoping at the commencement of any assessment 
process to identify alternatives which consider cross-cutting issues and which form the 
basis of the sectoral assessments.  
If the respective impact assessment processes are not integrated effectively, then this 
form of ‘integrated’ assessment is reduced to three separate impact assessments, each 
generating data relating to the potential environmental, social and economic impacts of 
the proposal or initiative. The three sets of data must then be ‘integrated’ in some way 
after it has been collected in order to reach a decision as to whether or not the proposal 
or initiative is acceptable within a sustainability context.  
It has been pointed out that some trade-offs are inevitable in this situation (Gibson 
2001). While Post et al’s (1997) definition of integrated assessment discussed previously 
suggests that integrated assessment aims to fully expose trade-offs, others go further in   384 
suggesting that trade-offs should be minimised by an integrated assessment process 
(Government of Western Australia 2002).  
Several writers have recommended the use of tools such as multi-criteria analysis 
(MCA) to aid the integration process (Twigger-Ross 2003), while others have proposed 
criteria to guide decisions regarding trade-offs (Gibson 2001). However, the integrated 
consideration of triple bottom line impacts remains a challenging task.  
EIA-driven integrated assessment process should result in acceptable outcomes with 
respect to environmental, social and economic baselines. However, as George points 
out: “For this type of activity, the term sustainability appraisal, or sustainability impact 
assessment, is shorthand for saying that all three of the sustainable development spheres 
are evaluated. It does not necessarily mean that the appraisal evaluates a proposal 
against sustainable development objectives” (George 2001, p96). Therefore, 
contributions to sustainability may be limited to minimising negative outcomes rather 
than to maximising positive ones. 
3.2  Objectives-led Integrated Assessment 
Objectives-led integrated assessment reflects a desire to achieve a particular vision or 
outcome defined by integrated environmental, social and economic objectives. It 
assesses the extent to which the implementation of a proposal contributes to this vision, 
in contrast with EIA-driven integrated assessment which aims to ensure that triple 
bottom line impacts of a proposal are acceptable compared with baseline conditions.  
An objectives-led approach reflects a concept of sustainability as a goal, or series of 
goals, to which society is aspiring. As Gibson says: “Adopting contributions to 
sustainability as a key objective and test in environmental assessment clearly implies 
that minimization of negative effects is not enough. Assessment requirements must 
encourage positive steps – towards greater community and ecological sustainability, 
towards a future that is more viable, pleasant and secure” (Gibson 2001, p1).  
The implication that sustainability can be defined by a series of triple bottom line goals 
is consistent with the Western Australian Government’s definition of sustainability as 
“meeting the needs of current and future generations through simultaneous   385 
environmental, social and economic improvement” (Government of Western Australia 
2002, p24). Just as objectives-led SEA requires clearly defined environmental 
objectives, objectives-led integrated assessment requires clearly defined environmental, 
social and economic objectives against which the assessment can be conducted.  
It is suggested that an objectives-led approach, in which objectives are clearly defined at 
the commencement of the planning or decision-making process, is more likely to result 
in ‘win-win-win’ outcomes between the three pillars of sustainability, and therefore less 
likely to generate conflicts and trade-offs. This would require agreement of a broad set 
of objectives reflecting the needs of all stakeholders at the commencement of the 
process. According to Gibson: “For practical (environmental) assessment purposes, 
especially at the project level, it is usually desirable and often crucial to specify the 
relevant sustainability principles, objectives and criteria as fully and credibly as possible 
before proponents begin thinking about their purposes and options” (Gibson 2001, p20). 
Since the objectives define the required outcomes of the proposal under development 
specifying objectives at the commencement of the process places the onus of identifying 
and maximising ‘win-win-wins’ on those responsible for developing the proposal rather 
on than those who may be conducting a reactive impact assessment once the proposal 
has been largely developed. The former are much better placed to do this, since they are 
involved at a much earlier stage of the decision-making process; it is in their interests to 
maximise positive outcomes with maximum efficiency, thereby creating ‘win-win-
wins’; there may be additional incentives if sustainability criteria have been applied that 
restrict a ‘business as usual’ approach (or in other words ‘necessity is the mother of 
invention’); and because it is in the job descriptions of planners and designers to find 
new and creative ways to achieve objectives, especially when clear boundaries for the 
development are established up front. 
An example of objectives-led integrated assessment is the UK Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) process requiring that regional plans 
be subject to ‘sustainability appraisal’ defined as “a systematic and iterative process 
undertaken during the preparation of a plan or strategy, which identifies and reports on 
the extent to which the implementation of the plan or strategy would achieve the   386 
environmental, economic and social objectives by which sustainable development can 
be defined, in order that the performance of the strategy and policies is improved” 
(Smith and Sheate 2001, p265; George 2001, p95). 
Given the prevalent view that sustainability is about positive change rather than simply 
minimising the negative, objectives-led integrated assessment clearly has more potential 
to contribute to sustainability than EIA-driven integrated assessment. As Gibson points 
out: “In most jurisdictions, the essential immediate effect of a shift to sustainability-
based criteria is an expansion of central concern from avoidance of significant adverse 
effects to expectation of positive contribution to the achievement of sustainability 
objectives, however vaguely specified” (Gibson 2001, p19). 
However, an objectives-led approach to sustainability assessment has its own challenges 
and limitations. Issues of tiering and its practical limitations apply to objectives-led 
integrated assessment as they do to objectives-led SEA. Furthermore, the objectives 
must be consistent and compatible with each other, which in itself represents a 
challenging task since it is not uncommon for strategic objectives to be conflicting 
(George 2001; Therivel 1996).  
The potential of TBL objectives-led integrated assessment as a form of sustainability 
assessment forms part of the discussion in the following section, which begins by asking 
the fundamental question of what sustainability assessment should, or could, be.  
4  Sustainability Assessment 
The previous section discussed forms of integrated assessment based upon the triple 
bottom line (TBL) concept of sustainability. The examples of ‘sustainability impact 
assessment’ as applied to trade agreements, and ‘sustainability appraisal’ as applied to 
UK regional plans were provided as examples of the EIA-drive and objectives-led 
integrated assessment respectively. The former aims to minimise negative triple bottom 
line impacts while the latter seeks to maximise positive triple bottom line impacts, and 
both therefore can be said to make some contribution to sustainability. But does this 
mean that these assessment processes are examples of sustainability assessment?   387 
At this point, it is necessary to ask the fundamental question of what the purpose of 
sustainability assessment should, or could, be.  
4.1  Assessment for Sustainability  
The observation has been made that the integrated assessment processes defined in the 
literature, whether they fall into the EIA-driven or objectives-led category, essentially 
evaluate only whether a proposal represents a positive or negative contribution to 
sustainability (Fuller 2002; George 2001). Generally, they avoid attempting to define 
criteria or conditions for sustainability, and limit themselves to minimising negative 
triple bottom line outcomes (EIA-driven integrated assessment) or maximising positive 
ones (objective-led integrated assessment). 
Even the UK DETR, which does require assessment against “objectives by which 
sustainable development can be defined” does not actually require that these objectives 
be achieved, requiring only that “the extent to which” the objectives of sustainable 
development would be met is identified (George 2001).  
While this ‘direction to target’ approach is recognised as being of some benefit, 
concerns have been raised that it is not enough, and that sustainability assessment 
processes should go further if they are to fulfil their potential of contributing to a 
sustainable society (Fuller 2002; George 2001).  
For example, Fuller (2002) and Sadler (1999) discuss the need to measure ‘distance 
from target’ as well as ‘direction to target’. George goes even further by stating that 
proposals should not be assessed for their contribution to sustainability, but to determine 
whether or not they are in themselves sustainable. He reaches this conclusion following 
his detailed examination of the UK DETR process (George 2001).  
In George’s model, sustainability assessment can be defined as a process to determine 
whether or not a particular proposal, initiative or activity is, or is not, sustainable, and 
therefore effectively becomes a yes/no question. Based upon this discussion, it is 
suggested that the term ‘sustainability assessment’ should be reserved exclusively for 
those processes that have the aim of determining whether or not an initiative, whether a 
proposal or an existing practice, is sustainable. However, to avoid confusion between   388 
terms, this paper will use the term ‘assessment for sustainability’ to distinguish it from 
other related forms of assessment which do not share this specific aim. 
The notion of ‘assessing for sustainability’ implies that sustainability is a societal state, 
or perhaps more realistically a series of societal states, with particular characteristics or 
conditions, defined by sustainability criteria. In the words of Dr Karl-Henrik Robert of 
The Natural Step: “When the global society is sustainable, pollution will no longer 
increase, nature will no longer be impoverished through physical degradation, and 
within that frame, human needs will be met globally” (The Natural Step 2001, p10). 
“Assessment for sustainability’ is conducted to determine whether or not an initiative 
embodies these sustainability characteristics and meets these sustainability criteria. If it 
does, then it may be considered sustainable.  
4.2  Context and Application 
In discussing his ‘assessment for sustainability’ model, George points out that it does 
not eliminate the need for the kinds of impact assessment processes discussed 
previously. Rather, he acknowledges the role of impact assessment and the importance 
of planning to meet a range of environmental, social and economic objectives. However, 
he disputes that these processes can be considered to be forms of sustainability 
assessment, because they do not assess whether a proposal or initiative meets 
fundamental criteria for sustainability. 
With respect to impact assessment, George recommends that the identification of the 
potential impacts of a proposal should be addressed by the planning process in the case 
of spatial plans (George 2001) or by EIA in the case of specific project developments 
(George 1999) and that mitigation of significant impacts must be satisfactory (George 
1999). Information generated by the impact assessment processes is necessary in order 
to address the proposed sustainability criteria from an informed perspective. 
Furthermore, the application of weak sustainability requires integrated assessment as a 
component of the decision-making process, because weak sustainability involves the 
conversion of natural capital into other forms of capital which requires consideration of 
trade-offs between the three ‘pillars’ of the triple bottom line (George 1999).   389 
George also recognises the important role of environmental, social and economic 
objectives within the decision-making process, but suggests that such objectives, which 
typically concern issues such as jobs, economic growth, housing, transport, services etc, 
relate to development that is not necessarily sustainable and therefore should guide the 
planning process rather than the sustainability assessment process (George 2001). 
‘Assessment for sustainability’ could potentially be applied for a range of different 
purposes, although it is noted that actual experience with this approach remains very 
limited. For example, it could be conducted reactively at the conclusion of decision-
making, perhaps by regulators, to determine whether a proposal is sustainable (external 
process), or proactively during the decision-making process to assess the sustainability 
of the various options proposed to meet a series of objectives (internal process) 
(Verheem 2002b). It could also be applied to existing practices and activities.  
In some cases it may be a stand-alone process, and in others it may be one component of 
a more complex decision-making process.  
It has been recognised by a number of writers that if ‘sustainability assessment’ in any 
form is to fulfil its potential as a tool for sustainability, then it must be applied broadly 
within a robust framework. These conclusions have arisen from discussions of 
sustainability assessment and also of other forms of assessment, particularly SEA. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to review these in detail, but in summary it has been 
suggested to be effective and an instrument of change, ‘assessment for sustainability’ 
must be applied: 
•  Within a structured framework (Jenkins et al 2003); 
•  To proposed new initiatives at all levels of decision-making (Noble 2002); 
•  To existing practices across all sectors (Jenkins et al 2003); 
•  To the prevailing policy and legislative paradigm (Dovers 2002);  
•  To any decision with the potential to impact on patterns of production and 
consumption; governance and settlement (Dovers 2002); and 
•  By all sectors of society (Devuyst 2001a; Verheem 2002a).   390 
4.3  Criteria for Sustainability 
This approach of ‘assessment for sustainability’ clearly requires some form of 
sustainability criteria against which the proposal can be assessed.  
Gibson has the following to say on the matter of criteria in assessment processes: 
“Decision criteria are the basic rules of the game. Effective application of sustainability-
based criteria in (environmental) assessments will entail at least some clarity about what the 
effective criteria are and how they are to be interpreted. Policy-makers and process designers 
have sometimes embraced vagueness as a means of preserving discretionary flexibility and 
contextual adjustability. Constructive ambiguity can also be helpful in keeping 
representatives of competing interests at the table. But vagueness is maintained at a cost. 
While participants in (environmental) assessments – proponents, intervenors, administrators 
and decision-makers – will appreciate the need to adapt assessment obligations to suit 
different undertakings, locales and expectations, reinventing the rules for every specific case 
is likely to bring intolerable uncertainty and unduly attenuated deliberation” (Gibson 2001, 
p5). 
Sustainability criteria should effectively separate sustainable outcomes from 
unsustainable ones for the purposes of the assessment process. Sustainability criteria are 
analogous to the ‘acceptability limits’ which are embodied in many environmental 
assessment processes (see for example Sippe 1999). 
While it may appear a daunting task to define sustainability in terms of criteria, Gibson 
points out that “many versions of sustainability-based decision-criteria have been 
proposed for implementation” and that “a few have been, in various ways, been applied” 
(Gibson 2001, p1). Some alternative principles-based criteria for sustainability are 
discussed in the following sections. 
4.3.1  The Triple Bottom Line Objectives Approach 
This section returns to the triple bottom line objectives-led integrated assessment 
process identified earlier as having potential as a form of sustainability assessment, and 
examines whether or not it provides a suitable basis for the ‘assessment for 
sustainability’ (assessment against criteria defining the conditions of sustainability). 
Firstly, the relationship between triple bottom line objectives and sustainability is   391 
discussed, followed by a more detailed examination of the triple bottom line as an 
interpretation of sustainability. 
When considering the suitability of objectives-led integrated assessment processes for 
‘assessment for sustainability’, it is important to recognise firstly that a series of 
environmental, social and economic goals do not necessarily define a condition of 
sustainability. Beginning with a series of triple bottom line objectives is a ‘bottom up’ 
approach, reflecting the view that sustainability is the simultaneous achievement of any 
environmental, social and economic goals, while the alternative ‘top down’ approach 
begins with the concept of sustainability as a state to which society aspires, and then 
seeking to define this state in terms of environmental, social and economic goals.  
The difference between these two approaches was recently debated in Western 
Australia, following the development of a definition for sustainability in the State 
Sustainability Strategy Discussion Paper as “the simultaneous achievement of 
environmental, social and economic goals” (Government of Western Australia 2002). It 
was pointed out in various public submissions that this definition did not incorporate the 
criteria of meeting basic needs of both the current generation and future generations, 
embodied by the principles of intra- and intergenerational equity. These principles are 
generally considered to be fundamental to sustainability (George 2001; Sadler 1999) and 
intergenerational equity in particular is the focus of the original Brundtland Commission 
definition for sustainable development (WCED 1997). By omitting intra- and inter-
generational equity, it was argued that the original Western Australian definition 
therefore did not actually define sustainability.  
This debate, and the resulting change in the Western Australian definition of 
sustainability to include the phrase “to meet the needs of current and future generations” 
as well as the notion of the simultaneous achievement of goals (Government of Western 
Australia 2002), emphasises the concept of sustainability as a societal state, or more 
realistically a range of possible states, with certain definable characteristics, in contrast 
with the view of sustainability as the simultaneous achievement of any triple bottom line 
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George (2001) argues a similar point in his analysis of the UK DETR ‘sustainability 
appraisal’ process, which is an example of a TBL objectives-led integrated assessment 
process. The UK process goes as far as to require that the environmental, social and 
economic objectives against which the assessment is conducted actually represent a 
condition of sustainability. However, as George (2001) points out: “the extent to which 
an appraisal will achieve its aim depends critically upon the extent to which the chosen 
objectives do indeed define sustainable development. It is insufficient for them to be a 
combined set of environmental, economic and social objectives. They must be 
objectives ‘by which sustainable development can be defined’” (George 2001, p96).  
He goes on to suggest that the types of TBL objectives typically applied in the UK do 
not define sustainability, and are actually very similar to objectives that would be 
applied for development that is not purporting to be sustainable. While he acknowledges 
that such objectives are appropriate to guide planning processes, he argues that they are 
not appropriate for the assessment of sustainability (George 2001).  
If TBL goals and related criteria are developed that do not actually define sustainability, 
then assessment against these criteria could be misleading, and suggest that something is 
sustainable when in fact it is not. Fuller (2002) makes this point when he points out that 
if prevailing economic or political philosophies which may not support sustainability are 
assumed unchangeable at least in the short term, and the assessment is conducted within 
this framework, a false conclusion could be reached that a development is moving 
towards sustainability if the implications of context are ignored. 
Despite the risks identified above, if it were feasible to define sustainability by a set of 
triple bottom line objectives, as is required by the UK DETR, it would be possible to use 
these objectives to develop sustainability criteria against which an initiative could be 
assessed for sustainability. Therefore, theoretically, TBL objective-led integrated 
assessment could provide the basis for a process for assessing for sustainability (George 
2001).  
However, as has already been discussed, it is extremely difficult in practice to develop a 
consistent and compatible set of environmental, social and economic objectives that 
truly define sustainability, and practical experience in the UK demonstrates a tendency   393 
to develop series of objectives that are very desirable but which do not define a state of 
sustainability (George 2001).  
It is suggested that the reasons for the difficulties reflect the limitations of the triple 
bottom line as a concept of sustainability. 
Firstly, as has already been discussed, the starting point for a TBL concept of 
sustainability is a series of separate environmental, social and economic considerations, 
which then must be integrated. The question of how to integrate environmental, social 
and economic concerns in practice, and how to incorporate the inter-relations between 
the three ‘pillars’ of environmental, social and economic concerns, has been the subject 
of considerable debate in the literature.  
It has been suggested that the separation of the concept of sustainability into the three 
pillars of the triple bottom line tends to emphasise potentially competing interests rather 
than the linkages and interdependencies between them, making the task of integration 
extremely difficult and promoting trade-offs (Gibson 2001). The risk of environmental 
standards being traded off against socio-economic factors in such a process has been 
discussed extensively in the literature (Sheate et al 2003; Jenkins et al 2003; Gibson 
2001; Lee 2002).  
Fuller (2002) summarises these concerns by suggesting that “where trade offs between 
the economy and the environment are seen as legitimate in the pursuit of sustainability, 
sustainability assessment could be regarded as a means for economic requirements to 
override those or the environment or the social context”. Although Sadler points out that 
the likelihood of win-lose scenarios can be reduced by the incorporation of minimum 
acceptability thresholds into the TBL model and requiring that any initiative at least 
meets these minimum thresholds, he also agrees that “beyond these boundaries, one set 
of criteria are either unduly promoted or unduly discounted against the others” (Sadler 
1999, p20). 
Furthermore, the triple bottom line can be considered reductionist approach to 
sustainability, and that dividing the holistic concept of sustainability into three pillars as 
a starting point invariably runs the risk of the sum of the parts being less than the whole. 
This is particularly true if the interrelations between the three pillars are not adequately   394 
understood and described, and therefore sustainability is reduced to a consideration of 
separate environmental, social and economic factors, the sum of which is less than the 
whole, that is, sustainability. Gibson expresses this concern by pointing out that there 
are sustainability-related discourses that are “not always incorporated in pillar-based 
sustainability literature and practice” (Gibson 2001, p17). 
As the originator of the concept of holism, Jan Smuts, said: “In all of the previous cases 
of wholes we have nowhere been able to argue from the parts to the whole. Compared to 
its parts the whole constituted by them is something quite different, something 
creatively new, as we have seen. Creative Evolution synthesises from the parts a new 
entity not only different from them but quite transcending them. That is the essence of a 
whole. It is always transcendent to its parts and its character cannot be inferred from the 
characters of its parts” (Smuts 1999, p367). 
In addition, Gibson points out that the three pillars of the triple bottom line, although 
recognised to be interconnected and interdependent, still “reflect more or less 
conventional modern disciplinary categories” (Gibson 2001, p7) whereas sustainability 
should be “necessarily an attack on conventional thinking and practice” (Gibson 2001, 
p6). 
Based upon the preceding discussion, the conclusion is drawn that it is difficult, and 
probably inappropriate, to define a holistic concept of sustainability and corresponding 
criteria or conditions for sustainability from a triple bottom line starting point. 
Alternative approaches are discussed in the following section. 
4.3.2  The Principles-Based Approach 
Several alternatives to the triple bottom line as a means of defining sustainability for the 
purposes of assessment have been proposed. These involve defining sustainability 
criteria or conditions derived from sustainability principles instead of triple bottom line 
goals, to avoid the limitations and challenges of the triple bottom line. 
Gibson (2001) promotes the use of a principles-based approach to sustainability 
assessment instead of the triple bottom line ‘three pillar’ approach as adopted by the 
integrated assessment models already discussed, arguing that the pillar approach   395 
emphasises the potential conflicts between the pillars, and is more likely to result in 
trade-offs, whereas a principles-based approach emphasises interconnections and 
interdependencies between the pillar areas. 
 
In presenting his model, Gibson says: “We have therefore chosen here to propose a 
slightly different approach – one that avoids constructing the edifice of sustainability 
criteria on the conventional pillars…The alternative, which is perhaps only superficially 
different from the pillar approach, is to begin not with categories based on the usual 
areas of concern (ecological, social etc.) but with a list of the key changes needed in 
human arrangements and activities if we are to move towards long term viability and 
well-being” (Gibson 2001, p8).  
Sadler discusses the potential use of indicators to define sustainability criteria, and  
concludes that “the better way forward is to establish ‘benchmark principles’ which are 
robust enough to evaluate the ‘sustainability contours’ of development proposals and 
choices” (Sadler 1999, p17). 
George (2001) also reaches the conclusion that a principles-based approach to 
developing sustainability criteria is the more appropriate, after recognising the 
limitations of the objectives-led approach in the UK. He recommends an approach to 
sustainability assessment based upon fundamental principles of sustainability as defined 
by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 (George 2001), as does Sadler (1999). 
The use of the Rio Declaration principles is also supported by the International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) in their performance criteria for SEA where 
it is suggested that the ultimate objective of sustainability assessment should be to 
determine how proposals can best contribute “to the overall sustainable development 
strategy as laid down in Rio 1992 and defined in the specific policies or values of a 
country” (IAIA 2002). Sadler (1999) calls assessment based upon sustainability 
principles ‘environmental sustainability assurance’. 
‘Assessment for sustainability’ using criteria based upon sustainability principles avoids 
some of the inherent challenges of TBL integrated assessment, such as the practical   396 
difficulties of integrating environmental, social and economic concerns; the risk of 
trade-offs and the erosion of environmental standards (Gibson 2001), and the likelihood 
that a series of TBL goals will fail to fully describe the holistic concept of sustainability. 
Three proposed sets of principles-based sustainability criteria are discussed below. 
George’s Sustainability Criteria (George 1999; 2001) 
Essentially, George considers that the principles of intra- and intergenerational equity 
are the cornerstones of sustainability (George 1999, 2001). From this basis and by 
incorporating other Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 principles including the 
participation principle (Principle 10); the local communities principle (Principle 22); and 
the precautionary principle (Principle 15), he develops a series of criteria for 
sustainability, in the form of questions to which the answer must always be ‘yes’ 
(George 2001). These are: 
1.  Have all social groups within the planning area (groups affected by the project) been 
identified, and have the social, economic and environmental impacts on each group 
been assessed separately where they are likely to be different, including different 
impacts on men and women? 
2.  Will  the  planning  documents  and  the  sustainability  appraisal  (or  EIA  report)  be 
published and made readily available to all members of the public? 
3.  Will all members of the public have the opportunity to comment on the planning 
documents and sustainability appraisal (proposals), and will their views be taken into 
account before plans or planning guidance are adopted (a decision is made)? 
4.  Have suitable provisions been made for the participation of disadvantaged minorities 
in the planning process? 
5.  Has all relevant planning guidance been complied with? 
6.  Have significant transboundary impacts been identified and properly assessed, are 
relevant  international  agreements  complied  with,  and  will  affected  parties  be 
consulted before final decisions are made? 
7.  Have  all  potential  global  impacts  been  identified  and  properly  assessed,  and  are 
relevant global agreements complied with? 
8.  Have any potentially critical ecosystem factors that may be affected been identified?   397 
9.  Has the risk of serious or irreversible damage arising from any such impact been 
satisfactorily assessed, with suitable systems for monitoring and impact avoidance 
where needed, and using risk assessment techniques where appropriate? 
10. If the risk of serious or irreversible damage is significant, or if a risk that is already 
significant may be increased, will the impact be fully mitigated, in kind, so that there 
will be zero adverse residual impact?  
10a.  Is  any  loss  of  natural  habitat  quantified,  where  it  is  important  for  species 
conservation? 
10b. Is it demonstrated that the rate of loss will not exceed the equilibrium regeneration 
rate? 
10c. Is an appropriate contribution to reducing greenhouse gases shown to be made, 
which is in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol? 
11. Has  the  natural  capital  that  may  be  converted  into  other  forms  of  capital  been 
identified? 
12. Is it satisfactorily demonstrated that total capital will be conserved? 
It is noted that some of these criteria relate to process rather than outcomes: for example 
questions 1-4 relate to community involvement in the decision-making process. This is 
because George relies upon participatory processes to deliver local and regional intra-
generational equity; in other words that each social group will demand equity and obtain 
equity through the participation process. Similarly, Criterion 5, which addresses national 
intra-generational equity, assumes that “democratic processes have resulted in a national 
strategy, national objectives and national guidance for lower levels of policy-making 
and planning, which cater for the interests of other regions and the nation as a whole” 
(George 2001, p101). 
In summary: criteria 1-4 address local and regional intra-generational equity; criteria 5 
relates to national intra-generational equity; criterion 6 addresses trans-national intra-
generational equity, i.e. short or medium range international impacts;  criterion 7 global 
intra-generational equity, i.e. global impacts; and criteria 8-12 relate to intergenerational 
equity.    398 
George considers that communities and individuals can generally be trusted to make 
appropriate decisions about social and economic benefits to be handed on to their 
ancestors, but that intergenerational equity is mainly about environmental issues and the 
conservation of capital, and therefore strict criteria to address these issues are required. 
His criteria incorporate the concepts of strong and weak sustainability, where strong 
sustainability requires that natural capital must be conserved, while weak sustainability 
allows for natural capital to be converted into another form of capital (George 2001). 
George suggests that the application of strong or weak sustainability should depend 
upon the use of the precautionary principle (Rio Declaration Principle 15): “where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation”. Therefore, Criteria 8 and 9 determine whether strong or weak 
sustainability should be applied. George suggests that this decision should be made 
explicitly, and also suggests that the principle should be used without consideration of 
cost-effectiveness (George 1999, 2001). 
Criterion 10 is the strong sustainability criterion. George suggests that biodiversity loss 
and climate change are sufficiently significant to require the application of strong 
sustainability (George 1999, 2001) and that compliance with the Biodiversity 
Convention and the Climate Change Convention (in accordance with the Rio 
Declaration Principle 7) would be a practicable test of this criterion (George 2001). 
However, Criteria 10a, 10b and 10c reflect a condition of ‘working towards 
sustainability’ due to the limitations inherent in the Conventions; for example, the 
implication that intra-generational equity is met by the Kyoto Protocol, whereas it may 
not be in some cases such as island states (George 2001). They can also be considered as 
“time-limited weak sustainability” since they reflect the position that while increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions and loss of biodiversity are not sustainable, they will not be 
halted in the immediate future, particularly in developing countries where this would be 
inequitable (George 1999).   399 
With respect to Criterion 10c relating to greenhouse gas emissions, George suggests that 
if there is no nation plan that distributed Kyoto targets, then the applicable targets must 
be applied across the board (George 1999). 
 Criteria 11 and 12 are the weak sustainability criteria. Weak sustainability raises issues 
of how natural capital should be valued for the different groups (local, national, 
international or global) who benefit from it. By necessity, values must be determined by 
the present generation (George 1999). 
George has applied his sustainability assessment criteria retrospectively to a six projects 
of the type typically subject to EIA in the UK, to determine whether or not they could be 
considered sustainable according to his criteria. In doing this, he demonstrated that this 
approach is practical and can be effectively applied to addresses the fundamental 
question: ‘is this initiative sustainable?’ (George 1999). However, it is acknowledged 
that further trials should be conducted to further assess the practicality of this approach 
in different contexts. 
Sadler’s Sustainability Principles (Sadler 1999) 
Sadler’s approach is similar to George’s, in that it also takes as its starting point the 
principles of intra- and intergenerational equity (Sadler 1999). After discussing the need 
to elect a ‘standard for sustainability’ in terms of weak, moderate, strong or absolute 
sustainability, Sadler proposes both supply-side and demand-side strong sustainability 
principles. 
The supply-side principles are: 
1.  “Avoid irreversible changes; 
2.  No or minimal impact on critical resource and ecological functions; 
3.  No net loss or deterioration of natural capital; 
4.  Renewable resources should be depleted (harvested or used) at a rate equal to their 
regeneration; 
5.  Non-renewable resources should be depleted at a rate equal to their replacement by 
renewable substitutes;   400 
6.  Waste emissions should not exceed the assimilated capacity of the environment or 
cause harmful effects to human health; 
7.  Conserve biological diversity, comprising the variability of ecosystems, species and 
gene pools” (Sadler 1999, p24) 
 Sadler’s demand-side principles are based around the precautionary principle to be 
applied to individual decisions, as well as some principles for addressing structural 
causes of ecological unsustainability, whereas the supply-side principles are suitable as 
sustainability criteria against which sustainability assessment can be conducted.  
Sadler’s model strongly reflects a more ecologically-driven view of sustainability, 
whereas George’s criteria more obviously reflect issues of social equality. 
The Natural Step System Conditions 
An alternative set of sustainability criteria is presented by The Natural Step, an 
organisation devoted to providing tools to support the implementation of sustainability. 
The Natural Step defines sustainability in terms of four system conditions or criteria for 
sustainability: 
1.  “Substances from the earth’s crust must not systematically decrease in nature; 
2.  Substances produced by society must not systematically increase in nature; 
3.  The productivity and diversity of nature must not be systematically deteriorated; 
4.  Basic human needs must be met everywhere” (Sadler 1999, p22). 
These system conditions reflect what Sadler terms ‘absolute sustainability’, since they 
require “non-depleting and non-damaging use of natural resources” (Sadler 1999, p21), 
and therefore represent the most stringent of the three sets of sustainability criteria 
discussed above.  
Using Other Sustainability Principles 
Rather than beginning with the Rio Declaration principles, combined with weak, 
moderate, strong or absolute interpretations of sustainability (George 1999, 2001; Sadler 
1999), other sustainability principles can also be potentially used as the basis for the 
development of sustainability criteria.   401 
For example, Gibson proposes a set of sustainability criteria to be used for this purpose. 
These are conceptually and substantively similar to those developed for Western 
Australia and summarised below (Government of Western Australia 2002, p28):  
1.  Long-term economic health; 
2.  Equity and human rights; 
3.  Biodiversity and ecological integrity; 
4.  Settlement efficiency and quality of life; 
5.  Community, regions, ‘sense of place’ and heritage; 
6.  Net benefit from development; 
7.  Common good from planning 
8.  Integration of the triple bottom line; 
9.  Accountability, transparency and engagement; 
10. Precaution; 
11. Hope, vision, symbolic and iterative change. 
Sets of principles such as these have a broad scope and reflect an ‘all-encompassing’ 
view of sustainability. This contrasts with George’s approach, for example, which is 
based upon only two principles: intra- and intergenerational equity.  Arguably, this may 
make more difficult the task of translating these principles into sustainability criteria that 
define what is, and what is not, sustainable. However, this process would itself aid in 
clarifying what concept of sustainability is to be the model for Western Australia. 
4.4  Developing Processes Based Upon Sustainability Criteria 
The above discussion concluded that a principles-based approach to developing 
sustainability criteria is more appropriate than a triple bottom line approach, and briefly 
three alternative sets of principles-based were briefly outlined. They are clearly very 
different from each other, based as they are upon different conceptualisations of what 
sustainability actually is.  
While such sets of criteria such as these provide the basis for ‘assessment of 
sustainability’, they must be clarified for the relevant context before they can actually be 
applied within an assessment process (Gibson 2001). In practice, this is likely to involve 
the identification of the potential impacts of the initiative in question relevant to each   402 
sustainability criterion; assessment of significance of these impacts; establishment of 
‘acceptability thresholds’ for the potential impacts deemed to be significant; prediction 
of the scale and magnitude of the likely impacts; and the assessment of the impacts 
against the ‘acceptability thresholds’. This in turn will allow the assessment of the 
initiative against the sustainability criteria. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the development of assessment 
processes in any more detail, several key points can be made. 
Firstly, the sustainability criteria must define sustainability. This is a challenging 
concept, since has already been discussed, interpretations of sustainability vary 
considerably, even when founded on the same basic principles (Gibson 2001). While it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the meaning of sustainability in any depth, 
the conclusion can be drawn from previous discussion (for example, the evolution of the 
Western Australian definition of sustainability, and the criteria proposed by George 
(1999 and 2001)) that the sustainability criteria must reflect the principles of intra- and 
intergenerational equity in some way, as these are fundamental to the concept of 
sustainability. 
Secondly, the clear definition of ‘acceptability limits’ for the various potentially 
significant impacts are essential to the process. These should reflect the sustainability 
criteria which form the basis of the assessment process and should effectively separate 
sustainable outcomes from unsustainable ones for the purposes of the assessment 
process.  
Thirdly, since the potential impacts will vary depending on context, the process of 
identifying potential impacts, determining which ones are significant for the purpose of 
the assessment and establishing acceptability limits must be done on a case-by-case 
basis. This process can be aided by experience, as has been the case with environmental 
assessment processes. Tiering will also be important, in that higher level assessments 
can be used to “clarify sector and area specific sustainability principles, objectives and 
criteria” (Gibson 2001, p21).   403 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed the evolving concept of ‘sustainability assessment’ by firstly 
considering its origins as a member of the family of environmental assessment processes 
that includes environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA), where a distinction was made between EIA-driven, baseline-led 
processes and objectives-led processes.  
The potential for these processes to contribute to sustainability was then discussed. 
Typically, this has involved the expansion of the scope of environmental assessment 
processes to include social and economic considerations as well as environmental issues, 
reflecting the ‘triple bottom line’ or ‘three pillar’ approach to sustainability and resulting 
in forms of integrated assessment. Examples of EIA-driven and objectives-led integrated 
assessment were provided, and the risks and challenges of these approaches discussed. 
In particular, the practical difficulty of integrating environmental, social and economic 
considerations in a way which fully recognises interactions and interlinkages, and which 
maximises ‘win-win-wins’ and minimises trade-offs was acknowledged. 
These forms of integrated assessment were then reviewed for their contributions to 
sustainability. It was argued that EIA-driven integrated assessment tends to focus on 
minimising negative impacts and reducing unsustainable practices, but fails to address 
the concept of sustainability as a societal goal. Objectives-led integrated assessment was 
found to be far more compatible with the concept of sustainability, since it assesses the 
contribution of a proposal to aspirational objectives, rather than against baseline 
conditions.  
However, it was pointed out that most applications of integrated assessment processes in 
practice, even objective-led processes that attempt to define sustainability in terms of 
triple bottom line objectives, tend to limit themselves to measuring whether or not a 
proposal represents a positive or negative contribution to sustainability. In other words, 
they consider ‘direction to target’, where the target is a sustainable society. It has been 
pointed out that while this may be useful, it may not be sufficient to drive the kind of 
change required in the pursuit of this goal and that process are needed that actually   404 
assess whether an initiative is, or is not, sustainable. For the purposes of this paper, such 
processes have been termed “assessment for sustainability’ processes. 
‘Assessment for sustainability’ requires a clear definition of sustainability and 
corresponding sustainability criteria against which the assessment can be conducted. 
While sustainability criteria could theoretically be developed through a triple bottom 
line interpretation of sustainability, this approach has practical challenges and 
conceptual limitations. Several writers have therefore recommended principles-based 
criteria for sustainability that avoid the problems of the triple bottom line approach.  
Three sets of principles-based criteria have been briefly discussed, which have been 
developed to the point where they can be effectively used to assess whether or not a 
proposal or activity is sustainable, according to the particular interpretation of 
sustainability they represent, as demonstrated by George (1999). However, it is 
acknowledged that further trials of the approach in different applications are needed. 
Furthermore, it was acknowledged that the establishment of sustainability criteria is only 
one step in the overall development and implementation of ‘assessment for 
sustainability’ processes. 
Furthermore, ‘assessment for sustainability’ does not replace all applications of EIA-
driven impact assessment or objectives-led processes of decision-making. Rather, it is 
an additional tool that can be effectively applied within a decision-making framework to 
ensure that decisions are in fact sustainable. It can also be used retrospectively as a 
stand-alone process to evaluate existing practices for sustainability. It can and should be 
applied broadly, to both proposed and existing practices, and to all levels of decision-
making. 
The major conclusions drawn are therefore: 
•  Sustainability assessment should assess whether or not an initiative is sustainable, 
and  not  simply  assess  ‘direction  to  target’.  For the  purposes  of  this  paper,  such 
processes have been termed ‘assessment for sustainability’; 
•  ‘Assessment for sustainability’ requires a clear concept of sustainability as a societal 
goal, defined by criteria against which the assessment is conducted;   405 
•  While theoretically a triple bottom line view of sustainability could be used as a 
starting point to develop these criteria, in practice this is unlikely to be successful, 
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